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Introduction: Arche and Archive 
My thesis takes as its problematic speech and silence, and aims to lay out the dual aspect of 
representation as a political project of authority and as an ontological answer to what we are. 
Regarding the former, representative democracy in a certain sense equates politics with self-
legislation. Since, however, the legitimacy of law derives from the autonomy of self-
representation, I will explore in my thesis how politics is linked to an ontological self-
understanding and identity of a people that presumably constitutes the authorising ground of 
the law. The politics of silence studies blind spots of the deliberative democracy models 
centred on speech. It explores how new agendas, identifications, and subjects of the political 
are silenced by the norms of the present. This introduction aims to set out some aspects of the 
thought I engage with, such as Jiirgen Habermas' insights into democracy. It will explore the 
character of norms, the law, speech-acts, and the representation of the people in the context of 
Habermas' philosophy, as well as other thinkers 1 am indebted to, such as Jacques Derrida, 
Gayatri Spivak, Jean-Franijois Lyotard and Jacques Ranciere. 
Habermas envisions a consensus democracy of autonomy that relies on discourse to 
legitimize political decisions by the agreement of all affected. With no socially-transcendent 
grounds of justification, he argues, one can only authorize the constraints imposed by 
government through a process of legislating together with all those present. He therefore 
weaves together the theoretical threads of subjectless speech, action, recognition, authority 
and legitimacy to give an account of the formal process through which popular sovereignty' 
is achieved and practiced in a valid way through an orientation toward rational agreement. 
Although Habermas' main concern is with legitimacy, he expands on legitimacy as a process of autonomous 
self-realization of the people, i.e., popular sovereignty. Indeed he opts for Kant's (and Rousseau's) 
understanding of popular sovereignty as autonomous self-realization of will: "...Rousseau and Kant explained 
autonomy (Selbslgesetzgehung) as unifying practical reason and sovereign will in such a way that the idea of 
human rights and the principle of popular sovereignty would mutually interpret each other" (Habermas, 1994 p. 
10). 
In this Introduction I will provide a preliminary critique of this version of sovereignty 
and an introductory account of what I call 'acts of speech' that constitute the people. While 
the sovereignty of autonomy as 'being subject to the law one makes' is aporetic^ (one is 
neither inside nor outside the applicability of the law), an 'act of speech' in this thesis refers 
to the situation of legislation where ' the people' is subjectified by the utterance of "We are 
the people.' Rosa Parks' insubordination will be my main example where the act (un)makes 
the norm it is (not) subject to by the inventiveness of performativity, and the 'we ' 
discursively subjectified contests the tradition of the past. Therefore, as 1 shall describe it 
here, speech-acts that are (outside) the norm are acts of speech and they open to the future of 
the subject of the act. 
The aporia of (dis)continuity points in the general direction of temporality and in 
order to make sense of historicity underlying acts of speech, I will turn to Derrida's 
understanding of the rule and Spivak's notion of the history of the oppressed. I will argue 
these acts have a futural structure because their ultimate meaning lies in silence and is 
undecidable. Silence implies an act or speech to come, an exposure to what comes next, and 
critical re-working of the history of the situation of discourse that creates zones of 
unspeakability. Engagement with the past of the situation is futural because it derives a new 
norm from the silencing principles of the moment: it explores, identifies and re-iterates the 
norm in order to break with it. In other words, futurity opens to the fiiture of the situation 
through its past, seeking an otherwise moment where silence is filled up with speech. 
Moreover, the act of speech will be suggested to constitute a people of undecidable character 
ambiguously different to its representation, i.e., the archive. The people are not coextensive 
with their representations because, I argue, the act of sovereignty changes and re-articulates 
them. Time inherent in these acts is intelligible on the basis of the change they bring about. 
^ 'Apor ia ' originally meant "no way out," "a logical cul-de-sac," or "a paradoxical conundrum." In my reading 
aporias are paradoxes that only allows for a thinking according to their internal and conflicting logic. They can 
only be resolved or ended in time by action, force, and a violent application of creativity. 
Temporality intrinsic to an act-of-speech for Derrida is characterized by the openness 
to what is to come. All formalized structures are threatened by what they foreclose and 
Habermas' formalized procedure of popular sovereignty cannot give an account of the force 
of the law it tends to exclude. I argue that the people are the force of the law, being (outside) 
the norm as the sovereign. The ' self in the self-rule defers to a future people, always open to 
change and socio-political transformation, but Habermas takes popular sovereignty to be a 
stabilized formal procedure of archived identities and rules that does not provide a source for 
transformation by acts unforeseen by the law. Rosa Parks refused to relinquish her seat to a 
white person on a racially segregated bus. Rosa Parks' forceful subordination, which was a 
speech-act exceeding the formal provisions of the law, however, changed what it means to be 
a people ruling themselves by (un)making the norm. Just like Derrida suggests, hers sought 
the law outside the law, opening politics of her time to a zone of contestation, change and 
futural transformation of the society in general. 
Rosa Parks was a subordinated member of the white-dominant society that excluded 
her from participation in politics in the Habermasian sense. Her subordination sparked the 
Montgomery bus boycott. Montgomery law required black passengers to occupy back rows 
and give their seats to white persons (Levy, 10, 1998). On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, a 
middle aged black seamstress boarded a local bus. After several stops, the bus driver asked 
her to give her seat to a white person. When she refused, the driver called the police and she 
was arrested. "After being booked. Parks called E. D. Nixon, an officer with the all-black 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the local head of the N AACP, with whom she 
worked. Nixon, who had fought for years for gradual racial reforms, quickly bailed Parks out 
of jail. He also asked her if he could her arrest as an opportunity to mount a broader challenge 
against segregation, in particular by calling for a one-day bus boycott" (Ibid.). Later on, 
Martin Luther King was involved and he gave an address. The boycott was extended for a 
year. Finally the Supreme Court ended the segregation on public buses. Although the 
institutional context, the relations with NAACP, the network of civil rights activists and the 
involvement of Martin Luther King Jr. should be taken into account when analysing the 
Montgomery Bus boycott, it was Rosa Parks' individual action that reconstituted the demos 
because it signified popular sovereignty. 
If one interprets Parks' act in light of Spivak's notion of the subaltern, she did not 
take part in the public dialogue in order to speak rationally aiming for agreement. She rather 
acted aporetically, being neither inside nor outside the applicability of the law. She exposed 
the history of the Afro-American people as a constitutional wrong, both exposing their 
situation and dis-identifying with their status as the oppressed. Her discourse could not be 
reconciled with the legal discourse of popular sovereignty, but it caused a paradigm shift in 
sovereignty through a silent act. For Spivak the subaltern do not speak but engage in aporetic 
acts of speech that can be interpreted as revealing the silent history of the oppressed. 1 will 
argue that Habermas' framework of popular sovereignty needs to incorporate the silent acts 
of speech that change the rules of politics and open them to the return of what is foreclosed 
from formal political structure. Reading both Derrida and Spivak together, 1 argue that 
silence is the opening to what is to come, a future democracy where the excluded subjects of 
the political are included when they dissent. Rosa Parks became a political subject through 
the act of speech, exploding and expanding what 1 call the archive of the political. She 
enriched the politically acceptable archive of actions, subjectivities and rules. 
1.1. The Rule: Making and Following the Future 
My interest in the thesis does not lie in a dismissal of the Habermasian framing of 
deliberative democracies based on ideals like equality, the rule-governed due processes of 
justice, and freedom of the people. Although this Introduction is a critical work operating 
within the terms of Habermasian deliberative democratic theory, the following chapters will 
go beyond the scope of Habermas' thought. 1 will start with the most common liberal theory, 
only to critique it and supplement with other accounts that are incommensurable with the 
Habermasian framework. Within the scope of the thesis, I will not go into the question of 
how much the thought of these authors is compatible with each other. What follows instead 
aims to make visible certain blind spots in this institutional structure, possibly caused by 
aporias of democracies I shall explain below, with some insights from agonistic theories of 
democracy. The agonistic democracy models I shall draw on address some of the theoretical 
weaknesses of their solidaristic counterparts; how equality can be achieved in a factually 
inegalitarian society; how the archive, i.e., over-formalized structures of representation and 
recognition, may not take into account some demands of justice (like Rosa Parks' 
insubordination) when they cannot comply with the formal requirements of grievance, or 
worse, are silenced by the power structure of the society; or how dissent, too, should be 
conceived as a part and parcel of what it means to have a democratic dialogue. I shall also 
add to these criticisms, solidaristic theories' over-idealization of the present norms, and 
presentism, as a theoretical bias. 
Agonist theories' chief misgiving is probably that they do not answer the question of 
how dissent can be incorporated into, or reconciled with the formal structure of solidarity, 
agreement, rules, institutions and daily limitations of life. Perhaps the robustness of our 
democracies can be measured by how dissent -which is "costly"- is "handled"; whether by a 
change in the law, culture, or sensibility toward some demands that may not make sense to 
the majority, whether it is taken as a people's democratic response to a wrong that demands 
redressing. My methodology is not eclectic, but revolves around the conceptions of justice in 
each theory synthesized accordingly. The authors 1 engage with have at some points 
irreconcilable views on democracy. It is unimaginable to bring together, say, Habermas' 
understanding of sovereignty with Lyotard's views on authority but the point is to take the 
best from each theory to arrive at a robust democracy free of inequalities, domination. 
particularity, and, violence. A robust democracy can be defined through the attainment of 
ideals such as equality, freedom, maximum participation socio-political life free of violence. 
The "robustness" of a democracy, to be sure, cannot be manifested by anything other than a 
"better" sense of justice to all who demands it. In this sense my methodology combines a 
procedural justice with demands for justice such as Rosa Parks' insubordination. Central to 
the thesis 1 shall suggest here is the idea that both agreement and disagreement are vital to a 
robust democracy. 
Habermasian democracy is centred on agreement but also, 1 will argue, reduces 
speech to a confirmation of the present norms that overlook the world-disclosing 
performativity of 'We are the people.' A speech-act^ is usually taken as an utterance that also 
performs an action and constitutes what it refers to; "This is the law" both states and makes 
the law through its performativity. A speech-act also has "conventions," or rules it has to 
follow in order to successfully perform an action. Rule-making, i.e., legislation, however, is a 
form of grand speech-act that involves, for Habermas, public dialogue of all where the people 
seek to justify their claims (1989a, 151-152). The conditions under which a claim can be 
justified (Habermas, 1998a, 360-370) are truth, truthfulness and rightness. Habermas" starting 
point, therefore, is the primacy of the communicative use of language over and against other 
uses.'' But on my reading, the conditions of justifiability coincide with the rules speech-acts 
need to follow: what can be said is limited by these conditions that put claims to a test of 
universalization.' The undue limitations o f ' w h a t can be said' exclude speech-acts that go 
' For an introduction, see Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 1962, 1-5; Performalive Utterances, 1970, 
233-252; and Performative Constative, 1965, 22-33. Also see, Searle, "What is a Speech Act?," 1965, 231-239, 
and Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, 1998, 56-62; 72-94. 
"This approach begins with three types of idealized speech acts oriented toward mutual understanding 
(constative, expressive, and regulative), their concomitant speaker attitudes (objectivating, expressive, and 
norm-conformative), and their corresponding validity claims (truth, truthfulness, and rightness)." (Lee, 2002, 
408) 
' These conditions are intelligibility, truth, rightness, and sincerity, in a double linguistic structure of 
propositional content and illocutionary force that applies universally regardless of the content (Habermas, 
1998a, 82-85). The illocutionary element is a statement of tacit commitment to the obligations to a hearer, such 
as being sincere, reasonable, and just in providing reasons why the utterance should be valid. In return, the 
beyond and alter these conditions. If all agree on it in principle, it is justified and can be made 
a norm'' but the sovereign people are (outside) the norm. Rational discourse that follows 
rules, in other words, characterizes the process of rule-making, i.e., legislation in 
democracies, and it has its own rules. 
Democratic legislation as a speech-act for Habermas is also defined by self-rule 
interpreted in intersubjective terms, i.e., sovereignty as the all-encompassing rationality of 
self-legislation (2002a, 152-154): In Habermas" framing of sovereignty, "the concept of 
sovereignty remained bound to the notion of an embodiment in the assembled, physically 
present people ... But the " s e l f of the self-organizing legal community here disappears in the 
subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of deliberations in such a way that 
their fallible results enjoy the presumption of rationality" (1994, 9-10). Sovereignty implies 
authority and "this authority emerges from the citizens" power produced communicatively in 
the praxis of self-legislation" (1994, 2) where the people, following the rules of speech-acts, 
make the rules they follow, and, in this process of self-rule, constitute themselves as the 
sovereign. To the extent that a speech-act constitutes what it refers to, legislation is the 
speech-act that constitutes the people. When unrecognized groups with justifiable claims 
make a demand to be included into the people, the speech-act turns into a negotiation; to 
speak, for Habermas, is also to seek agreement with a diverse socio-political identity that 
demands recognition and inclusion (1993a, 130), and thus anyone in the dialogue hopes to 
hearer agrees to engage in a dialogue. Locutionary content on the other hand refers to objects and relations 
amongst them in the world interpreted through a certain framework. "In raising claims to validity, speakers and 
hearers transcend the provincial standards of a merely particular community of interpreters and their 
spatiotemporally localized communicative practice" (Habermas, 1993, 52). Ideally, validity claims are 
justifiable only if they are utterances with prepositional content a) the existential presuppositions of which are 
satisfied universally (Habermas, 1979, 2-5) and b) that yield a belief that guarantees successful action and 
practical certainty (Habermas, 1998a, 364). 
The principle of universalisability and that of discourse ethics, when taken together, indicate a salient affinity 
to the Categorical Imperative: The norms in a pluralist society cannot be deemed legitimate "[u]nless all 
affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial 
norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual" (Habermas, 1990a, 93; 
emphases original) and "only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of 
all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse" (Wid.). 
finally identify those who 'live differently' and integrate the new life form into the catalogue 
of acceptable identities that can be acted out in the lifeworld (Ibid.). The speech-act that is the 
people, I argue, constitutes an archive of representation, one that serves as the present limit to 
the future and that distributes what can be said by anyone among 'us'—the norms.' 
In the next section I will first introduce the situation of discourse that is co-extensive 
with legislation for Habermas. However, I will argue that rule-making is predicated on rule-
following, and hence paradoxical, groundless and unjustified. Here 1 will also formulate acts 
of speech that aporetically (un)make the norms they are subject to, illustrating my points with 
Rosa Parks' civil disobedience. 
I. 1.1 Rule and Time 
Discourse aims at agreement of all and the rule agreed on by all states what can (not) be done 
and said. Making the rule by public discourse has its own rules as it takes the form of a 
speech-act (Austin, 1962, 1-2) that precedes, enables and limits other speech-acts 
characterized by the act of following the rule. Early Habermas names this procedure The 
Ideal Speech Situation and the key to effective working of this procedure of just i f ication is 
homogeneity. Wittgenstein reminds us that the "use of the word "agreement" and the world 
"rule" are related to one another... [and the] use of the word "rule" and the use of the word 
"same" are interwoven."® Where there is no sameness, democratic discourse is defined by 
plurality, heterogeneity, and possible disagreement as a rule. 
When the norm is wrong,' the people suffer its violence, either turning a blind eye to 
the unliveable conditions it forms, or finding themselves in a "situation" of discord, 
disagreement, and negotiation. In my thesis 1 pursue the traces of this situation lived by the 
' I define norms as the socio-politically or legally enforced framework of what is a proper, acceptable thing for a 
subject to feel, think, say and do. They certainly incorporate the positive law but also involve unwritten rules 
and principles of social life enacted by socio-political pressures of all forms. 
' Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 224, 86°. 
' When the limitation put in place by the norm is undue, unequal, biased, violent, authoritarian, the norm can be 
said to be wrong; in fact any norm that sets an unequal power relation in life is unjust and wrong. 
people as theorized by Habermas' shift from Kantian regulative "Ideas," to idealized 
presuppositions of communicative action in a totality of the systems of communication. He 
offers an account of The Ideal Speech Situation as a power- and violence-free situation of 
uninhibited freedom, universality, and rationality. Although his account is derived from the 
ideal Kant suggests, he re-formulates it in terms of actual socio-political practices and 
institutions. His formulation is based on how "the transcendental tension between the ideal 
and the real, between the realm of the intelligible and the realm of appearances, enters into 
the social reality of situated interactions and institutions" (2003, 84). 1 argue that this 
"situating" of the ideal justificatory process of rule-making within the actual public sphere is 
re-oriented toward speech-acts and de-centralizes "the subject" impossible to totalize as a 
homogenous, monolithic "people" living behind what Rawls calls "the veil of ignorance."'" 
Indeed it is through an investigation of democracies" relation to what is behind the veil, i.e., 
identities, violence, sensibility, and situatedness in a lifeworld of appearances that 1 shall 
critique the rule with a view to its temporality. 
The rule can be defined as the (un)justifiable "must" of a political order, but the 
"necessity of this 'must" has a Wittgensteinian rather than a Kantian sense," (Habermas, 
2003, 86). Habermas borrows from Wittgenstein sense of normativity of learned, rule-
governed, and conditioned life, a shared life conditioned by appearances, forms of perception, 
ways of seeing, hearing, responding, thinking, talking, and acting always already in place and 
enforced by this necessity. In replacing the transcendental conditions with the life-worldly 
ones, Habermas lists the Kantian "cosmological idea" of "All" as the analogy to a common 
objective world presupposed in communicative action; the "idea of freedom," which is 
spontaneity of self-legislation in Kant, as rationality, the "totalizing movement" as 
unconditionality of claims, and finally "Pure Reason" itself as the inter-subjective realm 
Rawls places the parties to the dialogue under a theoretical constmction that deprives them of knowledge of 
their identities and other specifics of the situation that would advantage or disadvantage them; see Rawls ' A 
Theory of Justice, 1971, 16-18. 
(Habermas, 2003, 87). The idea of "All" for Kant has a dual role; epistemologically, it 
signifies the (im)possibility of totality of possible objects, and politically, it gestures toward 
the horizontal telos of a possible Realm of Ends where all human beings must take part in 
legislation. ' ' Here it is re-conceived by Habermas as a public sphere and a procedure that 
filter out violence and provides the space to justify rationally acceptable claims. Given that 
"the transcendental subject loses its position outside time and space and is transformed into a 
multitude of subjects capable of speech and action" (2003, 88) situating rule-making in a 
subjectless public discourse where claims and demands are made, Habermas further 
explains,'^ implies that the law becomes the contingent, groundless and unjustifiable 
discursive horizon of the rationally acceptable. Not only the law, but also the norms of 
legislation are subject to the test of justification, and the people are the only yardstick of 
justifiability that they have. " The law regulates the future actions and thus becomes a 
regulative ideal of the future. That is why, futurity, i.e., the temporal horizon of the people is 
also the site of negotiation of the law. 
In this section I aimed to produce a charitable reading of Habermas. Habermas admits 
that the interpretative gap between justification and rational acceptability "cannot be closed 
definitively within discourse" (2003, 92), opening the people to the horizon menfioned above. 
Therefore, "[a]s soon as we act out of "respect for the law" or "with an orientation to 
reaching mutual understanding," (2003, 97) he contends, we could proceed as if we can agree 
" See Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Chapter II where "[w]e are indeed legislating members 
of a kingdom of morals possible through fi-eedom and presented to us by practical reason for our respect" (1993, 
83). 
The implications of'situatedness' are thus (a) internalizing transcendental idealism, (b) making the concept of 
truth a regulative idea (justifiability rather than correspondence to reality) and finally, (c) contextualization of 
reference (mainly addressing by naming) in the lifeworld. Yet one may also argue that the "reality" as opened 
up by prepositional truth is divorced by Habermas from the noumenal world, which is the Kantian "ground" of 
law, and he begs the question of justification by presuming "a practice that copes with reality" (90, 2003) as 
opposed to mere appearances to elucidate the success of speech-act, which is none other than practice. 
" That general will can always err of course indicates the idea of reason is distinct from the people. 
Nevertheless even if reason is irreducible to the people, its fallibility also shows it to be grounded in people 
alone. Subjecting norms to the test of rightness/wrongness is always performed by people with no external 
criterion. 
on the law, for the declaration of the law is a performative act of speech. In other words, we 
act as // the law is justified, but the universalizing movement remains the gesture of as-if; we 
speak as //it is founded by the speech-act that constitutes what it refers to but there is always 
a reference and opening to the future. The foundation of the law turns into a horizon of the 
people constituting themselves in time. In the next section I shall critique Habermas' 
framework of justification which I argue tends to reduce openness to the future to a rule-
following. 
1.1.2. Opening to the Future: A Derridean Critique 
In my reading developed in the first and second chapters, I shall argue that Habermas' model 
tends to be monistic, conservative, linguistically reductionist and ontologically inadequate as 
his theory does not take into consideration the constitution of the people by the law of the 
past and their opening to the future. His theory has been challenged for its uncritical 
commitment to liberal notions, such as a unitary common will and consensus; its conformism 
to existing political structures, limitation to the present democracy and its misleading 
preoccupation with justification and authority (Morris, 2001; Shabani, 2003). Similar 
criticism has also often portrayed him as a "safe democratic reformist" (Matustik, 2001, 281). 
His Ideal Speech Situation, too, is criticised; "As always, Habermas' account "screens out the 
psychodynamics of the situation" (Whitebook, 1995, 194) of speech. And his idea of a 
political community as monist (Eraser, 1996, 122) is evidenced by the degree of homogeneity 
in the lifeworld that sustains an ethical relatedness of solidarity. 
In my thesis I agree with Habermas that the law remains an idea regulative of the 
future—not a justified norm grounded in factuality, but a precarious, self-referential speech-
act. I will therefore object to what I read as Habermas" reduction of the political to 
agreement-oriented speech-acts, and the situation of discourse to the present. Disagreement 
with the law, disruption of the norm, ethical civil disobedience, and conscientious objection 
have always been a part and parcel of the political situation and should be so. The acts of 
dissent in fact coincide with the procedure of universalization. As I will argue, they articulate 
what is not recognized at the present and refer to a future where the unrecognized will have 
been addressed and included. In chapter six, 1 will argue that demand for recognition in 
general refers to a future constitution of the society where the excluded will have been 
included as an equal part of the community. To be fair, Habermas agrees with a version of 
dissent that demands recognition; if disagreement with an unjust norm is in line with 
constitutional principles, it is "tolerated" as a part of the rational correctability of norms. 
However, I will raise some questions regarding the insurmountable discursive gap 
between justification as rational acceptability and other forms of taking part in legislation 
broadly conceived as the living way in which we suffer, contest, refuse, re-instate, change, 
make and unmake the rule. When the norm is suffered as a wrong, we do not seek 
justification or others' consent: Rosa Parks simply acted as if the norm was otherwise, and 
unmade the law in her disagreement without justification. In the third chapter I will argue that 
the law is ultimately unjustifiable, and the speech-act constituting it is and ought to remain 
open to further, subversive performativity of the people that may have to disagree with the 
norm. My main example will be taken from the American Civil Rights Movement where 
Rosa Parks changed what it means to be a part of All, by bringing an "ought" in stark 
opposition to the "must" of her present situation - one that did not find her spontaneous self-
legislation rationally acceptable. From the view point of our present, one can argue that her 
refusal to move from her seat went a long way to universalize the rule, making Afro-
American citizens a visible part of the future political world disclosed by her act. Rosa Parks 
didn't say anything that can be understood as a speech act in the traditional sense of the term. 
However, the speech act was formulated by a simple 'NO! ' : although she didn't elaborate, it 
meant "No, I am an equal member of the society!" But she did so by remaining silent. In the 
terms I develop here, however, this gesture cannot be adequately captured by a Habermasian 
frame. For Rosa Vaxkes, forcefully made what was not present in the situation of discourse 
(i.e., Afro-American people) a recognized part of pohtics of all; she expanded and re-
constituted the people by the futurity of her act. Accordingly 1 will argue that the people are 
not the ground but force of the law. She in fact seems to have acted as if she had always 
already been the law-giver; her act did not so much follow the rule as spoke louder than 
words}' 
I shall argue that staging belonging, to say or act like 'we are the people,' -
representing one as one of the people- is the most basic and queer'^ political speech-act that 
eschews all demands for validity, agreement and normativity. It predicates authority on 
authorship without a specific author, and although it is subjectless, it subjectifies by making 
possible being-otherwise. Hence 1 argue that it is an act of speech to be heard and responded 
to as one of the people that one will have been legally, culturally, and ethically. The authors 1 
shall turn to interpret acts of speech in different terms. More will be said the coming chapters: 
Lyotard takes them to be phrases of the differend that respond to the past. Ranciere conceives 
similar acts of disagreement as a contestation over what it means to speak, be rational, and be 
a part of the political world where one formerly did not count as one. And for Butler these 
acts of speech occasion a re-articulation of the social bond toward equality, destabilization of 
identities, and a change in the power structure of the "we" no longer unitary and "closed." 
Another intention in the following thesis is to supplement the speech-act theory 
developed by Austin, Searle, Habermas and Derrida with a study oi acts of speech in a 
political context. My thesis owes a great deal of its substance to an encounter among Derrida, 
What she said is irrelevant because it was a simple 'No! ' , i assume the meaning of her act of speech was the 
silent action of refusal. Silence here is an act of speech because it is meaningful. 
" There will be much on "Queer" theory below. Queer theory is a field of interpretation emerged in the late 
1980s , challenging the idea that gender is an integral part of the essential self The socio-politically constructed 
nature of gender and sexual acts and identities form the basic claim of the theory. In my thesis, queer also 
implies that the meaning of an act or identity is socio-politically constructed, always partial, and conflictual. 
Habermas, Foucault and Spivak, although of these great thinkers only Habermas will be 
critiqued here. Acts of speech and the temporality of the political are two subject-matters 
pivotal to my investigation. To contrast my framework with that of Habermas, Derrida 
provides my thesis with the understanding that all structures, contexts, and institutions 
(contexts of speech-acts, democratic institutions, and the fabric of our lives) are characterized 
by a "non-closure" (Derrida, 2001, 13) of, to name a few, speech, action, identity, meaning, 
space and time. The openness of all formal edifices, which remain out of joint and 
incomplete, can of course be seen as a weakness, an inability to totalize and insulate the 
structure against what it aims to keep out—wager, risk, contamination, impurity, uncertainty, 
conflict, violence and the like. However unattainable stability and closure also indicate a 
chance to better those structures, responsibility to avoid their total destruction, and an ethical 
opening to an otherwise future {Ibid.) where what/whom is foreclosed can be let in peaceflilly 
and transformed. I argue that Rosa Parks made use of a similar opening of the formal 
structure of the law to what is to come at the moment of dissent; she forcefully entered the 
legal sphere and started a venerable civil rights movement.'^ If this is the weakness of the 
gesture that structures and gains affinity to what it aims to foreclose, this can also be 
conceived as a strength of the structure that ought to remain open to what is to come. 1 argue 
that the gap between justifiability and justice, between the political and the ethical, and 
between the structure and the totalizing movement is futural. 
As for the rule, Derrida identifies it as an aporia; it all harks back to the undecidable 
force underlying and heterogenizing it, constantly wavering between might and right, 
justification and violence (i.e., the unjustified): "Violence is not exterior to the order of the 
law. It threatens law within law" (Derrida, 2002, 268) when it is enforced. Unjustifiability 
forms the context of the constitutive speech-act that legislation is. Within the context of 
" Of course there were other women who refused to give their seats before and after Parks: Rosa Parks' action 
was not singular, or historically unintelligible on the basis of institutional context of the Civil Rights Movement. 
It was rather that the meaning of her action was contested. 
speech-acts, the rule that makes a speech-act successful in Austin's terms cannot be 
successfully identified independent from the context (i.e., "situation") in which it is 
performed because all speech-acts are subject to a re-iteration that calls into question the 
enforced closure of the rule's interpretation (Derrida, 1982, 310). The situation of the speech-
act is not limited to what/whom is present, present acts and words but also has a history that 
leaves a trace on the present, that history which constitutes the authorizing force behind the 
speech-act can be possibly cited, quoted, re-interpreted, which means it also has a possible 
future that, although unexpected by its past, communicates this force. ' T o communicate, in 
the case of the performative," he concludes ".. . would be to communicate a force by the 
impetus of a mark" (Ibid., 321) that turns a possibility into an event. 
In the reading 1 develop here, to re-iterate a speech-act, or to re-communicate its force 
is to re-present the present situation as a spatio-temporality both open to the past and the 
future of the context. In other words, as Spivak elaborates, "[d]istinguishing clearly between 
possibility [that performatives can be cited] and eventuality [that such possible events— 
citations, 'unhappiness'—do indeed happen], Derrida suggests that the protection and 
definition of a standard or norm which is obligatory to all ethico-political institutions is 
carried out by Austin's creation of a "theoretical fiction"—the logically prior norm or 
standard—'that excludes this eventuality in order to purify his analysis. '"" When the context 
is theoretically (and one might add. violently) "closed." force is endured as a deadly rule that 
denies its own past and future, remaining recalcitrant to re-presentation and change. But 
paradoxically a force enforceable but not in force has no force, cannot be justified but by its 
self-authorization: if it cannot have a past, neither can it have a future, and the speech-act 
does not happen (it becomes neither possible nor an event). If it does have a past (a beginning 
unexplained by its force) which remains outside the situation of the present speech-act, it 
" Spivak Gayatri, "Revolutions That As Yet Have No Model." 78, in The Spivak Reader, ed. Lendry & 
Maclean, Routledge, New York, 1996. 
means the context is not closed. It is for this reason that "Austin had to free the analysis of the 
performative from the authority of the value of truth, from the opposition true/false, at least in 
its classical form, occasionally substituting for it the value of force, of difference of force 
(illocutionary or perlocutionary force)" (Derrida, 1982, 322). 
My thesis thus revolves around/orce in its aporetic character, in terms 1 have 
borrowed from Derrida's discussion of the norm in Mystical Foundation of Authority (2002) 
but 1 do not aim to solve or presume away the relevant aporias of temporality intrinsic to the 
norm that opens it to re-interpretation. 1 argue that it is precisely because the 'beginning' (i.e., 
making of a principle) is not accountable by the principle that we can keep re-iterating it in 
and through language, but not necessarily always in speech. Rosa Parks' subordination is not 
performed in speech: it was the meaning of her action that disrupted the politics of her time. 
In the next section 1 will turn to Spivak's reading of widow self-immolations that silently 
perform the aporia of autonomy. 
1.1.3. Rule and History: Speech and Silence 
Another resource my thesis draws on, Spivak's Can the Subaltern Speak? (1988), tackles the 
question of how re-iteration can be performed in and outside speech and so must be 
conceived as representation in its double sense (of signifying and of speaking for). Indeed, if 
as Derrida suggests, "[r]epresentation regularly supplements presence," (Derrida, 1982, 313), 
and is predicated on force, Spivak asks whether this centriftjgal force also creates and is 
expressed by a silenced centre that by virtue of historical power relations lies on the 
periphery, if not totally 'absent" in the situation. She raises the question of whether the 
production of history and representative structures, i.e., the presumed "origin" of the present 
situation, has left the subaltern a chance to tap on this force/power. She suggests that the 
history of the oppressed is concealed by intellectual attempts to represent the subaltern in 
their "truth," as well as an abstention to representation on the grounds that no signification or 
principle can do their silence justice (1988, 285). If they are not seen or heard as present in 
the situation, if their voice does not have the 'force,' if they cannot represent themselves as a 
part of the situation, can the subaltern speak? Can they be signified, spoken for, and 
represented within the history of All without denying them the autonomy to do so? 
Spivak argues that their history, and the history of the structure that oppresses them, 
can be approached from the itinerary of what cannot be said, measuring silences, making 
visible what has hitherto had no relevance to the discipline of history, with a change of level 
in the "study" of the subaltern. Historicizing their absence in the totalizing structure allows us 
to "encounter" them; and "[t]o confront them is not to represent (vertreten) them but to learn 
to represent (darstellen) ourselves" (288-89). This encounter as I argue in my thesis is the 
situation of discourse; but what is confronted is their invisibility and what is heard is their 
silence. In making visible the aporias of autonomy, force, and speech within the context of 
widow-sacrifice in India, Spivak represents the subaltern, coloured, Indian women 
representing themselves through what I shall name acts of speech (297-298). 
The self-immolation of widows as Spivak interprets it is a signifying event of what 
Lyotard terms the differend;'' as an action, it sa^s something and is in the order o{"sruti 
(what is heard)" but it is not decidable whether it is heard as discourse (299). Acts of speech 
are aporetic because they rely on silence. Widow-sacrifice for Spivak performs the aporia of 
autonomy." For the male subject, the felicity conditions of the act of speech are paradoxical: 
"it is the felicity of the suicide, a felicity that will annul rather than establish its status as such, 
that is noted" (300), whereas for the female performer of the act it "brings praise for the act 
of choice on another register" (Ibid.)-, she becomes autonomous in rejection of autonomy. For 
the colonial white it was a grotesque crime against humanity, which, when not performed. 
"The differend implies "the inaccessibility of, or untranslatability from, one mode of di.scourse in a dispute to 
another" (300) as Spivak defines it. Spivak's discourse cannot be taken as a plea for suicide, or celebration of 
violence but as a representation of the subaltern women subjectified by demands on and interpretation of the 
rite. 
" Autonomy is aporetic because the self is (outside) the law it gives itself 
signified "real choice." But choice here, implying autonomy, rule of the self, is paradoxically 
enmeshed in nonchoice, a lack of choice as it annuls Wself, or rdXh^r finds its expression in 
others' choices. And what is (not) said is (not) heard precisely through this undecidable 
character of the act of speech that says something the mute women can(not) say and others 
can(not) hear when it meets its felicity conditions, i.e., becomes "successful." The 
paradoxical representation of self-rule in self-immolation was outlawed in 1829. "When the 
law was finally written, the history of the long period of collaboration [of autonomy and 
heteronomy] was effaced" (301). However, because the widow identifies with her husband in 
the act of self-immolation and gives her autonomy, choice, body and life over to him, her 
status as the object of a man remains enforced even when she chooses not to sacrifice herself 
(Ibid.). In my reading, the widow's act of speech brings together autonomy and heteronomy 
in a signifying event. As opposed to the Habermasian understanding of autonomy, it is 
(un)making the rule in the self-rule, and revealing the self as heteronym. One becomes 
submissively autonomous and an other to oneself 
I borrow from Spivak both the idea of the dual operations of representation and that of 
the aporetic character of acts of speech. One of the key ideas informing my thesis is that acts 
of speech cannot be reduced to the mirror image of speech-acts just because their locutionary 
force is analysable in the same terms as speech-acts; rather, an act of speech signifies the 
emergence of a speech-act, its excessive character, and its first instance and 
institutionalization.^" Remaining in one's seat when asked to give it to a white person is a 
signifying act. Habermas discusses signifying acts under the category of "nonlinguistic 
actions" (1998a, 59) which are incomprehensible unless their propositional and normative 
content had already been made known to others; thus their institutionalized past matters. In 
Rosa Parks' civil disobedience instances an act of speech through its singular emergence: it was 
institutionalized only after the Civil Rights Movement succeeded, but at the moment it was performed for the 
first time, it exceeded the political-legal framework of her time. The act itself was singular: otherwise there were 
other black women who refused to give their seats. 
Rosa Park's case, her act would be unintelligible without the Civil Rights Movement 's past. 
Yet if signalling a taxi has its widely-known conventions, silence, on the other hand, does 
not. Its meaning is undecidable. Although Habermas prioritizes the verifiable and verbal 
content of signification, I argue that the locutionary force/effect of an act of speech takes 
priority in an address.^' For him, "[i]n short, propositionally differentiated speech leaves the 
actor more degrees of freedom in relation to a recognized normative background than does a 
non-linguistic interaction" (Ibid.) but I argue that the main act of speech of the political is 
both constitutive of the norms and representative of the situation where fi-eedom/sovereignty 
are enmeshed in unfi-eedom/submission. 
If, as Spivak argues, the subaltern is silenced by the asymmetrical power structure of 
the situation, then we need a model of ethical representation—not representation by the 
rational discourse of universal language that conceals inequalities, violence and aporias, but, 
as Butler puts it, ''that vocalization of agony that is not yet language or no longer language" 
(Butler, 2004b, 139). Butler's later concerns about "addressing" in an ethical response what is 
not addressable in scientific, legal or universalized language, put under critical scrutiny "the 
domain of representation where humanization and dehumanization occur ceaselessly" (Ibid., 
140). She engages with the (mis-)representation of what is paradigmatically human, viz., the 
face in Levinas and concludes that "the human is indirectly affirmed in that very disjunction 
that makes representation impossible, and this disjunction is conveyed in the impossible 
representation" (Ibid., 144). Likewise, the face of the subaltern is not erased by any 
representational practice but remains to witness the failure and to present this (im)possibility 
of representation. 
He suggests that "[tlhe non-verbal utterance itself cannot bring the prepositional content of the presupposed 
norm to expression because it cannot take on representational functions" (1998a, 59)^' but he seems to overlook 
the bodily performativity, the fact that one 's presence, action, gesture and performance of oneself as the subject 
of the act can always take on a representational function even in silence. 
That some signification is at work in both speech-acts and acts of speech, and that 
what is signified can be expressed in propositions, should be granted as truisms. However, an 
act of speech, I shall argue, can be performed without propositions and represents a silent 
presence nevertheless acting, addressing us to the situation and reasons of its/his/her silence. 
Merleau-Ponty conceives silence as the window surrounding discourse that discloses 
meaning (1973, 45-46), but in order to express meaning, we need to give up the silence that 
reveals it to us. Silence as a topological metaphor appears as a boundary, a law that can turn 
into the sayable only by suspending its (im)possibility conditions—that is, by expressing the 
socio-political significance of the act in discourse and registering the normative shift in 
meaning. In other words, the subject of Rosa Parks' act is re-signified when its success 
conditions were satisfied (when Afro-American citizens were treated equally).Silence can 
also shed some light on the way the sayable and why one forced to remain silent, or why 
certain subjects cannot take part in public discourse—and later in this vein 1 shall turn to 
Ranciere's characterization of democracy as "a way of keeping the people present in their 
absence" (1995, 93). We may also investigate how certain acts aim to voice in silence what 
cannot be said due to socio-political limitations on the sayable, as Butler has argued (Butler, 
2004, xvii). The sayable is organized in the political space as a limitation that works from 
within (as an inner split within the public discourse, as a foreclosure of certain words, 
propositions, speeches and act). The idea of the 'sayable" also thematizes how discourse 
creates myths, fantasies that sustain themselves by limits, prohibitions, and reassurances. 1 
treat silence here as an expression of the anxiety of facing radical difference, the aporetic 
moment of our attempts to representation of that which thwarts representation. The 
distinctive character of acts of speech in juxtaposition with speech-acts, however, will be an 
ongoing theme of the following thesis when considered within the implications of the broader 
issues of (un)justifiability (i.e., violence/non-violence), sensibility (rationality/irrationality. 
understanding, perception, seeing, hearing) and "situation" (of discourse, of limits, of 
democracies, of the socio-ethico-poHtical world). 
Acts of speech seem unique in that they (un)make the rules they do (not) follow. If 
speech-acts" success depends upon some codifiable "conventions" as Austin suggests, acts of 
speech are unconventional, they rather disagree with the rule they universalize without 
endorsing, or suggesting another one. If Rosa Parks could be seen as having disagreed with 
the (defective) norm of equality of her present, she certainly did so by vindicating the 
(universalized) norm of equality of our present. She in fact disclosed the norm to be in the 
wrong although from the view point of her present's conventions, she was wrong. Acts of 
speech are thus disclosing; Rosa Parks' act disclosed an emergent subject following an 
emergent rule of an emergent political world; it was then disclosed to be enmeshed in a 
wrong which was then disclosed silently by an act that continues to disclose its meaning in 
time. Rosa Parks' act subjectified her as a part of the political world of which she formerly 
had not counted as a part formally. Acts of speech are aporetic: they are (not) rule-governed. 
Acts of speech are also poetic: they engage in poesis, creation, making (of a subject, 
of a people, of a rule, of a world). Those who perform the act also perform themselves as 
subjects of the political, as an unforeseen part of a collectivity, a "we" that comes into being 
when Rosa Parks, say, sang the famous hymn "We shall overcome." If there was an "us' 
articulated and embodied by those engaging the rule of racial segregation at Rosa Parks' 
time, it seemed like a literary self-creation, revealing itself only in and through the utterance 
of the act of speech when people acted and spoke in order to become the 'we' in the song. 
Although all acts of speech are also speech-acts that they will have been if successful (not 
vice versa), they are originary without an origin, precarious, risky, creative, and undecidably 
different to speech-acts (which presume the rule that precedes them). The 'us ' in "We shall 
overcome" is predicated on tiie overcoming, which would have always already articulated the 
people that possibly will have overcome. 
Thus there is a history and a future to the norm, the people, and their representations. 
The solidaristic^^ understanding of politics seems to take 'the people' -which is a subversive 
act of speech - to be an ossified, ahistorica! representation without inner ruptures. Agonistic 
democracy theories, such Lyotard's, Ranciere's, or Butler's as we shall see in the following 
chapters, capture the futural performativity of the act of speech but do not offer a clue how to 
reconcile it with the 'timeless' representation, or place it as a part of the democratic 
representative structure. In the next section 1 will explore what Habermas has to offer as the 
representation of the 'we.' The 'we' in his thought is the sovereign people making the rule by 
following the rule in ahistorical terms. Habermas does not take into consideration the 
emergence of the speech-act - "We are the people!" - and the people's act for him has no 
reference to the future either. 
1.2. The Archive: We are the Sovereign 
For Habermas democracy revolves around rational agreement, solidarity and good 
argument. The 'we' for Habermas is a Generalized Other that speaks the voice of the law, a 
subjectless address that coordinates action (1987b, 37-40). The 'we' is underpinned by a set 
of culturally shared practices, semantic or actual relations, and recognized identities in a 
democratic society; it is institutionalized by these practices and relations of autonomy as 'the 
sovereign people' which is a normatively limited representation of the 'self of the self-rule 
(i.e., sovereignty). Democratic governmental authority, he asserts, "proceeds from the 
communicative power generated by the citizens' practice of self-legislation" (2002a, 152). 
Taking the best out of the two theories and combining them in his account of legitimacy. 
By 'solidaristic, ' 1 mean agreement-oriented theories that emphasize procedural justice and legislation, 
dialogue, and understanding. 
Habermas concurs with the repubhcan view that democracy is justified by the discursive 
process of self-government, though, as in the hberal view, with formal restrictions operative 
on it (152-154). Sovereignty for Habermas is the discursive practice of autonomy within 
institutional limits. However, he distances his account from both paradigms of sovereignty, 
carefully placing it as a conjunction of them in the field of communicative actions theory. To 
summarize Habermas' argument that democracy and the rule of law mutually imply one 
another, one could say that self-rule is equated with the rule of law in the practices and 
relations of sovereignty (Habermas, 2002a, 152). In the next section I will argue that 
collective self-rule is exercised when the people transcend their private selves and act as if 
they form a Generalized Other, that is, the rule of law. Tracing his framing of the notion of 
'sovereignty' will allow me to propose that the sovereignty of the people is reduced by him to 
agreement with the present law. In other words, he suggests that the people follow the rule 
that constitute them, without offering any theoretical resources for the discontinuous and 
futural transformation of the norm or the people. For him 'the people" is a futureless and 
pastless representation. 
1.2.1. Archive: the sovereign 'we' and its norms 
My thesis takes as central the criticism advanced by Honig that Habermas casts the 
paradox of politics mistakenly as a process of authorization/justification by agreement (i.e., 
sovereignty), ignoring the paradox of normativity: the people is not only a constitutive but 
also a constituted power. Also the people historically emerged, acted and became socio-
politically present before speech legitimized the emergence by a representation within 
democracies. The people were the ground of the very law they violated to ground it and 
located their authority in an emergent political world they authored to constitute themselves. 
In my thesis 1 shall investigate the temporal interplay between the people and norms to argue 
that 'the people" has always been defined by what-is-to-come and still are, which implies, 
ontologically, people are not the ground, but the temporal force of (he law that may help live 
through the aporias 1 shall outline in the next chapter. Theories that start with the unexplained 
concept of the sovereign people as the ground of democracies overlook the aporias of 
temporality and power inherent in them, reducing the people to an archive of identities and 
justificatory relations between people who embody these identities. Habermas proposes to 
divorce the political application of speech from its ontological underbelly, viz., the 
philosophy of the subject, and locate the legitimate ground of autonomy in ideal 
communication: "If the idea of popular sovereignty is to find realistic application ... it must 
be severed irom a concrete interpretation of a body of present, participating, and mutually 
consenting members of a collective" and reconstructed as a "subjectless ... forms of 
communication" (1990. 43). However 1 argue that, he fails to make theoretical distinctions 
amongst the self (the 'we'), the subject ('the people') and the collective identity ('the 
nation'); because these notions pertain to the lifeworld that is for him strictly isolated from 
the public sphere, public discourse does not represent either.^' However, as I argue, the 
demarcation line between the two spheres is contestable and undecidable, and all categories 
of representation seep back into the public discourse.^'* 
Although later Habermas revised almost all assumptions regarding the public sphere 
as the power-free space of debate, argumentation and opinion open to all, a cultural way of 
" Although 'the people" legislates publicly and asks for justification by public norms, 'the people ' is bom 
outside the public structures of discursive politics, historically in an unidentifiable mob that set the norms of the 
political. The historical conditions under which "We are the people" is uttered destabilizes the liberal 
democratic distinction between the political and the non-political: the discursive creation of the French 
Revolution was the unruly speech-act that ' the people' still is. And it was invented by a mob that eschewed the 
limits to the political, in a sphere quite different to the Habermasian public; dissent, resistance, barricaded 
streets, trenches, the whole city. 
" Benhabib, re-interpreting the Habermasian public sphere, maintains that "there may be as many publics as 
there are controversial general debates about the validity of norms" of publicity (1996, 87), since distinctions 
between the public and the private remain contestable. If one should disabuse oneself of the idea of an 
indisputable public, on the other hand, the private, formerly excluded f rom the rightful terrain of the political, is 
entrenched back in the public discourse. 
living continues to underpin the possibility of agreement in his theory as "every requirement 
of universalization must remain powerless unless there also arises, from membership in an 
ideal communication community, a consciousness of irrecoverable solidarity, the certainty of 
intimate relatedness in a shared life context" (1990c, 48). I will question whether he denies 
anything that may interfere with the pragmatic representation of speech, the opacity of 
phantasmic constitution of the people by speech-acts, and aporias of democracies; firstly, 
how do we represent the present 'we, the people' as it were an archived, stable, sovereign 
subject of speech? What might be the aporias of sovereignty in a lived situation of speech 
structured by violence, domination, and injustice as opposed to solidarity? The intimate 
relatedness of the people in my reading has two implications: their situatedness in a shared 
life where unjustified and unjust relations too is a fact, and secondly, an archive of relations 
inherited from the past subjectifies us, a way of thinking, acting, speaking normatively 
allotted to each subject of the political. In the next section I shall introduce a central notion of 
my thesis, 'the archive,' both as a set of regulated relations within the people that makes us 
what "we' are, and a set of representations that constitutes the recognized identities making 
up the 'we.' 
Archived relations make us what we are: they constitute subjects. I shall argue that on 
the collective level subjectification serves to buttress a desire of sovereignty. The subject has 
been traditionally placed within conditions of action, and although dialogue and rational 
persuasion demands submission, action requires mastery of the self over others, i.e., what I 
call "sovereignty." In my thesis I shall also provide a critique oisovereignty which can be 
understood in several senses; the absolute self-rule of, say, an emperor; the will of the ftilly 
rational subject of decisionism; a self-enclosed mechanism/procedure of calculation resistant 
to changes and reforms; and finally, majority vote as in Rousseau's general will." Arendt, for 
See my discussion in the second chapter. 
instance defines sovereignty in the following terms: "root of the sovereignty is the will: 
Sovereign is who wills and commands" (1968a, 296). Commanding is traditionally seen as 
the privilege of the sovereign whose all demands are met. Ability to decide on a course of 
action by sheer calculation of harms and benefits, too, is generally associated with the 
sovereignty of the subject. Schmitt in his Political Theology places the sovereign aporetically 
both inside and outside the applicability of the norm, as the one who decides on the 
suspension of the norm: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception" (1985, 5). For 
Habermas the people are the sovereign; and liberal deliberative democracies are grounded in 
the political authority granted by the people's presence in the law-making process. The rule 
of law is equated to sovereignty, i.e., self-rule that constitutes the legitimizing ground of 
norms, though here the sovereign is understood in and through plurality, not as an atomic 
individual/mechanism of calculation, decision, speech, and action. 
The theoretical shift fi'om the subject-oriented understanding of sovereignty to a 
subjectless rational procedure of decision, however, only complicates the question of how the 
people addressing themselves as the sovereign can submit to themselves if the situation of 
address involves injustice and violence. I shall argue that Habermas overlooks the fact that 
the people's presence and self need to be constituted to be agreeable and represented via 
speech that makes them recognizable by the law. The law authorizes the people to speak but 
constitutes and recognizes only those who agree with it for the sake of sovereignty. A theory 
of robust democracy taking into account the lived situation of address must be attentive to the 
conflictual, agonistic and power-infused constitution of the people as a differential plurality 
that is not only split within multiple times, but also changes and re-emerges differently every 
time it is represented. In other words, disagreement and deferral of sovereignty to a plurality 
intrinsic to the people in a situation of conflict must be taken into account in democracy 
theories. 
In the Habermasian situation of discourse, the notion of'sovereignty' is hmited to 
justification of norms and agreement with the law, but in the lived situation of discourse at 
the present sovereignty is the privilege of the stronger, the dominant, and the violent. The 
'sovereign people,' too, is a limited representation of identities recognized at the present; it 
constitutes a discursive archive of identities one turns to in order to justify a claim; "It is the 
people's choice" seems like the slogan that authorizes elections, legislation, and public 
opinion, but who are the people? Likewise the meaning of "the people" seems to favour those 
who can refer to it in discourse. At the present the semantics of the term resides in majority 
vote, counting, arithmetically stronger, the main-stream identities with power, and those who 
think, act and speak in ways traditionally acceptable in a culture. 
1.2.2. Archive: a critique of the privileged past and the embodiment of norms 
There is a tradition at work here, a semantic and normative past that reasserts itself at the 
present in the grips of the archive. In the opening passages of Archive Fever (1995) Derrida 
introduces normativity as origination, or commencement of a commandment that will have 
continued to imprint the present decisions with the trace of a past. In fact language may be 
speaking for us, but one may as well argue that language speaks for itself through the 
authority given to it by us, in the past. The ancient Greek word 'arkhe,' principle and/or 
beginning, brings two understandings, one temporal, the other nomological, into close 
proximity to problematize the constitution of our meaningful presence in democratic social 
order as well as semantic normativity: "the principle according to nature or history, there 
where things commence —physical, historical, or ontological principle—but also the 
principle according to the law, there where Gods and men command, there where authority 
and social order are exercised, in this place from which order is given" (Ibid., 1). Therefore to 
constitute a principle of (democratic) sociability such as consensus means to construct an 
archive of shared meaning, an index of reference anyone can defer to in pubhc addresses, a 
mode of speaking anyone can feel at home within. 
However, an archive, Derrida reminds, is an arkheion, "initially a house, a domicile, 
an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, those who commanded" (Ibid., 2). The 
archives do not belong with the same symbolic space as agora, the public space of speech, 
discussion and deliberation; they are rather exclusive spaces, open only to those who have the 
power of interpretation, command of rhetoric, skills of oration, authority of speech and power 
to make and interpret laws {Ibid., 2-10). "Entrusted to such archons [law-makers], these 
documents in effect speak the law: they recall the law, or call on and impose the law" {Ibid.)', 
they mark down the conditions of speech as lawfiil address and address of law. Each 
document in the archive bears the signature of an archon that represents a singular instance of 
political power, not a powerless, anonymously universal petitioner. "They inhabit this 
uncommon place, this place of election where law and singularity intersect in privilege'' 
(Ibid., 3). 
The way in which an archive becomes institutionalized attests to the sheltering of 
meaning, and the semantic/political privilege attached to it. The rules applied to the former 
trial cases stored within the archive fi^om now on would be reiterated in similar conflicts, 
establishing a judiciary tradition based on reference and deference to the arkhes codified in 
positive law. If the present meaning of words derive from a past, their publicity also stems 
from a private space of the symbolic, the pri - b e f o r e - of the constitution, their origin. The 
gathering of the signs in the private confines of the archive, through the authority of the first 
reference, also founds a public space of normativity where speech, discussion, and 
deliberation from now on would have to be in the orbit of political power that comes with 
"the control of the archive" (Ibid., 4) that safeguards the familiar "normative implications" of 
the sayable. 
1.2.3. Archive: embodiment of norms 
Lyotard further elaborates on how an archive of the sayable is attached to the icnowledge of 
presence that is addressed and named by the archons of the present. The guardians of the 
archive fix the referents of rigid designators of a language to objects they name, and classify 
(Lyotard, 1988, 37-44). In documenting what is present in reality, they indeed form links 
between reality and constituent simples of language that represent the presence of objects. In 
other words, the authority of the semantic archive is potentially justified through the archive 
of beings that present themselves to language: "it was the given described by the phrase, it 
became the archive fi-om which are drawn documents or examples that validate the 
description" (Ibid.). But the language underlying the denomination of public goods, universal 
rights, and commonsensical structure of Res Publico issues from privus, again privacy in the 
sense that the presence is separated fi-om its representation; that a word acts as the 
representative of a thing suggests that words refer even in the absence of the things they 
signify (Lyotard, Ibid., 42).^^ If reiterability implies public meaning, and publicization of the 
meaning of presence entails its privatization by the letter that becomes independent, public 
meaning undecidably wavers between presence and absence, the past and the present. 
Ranciere's project in The Future of the Image clarifies the stakes, developing "the 
whole history of relations between three things: the images of art, the social forms of 
imagery, and the theoretic procedures of crhicism of imagery" (2007, 15). ' Image' in this 
context is seen as "not simply [an] old representation, but. . . the new tension between naked 
presence and the writing of history on things., .the tension between the operations of art and 
social forms of resemblance and recognition" (Ibid., 19). The image punctuates an 
association of the visible with the sayable: it "produces the likeliness of an original," (Ibid., 
Thus legitimation of words formed through reference to the archive fails to ieXner puhlicus sensicum -
common sense- representative of publica res -common beings- that would perform a justification test in the 
republican gathering. 
6). The meaning of the represented (the visible) is interpreted through the vicissitudes of the 
representative (the sayable), generally in lines with the canonical norms of reading it 
established throughout a shared history, an agreed-upon archive of meaning {Ibid., 7) and 
"[i]n the representative order, they [words] serve as its model or norm" (Ibid., 78). In other 
words, the principles of the sayable stipulate what an image means in a context. 
For Ranciere the archive and norms are embedded in an aporetic history of types, not 
stereotypes, but arche-types, a rule-governed manner of being, acting and saying assigned to 
each and every one to make up a community. The history of archetypes is formed by a series 
of speech-acts that represent others and imagine them as a part of the same public; and by the 
canons of these speech-acts of making sense of the visible with the sayable assigned to 
political subjects as proper archetypes of the community. The rule-governed archive of 
images thus brings together and separates everyone in an imagined, and imaged community: 
An imagined community is basically a theoretical fiction and a representation of discourse. In 
my thesis I will argue that the archive is not the universal representation of the people but a 
limit to it that forecloses certain identities from becoming a visible part of the society. The 
archive of norms, likewise, is the "closure" of the law that ought to remain open to dissent, 
subversive re-interpretations, and future acts of speech. The 'archive' is a key thought for my 
thesis; it is I argue the site where the re-appropriation of the norm in a living way is possible. 
It both enables, and limits the way we think, feel act, say and be. To conclude, archive is the 
normative site of privilege, subjectification, speech, and action that precludes openness to the 
future. As the lived past that resists the fijture at the present, the archive is the site of a futural 
conflict between temporalities. 
Conclusion: The Archive 
To summarise the themes of this introduction, which aims to make the reader familiar with 
the pivotal notions of my thesis, the archive is the representation of 'the people' which is 
(outside) the norm. Above I introduced Habermasian framing of the self-rule and 
representation of the people. 1 argued his Ideal Speech Situation consists of universality, 
sovereignty, and the people constituting themselves in making the laws they are subject to. 
Legislation is a speech-act that subjectifies but being (outside) the norm it follows, it is rather 
to be conceived as an act of speech, contingent, spontaneous, innovative, performative and 
universalizing when it takes the form of dissent. When it is taken as the articulation of a 
constative, as understood by Habermas, however, it reduces the people to an ossified 
representation, i.e., the "we" as the archive. Sovereignty likewise is simplified as rule-
following, and universality as an unjustified assumption that overlooks exclusion, violence, 
and injustice still informing the lived situation of discourse at the present. 
If there is more to the act of legislation than simple rule-following, its excessive 
character resides in its (un)making the norm it is subject to. Sovereignty becomes aporetic, 
neither inside nor outside the enforceability of the law. As the force underlying the 
performativity of the acts of speech, it opens the subject of the act (the people) to the future 
of what it constitutes with (dis)regard to the law. The people subjectified in the act finds itself 
in a problematic relation to the representative archive which loses its normative force; the 
archive is 'exploded' by the democratic forces of dissent and performed otherwise by the 
people who constitute themselves in a different way by the act. In my thesis 1 see the gesture 
of re-constitution as futural. It is exemplified by the American Civil Rights Movement 's act 
of speech, "We are the people." In Habermas thought, the people are equated with the 
representative archive of the sovereign 'we ' : The 'we ' is the sovereign people with stable 
identities, needs, socio-economic preferences and political opinions. As opposed to the view 
that couples the people with their perfect representation, I assume a temporal gap between the 
people and its performative emergence. The "we" in tiie act addressed a people that had yet to 
become, when Rosa Parks disavowed the lived norm of racial segregation of her present. It 
was not present at her time and referred to the future people of America where the Afro-
American citizens would have been equal to other races in the lived situation. It, however, 
succeeded in constituting what it designated in fijtural terms. "She had, in the felicitous 
phrase of Martin Luther King, Jr., simply been 'captured by the zeitgeist-the spirit of the 
times'" (Chong, 1991,230). 
Seeking an understanding of this (re-)constitutive moment of futurity is the aim of my 
thesis. The temporality of politics, I argue, conjoins the past ( 'have been') and the future 
( 'will ') in future anterior combinations of time (what 'will have been'). Performativity of the 
act of speech defers the constitution of its subject to a future time where it, depending on the 
success of the act, will already have established it. Just like Habermas implied, it is the 
performative emergence of the people at the moment of the "as-if; the subject (the "we" of 
the future American people living in equal terms) always already acts and speaks as if its act 
is successful and as if it already constituted the subject. In a political setting of conflict, of 
course this is a wager, an act of faith, and sometimes wishful thinking, but its success or 
failure notwithstanding, the act remains an act of as-if. 
In the following 1 shall explore the relations between paradoxes of democracy and 
temporality. In the first chapter I will focus on the paradoxes of sovereignty (that the people 
justify the laws that make them a law-making people) in Habermas' thought and develop a 
critique that disruptive performativity of a mob enable the people to re-constitute themselves. 
In the second chapter I will explore Habermas' account of subjectification in relation to the 
addresses of the law, the tension between the individual 'character' and identification with 
the 'we, ' counter-posing against this what I shall cal the 'mob-ility of speech.' The third 
chapter will call on Lyotard's discussion of the law, ethics, the differend. and 'the jews ' in 
Nazi Germany as a representation of the (un)representable to demonstrate how politics 
operates as a constitutive address simultaneously forming the sovereign people and 
excluding those not seen to be a part of that body. The fourth chapter will focus on the 
relations between sensibility and democracy, whom is visible as belonging to the 'us, ' how it 
is possible to respond to a demand that does not make sense to us or is not heard as a political 
demand. In the fifth chapter I turn to Ranciere, exploring ideas such as "partage du sensible,' 
politics and police, injustice, wrong, dissensus, and the concept of literarity. The sixth chapter 
will be devoted to the issue of recognition and the speech of the subaltern: 1 will examine 
how dissent operates as a futural silent act of speech embodying a ' wish-to-say" and how 
recognition shows our otherness to ourselves. In the seventh chapter 1 will engage with 
Butler's work, subjectification, foreclosure, and Antigone's dissensus and attempt to show 
how recognition as a futural act reveals the temporality of politics as a battle between the past 
and the fijture. In the conclusion chapter 1 sum up my thoughts with a focus on the 'wish-to-
hear' as the conditions of responding to others' demands. 
Chapter 1: Politics of the Unsayable: Aporias and Temporality of the Political 
In this chapter I explore the aporias of the poHtical and pursue how the people emerge 
through an emergency of justification, and thus come before the law. The gesture of 
sovereignty in Habermas' thought is characterized by an aporia that I begin this chapter by 
exploring, one that Honig identifies astutely: the people justify the laws that will have made 
them a people that make the law. The aporia of normativity defines the temporality of politics 
as a futural one. I shall argue that the people precede their own representation in a disruptive 
act of speech that is futural in referring to a people that have yet to come. With this aim, 
drawing on Honig, 1 investigate how the people historically always emerge as a mob that has 
yet to become a people, eschewing all normative limitations. In the second section, 1 argue 
that the people have an undecidable character that oscillates between a raucous mob and rule-
following archive of identities. Their presence is caught into a temporal movement that brings 
together the past' the present and the future: I argue that the people is an aporia that demands 
an 'otherwise' future. In the third section I interpret Kafka's parable Before the Law, using it 
to point out the fijturity inherent in the subjectification of the people, and suggest that 
democratic politics is defined by what is to come. 
1.1. The Lawful Mob: The Present and the Future 
Let me begin by reviewing some themes touched upon in the introduction. The law is equated 
by Habermas with popular sovereignty as the people's self-rule maps onto the rule of law; the 
deliberative process involving public claims made through speech-acts, their legitimization 
by the agreement of others, and normativity intrinsic to language that orients the participants 
of the public dialogue toward agreement frames the crisis of legality that engulfs 
democracies. Language sets up the scene of legitimization and self-representation in which 
"the collectively binding decisions" (Habermas, 2002b, 163) are made by all those present 
and ensures the legitimacy of the outcome of the voting. Language achieves consensus 
through the "normative implications that He in the concept of possible understanding with 
which every speaker (and hearer) is naively familiar" (Habermas, 1973, 17) since language 
ultimately refers to lifeworld practices that normatively structure grammar. If a public 
address fails the test, it also fails to performatively disclose this familiar world of the sayable. 
This is the democracy of a lawful language, then, as Habermas suggests that language 
is lawful, embedded in the laws of presence"^ (of those in the lifeworld), and presents the 
ultimate tribunal of law. Contra Habermas, I argue that there are ample reasons to expect the 
co-originality of the law and the political presence to lead to exclusive politics, conformist 
practices, and a non-democratic culture. Given that it seems to be language, and not demos 
that does the work of legitimation in the present, Habermas' framing of the law begs the 
question of what "normative implications" intrinsic to language constitute our presence 
before the law in contemporary democracies. 
Reading Rousseau's Social Contract, Honig reformulates the paradox as one 
embedded within the political, since it appears as the self-referring causality of a law made by 
good people who are already in turn subjectified and educated to be good by the law in the 
past. The problem of origins and the fiature of the law is encountered once again against the 
temporal background: 
"In order for a nascent people to appreciate sound political maxims 
and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have 
to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the product of 
the way in which the country was founded would have to preside over 
the founding itself; and, before the creation of the laws, men would 
have to be what they should become by means of the same laws" 
(Rousseau, in Honig, 2009, 14-15). 
'The people' can thus be seen as a novel act of speech, a literary invention of people 
inventing themselves (as) a political subject and category, perhaps dating back to the French 
Revolution that changed what it means to be before the law. The people preceded the law that 
" By -laws of presence' I mean the normative framework that both represents and limits the way we think feel 
act, say and be. Our presence before the law is taken as its justifying ground and needs to be represented in ' 
discourse normatively. ^ ' 
constituted them as the people and their generic and generative speech-act that constitutes 
democracies was aporetically (non)democratic, lawlessly lawful and (dis)agreement-oriented: 
it was a disagreement on the part of the fiiture democratic people that the mob would have 
been constituted as in order to agree on the constitutional principles; it dis-identified them as 
the subjects of the Sovereign and identified them as the sovereign people; it was unjustified 
but set down the norms of justification for a shared life; it was lawlessly lawful. 
In the next section 1 shall illustrate normative and temporal paradoxes of the people 
following Honig's engagement with Rousseau; for her the main issue of the political is not 
justification but the people who are both a constitutive and a constituted force of the law. For 
the people to be lawful, a law must have always already constituted them as a people, but 
they are not the people they will already have been until they constituted the law. The double 
paradox in my reading indicates why disagreement, undecidability and representation matter 
to a robust democracy, a point that will be supported in the third section with an example 
taken fi-om the American Revolution. Jason Frank takes it as a founding moment of what it 
means for a people to act, speak and represent itself as a people: "constituent moments dwell 
in a space where there is enacted felicity that nonetheless breaks from the conventions of 
authorized context—a felicitous infelicity" (Frank. 2010, 8). If this is a speech-act that 
represents the people that both need and escape the confines of their own representation, it is, 
1 argue, also an act of speech that enacts a paradoxical temporality where re-presentation 
breaks with the presence and the present. To foresee my conclusion, 'the people' are never 
coextensive with their present, or representation due to the temporal and normative paradox 
entailed in their constitution. 'The people' is the enactment of an aporia that calls us to be 
otherwise in the future. 
1.1.1. The Unsayable: The Past, and the Present 
In this section I shall argue that the law cannot precede the people, as only a law made by the 
people can be democratic, but the people cannot be present before the law represents them as 
the people either, since a lawless mob is by no account a democratic community. In other 
words, their political presence (self-rule) must be deferred until it gives rise to a 
representation that differs from it (rule of law): yet if their presence always runs ahead of the 
present, it cannot legitimize the past that has never been. As the self-rule never quite catches 
up with the rule of law (rule of others in the past), a thin, aporetic line always separates and 
joins them—Democracy remains a promise, or maybe a threat. The predicament, however, 
does not discredit democracy, but supplies a critical perspective from which its 
(im)possibility can be appreciated better. If the concurrent emergence of the law and the 
people take place as paradoxical temporalization and materialization of self-difference in 
language, the only conditions under which their own promise makes them what they already 
are and will never be, the conditions of undecidability, raise the question of how they, being 
absent before the law, can re-present a past as their possible ftiture. As they stage their own 
undecidability, they are split within, and also become the past sign of their own future 
present. In other words, their presence comes after their representation (as in the future 
perfect tense), which makes the speech-act at stake performative and self-contradictory. 
1.1.2. Emergency of the Law, Emergence of the Self 
If one genuinely faces the contingency of democracy, one will have to theorize an ongoing 
political crisis:^^ for Habermas the crisis liberal deliberative democracies undergo is one of 
justification and "[w]e therefore associate with crises the idea of an objective force that 
As the etymology of the term 'tirisis' reminds us, the turning point in a disease comes with 'krinein ' 
criticism, as well as separation. 
deprives a subject of some part of his normal sovereignty" (Habermas, 1973b, 1). "Normal 
sovereignty" here must be understood in terms of one's being subject to the law one makes, 
but as legislation is a collective speech-act of negotiation that involves submission to others 
as well as freedom, the law the people will make would already have made them the people 
that give consent to it. Thus they are tasked with the impossible articulation of their own, 
spectral political presence with no measuring rod but their own alien, open ftiture where they 
have to re-present the past in which they emerged from a violent mob. The emergency of 
justification and law thus finds company in an emergence of the self that brings into life its 
own aporetic state that may unfold into a precarious democracy (of absent people that will 
have to interpellate themselves time and again). Or as the first elections in the newly 
decolonized Arab countries tragically exemplified in the last century, their speech-act may 
end up abolishing themselves.^' 
In asking "[wjhere would that good law come from absent an already well-formed, 
virtuous people?," Honig problematizes how "the 'people' are always undecidably present 
and absent from the scene of democracy" (Ibid., 19) due to the gap between factuality and 
normativity that casts them at once as a lawless mob, and a self-legislating community. The 
people rather waver between "We, the people" that emerges and the archive. The elusive 
discrepancy flagged down by Rousseau, the one between the justified general will of the 
people that make the law fi-eely and the mere will of the "the blind multitude" that is to be 
gently forced by the law to form the lawful people, has to be traversed by the paradox of 
justification—anticipation of the very thing troubled by its own preconception, and 
conformation by that which presupposes its own formation by the same act. If the represented 
is not independent, but partly the product of the rules of representation, then the formative 
powers of the law involved in the making of the subjects who are in turn obligated to make 
" For instance Algeria is one of the Arab countries that chose not to be a democracy through democratic 
elections last century. 
the law simply direct us to the undecidabiiity of a political presence that "forever seeks and 
rejects efforts to ground itself in something outside itself (Ibid., 27). This might be the 
archive of public meaning unsullied by 'private' forces, or the constitution that escapes 
contestation by that which it constitutes - as I explore here. 
Honig argues that an aporetic thinking, which locates the political firmly within the 
indistinguishability of the people from the mob, or of self-rule from heteronomy, of the 
public from the private may restore normativity as a set of precarious relations that need to be 
reproduced on a daily basis {Ibid. 30-35), Those relations, multiple, caring, agonistic, and 
poetic take up new meanings in an emergent political world, re-founded, contested, 
deconstructed, and perhaps re-constructed through the tactful exploitation of the aporias 
imminent within. The intimacy of the law with the lawless in its past, the poetic nonsense of 
the futural within the meaningflil present, and absence qua presence underwrite some of the 
aporias that identify the emergency as an internal, daily, and ordinary part of the socio-
political world in which they are adjudicated, dismissed, negotiated, re-examined and/or 
deferred. The quandaries of the political which we, occupying certain subject-positions, 
experience, struggle with, and adapt our lives to in multiple ways sustain and maintain the 
uncertain social bond that holds the society together. They form and deform an incomplete, 
uncertain totality subject to the non-law of its own fragile contingency that can go astray any 
moment. If the normativity underlying the socio-political does not follow the unerring 
guidelines of anything external to its own paradoxical logic, most of the time conflicts, 
disagreements and emergencies are not only inevitable, but also desirable to explore the ways 
in which an internally conflicted community uncertain of its bearings can inhabit the 
paradoxical space of the society democratically. 
1.1.3. Future and Futurity 
The gap between the presence and absence of the people does not only pose a threat to 
democracy, but also functions as an omen that opens up the auspicious political space of their 
future. Habermas emphasizes that the norms of the present are geared towards future 
consensus, since being together is informed by the conditions under which we make sense 
together. But where do the normative guidelines originate from, if not from an archive of 
socio-political lexicon that precedes the present as the first possibility of reference, a legal 
archive, the constitution that sets up what it means to be a people? Habermas "rejects the idea 
that constitutional democracy represents a struggle between past and present," as Honig 
elaborates {Ibid., 29), since the "allegedly paradoxical relation between democracy and the 
rule of law resolves itself in the dimension of historical time, provided one conceives of the 
constitution as a project that makes a founding act into an ongoing process of constitution-
making that continues across generations" (Habermas, 2001c, 768). Honig calls it ' tapping'; 
"the present generation •tap[s] the system of rights more fully, expands the circle of rights to 
ever greater inclusion, and thereby brings constitutionalism and democracy into better 
balance" (Honig, 2009, 31)1 argue that the struggle is among the past, the present, and the 
fiiture. 
The unsayable, as I interpret it, relates to the undecidable identity of the subject of 
subjectless speech. 1 argue that 'the people' is not only caught within a normative imbroglio 
where the law is only justifiable by the constitution of sovereign people who speak to make 
the law, as Honig suggests, but it is also a constitutive embarrassment by virtue of being 
subjectified by the law to speak as such. Instead, 'the people' may be conceived of as being 
oriented towards the norms of speech that they both need and disturb in order to represent 
themselves as the people that they will have (never) been, re-presenting themselves as the 
people that (never) constituted themselves in the past without justification. The temporality 
implicit in the act of speech, viz., the future anterior, suggests that people have (yet) to be, 
and democracy has (yet to) come if they experience aporias and open themselves to the fijture 
that disregards concerns with present justifications of the present: they will have always 
already spoken and acted before they have found a rule to justify, and they will have always 
already experienced aporias before democracies (will) have come. The act of speech breaks 
down the linearity and order of time, reveals coexistence of multiple temporalities within the 
present, and has a detour to the past which is re-enacted as a possible fiiture. 
I think Habermas would agree that openness of discourse (as a self-learning process 
of democratic communication) casts in relief the futurity inherent to speech-acts, since his 
understanding of the sayable seems to resemble the so-far-unsayable. According to his view, 
politics is self-correcting: validity demands expand the horizon of the sayable as the claim-
bearers redeem their utterances with reasons why we should revise our discourse, enrich it 
with new identifications, objects and subjects of the political. ^^  Struggles of recognition, too, 
are framed as a "dispute over the interpretation and satisfaction of claims not yet redeemed" 
(Habermas, 1993, 128) and a demand to have all identities integrity under the protection of 
rights. This struggle falls under the category of engaging the constitution which is a 
"historical project which the citizens pursue" (Ibid.) and thus open to contestation. 
'Openness ' as Habermasians conceive it is hence predicated on a desire to include others into 
the public realm whose presence would guarantee the legitimacy of democratic decisions. In 
this sense, it would be only fair to admit that Habermas' theory promises realization of the 
sayable as it aims to assimilate the unsayable that is of the future. 
Yet, if some people may not have the authority to speak because they are not included 
in the hfeworld to begin with, then the future of democracies hangs on the balance by the 
He talks aboullegitimation, i.e. validity of discursive claims either as a 
under democratic regimes (cf. Habermas 1996, 447; 2 0 0 1 b , T l 5 r f o 0 3 265) ' " " ^ ' ' P ^ ^ ^ f o n 
thread of the unsayable; because there can be a lived gap between the people and the archive, 
some of them may be of no ac/count in a democracy. The latter insight leads us back to our 
present in relation to what is (not) present in our public sphere, not to a sanguine assurance of 
an obscure day to come." At this point the future appears not as that which is yet to be said, 
but what remains unsaid as we speak here and now, promising authority and voice to the 
silenced and absent, and it takes a detour to delineate the self visible and audible in the 
present public to identify who is not present .Al though the lifeworld harbours an 
expectation of its own meaning yet to be articulated, the enigma of emergent deliberative 
democracies traverses a horizon, as Honig rightly points out (2001, 796), a horizon that in my 
reading opens along the contested lines of what/who 'we' will and should be as the people. 
The people speak to become what they will have been given the right conditions under which 
their claim is heard by others, but their subjectification does not need justification and 
agreement. To count as just, it needs a political world that paradoxically becomes achievable 
when their speech-act will have satisfied its happiness conditions. It was just that Rosa Parks 
was treated equally like a white member of her society, but in a racially segregated America 
her demand to be an equal subject was preposterous. She spoke to be what she would have 
been, an equal subject before the law and her demand was justified when the Civil Rights 
movement succeeded. 
1.2. Validity or Mobility of Speech 
Faced with the question of speech-acts' validity, Habermas' model of deliberative 
argumentation faces another aporia. It relies on an undistorted form of communication 
presumed to bracket the lifeworld it paradoxically relies on; i.e., our identifications, intimate 
" 'Th i s happens in the singular event of engagement, and when I speak of democracy to come .. . it means that 
there is an engagement with regard to [present] democracy which consists in recognizing the irreducibiUty of the 
promise" (Derrida, 1996, 83). 
And whatever is absent appears to be present in the salience of its absence. 
relations and parochial understandings that Habermas wishes to rid the Ideal Speech Situation 
o f . " Yet, a holistic approach to communication may show that our words acquire their 
argumentative force, if not also propositional validity, mostly by their meanings in the 
lifeworld where we are subjectified.^'' In this section I examine the Habermasian process 
Honig names 'tapping,' i.e. the dialogue between the excluded who demand equal 
recognition and others who exchange subject-positions in order to fijrther the project of 
constitution-making. 
1.2.1. Justification, Agreement, Identity: selfless language games 
The 'tapping' process for Habermas is a double-tier procedure. The first procedural principle 
of argumentation in Habermas' theory, the principle of universalization (Ui), operates to 
secure the content of all affected by deliberation: "[o]nly those action norms can claim to be 
valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in a practical discourse." (Habermas. 1990a, 43) As an abstract reconstruction of 
the actual conditions of dialogue, the principle does not go into the specifics of debate, or ask 
the participants to suspend their identities; the participants are just to swap the subject-
positions, "reciprocally reversing interpretative perspectives under the general 
communicative presuppositions of the practice of argumentation" (Habermas, 1993, 52). As 
per the principle U,, we put ourselves in the shoes of others as a commitment to universal 
Habermas aims to jettison a theory of speech as represemation where categories of a single subject are 
employed to re-present what is present and to replace it with an intersubjective model of speech-acts where the 
sayable, unequivocally grounded on the public conditions of meaning, appears as what is analysable to reasons 
one may have to take it as justified; viz., not the statement, or the objects it refers to, but what makes a statement 
valid intersubjectively. In as much as a proposition can be deemed meaningail if and only if it ftilfils universal 
"conditions of validity" (Habermas, 1979, 49), the universal pragmatic contexts of action encompass the 
rationally sayable. If "[t]o understand a symbolic expression means to know under what conditions its validity 
claim would have to be accepted," (Ibid., 135, cf 115) one interprets and understands what is said only if one is 
familiar with those conditions and grasps and evaluates the reasons a linguistic community have for t a L g a 
proposition as valid. ' a c lui wMng a 
" I n actual life situations of decisions, it seems more plausible that agents of speech "would cominue to exhibit 
all kinds of traits conducive to 'distorted communication"' (Lukes, 1982, 139; cf Fraser 1996 119) since tho e 
traits are an intepal part of their identifications they tend to hold fast onto. Given that the evaluative norms of 
meaning are included m the symbolic structure of the lifeworld it seems fair tn .i, , u u 
stabnize his theory of deliberation by vaUdation of meaning m ihe f ^ c ^ f t S y 
words that must nevertheless be uttered by subjects. suojectiess 
solidarity. Again, not all of us may be willing or able to empathize with a stranger with whom 
we share little, let alone a concrete other whose subject-position we think may be partially 
responsible for the inequality we suffer in the lifeworld. If one revises this picture with the 
addition of agonistic remnants of the intersubjective relations (irresolvable conflicts of 
interest and disagreement) in the lifeworld that re-appear in dialogue, insurmountable 
differences of socialization may preclude role-swapping, bringing dialogue to an abrupt halt. 
One can also doubt that the advantaged parties to dialogue would readily consent to a 
decision that would effectively deprive them of their privileges, and no one else can vote for 
them." At this stage of discourse, it is likely that parties to dialogue retain their identification, 
along with the possibility of irresolvable conflict, and others may not be included to dialogue 
for they may not be included in the lifeworld to start with. Habermas' retort is as follows: 
when the focus of dialogue becomes the irreducible difference, i.e., particular values, beliefs, 
practices of interlocutors (the self), we can "rely on the 'neutral' fact that each of them 
participates in some communicative form of life which is structured by linguistically 
mediated understanding" (Habermas, 1998b, 40) to neutralize the differences of the self by 
the universal-pragmatic presumptions of speech. The second principle of universalization 
(U2) has a different theoretical status; it is not a derivation from concrete situations of 
dialogue, but a formalized structure of possibility conditions of acting and speaking in a 
world we all share. When political-ethical discourse exhausts the attempts to bridge the 
differences between the self and the other, Habermas hopes, we can re-build the shared 
horizon of solidarity on the basis of a world in which the other is presumably already 
included, a lifeworld that envelops the sayable. 
But how adequate is Habermas' answer? His double-tier reconstruction of discourse 
has become the target of criticism that challenges his fundamental distinctions between the 
" For Habermas, "every single participant in argumentation remains witli liis 'yes ' and 'no ' a court of final 
appeal: no one can replace him in his role of one who pronounces on criticizable claims to validity" (Habermas, 
1990a, 252). 
just and the good, between the public and the private, and between Ui and U2. McCarthy 
maintains that it is impossible to "agree in what is just without some measure of agreement 
on what is good" (1991. 192) since justice is more often than not a matter of distributing what 
individuals consider the good in the lifewodd. Likewise, Cohen believes '[d]iscourses do not 
create values and solidarities e^ : nihilo but draw on already shared commonality and culture, 
i.e., lifeworld" (1989, 496). Tully too claims that what Habermas considers universal 
conditions of discourse indeed presumes a decentred subjectivity native to the lifeworld of 
developed. Western democracies (2002, 101; cf Heller, 1984, 5-18 and also Outhwaite, 
1994, 9-54). A host of thinkers have revealed a set of assumptions in Habermas' theory that 
form the faint contours of a self whose practice and language game inform the so-called 
universal principles of discourse. His theory represents the discursive practice of a self 
embedded within a certain lifeworld. 
Habermas' reply to such implicit accusations revolves around the common ground of 
language where basic "[c]oncepts such as truth, rationality, and justification play the same 
role in every language community, even if they are interpreted differently and applied in 
accordance with different criteria" (1993, 105; emphases original). He refers to the pragmatic 
application of those concepts that rules out any conceivable incommensurability amongst the 
language games of different lifeworids. Given that the pragmatics of these concepts cuts 
across the diversity of identities, as the eariy Habermas (before the 1980s) insisted, the 
distinction between Ui and U2 can be stabilized without leaving the obstinate trace of the self 
on the conditions of agreement. 
Yet, although Habermas wishes to recast the meaning and validity in terms of the 
pragmatically decidable, he cannot provide a complete account since the identification of the 
subject of speech, here 'the people,' seems to escape the algorithm of the Ideal Conditions.^^ 
My aim here is not only to unmask and debunk the Utopian elements of validity, and of 
subjectless speech in an ideal, unrepresentative, identity-free discursive space in Habermas' 
conceptions of speech and the political. I also seek to point out that the foundational speech-
act of the political (the act of speech "We are the people") doesn't need justification; instead 
it represents the present as fettered by the past; it both identifies (the mob as the people) and 
dis-identifies (the people as the subjects of the king) the sovereign. The act of speech at stake 
dis-identifies its subject with the present, identifies it with a future community that will have 
always already been if the subject is heard and responded to as the law-giver. It stages a 
contestation over the community, its constitution, its membership criteria, its norms, and its 
space-time. It exposes and re-articulates the social bond toward a democracy-to-come. 
1.2.2. Spontaneity. Disagreement, Identity: futural language games 
For reasons briefly outlined above, I propose to theoretically separate the self from the so 
long vilified subject, and, contra Habermas, to restore to political actors an inevitable 
identification, though not an immutable, metaphysical identity. That the self of a people - a 
historical set of identifications- should be identified and laid out as the background of 
discourse to enable dis-identifications must be understood as a part of revealing the unequal 
structure of the political symbolic one should disavow and aim to destabilize. With this aim, 
one first needs to displace adherence to the normative ground embedded within a structure of 
inequality, violence and history of oppression. Rational agreement in an unjust situation of 
discourse can only justify the perpetuation of injustices that silence the weak. I argue that if 
one shares the conviction that the present socio-political conditions are unequal, then 
progressive politics should target and oppose precisely stabilizing presumptions, such as the 
Although the next chapter is devoted to the making of the subject of speech in singular, here it suffices to say 
the question is rather being subject to speech (of others), rather than a subjectless speech (where the difference 
between the self and other is lost in dialogue). 
universal-pragmatic conditions that function to obscure the factual limits to the political, as a 
fantasy of sovereignty that mutes the unsayable of disagreements, radical differences, and 
groundless claims that cannot be justified, but are politically relevant and perhaps just. 
The point is not to vindicate the political virtues of disagreement over and against 
rational agreement but provide reasons why and how systematic injustices can be addressed 
and redressed through the politics of a robust democracy that has "yet to be constituted" 
performatively. In a similar vein, Frank pursues the performativity that is both the making of 
a representation and bringing into presence that which may have failed, had the American 
Revolution gone awry. Centred around "the logically prior and more painfully ambiguous 
question of who constitutes authorizing and consenting people in the first place" (Frank, 
2010, 2), his take on historically constitutive moments casts into relief how the people both 
enacts and exceeds their own representation that precedes their becoming the source of the 
norms they (will) have violated. For Frank, "the people are a political claim, an act of 
political subjectification, not a pre-given, unified, or naturally bounded empirical entity" 
(2010, 3); it is the speech-act of the mob, in other words, that aims to set down the ground 
norms of all other claims raised toward a fiiture political world. The speech-act that is the 
people in fact "effectively change the conditions and contexts through which they are heard 
and recognized as claims " {Ibid., 8: emphasis original), marking the degree to which they 
will have authority in what will be nominated as the public. The act of speech "We. the 
People" precedes and enacts what it refers to (that which has yet to be and will have been). 
The temporal order is not only reversed but also queered: the claim makes sense after the act, 
referring to a past that has (never) been which was the possible future. Although "the people 
have been at once enacted through representation ... and in excess of any particular 
representation," (Ibid., 3), authority is inserted into this open-ended future of the people as 
the "reference to the sovereign people beyond representation, beyond the law, . . [as] the 
mystical foundations of authority" {Ibid.). And this moment attaches the authority to speak 
with the precarious figure of the people it may bring into presence. 
Futurity suggests that the people are never present with their representations, nor do 
they fully strip themselves of them; rather, their representations stage the undecidability 
inherent to their identity. Their presence both requires and escapes their own representation 
toward a future political world of contestation where absolute sovereignty fails and they stand 
on the brink of becoming otherwise when addressed by an authority other than the present 
law. The law is but the felicity conditions of the act of speech that constitutes them as the 
archive of the recognizable socio-political subjects,'^ yet the illocutionary force of an address 
has little to do with justification because in a conflict of interest, subordination and legal 
violence persuasive power of speech loses its relevance. In other words, the subject of 
politics, the people, is not reducible to the norms of speech that enable its performance: it is 
the force of the law that constitutes them as such. 'The people' is not even a sovereign that 
controls the terms in which it is performed, but a temporal paradox of speech that cannot be 
captured by speech. 
1.3. Coming before the law: aporias 
Kafka's parable Before the Law in fact can be read with an emphasis on the before as a mode 
of temporality strangely postponed, as a mode of address from nowhere and by no one and 
finally as exposure to an undecidability regarding the law. The country man arrives at the 
gates of the law, asks the gatekeeper for entry, only to be deterred and deferred to an 
uncertain time. He says all that he can to persuade the gatekeeper but he is told that it is 
possible for him to be allowed in the fiiture so he agrees. Alternatively, the gatekeeper adds, 
you may "try it in spite of my prohibition... [b]ut 1 am powerful." Besides, even if the country 
man bests the gatekeeper, there seems to be other gates within, and other, stronger guardians 
" See my introduction. 
in the hierarchy of the edifice. "The law should always be accessible for everyone," the man 
thinks but he consents to standing before the gate for years, resolutely giving the gatekeeper 
everything he has, his possessions, his time and attention in the hope that he will soon be let 
in. However the judgment given even before he arrived does not change. Finally, after a 
lifetime spent before the law, he inquires one last time before dying: 
"Everyone strives after the law," says the man, "so how is that in these 
many years no one except me has requested entry?" The gatekeeper 
sees that the man is already dying and, in order to reach his 
diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, "Here no one else can 
gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I 'm going 
now to close it." 
Set against the background of democratic theory, Kafka might be read as narrating how 
being subject to the law of which one is not the subject may wrong the people with a 
reference to "the before.' Kafka's take on subjectification does not invoke voice, guilt, or a 
governmental mechanism of interpellation: the man from the country, for reasons unknown 
to the reader, demands access to the edifice of the law apparently constructed before his 
arrival. The story, however, subtly invokes a past the country man is not responsible for, the 
secret history of the law. The entrance had already been designed for him alone, he had 
already been assigned to this entrance, the gatekeeper had already been tasked, and the rules 
and regulations of access had already been laid down.^® As the law's history is never to ld , " 
the reader feels compelled to wonder whether the country man was summoned, merely 
anticipated, or addressed ; / he has always already been the one the law addresses; whether 
the rules of access to the law should not be a part and parcel of what it means for the law, 
treated as ; / i t was the secret behind the door, to be. 
" ahistoricity of the law: "To be invested with categorical 
The man comes before the law as if he was the subject of the law, always already 
identified by the law as the one with the right to and privilege of access, perhaps only to find 
out that he is not. He is/was in fact one of the people but not authorized to go through; and 
access, the gatekeeper says, is prohibited. Therefore he has never been the one and he is 
forced to agree. But the idcntification/subjectification takes on a paradoxical character when 
the gatekeeper at last announces that he, without doubt, has always been the one."" The 
speech-act that the reader suspects to have been uttered before the country man's appearance 
before the law but is not said explicitly in the story should be: "Thou shall have been the one 
if you act as if you were." The grammar here brings together future anterior with an 
(im)possible conditional from an unannounced past: the man will have been what he is/was 
(not) if he acts like what he is/was (not). His present status before the law, always already 
announced by the address fi-om the past, is equated with his fiiture status, on an ambiguous 
condition of the present that has yet to come. 
Kafka only lets his readers dwell on this aporia, 1 argue, to imply that the present that 
has yet to come is sustained by re-enactments of a past that has (never) been to reach a 
fiiture that will have been our past. The temporal circularity that defers the future back to a 
past that has yet to happen in our present is democratic and futural. According to our 
democratic intuitions, the country man, seemingly powerless before the powerful guardian 
of the law ought to have access to the law whose sovereignty rests in the people he 
symbolizes in the parable. The reader of the story is again asked to wonder why he has yet to 
come, acting on an identity he has never/always been in the past. Likewise, although the 
force of the 'will-have-been' may be taken to have brought the people before the door where 
the anticipated course of history gets dangerously close to the "have-never-been,' there, in a 
"" "There is a singularity," notes Derrida, "about relationship to the law, a law of singularity which must come 
into contact with the general or universal essence of the law without ever being able to do so" (Derrida, 1992, 
187). In his reading the paradox lies in the deferral of the encounter between the singular and the universal, i.e., 
undecidability. 
past that has yet to become the future, it remains in effect, as a force moving them towards 
the law. 
If actually this is a secret exposed as the secret in Kafka's story, while reading it one 
may anticipate the country man's failure which will, time and again, constitute his success to 
identify with what/who he, paradoxically, has never been but will always become.'" 
Whatever secret is kept behind the door as the ground of the law has yet to be seen, heard, 
known or understood, true enough. The man in Kafka's story cannot even take a peek 
through the door. But perhaps the movement in time, spaces, between identities and towards 
a law of a democracy to come is the secret of the law. Once founded, the narrative of 
democracy tells us we will always already have been what we have (never) been—the 
subjects of the law that we are subject to as the sovereign people. Either way, we respond to 
the insensible secret behind the door sensibly. We come to be (to have a presence in and 
around the normative domain) and we become, in time, what we are (not). This I am 
suggesting, is perhaps taking place through the postponement of the exposure of a secret 
that, nevertheless, always exposes itself as a secret - that is, by disseminating itself the 
secret. 
1.3.1.Becoming a mob or the people 
What Kafka's parable says about the moveinent of the people is that the people come before 
the law to become what they are (not) -the sovereign - , but their self-constitution coincide 
with legislation. The law can(not) be broken because the force behind the law is the people; 
they are (outside) the law they (un)make. Hence the aporia of the people who constituted 
themselves, in the historical situation, as a mob that takes up on a novel character when they 
succeeded in making a constitution without the guidance or protection of a constitution. 
The democratic situation is not to be characterized by a disjunction: it is either the case that there is no secret 
oi.sovereignty, or it is the secret of sovereignty that there is no sovereignty. I argue that this reductive 
disjunction reduces sovereignty to a property that the people always have regardless of their actions 
Similarly, in an unjust situation narrated in Kafka's parable what we need is the 
disagreement of the weaker leading to the stronger's agreement on a change.The story 
does not tell what the change will be about, or how precisely it can be brought about, but it 
tells us that the secret will be when the people come in, having heard and responded to as the 
law-giver that they will have been. In fact the country man speaks loud and clear and is heard 
but not as one of the people who have the authority to make a norm. He ought to be; we all 
ought to be but historically we are not there yet. 
The central paradox 1 aim to address here in the democratic situation depicted by my 
reading of the parable is that while subjects may speak to authorize the norms, speech 
constitutes subjects authorized to make norms, and norms subjectify people authorized to 
speak. In a similar vein, while people seek recognition in order to have the authority to speak, 
recognition demands adherence to the norms, and norms tend to authorize only what they can 
recognize (i.e., the country man subject to the law but not the sovereign subject of the law).*^ 
We mostly speak the speakable, hear the audible, and recognize the recognizable as we all 
have a wish to conform and live as a part of the wider society. The latter argument should not 
be taken as a tautology, but as an invitation to put into question the agreement-oriented public 
speech that may fail to criticise the present limits to its own constitution. In the second and 
third chapters 1 shall argue that it disregards what may so adamantly foreclose change— 
fantasies of sovereignty (i.e., mastery) reduced to autonomy at the present. 1 shall further seek 
to argue that Habermas' lack of interest in the paradoxes of autonomy, rationality, speech and 
law forecloses effective political resources for a radical transformation of a society. 
My point also follows from Rawls' definition of the goal of social justice as making the least advantaged 
group better off (1971, 205). 
The democratic appropriation of the universal norms by individual lives in the public sphere, Habermas 
argues, is characterized by a norms of justification -be ing responsible for the life one leads- in a violent-free 
relation of equality, reciprocity and unbridled freedom whereby the individual subjects, reflecting together on 
the norms they have been given over to from the start, can become the collective subjects of the law they 
inherited from the past. To accomplish this, they "must consider themselves mutually accountable, hence they 
must presuppose that they can orient their action according to validity claims" by giving reasons for actions and 
discursively thematizing a pre-theoretical world given to us immediately in its direct, pragmatic sensibility 
(Habermas, 1996,20; 1987, 119-52). 
My intention in this thesis is to bring into light a constant tension between the past 
and the future of the people as 'the people.' Given that the discursive democracy of a 
Habermasian public sphere cannot get off the ground unless it is already out there, 
ftinctioning in a regulative manner that secures authority to speak in the basic sense,'*" 
agreement would only serve to ratify the norms of the past. Habermas takes the parties to the 
dialogue to be actual individuals living in actual democracies highly permeated by structural 
inequalities."*' If the systematic inequalities also deny the disadvantaged access to the law and 
participation in legislation, Habermas' transcendental moment of an all-inclusive public 
discourse would be postponed to the ever-withdrawing historical horizon of democracies-to-
come. In the meantime in order to widen the scope of participation into the discourse, norm-
making would take on the form of disruption of the limitations on the public sphere'"'—that 
is, dis-identification with the 'we' and destabilization of the regulating norms of public 
sphere. 
When Habermas places the socio-political possibility of conditions of agreement as a 
liberal restraint on speech to ground and authorize the conditions of the sayable, his theory 
runs counter to his goal of including the other, as a theory of the lifeworid cannot justify its 
own terms absolutely without self-reference.'" The conditions of agreement as justification 
seem embedded in a silent and secret history of a particular self, the identification of a people 
that escapes the gatekeeper's pragmatic reduction, calculation and decision. The past of 
democracies can be found in Rousseau's Social Contract where he defines the society as "a 
sum of forces" (2008, 6) that comes into being when individuals seeking to further their 
" Even the sympathetic reading of Chambers allows the same conclusion: "It would indeed be difficult to 
imagine a genuine and legitimating deliberation about free speech, under conditions that severely limited free 
speech, especially conditions that silenced advocates of liberalizing free speech" (Chambers 2002 182) The 
point about free speech can be generalized to claim that under conditions that severely limited autonomy 
Habermasian deliberation cannot function. auiunumy, 
^^  Habermas emphasizes this point, comparing his framework to that of Rawls (Habermas 2003 10) 
^^  It means the procedure is a different kind of universalization than the one he theorizes 
"If words and concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one can just ify one ' s language 
a : S n t v V ^ e ^ r T d a T ~ ^ ^ r be S t e ' 
interest coordinate actions through aggregation of opinions and wills. "Each of us puts his 
will, his goods, his force, and his person in common," he notes, "under the direction of the 
general will, and in a body we all receive each member as an inalienable part of the whole" 
(Ibid.). "Will" in Rousseau's political vocabulary denotes interest, desire, demand, opinion, 
and a sovereign force behind action. "Privacy" of the will refers to the individuality of each 
of us, "tending to his personal advantage" {Ibid., 26) whereas its 'generality' implies that the 
will at stake is to the benefit of all, submitting every one of us to the sovereign will of the 
people that sets us free in subjection to the law we make. Although sovereignty is the 
exercise of the general will, "the general will is found by counting votes" (90) as in 
aggregation of wills. The aggregative theories of democracy that follows Rousseau's example 
take as central to a shared life the general will that is practiced as majority vote. 
1.3.2. Democracy-to-come: a queer claim 
Counting, decision, sovereignty (i.e., secret mastery of the self over the other) constitute the 
limit to the present representative democracies where the country man arrives, unexpectedly, 
at the gate of the law only to find out he does not count; he is not recognized as a citizen who 
has access to the law. "Democracy counts," Derrida notes, "it counts votes and subjects, but it 
does not count, should not count, ordinary singularities: there is no mtmerous clausus for 
arrivants'" (1997, x). Although counting is indispensable for democracies (Ibid., 22), 
democracies at the present are also crippled by a miscount where the incalculable, 
unforeseen, emergent subjects of the political, as well as the weak, the minorities, and the 
outsiders do not count: their votes are reduced to silence in the face of the obvious 
inequalities. The majority vote system takes into account the votes of the main-stream 
society. It reduces lives to numbers in a statistical ontology, an undecidable demos to the rule 
of decision out of always already limited choices at the ballot, and temporality of the people 
to a silent past that repeats itself in the face of numerary,"® ontoiogical, racial, class- and 
gender-based inequalities, misrecognition and violence. 
The country man survives there and "[tjhis time of surviving thus gives" (Ibid., 14) 
the time of politics of agreement, decision, counting, and equality, although this time 
succeeds only in effacing itself,"' in a refusal to move forward. Time holds still. His demand 
for access to the law has not been justified. Not yet. Final decision for the incalculable arrival 
has been deferred to the future, to an otherwise democracy of the future, to a democracy-to-
come where the self and the other will have been recognized as equals (before the law and 
before each other). 
Drawing on Derrida's notion of "democracy-to-come."'" 1 argue in this thesis that the 
first theoretical gesture should be making the situation of present democracies visible in order 
to point out what is wrong and what can be transformed toward a greater socio-political 
justice, toward an otherwise democracy. In order to thematize and recognize the present, what 
is present in public, and the self of a people, on the other hand, one should direct theoretical 
attention to the lifeworld Habermas severed off the agonistic political relations that tend to 
foreclose, mute and render invisible and absent. He notes that although the line between the 
public and the private" is widely contested and undecidable, we should all the same aim to 
formalize the line to secure the autonomy of the political (Habermas, 1995, 129), though 1 
argue that the lifeworld leaves an ineffaceable trace imprinted on the way politics is 
One of the unfortunate consequences of the majority vote rule is the dismissal of minorities' votes which may 
even lead to the tyranny of the majority. 
« It effaces the alterity and singularity of the present subjects and demands, i.e., through misrecognition, Ibid 
As an unforeseen "event • 1997, 18; as "the question o f , h e citizen or the subject as a countable singularity " 
22; as a perhaps, 28; as the self-contrad.ctory present's coming out o f jo in t and addressing itself forward 32-
as an mvitation to share, 35; as a messianic structure," 36; as a "community of those without community " 36' 
as response and responsibility, 37; as "welcoming what remains undetermined and indeterminable " 38 as ' 
"keeping quiet together," 57; as ^^unhemlichkeit:' 58; as One as the Other and the "we" as Them 57-58 as 
f ^ g V heprecsely whaj one 60; as "new justice," 64; as heteronomy of decision, 69; as enemy as best 
fhend, 72; as the end of self-immumty, 76; as belonging without belonging, 80; in sum, as yZado7cal 
aporetic. impossible manner of community, law, equality, the republic and democracy " 82 ' 
The private constitutes another secret, what is held from the public. 
conducted, an obvious but secret trace of the past one ought to pursue in the present 
regulation of the sayable. 
The main argument I develop in my thesis will be twofold: Firstly, I aim to illustrate 
that Habermas' deliberative politics is prone to disregard zones of unspeakability in the 
lifeworld that are yet to be recognized as political in their indeterminacy, such as new and 
risky (dis-)identifications, disruptive agendas, and other progressive political (dis-
)engagements that reveal the secret as a secret, as Lyotard, Ranciere and Butler argue. The 
emergent subjects, demands, acts and speeches of the political out of the private, daily, 
aesthetical, and historical constitute the sphere of the singular that the law fails to identify, 
address and represent: "There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or 
alterity, but there is no democracy without community of friends ...without the calculation of 
majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal" (Derrida, 1997, 
22). The aporetic situation of the present therefore refers to the relation, perhaps dialectic, or 
the tragedy between the two aspects of the political that affect and leave traces on each other. 
Secondly, I will study temporality intrinsic to politics of a robust democracy 
conceived as structured by antagonisms, civil disobedience, disagreement as well as 
agreement, ethics, solidarity and social bond. Radical differences, disagreements, and any 
discursive enterprise directed against the constitution of the "we'" that may decentre, 
destabilize and perhaps "queer" the main-stream political structure for Habermas should be 
overcome; it is all unsayable, unauthorized speech-acts in decent politics. What follows is 
also a "queer-y" into the limits of discourse that plays a vital role for Habermas' deliberative 
democracy, an inquiry into its secret past that is in plain sight, and the silence that surrounds 
its "origins." As my intention here is to trace temporality of politics, the past that still holds 
the present in its hold and Butler's understanding of the queer as that which has an "obscure 
' T h e ' w e ' in this sense is a sect, and a secret in its undecidabi l i ty . 
origin" (Butler, 1993, 176) mark the undecidability of constitutive principles of democracies, 
identities, times and spaces that need to address themselves to their past in order to arrive at 
an otherwise future. 
The futurity present democracies need is represented and embodied by this 
undecidable figure. The queer exemplify the aporoi" in a conflict staged on the borders of 
democratic communities that signals a wrong that has always already constituted the inner 
"outside" of a "we" where they are "absent" legally or in a lived way.^ "* Any "community," 
any "we" is performed by the mobilization of belonging by virtue of birth^lood/citizenship. 
However, as Livermon notes "belonging exposes the differential power relations that are 
sometimes obscured in the language of universal citizenship" (2012, 299). The queer 
represent the people out of place within democracies where they legally belong, but surviving 
inequalities, violence, lack of recognition. Their situation signifies a temporal gap between 
the law and the lived situation even when they have rights (say, to marriage); and when they 
do not, it signifies a time out of joint as they feel forced to re-enact access to the Constitution 
to demand them as part of the people. Belonging, Livermon concludes, "navigates the fraught 
relationship between forms of legal/constitutional freedoms and social and cultural freedoms, 
serving as an important reminder that the existence of the former does not guarantee the 
possibility of the latter" (Ibid.). 
Drawing on these theorists, I argue that historically 'the people" could have never 
been present in the political world if they had never successfiilly challenged and represented 
the (formal or lived) norms of their present as wrong; 'the people' first enacts its 
undecidability with the indignant discourse of the anonymous mob that speaks, not to agree 
but to re-present its political world as heteronomous, unjust and limited, and itself as the 
people-to-be that would unmake the law of the present. Speech here is not a demand for 
^^  The aporoi denotes those who are neither included into nor excluded from a shared life 
They are living a "secret," i.e., an unrecognized life socio-poht.cally, culturally, and ethically. 
justification by lifeworldly norms, but an invitation to respond to a future political world that 
has yet to become. The staging of belonging and making a 'community' in fact mirror the 
undecidability between the agonistic and solidaristic currents of the political that are 
intertwined in the act and speech. ' ' The decisive distinction between an act of speech and a 
speech-act, however, lies in the reference of the former to a possible, otherwise future derived 
from the past. 
Conclusion: The Past, the Present, and the Future 
I have argued that the ground-making speech-act of the political is not agreement-oriented, 
rejects justification by and authority of present norms, and subjectifies heteronomously. 
Habermas' approach does not take into account the disruptive performativity of the act that 
poetically changes what it means to be a people, as well as their constitutive presence. If the 
latter is registered by the former indexed to the rule of the law, how do the people re-
constitute themselves if they cannot disagree with the law? In a similar vein, how can they 
say something unanticipated by the law of the past, if they have to agree with the present law 
of the sayable? 
The paradox of transcending the self that is supposed to give the law through the law 
occurs because of the paradox of normativity Habermas overlooks in his preoccupation with 
agreement and legitimacy: the constitution is justified by the people who will have always 
already been constituted by it as a people if they successfully utter it. Paradoxically, subjects 
speak to authorize norms, but speech constitutes and authorizes subjects to make norms, and 
norms subjectify people authorized to speak. The vicious circle is ended when the people 
perform themselves as the sovereign subjects of the political that they will have (never) been. 
Habermas' legitimation-by-discourse model assumes that the people's agreement and 
presence justify the law, although before the law will have represented them as a people, they 
would have been a mob. The constitution is either made by a mob which will always already 
" Likewise, every act of speech is also a speech-act that it will have been if successful. 
have been a people if it is/was made successfully, but a mob is neither lawful nor sovereign. 
Or it was a people that has a presence in its making, it means there always already is/was a 
constitution in place that has already represented them as the people and they did not make it. 
If they did not make it, they cannot be sovereign or lawful. In any reading of the aporia, the 
people who are both constitutive and constituted, both legislating and subjectified by the law 
they are supposed to justify by their presence and discourse, occupy a problematic and 
provocative temporality. The sayable discloses the problem of origins on the one side, 
locating the source of authority in the people, not calling to question why the people agree to 
the agreeable, what law in their constitution in the past makes them say the sayable, how they 
internalize, re-iterate and act on the norms that make them what they are. 
The sayable in this context conflates the community of subjectless speech with the 
people subject to the law; Habermas pursues and expands on consensus as the moral principle 
of making sense thrice as a gathering of demos, of words, and finally of norms. Derrida, on 
the other hand, disagrees with the ethical conception of the law as consensus, the appeal to 
which "produces in fact the indecent transgression of the classical norms of reason and 
democracy" (1988b, 259) since it founds democracy in an alien law external to its logic that 
robs the people-to-be of a chance to speak against the present norms that may do injustice. In 
fact, Habermas reduces the experience of coming together to an address free of performative 
contradiction, ethical obligation, disagreement, risky experimentation, and poetic freedom 
that characterize the political. 
To pursue the ramifications of the paradox of normativity, the original address of the 
law of the sayable was thus the private, thepn, a past one always refers to m speech though 
the allocation of the origin of shared meaning onto this site was not justified by the law that 
authorizes the archive with the task of justice. As the law of justification does not address the 
thorny issue of its own origin, it instead refers to itself in an obfuscating silence regarding its 
authority delegated to privileged mainstream identities favoured by the archive. "Here a 
silence is walled up in the founding structure of the founding act," Derrida explains (1992, 
11), since questioning the origins of the principles of speech, or more precisely calling into 
questions the principles of speech-acts, leads to a performative contradiction. And a self-
contradictory speech-act is no lesser an offence than violation of the law of the sayable, in 
other words, speaking nonsense, not making sense to one's fellow citizens. If questions 
regarding the origin of the principles cannot be put into words in the "proper' language, how 
can they be put into words at all? 
This brings the matter of temporality, and the past, into the domain of speech as the 
arbitration ground of the political. Historically the representative formation of the people, the 
meaningful relations of the lifeworld and the sayable were achieved in a violent exercise of 
unauthorized self-invention by the mob, performed outside the discursive politics, that left a 
trace on the way we speak, do politics and exercise autonomy today—all made possible by 
heteronomy, by the law inherited from the founding others in the past. Yet this performance, 
the act of speech "We, the People," made them what they were not, a people. It changed the 
meaning and rules of what it is for a people to be. It made them otherwise. Therefore what 
Habermas takes as the justifying presence of the people is a normative but precarious 
representation from a lawless past, of a people performing its undecidable identity and 
forever seeking to ground its norms through speech that invites 'us' to become otherwise in 
the future. 
Speech of those who have long been gone and speech from those who have not yet 
been (the act of speech is open-ended as it only refers to what is to come, to the future) 
circumscribe what can be said at the present by the 'we' who is neither and both. In the 
following chapters 1 will illustrate this point by turning to the aporoi in general, i.e., the 
victims of Nazi genocide, the slaves in Ancient Greece, and Palestinians in the present Israel. 
They are neither a part of the people, nor folly excluded. Their speech refers to a future 
democracy where they are recognized as equal subjects. It may have been so far determined 
by a normative structure of the past that continues to exercise control on the arkhe of speech 
and archivum of meaning, in that the constant reference to ihe private archive of norms may 
effectively demarcate what counts as speech that makes sense m public, viz., the sayable, and 
dismiss the rest as nonsense that should not be uttered in any respectable political setting. If 
the happiness conditions of their speech-act are only sought in the present/presence per the 
Habermasian account, the anchorage in the archive tends to close down the gap, reducing the 
aporia of absence/presence to representation, and a wish-to-say to the sayable. 
In the thesis the terms "wish-to-say," "wish-to-hear," and "wish-to-live" are used to 
denote both the performativity and performance of acts of speech contingent on the fijture, 
and their possible success. As acts of speech do not have stable, codifiable rules, conventions, 
or happiness conditions at the present, the wish expressed or demanded depends on how 
"well" they are performed if they are to be actualized in discourse, responses and within a 
peaceful shared life. I also argue that acts of speech express nonsense by the present's norms; 
they do not make sense unless the act is successful, and when it is, it changes the meaning of 
what it means to be the subject of the act expressed therein, as well as the referential relations 
and coordinates of the political world where it is performed. To take what I shall call the 
"wish-to-say" as an example, since the speech at stake in the act is contingent on the success 
of the act as well as the making of a political subject, object and world, it is not speech per se, 
but a wish to say that may or may not come true depending on its performance, and be heard 
as rational, political discourse of a lawful subject to come in a democracy to come. Similarly, 
a wish-to-hear is a performance by the addressee on whom a demand is made and may or 
may not recognize the address as if it is voiced by one of 'the people.' And finally a wish-to-
live is none other than the fundamental demand that finds its expression in a democracy-to-
come, a life structured by freedom, equality and peace with otherness and others not 
recognized as one of 'us. ' 
The subject-to-come that wishes to say is at its present not a recognized part of the 
archive. The subject-to-come is aporetic: both one of us but not heard and responded to as if 
it is one o f ' u s ' in the archive. As the archive is institutionalized into the constitution, the past 
that has (never) been risks being the present that hijacks the future of democracies. The 
speech-act turns into a constative, the reality of a people safeguarded in the archive. The loss 
of the performative dimension within representation potentially deprives the people of a 
chance to democratically engage with the law one can only iterate; and democracy remains a 
promise or a threat to itself 
Chapter 2. Address of the Law: It Is We Syeakins in You 
In December 1955, when Rosa Parks refused to give her seat to a white person, she disagreed 
with the law of the past, saying words that were unsayable, performing unauthorized actions 
in public at that time, acting out of character as a Negro, refusing to be a Negro. Hers was an 
act of speech that troubled the rule-governed speech-acts of the political of her present that 
relied on the repetitive representations of the past. It created anxiety because it was not 
authorized by the law, could not be justified by the law of racial segregation it violated and 
exemplified an act of civil disobedience, which by definition cannot be foreseen or 
incorporated into the positive law. Yet she made use of an undecidability regarding the 
sovereignty of the people: she defied the sovereignty lodged in the positive law, but 
vindicated the sovereignty that necessarily originates from the people. She authorized her 
unauthorized act of speech, and acted in defence of the constitutive principles of democracy, 
and mainly, ideals of equality and freedom. The law she (un)made was followed by others 
who submitted themselves to her example, heteronomously acting like her in order to be the 
sovereign people that they would already have been once they did so. 
Legalization of civil disobedience is still somewhat unsayable, as the fragile limits to 
it within which the Rose Parks of the worid can perform non-violent but constitutional acts of 
disagreement with the law, are undecidable by the law that would authorize them. The 
paradox brought into the fore by her act of speech is one of authorization and sovereignty. 
Moreover, it revolves over the undecidable character of acts of speech that enables 
performance of unauthorized speeches and actions—the unsayable of the present. Again, 
when Rosa Parks refused to give her seat to a white person, she was disagreeing with the 
unjustifiable segregation economy of visibility of the time that characterized black citizens as 
inferior. What she uttered made visible the black self in public, that is to say, she represented 
an ineffable character within the unthematized American lifeworid that embodies the law, 
prompting a movement of dis-identification with the subjugated subject position. Her act thus 
both dis-identified and identified the subject of the pohtical. 
Since Aristotle in Politics defined the human by the capacity of rational speech to 
persuade others, speech makes the human political because it is used for articulating what 
matters to a polity in general. Habermas too assumes that speech institutionalizes the 
formal frame of autonomy in deliberative democracies where rational argumentation, 
persuasion, deliberation and judgment coordinate action and make the rule. However, 1 shall 
argue in this chapter that voice/speech also has a politically subjectifying and recognizing 
function that 1 trace in its oscillation between rational address and irrational threat/promise. 1 
am only interested in this duality because these are the basic terms in which subjectification 
operates. Subjectification matters because it sets up the scene of the political, peopling the 
world with subjects and creating the sensible forms in which they can appear. 
Moreover, Habermasian liberal democracy seems defined by an anxiety over 
irrationality. There is a threat to singularity, sovereignty and individuality in the Habermasian 
scene of subjectification on the personal level; and on the collective level, the clamour of a 
mob similarly troubles the Habermasian project of deliberation. Rosa Parks subjectified 
herself through a conflict, followed by a mob that threatened the people with a society-wide 
disagreement. If rationality is rule-following, she acted on a thin line between rationality and 
^ Although the voice can also express pleasure and pain, what distinguishes the human being in its use of the 
voice is the expression the just and the unjust. It is the sharing of this rational capacity to voice matters of justice 
that make a household or a polis. Likewise, the gist of a political life for Hannah Arendt, speech, makes us 
political beings as we initiate collectively coordinated action by discourse and elevate from mere creatures of 
pleasure and pain to subjects capable of judgment. She follows Aristotle in asserting that "[m]en in the plural, 
that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because 
they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves" (Arendt, 1958, 3). Because speech enables 
and sustains both rule of law and rule of the people, ideally, in an institutionalized public space, everyone is 
entitled to speak within and take part in legislation. In Human Condition she states it emphatically that 
"wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what makes 
man a political animal"—even to the extent that "[a] life without speech and without action . . . is literally dead 
to the world; it has ceased to be a human life" (Arendt, 1958, 3; 176). To be fair, Arendt also takes into 
consideration singularity but reduces it to a non-political truth: "There may be truths beyond speech, and they 
may be of great importance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political being, 
whatever else he may be" (Arendt, 1958,4). 
illegality. The millions followed her. Her example shows singular acts of speech embody 
both a threat and a promise. 
Habermas thus falls short of grasping the political situation of subjectification and 
recognition in its entirety. Indeed, I argue he aims to sterilize and formalize speech, 
theoretically distinguishing between the action-coordinating and subjectifying functions of 
language on one hand, and formal justification and authorization functions on the other. 
However, whether in practicing self-rule in public, or becoming a self in private, speech is 
employed to address, recognize, identify and make sense of another person who makes 
demands on us, and an address is made to those identified and recognized by the address. 
Habermas too acknowledges the role addresses play in our subjectification but dismisses 
singular identities as dangerous pitfalls of subjectivity that leads to disagreement and gives no 
authority to the self (which is transcended) in the Ideal Situation of Discourse. 
In this chapter I thus de-idealize the 'ideal situation' in order to make visible the 
liberal anxiety over the (ir)rationality of the address of the law that subjectifies us. 
Disagreement for Habermas hinders identification with the people symbolized by the law and 
must be overcome. However, I argue that the matter at the heart of democracies is also the 
rationality of disagreement with an unjust law and dis-identification with the submissive 
position of the addressee. Dis-identification requires assuming responsibility for the response 
to the law. The emergent people transcend their self, the 'we, ' constituted by the law of the 
past that demands agreement and threatens with sanction in case of disagreement. Since the 
'we' is always on the process of becoming otherwise, sometimes organized as the law-
abiding good citizens who speak in turns, and sometimes as a raucous mob that brings down 
governments, the sovereign is always (an exception to) the norm that it (un)makes, 
(dis)identifying with its self 1 shall investigate how dis-identifications could be possible 
within Habermas' context of speech and drawing on Butler's understanding of the subject, 
argue that a lawless character is necessary for the exercise of sovereignty. 
My argument proceeds by first taking a critical look at Habermas' theory of 
subjectification, as one that enables private autonomy in an encounter with the voice of the 
law. I shall point out the shortcomings of his account where the self, when threatened by 
future sanctions and forced to agree, internalizes the main normative orientation in order to 
be the sovereign that one (never) is, taking over the voice of the law that transforms 
intersubjective relations of recognition into rules of action. I shall argue that speech in fact 
subjectifies as a pure address of sovereignty, stripped of concerns of validity because its basic 
function is to place 'me' into the wider society of the 'we.' The latter point reveals the 
primary address as one in which the self becomes autonomous through heteronomy, by 
submitting to the law of an other due to the possible sanctions that lurk behind the demand 
for agreement. In Habermas' account, the child has no choice but to submit to the voice of the 
law in order to achieve recognition; hence the heteronomous constitution of the autonomous 
subject. And the threats and possibility of punishment, as well as the promise of a shared life 
constitute the force of the address of the law as Habermas implies. The voice of the law 
makes autonomy possible only through heteronomy and submission, by the trace of the 
addressor XhaX forces the addressee. Yet this unjustified threat and demand form singularity 
and a character. And that unruly remnant Habermas termed a 'character' hinders sovereignty 
by sovereignty, exceeding both "me' and the 'we.' 
The first section explores in what terms Habermas conceives subjectification while 
the second emphasizes formation of "character" as a singular individual which is depicted by 
Habermas to be at odds with the political project of identifying with the "we." As 1 pursue the 
undecidability between autonomy and heteronomy in these sections, the third section 
completes my argument in returning to the past where the "we" was constituted by and as a 
mob where autonomy was indistinguishable from heteronomy. In this primal scene of the 
people, I argue, identities on the brink of {de-)formation are also destabilized and rationality 
gets dangerously close to the (ir)rationality of a mob where the voice (dis)places "me" within 
the "we." The mob" symbolizes the ultimate breakdown of the Situation of Discourse; 
speech gives way to action in politics and silenced people act to (un)make the norm. This 
constitutive moment ruptures and brings together, (dis)agrees and makes a demand 
unforeseen by the law to make the law. 
2.1. The "me" and the "we" 
Habermas, in offering his own account of subjectification, draws on Mead's research on 
linguistic development of the self (Habermas, 1992, 171-193; 1987, 96-100) where the 
linguistic competence children achieve enables them to critically reflect on themselves, adopt 
the perspective of the listener as well as that of a speaker.'® 1 shall pursue the question of 
what role speech plays in this process. Habermas suggests that the second person perspective, 
generalized into a reflective self by the address, brings about an impersonal identity, "me" ' ' 
that through dialogue turns into a universal "we" that signifies the sovereign people: 
The individuation ...is explained by the linguistic medium itself.. . 
the logic of the use of the personal pronouns, and especially ...the 
perspective of a speaker who orients himself to a second person... [;] 
this speaker cannot in actu rid himself of his irreplaceability, cannot 
take reftige in the anonymity of a third person, but must lay claim to 
recognition as an individuated being ... the speaker qua actor lays 
claim to recognition both as an autonomous will and as an 
individuated being. (Habermas, 1987, 190-191) 
How can speech reconcile universality and singularity in one breath without giving rise to 
a lived conflict for the self-to-be? As a 'medium' of the law that takes subjects as 
" A mob arises when the people's demand is not heard. A mob signifies an inner split within the people but it 
also brings them together. 
The fact that one imernalizes conventional norms of one's society and identifies oneself with a subject 
position available in one's culture through speech, however, does not require taking a critical distance from 
those norms and role identities. 
" He writes off the T (the pathic self t^ hat feels, desires, and needs) as a candidate for autonomous individual as 
one has no control over the body, and his discussion revolves around the 'me,' an identity shaped through social 
anonymous, and as an expression of an irreplaceable person's autonomy, does Habermas' 
account of the address conflate two functions of speech (collective action-organization 
and individual subjectification) where the self becomes a part of the 'we' to the extent that 
s/he follows the law? And is it singularity, or worse, heteronomous constitution of 
autonomy that is silenced here? 
In order to answer, 1 will bear with Habermas' appeal to a primary address that yields 
successful integration of the 'me' into the lawful world of the 'we.' He approaches 
subjectification through primary linguistic interactions with the child that leads to recognition 
of one's identity and achievement of ethical sense. The child, when addressed by authority, 
comes to recognize him/herself as a 'me' embedded within the normatively-oriented socio-
political world of the 'we' that demands valid responses. Mead's model presupposes a 
capacity of mutual understanding between the parties to this initiation dialogue. In Mead's 
theory of naturalistic development of language, transition from gesture-mediated to 
symbolically-mediated interaction occurs "by means of a mechanism he calls "taking the 
attitude of other'" (Habermas, 1987, 9). Whereas primitive interaction is based on responses 
to stimuli where each organism "acts as if the [first] gesture were an expression of the 
intention to bring about this result" (Ibid.), higher level social interactions involve 
'internalization as making objective structures of meaning internal....: the self relates to itself 
not by making itself an object but by recognizing in an external object, in an action schema or 
in a schema of relations, something subjective that has been externalized" (Ibid. : emphasis 
added). 
The primal scene of subjectification for Habermas is not predicated on a simple 
adoption of mirror images of action, beliefs and words (i.e., mere mimicry, mimesis, 
representation; cf Leys, 1993, 285), but recognition of and by a Generalized Other with 
which the child can start an inner dialogue of shifting positions, anticipations, expectations. 
and a whole system of relations that make up a world of life "because a subjective world to 
which a speaker relates with an expressive utterance gets constituted only to the extent that 
his identity is formed on relation to a world of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations" 
(Habermas, 1987, 26). The self comes to life in, responding to, and sustaining a lifeworld 
with meanings symbolized in actions that will have built a self of its own by virtue of "the 
pressure to adapt that participants in complex interactions exert upon one another" (Ibid., 12). 
The situation figures as a scene of address where one feels a threat, a hope, and an ethical 
urgency to recognize the self and the other as expecting a response. 
When they can take this 'attitude of addressing the other' toward 
themselves as well, they learn the communication roles of hearer and 
speaker; each behaves towards the other as an ego that gives an alter 
ego something to understand (Ibid., 13). 
In addressing a significant other who addresses him/her back, the child recognizes a 
normatively structured world s/he ought to recognize him/herself as an individual within. 
This generalized voice promises autonomy, 'arouses" a wish-to-say, and expresses a wish-to-
hear the right kind of response if the child has a wish-to-live in the world of others. It 
becomes a haunting voice with which s/he also addresses him/herself as an "autonomous" 
person.'" The self s interpretations of the other (and second degree interpretation of itself as 
responding to that interpretation), the other's expected interpretation of the self (and again 
second degree expectation of an interpretative response to that interpretation) follow a 
sequence of addresses (and expressions of disappointments) until they finally match and both 
parties reach agreement, identical meanings and norms of action embedded in those 
addresses. 
htmself but [i.e., a n s w e r s - . H ^ to h - m s e l ^ r r r ^ S t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
replies to him" (Ihid., 14: Habermas' emphases). ^ 
I argue that subjectification for Habermas is equally a symbolic action, i.e., an act of 
speech where the subjects-to-be recognize the principles of recognition they also have to 
apply to themselves in order to be a socially viable self (i.e., autonomous but also submissive 
to the law). For Habermas this speech-act becomes normatively binding when addresses are 
responded to, following the same norms of speaking and acting.^' As Habermas' elucidation 
of Wittgenstein's concept of rule shows, these rules lay down "examples of something 
[universal] that can be seen in them. ...; only the application of a rule makes the universal in 
the particular apparent to us" (Ibid., 16). Speech imbued with normativity produces subjects 
both unique (here "autonomous") and universal (following the same rule) since a rule can 
account for the meaning of examples that have a family resemblance, like individuals 
peopling the same life-world (Ibid., cf Wittgenstein, 1953, 87). 
Habermas' account of validity of rules, mutual critique and instruction and an ability 
to have a yes/no response to the question if a rule has been followed justifiably brings 
together speech (address), subjectification (recognition) and intersubjective validity 
(normativity, authority, the law). Although faced by significant others who make daily 
demands on the child, the universality of the self is thus achieved through identification with 
a General Other that comes in the form of laws. Habermas thus places the capacity to 
internalize, question and criticise norms at the centre of the self-development where the child 
is addressed by the voice of the law that orients, gives commands and expects normatively 
valid speech-acts. Since the child anticipates a threat when he fails to give the expected 
response, expectations of sanctions too are internalized through taking the attitude of other. 
At the end of this perilous journey of recognizing oneself being recognized by an 
other, through an abstraction process the child arrives at universalizable principles s/he 
adopts as an autonomous person as well as a critical perspective on what can be best 
" But the organization of the "we" as well as its respective norms vary and are not given. 
described as a community consensus on normative expectations and obligations that may at 
first seem threats and arbitrary commandments of authority. Not only taking over but also 
thinking through and selectively internalizing/critiquing those norms, as Habermas 
elaborates, the child's motivational structure is altered from a parochial interest-oriented one 
to a wider social mindset of mutual recognition, obligations and rights. S/he becomes an 
autonomous "me" firmly anchored in the social world of the "we." "This Utopia serves to 
reconstruct an undamaged intersubjectivity that allows both for unconstrained mutual 
understanding among individuals and for the identities of individuals who come to an 
unconstrained understanding with themselves" {Ibid., 2). 
2.1.1. Tlje Structure of Agreement: the self and the other 
Many have criticised this model on the grounds that there is no pre-given, monolithic 
normative edifice that encompasses unequivocal, undisputed principles of action symbolized 
by the General Other (Weir, 1995, 271), Although the Utopian character of his account 
reduces speech to a means of flawless re-iteration of The Rule, it is the ghostly 'we ' 
embodying the voice of the law that is the problematic crux of this model where an address 
becomes the site of the unaccounted transition from merely submissive anonymity to 
autonomous individuality. My interest here will lie in how speech presents the autonomous 
self to itself via the law that comes from others; Habermas promised an account of the birth 
of the autonomous self, but so far the emergent self seemed to submit to the voice of the law 
of others. 
Habermas' story implies that the self-to-be has a wish-to-live in the lifeworid, has a 
capacity for understanding the intersubjectively structured, rule-governed character of 
meaning that appears to justify threats, sanctions and limitations. Although Mead argues that 
"the authority oi obligatory norms comes to be by the way of the internalization of sanctions 
that are de facto threatened and carried out," Habermas thinks Mead locates the motivating 
force in violence, instead of a promised life as a member of the social, and argues that "the 
growing child learns these patterns of behaviour through anticipating the sanctions that come 
from violating a generalized imperative, thereby internalizing the power of the social group 
that stands behind them" (Habermas, 1987, 38: emphases added). The authority of the law is 
transferred by the social generalization of behaviour patterns and consists of a threat of 
sanctions that the child needs to give assent to (Ibid.) if s/he has a wish-to-live in the socio-
political world of others. This moment of universality also contains the claim "... that a norm 
deserves to be valid only insofar as, in connection with some matter requiring regulation, it 
takes into account the interests of everyone involved, and only insofar as it embodies the will 
that all could form in common, each in his own interest, as the will of the generalized other" 
(Ibid.). This 'we ' that signifies the sovereign people is heard as a disembodied voice of the 
law that addresses, gives life to and threatens the subject through thou shall not; the only 
right response to its speech is, so Habermas underlines, "1 agree." Although Habermas 
emphasizes that "1 agree" is characterized as a rational consent, it is received as a forceful 
demand akin to prohibition. It is worth noting that a child is not quite capable of rational 
consent and thus responds to the sanctions, threats of punishment and implicit coercion in the 
demand: 
When A regards the group sanctions as his own. . .he has to 
presuppose his assent to the norms whose violation he punishes in this 
way. Unhke socially generalized imperatives, institutions claim a 
validity that rests on intersubjective recognition, on the consent of 
those affected by it. (Ihid., 39) 
Therefore in order to attain recognition as a viable self, Habermas suggests, one needs to 
agree with the norms of the 'we, ' i.e., rationality that make all autonomous and sovereign. 
Recognition of the subject and intersubjective recognition of the law are mutually implicative 
if one wishes-to-live, i.e., wishes to share the power of the group, i.e., speak, act and live in a 
world of others as one of ' u s . ' " In fact this point parallels with the criticism that "the 
discourse ethical procedure in fact transforms forms of mutual recognition into abstract rules 
for the coordination of action" (Bernstein, 1995, 189). The voice of the Generalized Other 
does not only tell the subject what to do, act in imitation of others and represent itself as a 
universal self in conformity with the law; it also tells the autonomous subject into existence, 
grants recognition and represents it as a recognizable self worthy of a place in the world of 
'we. ' 
As Habermas notes the actual persons are absent in this picture; the Generalized Other 
is transmitted by speech into a nebulous pre-self that is given life as someone only after this 
conversation is over. Before or during the conversation, however, only commandments of a 
subjectless discourse prevail. It addresses its present self in arbitrary commandments, or 
represents to bring a self into presence. Since this process constitutes the self, the subject is 
not yet present at the moment. Likewise, Habermas abstracts significant others out of the 
picture and generalizes them into the voice of the law. At this level of abstraction the child 
learns to relate to him/herself through the dialogue with the voice of the law:: "A pattern of 
behavior that A internalizes in this sense takes on the authority of a suprapersonal will," 
(Habermas, 1987, 34) a Generalized Other that the self, when addressed by it, 'can split up 
the communicative role of alter into the communicative roles of an alter ego, a participating 
counterpart, and a neuter, a member of the group present as an onlooker" {Ibid., 35). The 
child learns to relate to her/himself as a third person through the address of others, as an 
interchangeable instantiation of the Generalized Other s/he can impersonate in order to avoid 
sanctions. Whereas Habermas tries to cast subjectification as a rational process, the 
threats/promises involved in the constitution of the self indicate prohibitions, coercions and 
force, rather than rational consent are central. The self starts with anonymity and ends up 
« C.f. the master and slave dialectic in Hegel ' s Phenomenology of Spirit, esp 113-117 and Butler ' s reariinp nf 
the dialectic in Psychic Life of Power Theories in Subjection, 1997, esp. 42 " ' 
with anonymity as far as the law is concerned; its autonomy and sovereignty are equated with 
heteronomy and submission. In the interim it hears incorporeal voices that tell him/her what 
to do; it tells one to imitate an Other, find itself in mimesis of a super ego that s/he will have 
(never) been.^' Although Habermas characterizes it as a critical learning procedure, the child 
relates to him/herself through mimesis.'^ The generality of the patterns and norms of 
speaking, acting and living implies that these norms apply to anyone represented and 
addressed by the law in these terms. And mimicry is in the anonymous, submissive way the 
subject takes up these patterns, makes them his/hers, identifies with the heteronomous 
representation in and through oneself to become the autonomous, sovereign self that s/he has 
(never) been. It is an act of speech of recognition that also culminates in the promulgation of 
norms that sustain and limit sovereignty and recognition.^' But as Habermas also supposes 
this schema of recognisability to be firmly universal (impersonal, and generalizable 
regardless of the singularity of the recognized) the unique character of the recognized 
remains unaccounted for, and perhaps unaccountable for, within and by the normative 
structure. In the next section drawing on Butler, I shall argue that this constitutive act of 
speech also leaves singularity of "me" unrecognized as an undesired, as an unforeseen 
remnant inassimable to the collective identification. 
2.2. A Private Self of One 's Own: Silence as Wish-To-Say 
The law does not only coordinate action but tells subjects into recognizable existence as a 
sovereign self Yet obviously we are not clones, but also unique individuals that contingently 
become a subject acting in particular ways. Speech, Habermas and Mead seem to argue, 
subjectifies and legislates without giving rise to any possibility of conflict between the law 
" "Since the Habermasian other appears as such to the subject as only a generalized other, it would seem that 
the subject itself can only become a subject for-itself (through the other) in a similarly generalized fashion, i.e., 
as a structure of internalized responsibility attuned to the normative requirements of social life" (Haysom, 2009, 
654). 
" The mimesis involved in Habermas' account of subjectification is a process of universalization in the sense 
that one represents onese/fas a Generalized Other, speaking, acting and living the way an image from the 
archive that one identifies with speaks, acts and lives. 
In Butler 's terms, the act of speech both relies on and re-instates "a certain criterion to establish what will and 
will not be recognizable, a frame for seeing and judging" (2001, 23). 
and life, individual and society, self and other. But what can give rise to unique 
individualities, a radical transformation of the "we" at large that re-enacts its sovereignty, and 
innovative (dis)identifications unless there is a performative contradiction, a twist to the 
primary address that returns the subject to itself in such a way that a creative tension occurs? 
"Individuality too," Habermas writes, "is a socially produced phenomenon that is the result of 
the socialization process itself and not an expression of residual, natural needs that escape 
that process" (Ibid., 58).'"' 
I.IA.A Lawless Remnant: character 
Habermas criticises Foucault's framework of subjectification as empowerment that leaves no 
room for individuation.^' And "[f]rom his perspective, socialized individuals can only be 
perceived as exemplars, as standardized products of some discourse formation—as individual 
copies that are mechanically punched out" (Ibid., 293). Accordingly, Habermas also attempts 
to avoid the assumption that discourse produces normalized, almost identical subjects.*^® He 
responds to this line of questioning with: 
The identity of the ego can then be stabilized only through the abstract 
ability to satisfy the requirements of consistency, and thereby the 
conditions of recognition ... The ego-identity of the adult proves its 
worth in the ability to build up new identities from shattered or 
superseded identities, and to integrate them with old identities in such 
a way that the fabric of one's interactions is organized into the unity 
of a life history that is both unmistakable and accountable. An ego-
identity of this kind simultaneously makes possible self-determination 
and self-realization.. . To the extent that the adult can take over and 
be responsible for his own biography... [o]nly one who takes over his 
own life history can see in it the realization of the self Responsibility 
to take over one's own biography means to get clear about who one 
Of course Habermas demes the alter ego, subconsciousness and psychodynamics of subjectification that may 
lead to an .rrational repef t .on compulsion to please the law that gives one social life and an acceptable identity 
He seems to identify the subject formed by the address of the Generalized Other with the superego T o u g h my 
argument remains neutral regarding psychoanalysis and does not make use of its theoretical too l ! i a l s o L s Z d 
i i c a t h " h e ; " " " ' " " ' f ' h e s e concepts h a v ^ n y 
" "Then, however, the socialization of subjects capable of speech and action camiot be simultaneously 
T h X i e t C ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ v.ta. substratl under the 
- - - and 
wants to be, and f rom this horizon to view the traces of one's own 
interactions as if they were deposited by the actions of a responsible 
author, of a subject that acted on the basis of a reflective relation to 
self (Habermas, 1987, 98-99). ^ 
Yet if the plasticity of the self is contingent and an ongoing project for Hfe, the question 
remains as to how he can theoretically achieve keeping two processes, of legislation and 
subjedification, from collapsing into one and the same dialogue in a daily life context; one 
becomes an autonomous self through submission, and forced to be sovereign, responsible for 
that which one has no other choice than agree on. He responds that "[tjhis problem can be 
dealt with if we distinguish ... between language as a medium for reaching understanding and 
language as a medium for coordinating action and socializing individuals" (Habermas, 1987, 
23). But the primary address is the primal speech-act that comes as an authoritarian 
combination of the two languages where the voice offers a life (of organized actions) to and 
threatens (with withdrawal of recognition) a presence that lacks the rational capacity of 
deliberation and critique at that age. One is asked to respond before one is able to be 
responsible and submits to the law if one wants to survive as the sovereign self one is forced 
to be. One cannot be fully responsible for one 's self For Butler too the self cannot be 
accounted for fully: "The i ' is the moment of failure in every narrative effort to give an 
account of oneself It remains the unaccounted for and, in that sense, constitutes the failure 
that the very project of self-narration requires" (2001, 37). If the self has a wish-to-live, it 
also should wish to enact its heteronomous representation since it cannot author itself without 
internalizing authority, i.e., the law of others first. In sum, if it seeks recognition, it needs to 
agree with the norms of recognition. 
^ He suggests that "identity of one ' s life history is a maintained by projecting goals into the future around 
which one ' s present identity is organized (Habermas, 1987, 102-105; c f Taylor, 1989, 25-52). That is, if one is 
autonomous, one can locate oneself in terms of biographical projections ( 'projects ' ) and retrospections. These 
provide, as it were, a content to the self When one thinks or says 'I , ' this refers to the reflexive traces of 
relations or says ' I , ' this refers to the reflexive traces of relations with the world that have been maintained, 
desired, projected, or broken. This i * is not, of course, guaranteed metaphysically or otherwise" (Warren, 1993, 
217) 
Drawing on Butler's notion of agency, I shall criticise Habermas' understanding of 
subjectification to argue that he does not make room for singularity, individuation and 
political resistance. Butler notes the 'me's being outside 'myself when she writes that "[t]he 
possibility of the i , ' of speaking and knowing the 'I,' resides in a perspective that dislocates 
the first-person perspective whose very condition it supplies" (2001, 23). In other words, the 
reflective relation to the self needs to be mediated (through the voice of the Generalized 
Other). "The 'me' represents not only the particularities of moral consciousness tied to 
tradition," Habermas claims, "but also the constraints of a character that impedes the 
development of subjectivity" (Ibid., 99). The subject is bom into the story of the 'we' with a 
character that inhibits the internalization of the law, which also is a social attainment, but 
unaccounted for in Habermas' picture. Habermas simply remarks in passing on this irrational 
aspect of the singular self that disputes the authority of norms and asserts its sovereignty: it 
appears as a wish to talk back to the law since it impedes internalization of the law which is 
different to the heteronomous submission to the law. Since the subject comes to life at the 
first address, it apparently too slips in as an uninvited but necessary passenger. The aporetic 
line between heteronomous submission and rational internalization is situated in the domain 
of the "character' that negotiates and navigates sovereignty.™ 
In Butler's account our responsibility and agency "begins where sovereignty wanes" 
(1997, 15-17) and in this context it is to be situated not in the lawful T but in a character 
excitable and out of control. A character, or kharakter in Greek, is an indelible mark on the 
soul, and since it was put on place not by the individual but by an other in Habermas' 
account, it is not represented to the self that is marked down or presented to discourse that 
can give an account of it in representation: the generality of the address consumes character 
without being able to represent it within the schema of recognisability that is always too 
™ It forms inside the heteronomous self an autonomous wish-to-sav for it is nm a , ^ i. . , , 
asks "Yes? Or no?," or solely an achievement of the atomic subiec^ of s o e e L I n h'^ 
"No, 1 disagree and don ' t belong with ' us . ' " '' ^ " P " " " 
universal. For Butler, too, singularity turns into the limit of recognisability in normative 
terms and discourse addresses 'me' to a specific other in their singularity as well as 
questionable universality that borders on substitutability one's singularity contests (Ibid., 
24). And "in giving the account, I establish a relationship to the one to whom my account is 
addressed, and whether both parties to the interlocution are engaged in a sustaining address, a 
revised scene of reciprocal recognition in which full accountability is neither expected nor 
provided" (Butler, 2001a, 31).If a character is formed by other's demand to respond in the 
scene of recognition necessarily structured and limited by the schemas of recognizability, it is 
formed as an unrecognizable stranger within the "me" that exceeds these limits. Character 
has an undeeidable origin: it does not arise out of identification with a significant other or the 
Generalized Other. It makes one singular, (outside) one's own norm, just like the sovereign. 
The law, on the other hand, demands full identification. In speaking, one repeats the 
words of the Generalized Other. In responding to the law, one speaks like a child, or a 
stranger one does not chose to be. The law gives no orders to the subject, but orders into 
existence the subject that will have always already acted it out: full identification with the 
'we' implies uncritical submission, and a loss of sovereignty that comes with the character. 
The character doesn't necessarily have to be explained away as the irrational self, ' ' because 
autonomy, i.e., the law of the self, is always given by the life of a self that rather fades into 
otherness without being able to represent it in speech. "The address that inaugurates the 
possibility of agency," Butler says, "in a single strike, forecloses the possibility of radical 
autonomy" (1997, 26). For the purposes of the argument all Habermas needs to admit is the 
possible presence of character in private, a secret locus of singularity and irreducible 
individuality alongside the rule-governed representation of the self 
" To take an example, as typical sub/unconsciousness in psychoanalysis, or a remnant of the first encounter 
with a significant other that transforms a child's unverbalized intentionality (Mcintosh, 1994, 7), desires, 
impulses into strange tendencies and needs but I am not interested in debates on psychoanalysis here. Character 
doesn't buttress a theory of radical autonomy like Habermas, ' neither does it refute nor locate the agency of the 
autonomous self in a darker place. 
2.3. A Loss and Disruption to Sovereignty: temporality of character 
Therefore we identify nhe twist' to the first address that sets up an ongoing creative tension 
between the law and the self, a chance of being otherwise than the law suggests, a discursive 
opening to the private self that is not let in the public space. It is the same private 
identification that Habermas suggests one 'transcended" in an Ideal Situation of Discourse. 
And this unruly, unspeakable, and secret part of the self is foreclosed from the political, 
locked in a silent, private place since it presumably "impedes the development of 
subjectivity" in a political world that cherishes subjectless speech. At this point, Habermas' 
terminology falters and vacillates between lionization of subjectless subjectivity and 
dismissal of subjectivity that impedes subjectivity (which is the criticism he directs at 
Foucault).'^ 
What Habermas rather means is that the character is not a sovereign part of the self 
the law can control since it is not put into place by the law that the self agrees on, but as it is 
an indelible mark left during the address of the law, and a split within the self that disagrees 
with the law, it must be a secret trace of the address unrecognized by the law. So just as Mead 
writes, "when an individual puts himself in the place of another he is speaking as the other 
has spoken ... [but t]hat mutual control we transfer to the other person... controls us [even] 
when we are not putting ourselves in another's place." (Mead, 1914. 69-70) The unnerving 
presence of a character for Habermas can be tolerated as long as it is kept within the private 
realm since it foils the pursuit of absolute rationality and public sovereignty. However, 
drawing on Butler I argue that it is necessary for exercise of sovereignty as there may be 
times when one needs to critique, resist, dis-identify with, and disrupt an unjust law. As long 
as character constrains the self, even after the address that marked its trace ended, it must be 
another instance of heteronomy. It is a silent remainder to the heteronomous constitution of 
" He might have assumed thai whatever impedes subiectivitv miehi hp J 
p C t i e a . dtscourse, one may m.s taken, , .„fer, necess.lates 
autonomy, the submission that always accompanies sovereignty; character is a stranger that 
disagrees with and thwarts the fantasy of sovereignty as mastery over and full responsibility 
for 'me" and the 'we.' 
Butler re-articulates the disturbing remnant of 'me' that escapes the universal 
schematization of norms and foils fall narratability and mastery as an interruption necessary 
for a shared, democratic life built on the concept of popular sovereignty: "If a life is 
constituted through a fiindamental interruption, even interrupted prior to the possibility of any 
continuity, then narrative reconstruction will also have to be subject to an interruption if it is 
to approximate the life it means to convey" (2001, 32). The interruption, I argue, is temporal: 
subjectification precedes the subject, as a secret past of the authority that brings 'me' to life 
but limits 'me's being made fully autonomous, sovereign and discursive. "Me" at its 
constitutive moment breaks with the past that has (never) been in order to be present before 
the law through "the process by which 1 cease to be able to return to what 1 was" (Ibid., 23) 
unless it is re-enacted. For Butler the re-staging of the encounter is possible because "me" is 
both "subjected to that norm and the agency of its use" {Ibid.) and a character is precisely 
what allows for and interrupts the representation of what was (not) present from the view 
point of norms one does not author. At that moment, Butler adds. "1 find that the only way to 
know myself is precisely through a mediation that takes place outside of me, exterior to me, 
in a convention or a norm that I did not make, in which 1 cannot discern myself as an author 
or an agent of its making" (Ibid., 23). 
Representing oneself anew, however, entails appropriation of the authority of norms 
one does not author —sovereignty enmeshed in submission— in order to authorize the 
character as a part of the political world, disagree with an unjust law, speak and act like the 
sovereign people we (never) are. Recognition is performed constantly, on a day-to-day basis 
to reveal and make visible what has always already been foreclosed from discourse and 
denied a place within the 'we' divorced from the people that have to submit to each other in 
order to be sovereign. Every time this moment is repeated, 'me ' re-articulates its undecidable 
character to disclose its otherness to others (submitting itself to others as an other) and make 
it a part of the shared world; if this is a means for bridging the gap between ' I ' and 'me, ' its 
unsayable past and lived present, it is also the futural way in which an T becomes the 'me' 
that it will have always already been once it is re-presented to and by others. But it is also the 
interruption of the present with a reference to the past where character was constituted, and 
the re-articulation myself as a future self that includes the otherness in oneself For Butler 
this is experienced as a vacillation between ecstasy and a loss on the personal level; and on 
the collective level, I shall argue in the next section, it is lived by the sensation of one's 
identity (and personal sovereignty) lost in the undecidable identity (and sovereignty) of a 
mob where the subject re-enacts its constitution as a process where it is displaced, moved 
beside and outside itself 
2.3.1. Mob-ility of Speech Again: A General Other in the Extreme 
In this section I shall examine the implications of subjectification for politics. I will argue that 
the mob, analogous to the character, is necessary for the exercise of sovereignty. The 
undecidability between submission and sovereignty, between the people's voice as the law 
and unjustified violence of an amorphous mob that defies stabilization of identities, rational 
discourse, and coordination is parallel to the constitution of the subject with two polarities in 
Habermas' thought. The perils of the voice, (un)fTeedom, (ir)responsibility, law, violence, 
(dis)agreement and (dis)identification creates a source of anxiety within Habermas' project of 
agreement-oriented deliberative politics that reduces the voice to coordination of action. 
2.3.1. Perils of the Voice: Mob and Identification 
To forther the analogy between the individual and collective levels, in the presence of the 
law, the subject hears a voice (of the 'we ' in its undecidability as the lawful, sovereign people 
or the violent mob submitted to their own ecstasy) that will be his/her own voice (that never 
is one's own) and sees a re-presentation that will bring him/herself into presence outside 
oneself: This is an imaginary identification, a loss and ecstasy over an image as one of 'us. ' 
"Our need for imagery is fundamental," Mead states, "for it is by that means we can put 
ourselves in other people's places" (Ibid., 97). This image that secures identification,''^ the 
'me, ' Mead and Habermas argue, cannot be equated with the mob psychology where the 
"we" takes over 'me ' : 
When the community is merged with us the restraints are gone. 
Everyone is doing the same thing. In the sense that the critical process 
is interfered with this may be called the lower stage of consciousness 
(Ibid., 73). 
The mob is where the self is not present, just like when it is in the situation of constitutive 
address; one repeats the words of others without thinking, without asking for a justification, 
simply belonging. It seems as though the highest and the lowest stages of consciousness are 
quite alike, and an address of authority can dis-identify just like it identifies. 
What stands radically opposed to the self is identification with the 'we, ' which, as 
Habermas suggested following Mead, provides the possibility condition of the self that 
authors itself with authority (sovereignty) it never/always has. When in a lawless mob, one 
hears voices that one can only repeat but not understand; speech is given over to and by an 
other not fully identifiable with those present. One is always present, acting in agreement 
with the mob one is submitted to, disagreeing and making the law as the sovereign people. 
But since no individuation can take place in a crowd, one instead finds oneself in the 
anonymous representation of the law gone drunk with (unauthorized) authority, a spectral 
generalized other that gives seemingly arbitrary commandments and issues threats just as the 
Generalized Other does to a child. It has the same character as the law that bizarrely 
approximates to 'character,' an unruly unity not universalizable, escaping and impeding 
" "But one always carries with him a picture of himself which he has seen in the glass, and that is, in his 
consciousness, the individual to whom all these other individuals are responding.... Just as soon as he takes the 
place of another, he will have to present himself over against the other, the looking-glass i . ' (Ibid., 70) 
discourse and rational demand for validity. Speech does not represent a subject, but also gives 
rise to and is given over to a presence (dis)possessed, or diffused by a representation that the 
self although identified with it, cannot recognize itself within. 
What if speech subjectifies when stripped of validity claims, as a voice one cannot say 
yes or no to sovereignly, but that almost seduces, nearly hypnotizes, brings one besides 
oneself, attaches, leaves a mark when it "transfers control" to an other unrepresentable to the 
controlled? How does it control even when the self oscillates between absence and 
presence,between 'me' and 'character' in the world of the law that oscillates between the 
submissive 'we' and the sovereign 'mob'? A mob usually emerges when public discourse 
fails to represent or hear a character as the subject of the political (that is, not as one of the 
sovereign people)?^ A new 'we' is always on the threshold of birth when those who have a 
character disagree long enough to find a voice and speak for the whole community qua the 
mob. Disagreement here occasions the responsible kind of subjectification that Habermas 
asks us to undertake in 'building up new identities' (Habermas, 1987, 98-99). 
Making a new identity in this context implies representing oneself as one of the 'we,' 
(un)making the norm that makes one what one is (not), and being otherwise. Disagreement 
re-enacts the constitutive moment of the people when they take responsibility for an unjust 
law and form a demonstrating 'we' (the mob). But the mob also dis-identifies with the 'we' 
of the present society as an injustice that wrongs the people that need to be heard as the 
sovereign people. Becoming a people, Habermas implied, requires taking over, being 
responsible for and transcending the present self that has (yet) to be (Ibid.). Disagreement is 
an aporetic act of speech that fits perfectly Habermas' definition; it both identifies and dis-
" Butler suggests thaf 'a t the most primary level we are acted upon by others in ways over which we have no 
say, and that this passivity, susceptibility, and condition of being impinged upon inaugurate who we are'' 
(2003a, 90). For her -.he other is always there, from the start, in^e'place of whe e the e ^ w t l b " ( b d 52) 
as a character that defies full characterization in discourse. ^cguwii iDe uoia., 
" But the people do not only live in public but in a lifeworld where'other'kinHcnf , and foreclosed from the public realm of speech in communLToTa Iwed law disagreeable 
identifies, offering a discursive site for making of new identities, because it is flitural. It is 
engaged in constitution-making and constituting people into a collective identity that 
transcend their selves in the mob. Why the anxiety over its irrationality, then? 
2.3.2. A Mob at Work: Constitution-Making 
To credit Habermas, his model incorporates disagreement in the form of resistance and even 
civil disobedience when the maintenance of the legal order itself or a clash between the law 
and the constitutional principles is at stake (1985, 136).'^ When disagreement brings 
discourse to a halt, Habermas adds, a background of shared 'thin' beliefs, practices and 
institutions must bridge the gap between dissenting parties: "I would like to suggest that the 
performative meaning of the practice of constitution making ...provides a thin yet sufficiently 
strong base to be shared by citizens in their interpretative struggles—within a pluralist society 
as well as in the supranational sphere" (Ibid., 193: emphases added). 
Yet the work of constitution making historically was done by the greatest example of 
the 'we'—the mob as the sovereign people that disagrees, makes a constitution they submit 
themselves to without the guidance or protection of a constitution, and finds agreement 
within disagreement. Habermas contends that "constitutional law-making has a performative 
meaning" (Ibid.), but this meaning has been, in most cases, disclosed by a (non-)subject of 
politics that transcends discourse, rational representation, and validity; it has just embraced a 
wish-to-say that cannot be turned down by a 'No' when it was successful. And although 
Habermas rightly points out that the "performance of those founding acts [of self-governing 
communities]... thus contains an implicit, intuitively available meaning that is the same for 
everybody" (Ibid.), it subjectified a hitherto nameless community (the people) only in so far 
" Michelman (1998) and Waldron (1999) argue that the multiplicity of interpretation of the law and consequent 
disagreement on rules, procedures and constitution undermine the assumption that public discourse is oriented to 
agreement: "But he [Michelman] realizes that the continuation of debates on conflicting interpretative issues 
would lose its point and would turn into a bizarre, even opaque practice," Habermas disagrees in his response, 
"if participants were not tacitly presupposing, albeit counterfactually, the possibility of an agreement that is 
worthwhile to aim at" (Habermas, 2003, 192: emphasis original). 
as it de-subjectified another of the past (the subjects of the king, the proletariat etc.). The 
practice endemic to the grounding of the self-governing community was thus undertaken by 
strangers to the art of government who had to re-interpret disagreement into a founding act of 
agreement; they also performed themselves as the sovereign people that they have (never) 
been. And performativity involved in these speech-acts took unjustified acts and creative re-
interpretation captured by a world-disclosing language of the new, and a silent absence 
turning into a presence that has a character to say the unsayable: "We are the people." They 
performed and took on a meaning formerly unavailable in political discourse, invoking the 
law of others they would have become, making a claim, not of validity but authority. Their 
act of constitution-making was not constitutional (there was no constitution that could justify 
their claims). It oscillated between violence and law-making, submission and sovereignty, 
illegality and legitimacy, a threat and a promise, absence and presence. 
•The people' of course has been the founding speech-act of modem democracies, but 
less remarked upon by Habermas who seems anxious about the performative art of 
constitution-making is the fact that "the people' has been a recent and violent invention, 
perhaps dating back to French revolution, that for ever since sought its voice and 
representation in a political world that it simultaneously attempted to build and deconstructed 
thereafter. Before that, 'the people" had no meaning, let alone an "implicit, intuitively 
available meaning that is the same for everybody" (Ibid.). In fact "the people' was constituted 
by a mob that did not so much speak meaningfiilly as threatened and promised, and after the 
act of speech became otherwise than what it was. Habermas' remarks on the performativity 
of the people seem to betray an anxiety over the constitutive past of the people that still has a 
hold on the present situation of democracies informed by the fear of the mob rule, violence 
and socio-political transformation. 
Exploring the political perils as well as promises of voice, Frank argues that the voice 
of the people brings into visible existence the image of the people that performs itself in the 
situation of discourse that indissolubly brings together sovereignty and submission in the act 
of representation. He pursues the theme of hearing voices in the context of deliberative 
democracies where voice represents an autonomous presence speaking for itself, genuine, 
sovereign—a "people" with specific needs, rights, obligations and identity that could be 
mobilized in the general schema of organized actions of community. To this conception of 
voice as indicating a ground of authority, Frank opposes another vocal performance that 
moves, ravishes and persuades without offering reasons; one that overwhelms, captures, and 
controls by shaping the perceptions of its audience. If "the people," as argued by Frank in the 
Introduction of my thesis, is a claim, an act of speech of self-justifying authority, voice is 
definitely a part of the performance that determines the success of the act of speech.^' 
The vocal performance conveys a subliminal message and gets 'under one's skin,' by 
masterful eloquence, rhetoric, addressing desires, hopes and affection: those perils of the 
voice that contribute to the performativity of constitution-making are also what troubles the 
Habermasian project of rational persuasion, deliberation and agreement as they chime with 
submission rather than sovereignty. However, those "perils' accompany every speech that 
mobilizes the undecidability between rational persuasion and 'seduction' that appeals to 
one's desires, hopes and wishes: if one does not hope for what is suggested in an address, or 
is situated in a conflict of interest, sadly, there is not much rational argumentation can do and 
an affective force is and should be a part and parcel of the persuasive power of any public 
argument. To repeat the criticism by Alvesson, "[djesires, norms and thoughts are not 
immediately responsive to good arguments and the twists and turns of discussions as 
Habermas supposes" (1996, 146). Habermas theoretically sterilizes speech into a purified 
" Voice therefore does more than organization of collective activity in political terms; it also acts on others, 
persuades, brings about a change etc. 
force of universalization free of sentiments but paradoxically relies on a sense of belonging 
that pre-affects the parties to the dialogue: "every requirement of universalization must 
remain powerless unless there also arises, from membership in an ideal communication 
community, a consciousness of irrecoverable solidarity, the certainty of intimate relatedness 
in a shared life context" (Habermas, 1990c, 48). But if the mobilization of this pre-affection 
is foreclosed by Habermas' anxiety over the force of speech, then, as Bernstein maintains 
"[t]his ethical substantiality is in a sense entering blindly, without cognitive sense or rational 
meaning, since Habermas already deprived such intimacies (feeling, affects, concerns) of any 
but de facto sense by handing over to communicative interactions hegemony" 
(Bernstein, 1995, 190). 
Frank's exploration of the paradoxical nature of authorization and vocal performances 
is not done simply in praise of political demagoguery: "The capacity of voice to bring forth 
an immediate response plays an important role in the constitution of public authority in 
postrevolutionary American political culture ...as [t]here was an animating tension in 
postrevolutionary American political culture between the authority of written texts (like 
constitutions) and the authority of spoken voice" (Frank, 2010. 163). In postrevolutionary 
America, he continues, when a self-governing community needs authority to ground the 
ground-zero speech-act, its authority is believed to perform itself through voice beyond 
representations that brings about autonomous acts of self-constitution, but Frank's study 
reveals that the self that lays down its self-law to perform itself speaks the words of others. 
Frank's debunking of the fantasy of the voice representing a self-constitutive, 
autonomous presence also maps onto his reading of Charies Brockden Brown's 
antidemocratic novel that negotiates the paradoxes of vo;c populi taken to express the popular 
sovereignty, Wieland: in the novel all characters act as if they are autonomous but actually 
submit to the voice of others that have always already told them what to feel, say and do. 
Although the people symbolized by the heroes and heroines of the novel express their ideas, 
opinions and suggestions (the origin of which, paradoxically, cannot be traced back to them), 
they do so upon hearing disembodied voices of others; the pivotal character, Carwin, for 
instance, persuades, influences or forces them.'* As the voices (of Carwin, of an old stranger, 
of God, of the past, of the ghosts, and of other others) multiply, the people as well as their 
voices in the novel are re-constituted as a constantly shifting metonym, (im)possible to 
represent, similar to a mob. 
Although they raise the voice of the people, it rather leaves undecidable who it is that 
speaks when they do. "Through the novel's device of ventriloquism," Frank elaborates, 
"Brown rejected this fantasy of vocal authenticity, or rather revealed its persistent but 
disavowed reliance on fantasy" (Ibid., 163-4). The fantasy he refers to consists of mistaking 
acts of mimesis for autonomous speeches and acts, "most poignantly democratic self-
captivation, the phantasmic identification with what is taken to be collective voice" (Ibid.: 
emphasis original). When one submits to the fantasy that the vote one casts, the decisions one 
makes and the words one utters are fully autonomous, singular expressions of one's own 
choice and expressions of a sovereign will of one's own that authorize the general will, there 
always is the worst risk of imagination at work, and "we must understand the role of 
imagination in constituting that authority, in constituting all authority" (Ibid., 166). 
The risk at stake culminates in the undecidability between autonomy and heteronomy, 
a threat to the representation of the collective voice as the aggregation of identifiable voices 
that indicate individual presences. The liberal anxiety over the mob is perhaps the same as the 
apprehension over the voice of the 'we ' as an imaginary, Active collectivity (the people 
identify with) that nevertheless escapes its monolithic representation as the sovereign people. 
™ His performance is sometimes purely rhetorical and sometimes performative and through performances of 
other kinds, he plants opinions, ideas and words in them, at times impersonating a frail old man {Ibid., 161), and 
at times the voice of God (Ibid., 160). The Calvinist past of the family (that signifies the American society of 
Brown's present), as well as the lost members of the family, too. Brown implies, have always already 
predetermined what the present members can say and do. 
Yet where our peril lies also lays a promise. Going back to the primary address that is the 
main concern of this chapter, through imagination the child may envisage the world, the self 
and the 'we' otherwise than they had been designated by the authority of generalized other.'' 
The emergence and dissolution of a fantasy starts with speech that takes one out of one's 
command, with a commandment.*" 
"Brown's novel reveals our irreducibly uncanny relationship to law and the 
impossibility of full democratic autonomy," Frank concludes, as "it suggests that since we are 
at once the agents and sufferers of our own rule, fantasies of agency and fantasies of 
submission are a single part of the interpellative scene" (Ibid., 181). When speech turns into 
the authoritarian voice of an absent authority, it authors the self that becomes autonomously 
submissive and submissively autonomous at once. Paradoxically, the self can only be 
autonomous within the context of a shared life which this voice introduces one into whilst at 
the same time locating the law of the self outside one, in primary submission to others. My 
argument is that speech basically subjectifies by giving the law as if all law comes from an 
other we can neither identify our selves with in a representation nor simply turn down to 
leave the scene of the 'we." The main use of speech is making demands on others, but it is not 
a demand for validity; it is a demand to be heard and responded to as if one is an authority. 
Conclusion: The Law of Others 
It is a platitude since the post-linguistic turn that the self is an effect of discourses, yet, as 
Habermas admits, discourses project the heteronomous structure of the lifeworld onto the 
discursive constitution of the self that takes part in legislation. In this chapter I argued that the 
major subjectifying address (of the law) for Habermas takes place when the self was neither 
" Through imagination and ethical creativity, s/he can craft a new identification. And through the failure of 
^ag ina t ion that turns down fantasies of norms, s/he may also fail to identify with the voice of the law In 
followmg the rule provided by the law that moves imagination through the interplay of presence and absence, 
through the invisible voice of the Generalized Other coming out of one's mother, s/he can leam to be a girl and 
at times a boy, or anything at a 1. S/he may even love that which threatens its autonomy and s e l f - i n t e g r i t y l m 
outside and find a threat m the love given by the 'we. ' nuegruy irom 
It is not quite a commandment as it lacks justifiable authority but still makes one what one is (not) A 
T p T e " o Z n d m e n t " " ' ' ' " "e taken as a 
absent nor fully present, hearing and submitting to the voice of a threatening authority, and 
thus becoming undecidably heteronomous and autonomous, since the law one makes one's 
own comes from the others that make the self what it is. The primary address is therefore 
aporetic: it constitutes an autonomous subject through hetereonomy, makes politics possible 
by delimiting an apolitical remnant ("character") and builds rationality with recourse to 
irrational threats and promises. 
The sayable in this picture, however, is circumscribed by the rule-following 
Habermas characterizes as the universal condition of recognition in the act of speech that '1 
agree on the r u l e s . I n this Utopian framing of subjectification, Habermas reassures his 
readers there are no paradoxes arising among the three fijnctions of speech as means of 
subjectification, of action-organization and of legislation. Yet through the address of the law, 
I argued, speech subjectifies, regulates the future actions of the child, and secures the consent 
by making sure that one will only be a valid self as long as one follows the rules, says only 
the sayable, and acts properly within the normative limits. However, the law the child agrees 
on is not his/her own, but the law of others that both imperils and enables the project of 
autonomy. Thus the chief issue with Habermas" account is the fantasy of absolute sovereignty 
that robs the people of a chance to disagree with an unjust law, dis-identify with the self that 
the law assigns to them, and say the unsayable without having the authority to do so.^^ 
Recognition of the heteronomous constitution of autonomy restores the absolute authority of 
the law back to the people, to those in the past, in the present and in the ftiture. 
" For him, " / a g r e e " captures both the use of a personal pronoun that signifies an irreplaceable individuality, 
and acceptance of an emergent autonomy which the child achieves by critical internalization of norms of 
speaking and acting in the lifeworld of the 'we. ' The emergent self gains validity and a life through universality, 
and through universality it is recognized by the law as an autonomous individual capable of agreement. 
The scene of subjectification involves autonomy only as entangled with heteronomy in such a way that in 
making the law we refer back to the law of others, and in speaking agreeably, we say the words of others; 
speech is thus the re-iteration of the words of others that we will have been once we spoke (cf Butler, 1993, 
242) and it is to their law conveyed to us in the past that we owe our present autonomy. 
In Habermas' theory the pohtical is delimited by the sayable that leaves the character 
out of the picture. His gesture is analogous to the totalitarian politics that tend to exclude 
minorities, the aporoi, and the subordinated. The departure for the unsayable, however, takes 
the identification of the self ('character') back into the picture, focusing on what kind of new 
possibilities of the 'we' can be disclosed if we apprehend speech as a demand to be heard by 
the silenced. Habermas insists that discourse does not represent or identify a self (2002, 155). 
Yet acceptance of rigid, hegemonic shared forms of life in a democratic society may motivate 
an investigation as to how self-legislation can go only so far, leaving the identity of ourselves 
and our society unquestioned, and silencing the unsayable. As opposed to the identity of the 
subject that cannot break with the rigidity of the sayable, I argue that subjectifying addresses 
always promise a subject-to-come, with an opportunity to dis-identify with the 'we.' Dis-
identification involves deconstructing the identification of the self and should inevitably take 
the detour of precarious representative publicity of our character. One should first represent 
publicly the private self that is yet to be recognized as a subject in the political.^' 
Once we reveal what types of economy of visibility and audibility prevail in our 
lifeworld to privilege the public representation of dominant identities, we may criticise the 
principles of recognition that sustain fantasies of absolute autonomy reduced to rule-
following. But freedom seems achievable through unfreedom, uttering what is so far 
unsayable to be free of an unjust law, though the origin of the "primary" autonomy that 
enables us to do so may always defer to others we owe our selfhood to, and can never be free 
of 
To conclude, Habermas equates deliberative politics with the sayable of the law but 
excludes singular identities, emergent political agendas and new subjectivities under the 
rubric of the 'character.' And the critique cannot take the current law based on agreement i 
t as 
That is not to embrace metaphysics of the self that camiot be captured by our human and fragile speech but to 
come to terms w,th an unescapable fa.litre of representation of socio-cultural constitution of the self that always 
leaves behind an element that escapes identities and creates a space for dis-idemification 
its starting point. I believe theories of radical democracy that take into consideration the 
regulation of the private in general may make better sense of the way that fantasies of 
autonomy demand absolute submission to the law that silences "the Rosa Parks" of 
deliberative democracies. In disagreement, one may demand justice beyond the law, 
articulate the ineffability inherent to the prevalent norms that constitute the self, represent it 
in public, and hopefully dis-identify with it for a subjectivity to come through freedom 
afforded by the unsayable. With this aim, we should look at how the self is structured 
(Chapter 3), what regulations of visibility are in place on the public space (Chapter 4), and 
what makes disagreement possible (Chapter 5) with the hope of a democracy-to-come. 
Chapter 3. The Remnant of the Law: Justice to the Silenced 
The last chapter, through a scrutiny of Habermas" framing of deliberative democracy and 
speech, aimed to give an account of why fantasies of justification and sovereignty may 
silence and make invisible those who may need to dispute an unjust law. In this chapter I will 
argue that the most basic relation of our political present is established by the lived limits to 
representations that constitute and foreclose the emergent presence of what threatens and 
promises the sovereignty of the people.^'' 1 shall take politics as a constitutive address that 
forms the sovereign people with authority to speak. The situation of address, however, 
excludes those who are not seen as part of the sovereign people. 
To illustrate, I will visit the horrors of Nazi Germany to explore the most radical 
situation of address where the law was wrong, rationality bordered on the technical cruelty of 
insanity, and possibility of persuasion was nil.^' The victims of the genocide, mostly citizens 
with rights and state protection, were excluded from the society because their characters were 
at odds with the identity of the Aryan sovereign. Habermas" sayable in this context refers to 
speech-acts that have all three kinds of authority; the legal authority to make norms, the 
constitutive authority to build a community these norms apply to, and finally the 
representative authority to entitle a political subject as a recognizable member of the 
community with the first two types of authority. ^^  The genocide victims were deprived of all 
three authorities. Their socio-political presence was foreclosed. They merely embodied a 
wrong. Yet what if it is the law that wrongs, denies recognition, excludes and silences? Can 
one have the legal authority without the constitutive and representative authority in this case? 
" T h e grammar of language in this sense is analogous to the law that wrongs, curtails, dismisses or margmalizes 
the differences and d.ssentmg voices seemingly inassimable to the repetitive representations of the past 
There, the undecidability between sovereignty and submission was violemly decided a w a y the fiituritv 
inherent to the people was closed as if the question of who the sovereign people are could be decided- the aporoi 
were judged no to be a part of the 'we ; and the S.S. wished to constitute a community untroubled by hem 
coi lTuni ty""" ' " " re-formation of the political 
All three types of authority invested in speech-acts bring together the political power to represent with the 
subjects only those that legitimize its authority and the unoppo's^! ^^ 
Or, can the silenced others be heard if they are not recognized as citizens, members of the 
community, a part of the 'we'? Drawing on Lyotard's agonistic conception of politics, I shall 
argue that the wrong occurs as the law only recognizes and authorizes what it constitutes: 
how is it that disagreement with the law cannot be heard as a legitimate claim of the people 
who take part in legislation then? 
To foresee my conclusion, the wrong consists of a mode of sovereignty—i.e., 
sovereignty lodged in the archive and ossified as the authority of rules of the self that refuses 
to hear an other that says what doesn't make sense by the present norms. Here if one frames 
speech as making-sense by the present norms, the emergent subjects of the political would 
not only be excluded from, but also foreclosed by the ossified representations of the 'we,' as 
their novel and menacing "character" makes them unrecognizable by the law. Unrecognized 
and at odds with the normative criteria of membership, they would not be the members of the 
community. They would not have the constitutive and representative authority, and they 
would not have the authority to speak. 
The foreclosure of the aporoi troubles the situation with a power conflict where zones 
of unrepresentability and unspeakability emerge and the project of sovereignty enters into a 
state of emergency. The aporoi are constituted paradoxically both as an exception to the 
norm (the Constitution that does not recognize them as a part of the sovereign people) and the 
norm of the community that is structured around the foreclosure of the aporoi. 1 shall 
characterize the situation of the people who do not count as a part of the 'we' in terms of a 
political emergency: in the sense of an exception to the norm that it defines, it is the 
emergency of sovereignty in the sense Schmitt uses the term (1985, 5), and in the sense that 
the aporoi emerges as an exception that makes the rule and as a remnant," it relates to the 
subjectification and emergent subjects of the political. Given that this being before the law 
' Cf. Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben, 1999. 
constitutes the whole community by the people's own force formalized into the Constitution, 
emergency in the second sense relates to a creative force and self-creation of the sovereign 
people that addresses its selfi^ 
In this chapter I shall draw on but go beyond Lyotard's philosophy first to introduce 
an ethics of responsibility, response, and hearing. My second aim is to argue that the future 
rests with the hitherto unsayable—a sort of relationality that may turn to, hear and respond to 
the our present engages in a violent encounter with the silenced other that emerges where 
discourses meet their limits at the silence around the constitution of the people—the 
unsayable that at the present takes the representative form of a material silence, i.e. the matter 
of the community}'' With an act of speech the prepositional content gives the priority to the 
illocutionary force. And in a situation of discourse of violence, inequality, oppression and 
unfreedom, rational argumentation by prepositional content loses its relevance.'"' In this 
radical situation of address, the weaker can only wish to rely on the ethical force of their 
suffering; they, as wronged bodies suffering the breakdown of rational discourse would 
represent the injustice of the situation as visible on their presence. They would reveal their 
injuries; and having failed that, they would expose the wrong through and on their dead 
bodies. If this is an address, it aims to dissuade by means other than rational speech. That is 
why visibility takes priority over audibility. Exposing the oppressors to the violent image of a 
These t e rns denote acts of speech m a situation of conflict where discourse of the weaker is not heard by the 
stronger as the future norm, and silenced by violence, inequality and unfreedom. Lyotard calls the situation a 
differend: those excepted are wronged by the sovereign whose discourse is incommensurable with their 
discourse. They are not heard as a part of the sovereign people and silenced by the power. When rational 
argumentation and persuasion fail due to the irresolvable conflict of power between the addressor and the 
addressee and discourses cannot be bndged, the weaker can only wish to be recognized, heard and responded to 
as one of the sovereign people that make the law, and offer its silent presence that testif^.es to t ^ ^ t ^ a f o n T 
mterpretation. The wish-to-say is thus an attempt at representing what is not repre.sented as one of us " v ng 
among us but absent socio-po itically: it also performatively expresses the si J , i o n , and bears w i n e s s to a 
socio-pohtical and ontological wrong. witness to a 
Silence in this context should not be conceived as the metanhvsical onnn<il.P ^f u . • 
anxiety of a possible discursive contact between a material w L S ^ l y T d l ^ f h 
b ^ r g u e d mcely. The wrong is a wrong t h a t L s r l n a l i t y r ^ S f ^ r ^ e S ^ ^ ^ 
mount of naked, emaciated, dead bodies they are responsible for can only wish to demand an 
ethical response, a wish-to-hear. 
The wish-to-hear is the act of speech of recognition: the 'we, ' exposed to the ethical 
plight of the weaker and addressed by their silent presence recognizes the wrong, the 
vulnerability of the addressors, and their equality before the law that they, too, can (un)make. 
Bridging the two wishes together is the force of representation, the illocutionary force of 
speech, of being exposed to suffering. The force brings the political community back to its 
ethical origin where the constitutive authority of the law matches the force of the social bond 
with the unjustifiable illocutionary force of the address of authority that represents us as the 
people: it is the risky and anxious gesture of submitting oneself to the addressor as if it is the 
law-giver ." 
But their silent presence in the situation is an act of speech that demands to be heard 
by the persecutors;'^ they of course may hear what has (never) been said by the pile of dead 
bodies: they may seek words in the visible, re-interpreting them as speech that would be filled 
by their own, and perhaps accusative words. The accusative mode of address is what provides 
the transition from 'seeing' to 'hearing': it of course points fingers back at the self, but it is 
also the legal mode of address conceived by Althusser in On Ideology as a form of 
subjectification that he names 'interpellation' (Althusser, 2008, 44-60). The unvoiced 'Hey, 
you!' the dead bodies (never) say could be taken as the address subjectifying the 'we ' that, as 
the addressee, refuses to hear and the others who, as our addressors, even in their silence 
keeps saying the unsayable. 
" In the first chapter I gave an account of the wish-to-say in the context of civil disobedience: Rosa Parks' act of 
speech was not justified by the norms of her present but it (un)made the norm. She also represented the situation 
of the wrong that could not be addressed by the law of her present. And finally, she represented a political 
subject claiming a place within the archive of the sovereign people that speak to (un)make the law. 
The shift from 'seeing' to 'hearing' is an imagined one (and not a notion native to Lyotard's thought): 
technically, dead bodies do not speak but rather induce a state of speechlessness in those who see them. Unless 
the oppressors have a wish-to-hear, the dead remain silent. Although the feeling is similar to the one induced by 
the sublime, they rather visually represent the wrong that can of course be re-articulated or in Lyotard's term re-
phrased into an address. 
Silence is thus a contact between the sovereign and the foreclosed, between a material 
wish-to-say and ethical wish-to-hear. It bears witness to the wrong, and articulates an ethical 
obligation to be heard as one of the sovere ign .Lyo ta rd calls this frightening moment of 
silence the differend which the 'we" should prepare itself to receive a new law from: "the 
differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able 
to be put into phrases cannot yet be" (Lyotard, 1988. 13). If one may have to seek the law that 
binds us in elsewhere, outside the public space and identifications, it would be, Lyotard 
argues, an enigmatic call of justice that wordlessly forces one to act without seeking 
justification through speech, in "the silent feeling that signals a differend remains to be 
listened to" (Lyotard, 1988, 171). The conflict, in other words, must be seen as the site of a 
debate on the future of the 'we, ' and the re-constitution of the society.'" This chapter explores 
the situation where 'we' are exposed to the wrong signified by and on others' bodies, as a 
silent demand: like the pile of dead bodies in Auschwitz, or the muted Musselmanner in the 
concentration camps. In other words, silence may not be heard unless it is seen, in the form of 
a mute, material presence of others wronged by the matter of the community, and felt to 
testify to an injustice done by the norms that constitute the material of the society, the 'we' 
that refiises to hear. 
Although the thrust of my argument will be borrowed from Lyotard, I also re-
construct his though to argue that this presence that wishes-to-say is thus first encountered as 
the visibility of an unrecognizable embodiment, as the bodily presence of those who do not 
have the authority to speak. They signify the wrong done by the law, and they demand to be 
"iheso-far-unrepresentablelives, however, can only indicate the • u , 
of .he sovereign people, but if i. is the .we' that d o e s L ^ E e V c ' S J i ^ ' t r r t ^ a y 
as maudtble this extreme form of disagreement gives rise to a feeling of apona that canZt be resol vrrbV 
resorting to the present norms of speech or politics. What counts as speech mav f.i tn^HH T ^ 
presence unless it is occasioned by a wish-.o-hear (an act of recogni fon) thaTseek 1 H ^  
muted by the present norms of the 'we.' Yet that requires disavow" If th W ^ ^ ^ 
submitting ourselves to the authority of a silent call that nevenher's obltateland deLTd 
- Moreover when the address of justice, onented toward the fiitu e s c S v e d a s . T l u • 
heard as the future law-givers. In offering their visibility, they ask "Will you hear my story?," 
and in speaking they demand an ethical wish-to-hear the unsayable, i.e. what could not make 
sense by the political rationality of their time, viz. the principles that materialize the 
community and norms that structure it. Thus they also demand a speech-act that identifies 
and recognizes them. This wish-to-hear, I shall suggest, involves a poetic creativity to sense 
the meaning in their senseless, unrecognizable presence. It would represent the traces of the 
unsayable in the already-heard. 
This chapter is devoted to the question of speech when it is the law of the 'we' that 
wrongs and serves as an address that can both reify and undermine the fantasies of 
sovereignty threatened by the emergency caused by an emergent presence. This presence, I 
argue, hints at its precarious representation in the making on the margin of speech, i.e., in 
differends when one needs to respond to a wish-to-say as if it was the law to come. A 
differend that characterizes the incommensurability between discourses nevertheless will 
have lent itself to discourse when one needs to invent a new phrase, concept, representation, 
or norm to address it. It is our obligation to address it and one is obligated before the law, 
Lyotard tells us, always already; the future anteriority of obligation makes explicit the fiitural 
structure of the obligation. One needs to see and represent oneself as the addressee before one 
responds, and having heard the addressor as the law-giver, one will always already have 
responded. 
The 'before' thus refers to a future that will always already have happened when one 
hears a silent call in two senses: we response to the authoritarian address of the 'we' that 
precedes us, the law of community responsible for our being the way 'we' are at the present; 
and we are responsible to emergent others, unrepresentable at the present, who silently herald 
another political world, others before whom we are "stripped of the illusion of being the 
addressor" (Lyotard, 1988, 111), of our authority and sovereignty. The address thus "contains 
together its two faces, freedoin and persecution" (Ibid., 112), autonomy and submission, 
identification and dis-identification, the past and the future, and finally an emergency and an 
emergent people. 
3.\.The -IVe What Comes Before the Law 
I argue that for Lyotard politics has always been about the matter of the community in 
emergency—emergency as a state of exception (to the norm, by decision of the sovereign 
outside of the law it is subjected to), and emergency as in the emergent (i.e., a creative force 
employed in becoming a subject, a community, a foreclosed remnant of the matter of 
community). Lyotard suggests that the two senses of emergency are conjoined in "being 
before the law': in my reading, the sovereign comes before the law as its force and decides on 
the undecidable in order to become what it will have been. For Lyotard, politics intersects 
with aesthetics to the extent that it concerns itself with forming an emergent community, a 
totality of subjects addressed by the force of law that precedes the rule of the law: "Nazism 
would thus be not only the '"aestheticization of politics' but... the revelation that politics has 
been, in its essence ... a work of art" for it is the '"fashioning" of a people" (Ibid., 77). The 
Nazi language of subjectification was that of a self-enclosed totality and unity. By attempting 
to capture the presence of the people subjected to its grasp, the dominant force of law aimed 
to found a society on consensus, common identity, and way of life of a totality of subjects as 
the justifying ground of the law. That which persisted in its difference to the common 
identity, however, could not merge: instead, it emerged, stood out the grasp of the force of 
law and the confines of the community. It was expelled outside the lifeworld, into the 
concentration camps of silent suffering." 
The aim of the Third Reich law was hus unification of the nation in Lehensraum (Bendersky, 2000, 38) and 
redemption of Anan race through racial purification (Cesaran, 2004, 196), in sum re-formation and protection 
of a totalitarian society agamst an emergency epitomized by the threat posed- the inassimilable r e m n L t s nf the 
Jew the gypsy the gay, the old, the frail and sick, and the Communists ' U n e a s i n e ^ a th pr encTof mh/r^^^ 
w„h,n the - w e " that authorizes the law spanned the conceptual space of the ethical commun i "Tn N ^ i 
Germany, as well as the feeling that some live among us, though they are not one of 'us. ' 
In this section 1 will interpret his understanding of agonistic politics as an aporia: the 
people precede the constitution of the community and hence stand as an exception to the 
Constitution (as the sovereign in the Schmittian sense) that constitutes them as the sovereign 
people: they, before the Constitution, stand outside the law that they will have been subjected 
to, as an inexplicable exception to the democratic norm, but the movement of making the 
norm coincide with their self-creation as the sovereign people. The community is formed as 
the merging of the people, but as it also always already exceeds its unifying, totalizing 
representation as the people, some of the people (the aporoi) have already been excluded and 
not represented as a part of the people. The foreclosure of what emerges outside the 
community within the community is, aporetically, both an exception to the unifying force of 
its norm, and the norm around which it is constituted as a unity. 
3.1.1. The Law as an Enigmatic Address: Indebtedness 
The modality in which this uneasiness with otherness arises finds one unprepared for the 
feeling of emergency that the situation merits. In coining the term 'banality of evil,'' ' ' 
Arendt's controversial depiction of Eichmann aimed to show that in Nazi Germany some of 
the ordinary people could not loosen the grip of the norm they trusted in even when it clearly 
failed. They were not simply passive bystanders helpless to bring down the Gestapo law, but 
sometimes senselessly acting on its prescriptions, its witnesses who performed its justice. 
Similarly, "the many were neither perverted nor sadistic ...they were, and still are, terribly 
and terrifyingly normal," Arendt concludes (1964, 276), noting that Eichmann suffered from 
an 'inability to think' like the sovereign, against the norm that supposedly represents the 
autonomy of the subjects. 
One becomes a subject by being addressed by the law as one and the address makes a 
demand on one to comply with the law, conducting oneself autonomously but legally, and 
' ' Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banahty of Evil (Viking Press, New York, 1964). 
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having an acceptable socio-political presence in the society. Thus, attachment to one's 
identity given even before one's birth may be considered a possibility condition of the 
politico-ethical life that revolves around consensus. Because autonomy as self-legislation 
presupposes that if one identifies with the subject-position assigned by the norm, one obeys 
the laws one makes, supposedly acting both freely and legitimately.' ' A wish-to-live in this 
context is to be understood as submission to the promise of a shared life. Thus a demand is 
made by the force of law that "indebts you" (Lyotard. 1999, 29) with the symbolic life it 
gives you as a gift one cannot simply turn down. However, for Lyotard the 'must ' of the 
socio-political forces that represent one as a subject dilutes, opposes and forecloses the 
'ought,' a more fundamental relation of the ethical. 
Underlying the distinction between 'the must' (of the norm) and 'the ought' (of the 
law) is a responsiveness to what is present before an enigmatic call."^ In the normative 
address "the first-person plural is in effect the linchpin for the discourse of authorization," 
(Lyotard, 1988, 98), which means that the norm authorizes itself by the force of a "we," 
already instituted as a lawftil community that testifies to it. Legitimacy is thus framed in 
terms of the autonomy "principle ... that the addressor of the norm, y, and the addressee of the 
obligation, x, are the same" (Ibid.) as members of community. As in social contract theories, 
the 'we ' that comes to an agreement and gives consent to the norm as the legitimizing force 
comes before the law that always already formed and authorized it as the legitimate "we." 
Yet although 'the must' binds, this model provides no answer to the riddle of the paradoxical 
justification. The inauguration of the norm and the form remains unintelligible, unjustified 
" In Habermas- theoo' of the law we found out that subjectiflcation, i.e., the conferral of a socio-political life 
w„h,n a law&l socety, demands the subject to respond to the duty of the law favourably; if onThL a w ^ . t 
hve among us, Habermas emphasized, one mus, give consent to the norm, and bear witness ,o the L t i l of ts 
representation in return for autonomy. justice or us 
"J.F.L. insists once more on the heterogeneity of sentences, more particularly here on the subtle difference 
between a nonnative sentence and a prescriptive one. Whereas the normative senten e r l T b l a 
performative one' and m itself, by itself, in its immanence, 'effects the l ee i t im. f rn^f .h m . • 
formulates it', the prescriptive sentence requires another sentence one mo e anTthis fil ® ' ' ft 
the addressee, the reader in this case; it is left to him or her, ,hu tTfollow up ev t l^ f " . 
elsewhere, with a 'last sentence'" (Derrida, 2000, 30). " " 
and mysterious: it only aims to circumvent the crisis of justice by indebtedness to the norm of 
the "we." In Nazi Germany, the pathological attachment to the 'must ' of autonomy and the 
mindless refusal to disavow i t , " Arendt implies, marked the dark side of sovereignty."'" 
Paralysed by the enigmatic legitimacy of the norm that becomes unjust, Eichmann and so 
many others fell short of doing justice to the conflict that cannot be resolved by the totalizing 
representations of the 'we. ' They could not muster a wish-to-hear the call of others as if it is 
the law and the norm of an ethics of responsibility. 
Irreducible to socio-political norms, Lyotard asserts, the law is characterized by its 
unrepresentability and inscrutability as an enigmatic address,"" not as a rule legitimized by a 
representation (the 'we ' ) referred to in speech. In the ethical relation "[t]he law does not 
demand a proper understanding to make itself heard, it needs you to be dispossessed of 
yourself," as Lyotard put it (1999, 29), pointing out the disorienting character of the address. 
Thus emerges an obligation, inexhaustible by the one imposed by the norm, creating a sense 
of emergency that cannot be dealt with by a static conception of the law: it signifies a 
necessity for an otherwise norm. "For Lyotard, underneath an obligation derived from the 
nature of one 's subjectivity lies one 's prior involvement in and dependence upon the political 
99 Cf. Butler's 'passionate attachments" in The Psychic Life of Power where she says that "the attachment to 
subjection is produced through the workings of power, and that part of the operation of power is made clear in 
this psychic effect" (1999, 6). 
"" I suggested in the Introduction that the norms should be opened to contestation on a daily basis and 
negotiated through the expressions of popular sovereignty. The example of Nazi Germany brings home what 
terrible losses may be incurred if they are not. It indicates why the people, when blinded by the fantasy of 
absolute self-rule, cannot respond to a call of others wronged by the law when an unforeseen conflict in the 
community emerges and cannot be addressed by present norms. 
"" Santner calls the silent body an "enigmatic signifler" that addresses us like a hieroglyph, in its material 
potential, losing "what it signifies, without thereby losing its power to signify to" (2006, 34). These signifiers 
ex-cite the subject, disturb it in the recalcitrance of the remnant that exceeds discursive expression or 
subsumption under concepts. "The opacity and recalcitrance that we associate with the materiality of nature — 
the mute "thingness" of nature— is paradoxically most palpable when we encounter it as a piece of human 
history that has become an enigmatic ruin beyond our capacity to endow it with meaning, to integrate it into our 
symbolic universe. Where a piece of the human world presents itself as a surplus that both demands and resists 
symbolization, that is both inside and outside the "symbolic order' ... What I am calling creaturely life is a 
dimension of human existence called into being at such natural historical fissures or caesuras in the space of 
meaning" (Ibid., xv). "For secular Jews, that is, the laws of normative Judaism —the commandments of 
Torah—experienced as a set of opaque rules —enigmatic signifiers—with which they could no longer identify 
even when if they did not fully cease to be addressed by them"" (Ibid., 39). 
means by which one's subjectivity and one's experience of the world comes to be constituted 
in the first place" (Silverman, 2002, 75), It was the unmistakable call of justice that 
mobilized, for instance, seven hundred German women helpless before Gestapo into the 
Rosenstrasse protest, making them Aryan blood-traitors who dis-identified with the 
normative phantasms of the German 'we' of the time.'®^ 
3.1.2. Obligation: Demand, Authority, Sovereignty 
Lyotard deploys the term "law" as a (de)formative address in his texts in three ways: first as 
an ethical demand, second politically, as the question of the future of the community, and 
thirdly, in epistemological terms, as a totalizing and unifying narrative. The most 
fundamental instance is the ethical, where the law is confi-onted as an enigmatic address 
which inspires a feeling of performative obligation to testify to the silent call of others. The 
obligation again takes on a performative character, and urges one to perform oneself as the 
addressee, to act and become otherwise (say, a German-tumed-Jew), because, politically, he 
calls "the law the fact that there is a question or that we are questioned about what we ought 
to become and what we ought to do to become it" (Lyotard, 1990c, 35; emphases added).'"' 
We are questioned about ihe future of the normatively constructed "we" that comes before 
the law as a socio-political organization in which others have no presence; they are not 
represented as a constitutive force of the norm, but as an excess the norm should foreclose in 
order to circumscribe nhe we.' Yet it is their silent presence amidst us that calls our self-
representations into question and obligates to dis-identify with the exclusive norm. 
The ethical turn of the political for Lyotard thus gestures in the direction of a break 
with the norm of autonomy (the norm of omselves), toward an obligation to represent the 
The protest is usually dismissed as a minor local event with little political effectiveness involving a handful 
Germans married to Jews who face deportation to concentration camps. "Rather it was a rare case of 
Zivilcourage—lht courage of those who act on their convictions when confronting authority" (Lacquer 2001 
X). "The story of mtermamed Germans, culminating on Rosenstrasse, is hard to swallow for ordinary Germans 
smce It implies that, had more ordinary Germans not abandoned German Jews socially many more German 
Jews could have survived" (Stoltzfus, 1998, 155). 
"" I am grateful to William McClure for reminding me of the latter point. 
unrepresentable in the political world of the 'we. ' Lyotard's 'ought ' therefore heteronomizes 
the addressee -obligates one to be o//ienvise-without authorizing the addresser; although 
"the request emanating from this entity be received as though it were law ... [t]he only sign is 
that the addressee is obligated" (Lyotard, 1988, 108). In other words, "the obligation in 
question does not result from an authority previously legitimated by me or by us" (Ibid., 112). 
The formative force of the normative address is immediate, similar to that of speech-acts 
(Ibid., 111), in that it "institutes a new universe" where one is constituted as the addressee, 
and placed as a witness to the emergent authority. The ethical demand, on the other hand, 
does not found the norm on the presence (of the autonomous subject), but points to the 
"blindness ... [that] resides in the pretension to found ...what ought to be upon what is" 
(Ibid., 108). The 'ought" of the ethical and the testimony to the silence, Lyotard maintains, 
should not be replaced by the 'must ' and the witness of a presence. In other words, a 
response could and ought to be responsible because it involves a risk, because any address of 
authority is unjustified: authority can only be grounded in obligation— a response that 
performatively constitutes the addressor as an authority. 
Speech occasions an apprehensive relation to others who make a claim to authority 
and on us as the addressee of the obligation. It calls us to hear others as if their call is the law, 
though revealing the risk in responding to an unauthorized address responsibly. It invites us 
to be the ones responding, but in order to be responsible one needs to disavow with the law of 
responsibility, viz., sovereignty: the sovereign in this context is the one who decides in the 
face of undecidabilities. And when the norms or others that can guide one through the aporias 
are wrong, one takes responsibility for a decision, action or speech that cannot be justified 
from their standpoint. The sovereignty at stake is undecidably (outside) the law one is 
subjected to. In fact the sovereign is (above) the law it is subjected to when it (un)makes it 
through sovereignty. Obligation is the effect of the address of the sovereign in its undecidable 
character. Although others address us through speech, they say nothing that can obligate us, 
but stage an almost silent encounter in the order of the ethical that subjectifies us as the 
addressee. The next section pursues why any authority is almost silent. 
3.2. Silence of Authorities: The Law Does Not Come From 'Us' 
Lyotard distinguishes between the "must" of a command and the 'ought" of an ethical 
demand. In Habermas' theory of subjectification, recall that the child must submit to the law 
of the self as s/he is threatened, and a wish-to-live in a political community puts him/her 
under a debt to agree with the authority that gives the gift of a presence, an autonomous life 
among the 'we' ; this is the situation of address informed by discourse as well as power. 
Butler elaborates on subjectification, noting the dependency on the subject and the power of 
the community: "the 'we ' who accept such terms are fundamentally dependent on those terms 
for 'our' existence" (1997, 2). The subject has no other choice to recognize authority, at least 
partly, as its addresser and turn toward the law.'"'' 
In fact a wish-to-live is the reason why one must turn, constitute oneself through this 
speech-act as the 'you' in the 'Hey, you!' of the address; the necessity is not of the strategic 
and calculative order, but ontological. In other words, it has always already happened so we 
have become what we would have been: one recognizes oneself as a subject in the act that 
already constitutes the addressor as the authority. If it subjects one to the norms of an 
authority one does not authorize responsibly,'"Mt also authorizes one's taking part of the 
power as a recognized member of the sovereign 'we ' even when it subjectifies one through 
subjection and as a subordinated identity. 
as .he one who .s hailed. In the exchange by whi/h .ha. r e c o g n . i . r S ^ T ^ a ^ ^^^^^^^^ 
.he d,scurs,ve produCon of .he soe.al subjec.-tekes place. Significan.ly, Al.husser does no o f e a I T a s .0 
why .ha. individual .urns around, accep.ing .he voice as being addressed .o him nr h . / r n . u 
subordina.ion and normaliza.ion effec.ed by .ha. voice" (1999 4) ® 
I d r o f t ^ u l ' r ; . " " " of one's sovereignly in .he 
The 'ought' of the ethical demand, on the other hand, obligates without authorizing 
the addresser or identifying the addressee, and it undermines the fantasy of sovereignty by a 
scandal of obHgation where the self submits to an inscrutable, unjustifiable law of others that 
makes one otherwise. It locates authority in authorless authorship of what is to come, not in 
what resides in the present. I shall formulate this address as (de)subjectification — although it 
takes place in the setting of speech, it is received as an almost silent call. 
3.2.1. The Unjustifiable 'Ought': Scandal of Authority 
Why silence, and where does language come into the picture as a normative proof of the 
presence? The answer revolves around the way in which the ethical demand is perverted into 
a norm through the mediation of speech that privileges knowledge of the presence—the law 
in the epistemologic sense of the term. Cognition entails the reduction of the 'ought' to the 
'must' through a set of self-justifying normative constraints effectuated by discursive 
practices, since the linguistic "norm is what turns a prescription into a law" (Lyotard, 142, 
1988). Yet the address can only give rise to a 'must' if shored up by the authority of those 
present, or reduced to rules, principles and self-grounding norms that stabilize identities of 
the 'we.' But, since no description of the present can justify a representative prescription, 
Lyotard suggests, no authority is justifiable. The address of the law rather demands /a/r/; in 
the 'ought' of a wish-to-say; not asking for justification of the said by present norms of the 
sayable, as it is the making of a new norm one witnesses, or putting the said to the discursive 
test of the 'we,' as it may as well be the sayable of the 'we' this wish is addressed to 
accusingly, but a wish-to-hear that receives it as a silent call one ought to respond to. 
Lyotard suggests that the law is epistemologically reduced to the application of a 
concept to an object that presents itself in language, since "[w]hat reality is ... is that object 
for which intuitions of its concept can be presented" {Ibid., 161). Lyotard first analyses the 
address of the law as a normative phrase that has a precarious hold on the prescriptive one; in 
order to assert the law a normative phrase is hnked with a prescriptive phrase by the authority 
of the addressor: The phrase that "One ought to do A" is authorized by the phrase N that "By 
the authority of the law, we decree it to be a norm that P" (Lyotard, 1988, 142). That is 
elevated to the status of a norm by the authority of the addressor, however, cannot explain 
why we put ourselves in the place of the addressee. The effectiveness of the norm comes 
down to the authority of those present at its inauguration. Yet authority cannot be deduced 
(Ibid.), only deferred (to other authorities), infinitely regressed (to authorization itself), or 
abandoned to a self-legitimating sovereign (such as God). Our democratic culture opts to 
defer to the authority of the experts who would rely on knowledge, though Lyotard identifies 
the groundlessness of authority as "the sign of an incommensurability between the normative 
phrase and all others" {Ibid.). 
Lyotard's use of the term does not attest to the irreconcilable paradigm shifts in 
science. Lyotard rather maintains that it is a challenge to link ethical and political phrases 
with the elusive facts of the so-called 'natural' sciences in order to justify them. Prescriptive 
phrases ("One ought to be virtuous") cannot be justified by the presence of an object denoted 
by the term of the phrase ("One is a virtuous person") since they have no referential or truth 
value (Lyotard, 1988, 48; Silverman, 2002, 63); as addresses of the law, they obligate and can 
be testified posr/ac/o, by a subsequent action ('being virtuous') which may justify them with 
reference to the addressee that witnesses their authority. Yet they may fail to obligate their 
addressee, in which case even the future presence of their objects cannot objectively present 
the justice of an ex post facto law. Since "[i]t is impossible to deduce a prescription from a 
description" (Lyotard, 1988, 108), the precarious justifiability of the prescriptive phrases 
hangs by the testimony of the witness who in turn ought to submit themselves to the 
obligation. "In any case, the explanation requires further phrases," {Ibid.) yet no other 
sentence can justify it in objective terms. The enigmatic law and its prescriptive phrase 
instead ask ior faith in their justifiability. Hence the scandalous crisis of justification, 
responsibility, and sovereignty. 
Incommensurable with the cognitive phrases, thus, the phrases of the law state the 
rules of formation subject to political debate (Ibid., 47; 64). Their justification depends on the 
force of the argument, the persuasiveness of their proof, their technological effectiveness in 
forming their objects (Ibid., 41-47) through a set of internally consistent and verifiable 
representations that follow certain rules.""' The body of the object is fleshed out by those 
rules of speech and narration. Although the corpus of those rules is the edifice of law the 
"rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a contract" 
(Ibid., 10). Again the laws of meaning need "supplementary constraints for statements to be 
declared admissible" (Ibid., 14), a primary force to effectuate them. Since their "legitimation 
is the process by which a legislator is authorized to promulgate such a law as a norm" (Ibid., 
1), the law needs to be justified by the presence of authorized witnesses, the archive of the 
'we, ' who take themselves as the addressee authorized to respond. 
Although the law constitutes its witness who would in turn give evidence and political 
force to its justice, the inaugurative relation of authorization of the 'we ' by the 'we, ' i.e., 
sovereignty, cannot be explained by either; it remains a basic relation of faith in the authority 
of the emergent constitutive law to hear it as an obligating call of the Ve ' that calls itself into 
political existence. Nothing can "allow one to distinguish the rightful authority from its 
imposture. Above all, the question ...is that the request emanating from this entity be 
received as though it were law" (Lyotard, 1988, 108). It is at this point where one cannot tell 
Although Lyotard later on opted for a phrasal account of meaning and justification, in his early, language 
game analyses in Postmodern Condition, a narrative "is to be wholly understood in terms of production and 
transmission of meaning, that is a conceptual instrument of representation" (Readings, 1991, 47). As a rule-
regulated structure, a narrative's function is to objectify a normative figure that embodies the social bond (say, a 
good citizen, a good capitalist and a good neighbour) and justifies the authority of the narrator. Therefore, "[t]he 
actual community or nation owes its identity to a shared narrative...[b]ut this account can never be legitimate, 
according to Lyotard, because any narrative of identity involves inclusions and exclusions" (Williams, 2002, 
122). 
the rightful authority from the sham. Here speech loses its force, takes on the character of a 
pure ethical call, made in silence. 
At the inauguration address, since authority is another ground zero speech-act ('Thus 
is our law"), the informative content of speech (description), or locutionary force of the act of 
speech turns out to be irrelevant to the illocutionary force. To put it another way, what is said 
('Thou shall') in the act of speech cannot legitimize but represents what will have been done: 
the act is futural. The said is not even a commandment, since the authority necessary to get it 
across as a commandment will have been constituted only if there is a response that 
apprehends the addresser as an authority. The same point applies to the felicity condition of a 
command: It cannot ground authority, but depends on it. The act of speech thus has no 
semantic content, or practical justification. But what is left when the said is taken out of the 
address? And why does one take the position of the addressed to hear it as an obligating call 
if one doesn't understand or justify its sense? 
3.2.2. The Ought: Silence and Force of the Sovereign 
When the said is put aside, what remains from the law is not silence if one understands the 
latter as absence of speech that indicates presence. Rather, what remains is speech conveying 
something more than speech silently, or a demand less than speakable enveloped in silence. 
Because the crux of this silent encounter with "this entity' takes place on the borderiine of 
speech that cannot ground the authority of the calling voice; the speech-act at stake will have 
grounded the authority of what will have been present if the call is responded to. Speech 
becomes an occasion for the response to take the fom, of responsibility since it mvolves the 
risk and undecidability of a silent call under the shroud of the said, silently responded to. 
Responsibility invested in an act of speech (which is, to remember, constitutive of a 
'we') turns into an incalculable, silent response to an aporia of address, a situation wrought 
with undecidabilities. Derrida, reading Zarathustra's wish for a voice of the kings, says that 
the sovereign leams to command in silence.'"^ The response takes its silent addressor as the 
sovereign being (outside) the law it is subjected to: the sovereign is not one of the 'we, ' 
although each and all are sovereign. Being (outside) the law, its address can(not) be 
accounted for by the law. And a response to what is (not) normatively captured would make 
responsibility that borders on irresponsibility. 
The making of the command leaves the addressee in the situation of deciding on the 
undecidable and taking full responsibility for the possible response to what escapes the 
present normative schema.'"^ The sovereign demands to be constituted and recognized as the 
sovereign that paradoxically will have the authority to demand it; circularity, self-reference, 
and reflexiveness build up on the aporia. When the addressee responds, if s/he decides to 
respond, it would constitute a breach of the present law, and a major irresponsibility; 
however, if there was no response that, too, would be a failure of responsibility when the 
present law is wrong. 
That is because, I argue, the call and the response to obligation goes beyond the 
present, in wishing to hear more than the sayable, or locating the law, not in what is present, 
but in what is to emerge and come. The speech-act constitutes the responsibility of what will 
have become the 'we ' in performing the addressee of the law it addresses paradoxically to its 
future self as an other, since before or during the address it—the T — i s not present. The 
blindness of faith here does not consist of being silent witnesses to the inauguration of a 
groundless law but the doubt, imagination and risk involved in becoming otherwise, taking 
oneself as the T that will have responded to the call. "The blindness is in putting yourself in 
the place of the other, in saying / in his or her place," (Ibid., 109) or forgetfiilness that the self 
is the proverbial other when speech turns into a scandal of sovereignty for those obligated 
107 ypjge commands him to command, but command in silence, to become sovereign, to learn 
how to command, to give orders (befehlen), and to learn to command in silence by learning that it is silence, 
the silent order that commands and leads the world" (Derrida, 2009, 4; First Section). 
That this command is no command at all complicates the possible decision further: a command supposedly 
relies on authority and justification but the silent one of the sovereign eschews the both. 
since the sayable says nothing by which an other can obligate us to make the self-rule: a 
studied forgetflilness is necessary to decide away the undecidabilities but a decision that 
disregards them cannot be autonomous, self-reflective or sovereign."" The law thus does not 
constitute sovereignty but instates a new universe where the self becomes undecidably the 
other, the other the self, autonomy heteronomy and authority risky authorship. 
Hence the obligation is accepted by what seeks itself outside itself, in the call of an 
other, beyond the present, and on the margin of speech, always silently obligated by a call. 
"In doing this," Lyotard continues, "'we' effectuated what "we' were looking for, a we. In 
looking for it, this we was looking for itself (Ibid., 102). And this 'we," the people put 
besides themselves by a call or resisting and refijsing to hear the call, become not the 
sovereign subject of the political that like a criminal {Ibid., 107) lays down the indisputable 
law of the community, but an instance of the subjectifying force of a differend where they, at 
times suspiciously, and at times gullibly, seek words to fill up the groundless discursive space 
of authority forever by the silent calls of others. 
From this minimal point of departure, Lyotard hopes to re-circumscribe ihe political 
in differends through a consideration of the failure to receive the call of others silenced by the 
fantasy of sovereignty as an obligation. In Nazi Germany, the authority of the SS came from 
a sovereign 'we' mesmerized by the imaginary power of the said, he continues, that only 
authorized its present self as the addressor of the law. It only recognized the call of the Aryan 
as the obligation, not wishing-to-hear the call of silent others commanded not to have a 
presence in the 'we.' It muted the proverbial phrase of the people ^Listen. Israeli!")- It 
murdered the messengers of the law in the name of the law, attacking the time of the people 
and attempting to freeze it m the sayable of the present (Ibid., 105-106). It wronged the future 
d e o d e .ndependently others, bu. others ,n the democratic 
t h e o „ are the possibi l i^ condition o f t h e s e l f s sovereignty!to decide i n 7 p d^ntty f Z r h : " " ^ 
eradication, the loss of democracy and sovereignty. 
of the sovereign 'we' through the law of the sovereign self as if it could stop the time of the 
people. 
The differend thus presumes a wrong, but how can one testify to the untestifiable 
differendl How can one assert that an unrepresentable wrong has been committed if one 
cannot present norms, or the law in light of which it is a wrong? First, that the law cannot be 
grasped by cognition does not rule out other means by which its force manifests itself 
Transformed into an enigmatic call that wordlessly urges one to act, the law is encountered, 
Lyotard avers, in "the silent feeling that signals a differend remains to be listened to" 
(Lyotard, 1988, 171). And as the next chapter elaborates, this silence emanates from the 
singularity of the matter, i.e., the material of the community, and the bodily presence of those 
silenced and wronged by the law of the said. 
Lyotard's account of wrong {tort) should thus be read in light of the differend which, 
as opposed to a mere conflict between the formally equivalent elements, reveals the 
groundlessness of legitimacy and paradoxical character of sovereignty that refuses to receive 
the call of others -that give the gift of autonomy and sovereignty-as the obligation. Since the 
main aim of the Third Reich was to eradicate the presence of the inassimilable difference in 
the Aryan lifeworld, the singularity of the event as a confrontation with the (un)representable, 
therefore, "would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments" (Ibid., xi)."" In the 
next section 1 shall dissect the elements of the conflict that takes place within the phrase 
which Lyotard likens to a performative utterance. 
3.3. Differend'. 11 y a. or' IVslawac'! 
This section frames the paradoxical address of the law through the phrase "You are 
Wslawac\" which circumscribes a universe in which no Wstawac should exist, and once the 
" " In other words, Lyotard commits to (i) the multiplicity of rules of identification (ii) the incommensurability 
of rules of identification (iii) the contestable validity of a particular rule in that "it obtains for a time the 
consensus of the community" (Lyotard, 1999, 22). 
perlocutionary force of an address takes effect, one does not have a meaningful existence in 
the phrasal universe the address constructs. "The distinctive feature of.. . 'performative' 
utterance is that its effect upon the referent coincides with its enunciation" (Lyotard, 1984a, 
9); in other words, the act of speech of sovereignty paradoxically subjectifies an addressee 
that despite crucial axiom of responsibility in the reception of the law, is unable to respond. 
Unless it is possible for the addressee to respond with a "No," people are not sovereign in a 
situation of address. The phrasal universe of the differend is thus founded by the normative 
exclusion of its own possibility condition (an addressee that emerges within capable of 
response), and the (im)possible object that embodies the norm "sinks into" the totality it was 
expelled from.'" I shall argue that the subjectification of the 'we ' is basically a performative 
act of speech that, when regulated by the fantasy of sovereignty and presentism, silences and 
renders absent difference that serves as its constitutive norm. 
In Lyotard's account, a performative utterance invokes existentially quantifiable terms 
('referents') that denote the subject and the object of the phrase. Conventional justice Lyotard 
takes issue with entails judgment to give each entity in a phrasal universe its due by capturing 
its presumably "essential" properties with fixed referents, significations and cognitive 
phrases. On the contrary "[i]n differend, something asks to be put into phrases, and suffers 
from the injustice of not being able instantly to be put into phrases" (Lyotard, 1984b, 7; 
emphasis added). The redness of a rose indeed is sensed and presented through a multiplicity 
of phrases which ostensibly show (by pointing a finger), name ("This here now is a rose!"), 
and describe a rose by denomination ("It is red!") but those diverse representations of a red 
rose displace and replace its existence and its redness, so that they keep referring to them in 
its absence (Ibid., 40). In other words, epistemic phrases are used as a substitution for the 
existence of the rose which in turn justifies their repeated use within the parameters of a 
Levi says "[o]ne cannot sink lower than tills ... inconceivable" objec t (Levi , quoted in Benchou iha , 2006 , 
genre, though their meaning is suspended in its absence: "Phrasing takes place in the Iaci< of 
being of that about which there is a phrase" {Ibid., 22). 
Lyotard's theory of representation thus holds that, since "[d]escription cannot free 
itself from denomination, reference cannot be reduced to sense" (Ibid.), a phrase conveys the 
semantic contents oiand becomes a substitute for the singular presence of the object it 
constitutes, precisely because "the objects to which they refer must be available for repeated 
access" (Lyotard, 1984a, 18) even in their absence. As a concept is justifiable if one can 
present an object that matches it, the main function of language for Lyotard is to point out. 
not to give justifiable evidence for, the singular presence of its object in its absence: "A 
phrase presents at least one universe ... No matter which regimen it obeys, it entails a There is 
[ / /y a]" (Lyotard, 1988, 70)."^ The 7 / y a, ' this material presence comes before the law in 
two senses: it precedes the inauguration of the law, and is addressed by the law. 
Ontologically, it is the body/the matter as I shall argue in the next chapter, and politically it is 
the community that has yet to become a 'we ' : the 'sovereign people' remains a promise, or a 
threat to itself Knowledge demands that the 'There is,' the presence of the object be 
represented within a language that testifies to it, and since once the reference to the object is 
secured somehow its presence plays no significant role in justification, the substitute (the 
concept) can be used and judged in its stead. 
If the differend merely testifies to the (un)representability of the presence, it does so 
by pointing out the heterogeneity between the phrases of the presence (knowledge) and the 
phrases of the law (ethics/socio-politics). In this section the space between the two genres 
gives rise to politics through the heterogeneity between the normative address that aims to 
constitute the presence as a political community, and the silent demand an excluded presence 
makes on us. The phrases are thus employed with an eye to the political goals and justified by 
The alternative translation of "It there has" marks the presence of the aporoi within the 'we'; we have the 
aporoi there, right amongst us, right before us. 
the presence of those addressed and potentially obhgated to respond. But what if an address 
paradoxically forces the addressee not to respond, but to be silent and absent within the 
community, like those in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany? The aesthetics of the 
phrase thus constitutes its undesirable object by constituting a community in which it has no 
political presence, nevertheless placing it equally under the register o f f e r e e of law. The 
object emerges (in Latin, ex-mergere), rises out of a totality when called forth only to sink 
back into it as its norm of constitution. Demarcated, and separated from its community, the 
object reveals an emergency in which unification proceeds on the basis of exclusion, which 
paradoxically foresees the centring of the community around what it bars out. The by-product 
of this process, the remnant thus included, is also called by Lyotard, 'a waste' (Lyotard, 
1990a, 85-93) that exposes the logic of representation. 
Lyotard provides an exposition as to how this "waste" is formed on a political terrain, 
in Heidegger and the 'jews' (1990a). Within this context "the jews" of Lyotard symbolize the 
excess that remains outside the phrasal universe of the agonistic politics. But if it is the 
excluded "exception" how does it provide the phrasal universe its norm? This section will 
pursue this question through an enigmatic address that constituted Nazi Germany as a 
community of the differend, and excluded the singularity of "the jews." ' "The jews" are 
irreducible to the Jew, and Lyotard's usage leaves no doubt regarding what it does not refer 
to."" In fact, it simply signifies, without referring to, the phrasal remnant of a political 
Lyotard s book is on the difficulties of voicing the unsayable in the case of a trauma that the Shoah was of 
remembenng what is tembly unforgettable, and of representing the event without reducing into a representation 
(1). Yet he invokes the terrible past in order to intervene into the present debates on the people as a unified 
totalized entity concomitant with its representation as 'the people' (21). He opts for a representation that 
represents the breakdown of the representative s t ruc ture- in art, literauire and politics: "What art can do is bear 
witness not to he sublime, but to this aporia of art and to its pain. It does not say the unsayable, but says that it 
cannot say it 47) Politically, "the people' is a representat ion- of the political philosophy tha also finds it 
"necessai j to 'exclude,' to conserve, and to reject" (72) in order to arrive a repreLntable totality One a g a k 
TbseTci' ( 1 9 9 t c y as "a way of keeping the people p r e s e n ' i n l i r 
[T]he jews," a name that is always plural, in quotation marks, and in lower case " does not refer "to a 
nation, nor to a political, philosophical, or religious figure or subiert It k n. ' . i , " 
of any specific people as such" (L r ro l , xii in L . / ' ) ' " " ' representation 
universe, embodied by the gypsy, the gay, the Jew, the old, the sick and frail, and the 
Communists in Nazi Germany: however this conceptual slip between the conceptual and the 
actual problematizes who/what the people signified as 'the jews ' were as another aporia. 
Since they had nothing in common that could have identified them as the unaddressable 
exceptions to the rule imposed by the force of law, it cannot be fair to argue that they were 
immune to the reductive grasp of the law. They were never banished from the force of law 
that anticipates its apor ia . ' " Indeed they were present in their absence, as a silent principle 
that organized the society and exclusion was thus never achieved. As a norm without 
cognitive and semantic content except for receptivity to the norm, all that 'the jews ' can 
disclose are the circumstances of sovereignty to which they have been exposed as it attempts 
to master the socio-political totality. They were in a '"state of total passivity, of total 
ugliness'" as objects of art (Lyotard, quoting Hegel, in Lyotard, 1990a, 87) when politics is 
about crafting a community like an object of art. The formation of (im)possible subjects of 
the political here goes hand in hand with the formation of their community as a whole 
through techne, a technology of power that creates gas chambers, subjectifies, totalizes, 
forecloses and closes the question of who the people are and ought to be: the political for 
Lyotard converge with the aesthetical in the formation, deformation, creation and eradication 
of the community, as well as its constituents. 
However, although it remains vital to determine who/what "the jews" were in order to 
judge the political aesthetics of the past, there seems to have been left an unrecognizable 
remnant that narrates the fierce crisis of judgment and thought. The ugly, abject figure that 
haunt the unforgettable memories in Levi's Survival in Auschwitz [If This is a Man, 1986] of 
"an emaciated man ... on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of a thought is to be 
seen," (90) embodies the critical moment when the force of law leaves behind it a faceless 
See The First Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law (in Landau, 2006, 311) or the Paragraph 175 of German 
Constitution (Gellately & Stoltzfus, 213) I discuss this below. 
remnant that cannot be gendered, categorized, identified, represented or judged any more. 
Stripped of statues and vestiges of their former lives, unable to speak or respond, "the jews" 
were at once marched to the bathhouses to wash former traces off their bodies, examined for 
unknown reasons by doctors ," ' and exposed to the Nazi force of law that "like a constant 
urge ... demands fulfilment" in enigmatic terms. They were about to be the cruellest object of 
art. The address that subjectified them into a dumb and numb remnant came in a foreign 
language, in an unknown phrase that reverberates in Levi's nightmares: "It is the dawn 
command of Auschwitz, a foreign word, feared and expected: get up, 'fVs/awacr" (1995, 
374). The address does not make sense, signifies a loss of meaning except for the 
illocutionary force, and so does the nameless phrasal object bom out of the senseless 
command: "they had become insensible to everything", "impossible to get them to tell their 
names, much less the date of their birth" (/bid. 95). However, the silent, ghostly, half-dead, 
insensitive mass of Musselmanner does not point towards a pure presence without sense and 
legality but epitomizes how one inhabits the domain of a present-oriented language, law and 
sovereignty. 
Agamben in his Remnants of Auschwitz does take into account the possibility of a 
meaningless but valid law/language. '" Similarly, when the norm paradoxically operates 
through an exception to itself, it constitutes to a normative space "in which application and 
norm reveal their separation and a pure force-of law realizes (that is, applies by ceasing to 
apply) a norm whose application has been suspended" (Agamben. 2005, 40). In other words, 
language, law and sovereignty operate through their own suspension where their norms 
gesture toward their own exclusion that always already takes place in their positing. What 
Agamben marks as a state of exception is parallel to what I call emergency where the 
IJ^ Levi "feel[s] like Oedipus in front of the Sphinx" (Ibid., 105) at that moment 
He notes that "[t]he language of testimony is a language thai no longer testifies, and that in not signifVing 
advances mto what is without language" (1999, 39). In the unsayability of an even . in Agamben w o r ^ 
sovereign need to violate their own law and suspend sovereignty in order to be sovereign. But 
in my reading of the aporia that also sets down the norm which gives life to the emergent 
(subjects, objects, and a community of the political), this movement subjectifies. 
As for the suspension of the norm of language I shall turn to Lyotard to argue that 
representation by language refers to the norm, i.e., the represented that escapes full 
representation precisely because of the implicit performativity at stake: a representation 
substitutes for the represented it constitutes within language and thus takes as its norm that 
which it excludes. For Lyotard, a phrase is not a sentence, not a propositional unity of 
meaning that refers to an arrangement of objects that precedes the moment of uttering. If a 
phrase is a substitute for the lack of a self-evident object, many phrases linked together 
according to the rules of their genres create a universe: they demarcate what can be sensed in 
and through them. As an event, or occurrence that institutionalizes a universe of the subjects, 
objects, and means of communication amongst them, a phrase brings those instances into a 
unique relation of sensibility with each other (Lyotard, 1985, 59-85). In a sense, the differend 
reveals the pragmatic performativity of an address where the locutionary force of the 
phrase"^ forces the addressee to create the spatio-temporal arrangement in which the objects 
referred to by the command exist (McClure, 1999, 20-23). 
To illustrate, the command "Close the door!" is taken as a conjunction of two 
commands, the first of which directly expresses the illocutionary force ("Obey!") in the 
differend-hased analysis. This implies that the addressee of the phrase does performatively 
create, not only the object of the phrase ("the shut door"), but also him/herself as the subject 
who performs the action (the anonymous "1" who will have shut the door). Again, this is a 
case of interpellation in the Althusserian sense of the term: the response subjectifies the 
Austin, 1962, 120. Lyotard interprets the illocutionary effect of the address to be 'winning,' i.e., persuasion 
of the addressee. 
addressee, ' forms' it in what Lyotard calls aesthetic terms."' ' If it is felicitous, the object thus 
formed testifies to the effectiveness of ihe force of the phrase. 
Yet just like the address of sovereignty that has no semantic content or justifiability, 
' WstawacV subjectifies an addressee in a universe where no irreconcilable difference (in 
opinion, identity or way of life) should have a presence. ' WstawacV should exist in order not 
to exist within the phrasal universe. The wrong they suffer cannot be addressed by the law as 
it is the law of the sovereign that wrongs them. It cannot be verified as it takes place in a 
political universe where the 'we ' is the only authority in presence and representation. It 
cannot be quite put into words of the sayable either, since the moment they perforce respond 
to the address they perform themselves as the ' WslawacVs, muted objects of art. an II y a that 
there is not, the addressed that can never be the addressor of the law, abject bodies that 
cannot speak but signify a differend. 
Yet in their senseless, material existence, Levi tells us, they made a demand on him. 
"Levi's address suggests, not that the dead are without life or voice, but that despite 
everything and despite their silence, their claim on him persists. In the absence of voices and 
faces, they continue 'to say" and 'to show" too much" (Guyer, 2007, 11). Levi, who perhaps 
lived in the depths of a critical abyss and killed himself (out of despair, or survivors' guilt, or 
existential exhaustion, or the all: see Hirsch, 1991, 12; Patruno, 1995, 114; Homer, 2001, 
256) couldn't get out of his mind the excessive sense of a remnant that haunts its addressee in 
its brokenness, in a disembodied silence that survives the life of its utterer and becomes the 
law that rules the life of its witness. "Woe betide whoever fail to grasp the meaning," laments 
Levi (1986, 38), referring to a demand made by those absent. This demand, I argue, is no 
other than the 'ought' of the ethical, coming from the silent ones wronged by the 'must ' of 
the sovereign. It comes from beyond the present, and just like the speech of the sovereign, it 
' ' ' A n d the aesthetics of the phrase forms a universe (i) temporally: after a delay, on the comingency of the 
fehcity o he speech-act (n) spal.ally: only within the prescribed arrangement of the sensible (thaTinvolves "the 
shut door"), given the success of the speech-act. * "ivuivcs 
arrives as an unauthorized silent address that nevertheless, in saying too much without 
speaking, bears an authority to be heard as the law of the future community: the aporoi, just 
like the sovereign people, being (outside) the rule, do not justify their demand as Habermas 
argues but address themselves to a future demanded by the act of speech. Although the 
drowned could not even speak, their demand sounded more fiercely than 'Wstawacl," leaving 
a mark on the character o/^Levi who has become the hapless witness to the law of the 
present, and the law of the future. It also left a still bigger mark on the 'we' of Germany, 
orienting its future to a community of more democratic character. 
Thus the crucial question underlying the law is: whose address ought we respond to as 
if it is the law of the authority? And as the speech-act will make us the ones who, in 
submitting to the authority, will perform themselves as the addressee, who ought the 'we' to 
be? The political for Lyotard is thus marked by the risky business of responding to a 
differend, but speech has very little to do with the address that represents the 'we' as the 
sovereign with a stable identity. The address, if reduced to the sayable of the present can only 
reiterate the past mistakes of the sovereign. It rather ought to address the silence to find 
words that needed to be put into a phrase, and absent ones in their presence, as the missing 
norm of the 'we, ' that needed to be heard and responded to. 
If the address remains beyond the present, then it returns back to the past that has 
(never) been and unfolds toward a future that will have (never) been. Once the people re-
presents their past as an unjustified, lawless constitution of the law, the aporoVs demand to 
be recognized as the sovereign people, unjustified by the norms of the present, too, will have 
been heard and responded to. The aporetic situation of the present thus leads us back to the 
past in order to constitute the future the way it has (never) been, giving the aporoi a chance to 
respond, as an addresser equal to the 'we' in a future shared life. The address re-enacts the 
past that has yet to be in the name of the people that have yet to become, and is futural. 
Conclusion: The Remnant Remains a Call 
In Nazi Germany it was the law of the sovereignty that wronged 'the j ews ' and made the 
case unrepresentable to the jury of the 'we ' implicated in and responsible for their tort as 'the 
jews ' represented the emergency of inassimilable difference that threatened the authority and 
stability of the Aryan self The sovereign being (outside) the law it unjustifiably makes 
reduced legislation to the self-rule of a unified, totalized archive of identities that foreclosed 
'the jews ' as a part of the community. It was the paradoxical norm that, emerging from the 
lifeworld, demarcated from inside what ought (not) to be present among the 'we ' of the time. 
And as the law of the present could only recognize and represent what it constitutes, it 
constituted 'the jews ' as (un)representable markers of the boundaries of the Nazi community 
where speech and responsibility bordered on silence and irresponsibility; the presence o f ' t he 
jews ' was not represented by the law of the sovereign people that, nevertheless, constituted 
itself through their forced absence. Only as the addressees of the law that must not respond, 
or be responded to, their demand to live amongst the 'we ' as their equal was not authorized, 
or heard by the sovereign as the law of the future community. 
But after six decades 'we ' fmd out the other cannot be muted by the sovereign. The 
haunting voice in Levi's nightmares turned out to be the call of an emergent authority that 
shaped the matter of the future German community. It was heard by and responded to by 
those who disavowed the Nazi 'we, ' and was attempted to be incorporated into theories of 
democracy by the next generation like Habermas.'"" He explicitly profess to experience this 
"irritating climate of opposing insinuations and accusations" {Ibid., 130). And the Nazi past 
rightly gives rise to the anxiety discussed in the previous chapters over the mob, unjustified 
claims and disagreement that accentuate these accusations; I assume that Habermas' aim in 
relating democratic politics firmly to the agreement of all is to dispel these accusations and 
' For example, he notes the trauma that is still experienced in the n n U f i r c r . f r o ™ .u . u u 
azi past: "The mtema, poHtica, development of tL F e d e r a , r p : b t I s ^ t u l a " ^ o ' T e ^ a f 
msition from the democratic state fWe mart tr, thr c.-.u • . = """"lo me legai 
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recognizable from the outset as an evil regime" (Habermas, 1985, 129). 
anxiety and make sure the past does not repeat itself, but his diagnosis of the emergency is 
flawed and misleading with its preoccupation with justification. I argue that i f ' the jews,' as 
well as more of the sovereign people of Nazi Germany had had a chance to disagree with the 
Nazi law, the horrible past would have never happened. 
The unjustified demand of ' the jews' made the German community's future 
otherwise', after the fall of the Nazi regime, the wrong done to 'the jews' was recognized 
when the 'we' was exposed to the pile of dead bodies. The accusations were transformed into 
the accusative mode of address that subjectified the good people of Germany as a more 
democratic community. The demand of ' the jews' that did not make sense in the past was 
heard and responded to as if they were the sovereign people that constitute a community, 
sadly after the wrong, in the ftjture. That was possible because, I argued, the speech-act of 
authority does not require justification by the present norms, or validation by a referent. It 
requires risk-taking, envisioning, and the responsibility to take ourselves as the addressee of a 
silent call, the risk to imaginatively seek words in what does not make sense by the present, 
and a wish-to-hear that places us under the obligation to an emergent presence that 
symptomizes an emergency of sovereignty; the emergency of the question of who the 
sovereign people ought to be—the 'we' or all including "the jews' that disagree with the law, 
live, act and speak differently? The messenger of the law may not make sense to the present 
'we,' but it does not need to; it can still be sensed to address us, in the feeling of 
responsibility to our future selves it incites, in the question 'Will you be my addressee and 
hear me as if I am one of the sovereign people?'. 
Not to hear them is wrong; it wrongs us too through accusations. That is why if the 
wrong is committed by the law of the community both the community and its law need to be 
re-phrased by others outside the community of sense, or outsiders to the norm inside the 
community like the Rosenstrasse protesters who dis-identified with the German 'we' of their 
present. The absence o f ' t h e jews' constituted the matter of Nazi Germany's political 
community and the raw material for the ftiture Germany, and for the Rosenstrasse protesters a 
silent call made sense of the injustice done to those not present in their salient absence. Then 
and there the re-founding force of authority, i.e., mobility of identities that travel between the 
other and the self, mobilized a mob again to make a claim on the "we' of the future. 
The force of the differend thus can only be felt through an aporia that overthrows the 
distinctions between presence/absence, speech/silence, the self/the other, and the present/the 
future; also 'the jews'/the 'we ' in the community, senseless/meaningful in the phrase, and 
presence/representation. Why did they feel/orcec/ to represent the unrepresentable Jews, 
when they should have been convinced that this was not what 'we ' ought to be? Hilda Elkuss, 
one of the protestors, says, "[i]t was actually this feeling that we belonged there, and had the 
right to be there that motivated us. It wasn't a law but it was our right" (in Stoltzfus, 1998, 
32). The mob was situated over the aporetic line between the lawful and right. The differend 
they were caught within was indicative of absence, loss and suffering under the law of their 
present and they felt obligated. They ought to pay homage, they sensed, to the beloved others 
that left their mark on their character. If "[t]he wrong is expressed through the silence of 
feeling, through suffering" (Ibid.), then the ethical law excites through citation (of the 
differend), sets emotions into motion that grasp the unfathomable social bond of "belonging 
there" where they do not according to the law, exactly through the inexplicable character of 
the 'we ' that is called into question. The force did not come from the present law, or the 
authority of the 'we, ' but from the remnants that haunt the present as absence, indicating a 
sense of separation, wrong, loss, anguish, and a silent pain. A feeling for Lyotard can also be 
given in the phrasal universe of silence (Hatley, 2002, 80) that inspires ethical response to it, 
and the pathos the remnants silently incite is that of a limit set by/to the sayable beyond 
which is an other we doubt, recognize, felt obligated by, want to kill, or love, miss and feel 
attached to, even when they do not talk, like the silent sovereign that speaks without saying, 
or the senseless ' Wslawac' that addresses without speaking: "To doubt that one phrases is 
still to phrase, one's silence makes a phrase" (Lyotard. 1988, xi). 
Therefore the differend, having only the illocutionary force of ' the ought,' can cite 
and address undecidably without referring to the presence of an addressor, but still makes 
sense to those who have a wish-to-hear the question: Shall thou be my addressee and find a 
meaning in my silence? The promise of democracy lies over the aporetic line between law 
and right, between deliberation and disagreement, between absence and presence, between 
freedom from and submission to others. The differend are encountered not through meaning 
conveyed in speech, but as the undecidable sense of the II y a that, neither present nor absent, 
comes before the law to seek words and representations; we have the aporoi right there, 
where they do not belong, displaced and outside themselves by an urgency. Lyotard 
elaborates on this ethical sense of emergency by foregrounding it against the possibility 
condition of language. An object cited but not situated within a phrasal universe, like the 
'we,' forever re-phrases a political world to come it will belong. It merely embodies a 
senseless sense available for signification which cannot exhaust it by a myriad of phrases: 
"Sense is present as absence of signification..." (Lyotard, quoted in Bennington, 1998, 63). 
The naked sense of an object can thus be defined as its exposure to an infinite labour of 
interpretation over what it ought to be and it is through this unrecognizable, material 
presence—not unlike the abject bodies of the Musselmdnner, that the 'we' encounters as 
unauthorized, unidentifiable others making a silent demand on us. The next chapter explores 
the naked matter of the community, the material of the law, the meaningless sense. 
Chapter 4. The Visible and the Audible: Justice in the Community of Sense 
In the last chapter, I argued that the community of speech has yet to estabhsh its conditions of 
audibihty (who will be heard and responded to as if its call is the law) and visibility (who will 
be sensed and represented as belonging to the 'we') . The conceptualization of the public as a 
sphere where certain demands are authorized and heard as valid predicates material 
conditions of a shared life on sensibility. Butler argues that "[t]he public sphere is constituted 
in part by what cannot be said and what cannot be shown" (2004, xvii). The implications of 
her remark go beyond an insistence on the privatization of the political, or bringing the 
inequalities, violence and injustices of the lifeworld into the political agenda. The issue rather 
comes down to the constitution, limitation, maintenance and regulation of what is 
presupposed as properly political. The solidaristic understanding of politics in its 
preoccupation with unity, universality, agreement and justification conceals "[t]he limits of 
the sayable, the limits of what can appear, circumscribe the domain in which political speech 
operates and certain kinds of subjects appear as viable actors" (Ibid.). The concealment of the 
constitution of the political sphere thus excludes disagreement, interruptive acts and 
speeches, breaks and ruptures within the structure and deprives them of political relevance 
and efficiency 
As opposed to the exclusionary construction of the unified community with concealed 
limits, what comes before us in this chapter is a "community imperceptible to the 
community" (Lyotard, 1992, 3) since it still seeks itself outside the confines of present limits 
to the visible and the audible, in the absence and silence of those that will have re-constituted 
it if they are seen, heard, and responded to. "These confines were called Aesthetics," (Ibid.) 
as they bring together what can be sensed and formed through imagination in an attempt to 
commune whh "something 'uncommon,' out of the ordinary ...something singular" (Ibid., 3) 
These acts of speech are reduced to troubling nonsense and silenced. Their subjects are dismissed as 
disturbing marginal radicals. And the political value o fagonism in the face of systematic injustice inequality 
and violence is lost to the wider community that, in a refusal to hear their demands, risks perpetuation of them 
that escapes the unifying grasp of the norms. This 'something' singular but constitutive of 
commonality is something our present law is unprepared for, has yet no representations or 
words for; "So a secret common, that is, put aside, separated, secessioned, and as the 
expression goes in Latin se-curus, put out of reach of cura, of care, a common with no cares" 
(Ibid., 10). In other words, this community of sensibility seeks its material norm, not in the 
justifiable by the present but what is insensible at the present, in the call to justice of those 
put aside from the 'we, ' uncared for in their private life and unrecognized in their separation, 
unrepresented, silenced, and not responded to in a shared life. 
Lyotard is usually associated with an aesthetics of the sublime drawn from Kant'^^ 
Burke, and German Romanticism, that, in a vulgar reading, must not be put in words, or 
represented except through an absence.^^^ The sublime is defined as a situation where 
imagination proves inadequate to represent, or phrase ideas totally, coherently and 
systematically into a stable structure that perforce excludes (Lyotard, 1990b, 40-43).'^'* 
Lyotard's framing of the sublime that explodes the structure open parallels with Derrida's 
understanding of an institution, or the representative structure that is defined by an opening to 
the future: "If there are structures, they are possible only on the basis of the fijndamental 
structure which permits totality to open and overflow itself such that it takes on meaning by 
anticipating a telos which here must be understood in its most indeterminate form" (Derrida, 
1978,31). 
Kearney for instance situates Lyotard within theorists of the aesthetic sublime: "As such the subhme tells us 
nothing about what happens but only that something happened, that an event (ein Ereignis in Heidegger's 
language) took place. It has more to do with the quod than with the quid. The sublime is indeterminate and 
indeterminable and inspires in us, as Kant and Burke and other theorists from the seventeenth century on argue, 
the peculiarly contradictory feeling of 'pleasure and pain, joy and anxiety, exaltation and depression'" (2001, 
492). Cf Critique of Judgment, The Analytic of the Sublime, esp. 26,95 where the sublime is encountered both 
as a limitation and a sense of freedom and 107-109. 
It is usually the absence of suitable cognitive categories or concepts that can objectify it, or an understanding 
that can make sense of it, or imagination that is inadequate to conceptualize its object. 
124 Lyotard's critique of the sublime also refers to frustration of a sovereign subject that cannot master what 
comes before the law (as II y a) through knowledge or descriptive phrases; "This employment [o f / / y a] is an 
abuse, a violence ... [and] in the sublime feeling thinking becomes impatient, despairing, uninterested" 
(Lyotard, 1994a, 52). And the subject doesn't consume or give a full account of the encounter with the 
unrepresentable of the present that, in its undecidable character, rather constantly opens to the future. 
In this chapter I shall seek to conceive the community both as the totalized, unified 
and structured representation of the people in their undecidable character and the locus of the 
singular excluded from the structure; both as a political unity delimited by the law and as 
ethical engagements that exceed the regulated limits of institutions, structures and 
representations. The people come before the law; their priority over and dissenting presence 
before the institution of the law as a mob is a demand that they ought to be recognized as the 
sovereign "we' of which they are not represented as a part.'^' They are bound by the mutual 
responsibility in an ethics of demand and response, representing themselves as a community 
precisely when the representative structure that ought to respond to their demands f a i l s . I 
argue that one cannot reduce the issues of recognition and responsibility, like Habermas does, 
to a simple matter of formal exclusion'^' that can be redressed when the unrecognized are 
summoned to an ideal space of discourse where they can be identified and included in the 
archive of identities that make up the 'we that justifies 'our" law and recuperates the social 
bond through the new blood recruited. 
Therefore the issue spins towards an aporia of a presence that is sensed to be absent, 
silently living among us, but not as one of us to whom we are obligated to respond. The 
excluded make a demand on us: to be heard and seen as one of us. The self-rule states that the 
community must always be co-present with its representation, but the aporoi state that the 
The structure, however, makes a demand on them; that they must leave politics to, say, politicians, 
institutions, and the law. And as 1 argued in the last chapter, "the must' is at odds with "the ought' that comes 
along with the address that doesn't make sense by the norms of the present. According to the present conception 
of politics as agreement-oriemed discourse, people must not be out on the street, voicing dissent, forming mobs 
and invoking their constitutional right, in a lawless way, to have a presence in politics. 
Since this required absence functions as a silent norm present in the constitution of the "we ' it would be an 
injustice done to Lyotard to argue that he "hold[s] community, and necessity of community, to be founded on a 
certam absence" (May, 1993, 275) without giving a hint as to how the "we" can ever represent itself as a 
community of mutual responsibility and ethical bond. The acts observed during the Arab Spring I argue turn 
into acts of speech by which people re-constitute themselves as the sovereign people without sovereigmy the 
streets as the public sphere, and the demonstrating mob as a community. 
In adjudicating the issues of recognition in Habermas' framework of constitutional democracy Cooke too 
argues that "Habermas -despite the merits of his conception- is open to criticism for neither explicitly 
acknowledging the inevitability of exclusion nor confronting the problems raised thereby" (1997 259) 
128 Assimilation into Nazism (presuming it was possible and desirable) would not have saved others that could 
have become the new ' jews suffered at the hands of the sovereign since its norm was unification of the 'we ' 
against others, whoever that can fill the position of the latter. 
community ought to seek its undecidable identity, not in the present, sovereign 'we," but in 
those who, being unrepresentable, cannot exercise their sovereignty. The collective identity 
must be left open-ended in the question of who should be re-presented, seen and heard as a 
constitutive part of the 'we ' to come.'^' 'The common' in the community of sense ought to 
seek sense outside the normative confines of the presently sensible with an opening to the 
ftiture. 
In this chapter 1 aim to re-articulate the social bond and the constitution of the 
community in terms of sensibility; what can be heard as a political demand, who/what can be 
seen as one of 'us.' What can others' unrecognized presence amidst us tell us about the 
constitution of the public through normative limitations to our sensibility? If they are 'with' 
us how can one bear witness to their presence and 'with-ness'? How could the "we" respond 
if their demand does not make sense and is not heard as a political demand? 1 shall argue that 
if the aporoi are foreclosed from a shared life by the normative limits, they also witness and 
mark those limits. Their silent presence is before us, before the law, asking for recognition, 
inclusion, and equality as a part of the community. In my reading, the force of their silent act 
of speech thus originates from the past, i.e., the law that has already constituted the 
community; however, there is a temporal gap between the futural 'ought" of justice and the 
presentist "must" that will have been closed once the political catches up with the ethical. The 
Constitution has not been realized and will not be realized until they are heard and constituted 
as people equal to the "we.' 
In other words, the norm of the socio-political does not exclude the presence of those 
who witness the force of the law, but aporetically includes them as the witnesses to the 
before. They have already been constituted before by the law as silent parts of the 'we'; what 
is at stake is foreclosure, not exclusion. The foreclosed signify the past that silences and 
Likewise the social bond should be re-constructed as a responsibility to what could come before us, into our 
field of visibility and ear shot, if our law does not silence their call and efface their face. 
makes absent. Silence as testimony to being-there does not simply break with language, but 
phrases the obligation of the ethical that should not be conflated with the political norm that 
grounds itself in the presence. Although both addresses make sense of what comes before the 
law, justice requires a sensible response and critical responsibility to the before—those not 
represented as having a sensible presence in the 'we.' Recognition of the aporoi as equally 
constitutive takes response and responsibility that will have re-articulated the community and 
the social bond. 
Here I will borrow from Ariella Azoulay another sense of responsibility in order to 
illustrate some of the implications of reformulating the social bond "as a framework of 
partnership and solidarity among those who are governed, a framework that is neither 
constituted nor circumscribed by the sovereign" (Azoulay, 2008, 23). Her work aims to bring 
the Palestinians living in Israel into the visibility field of Israeli sovereignty, as images that 
speak out of the frame of the photographs: she interprets them as a testimony to the dominant 
socio-political relations that do not extend the same rights and obligations to Palestinians as 
Israeli citizens. Although their addresses are silenced, and their presence unrecognized by the 
present Israeli law, Azoulay assumes a responsibility in responding to their images and 
hearing a call for the Israeli community to be otherwise.''" For her, their silent visibility that 
demands not to be ruled in this way is an exposure to the undecidable character of what is 
seen, for what is supposedly excluded from the frame seems to seep back into the picture to 
make an unauthorized demand: "Even when it seems possible to name correctly in the form 
of a statement what it shows - 'This is X ' - it will always turn out that something else can be 
read in it, some other event can be reconstructed from it, some other player's presence can be 
discerned through it, constructing the social relations that allowed its production" (2008, 12). 
" " "Addressing these photographs is a limited, partial, sometimes imagined attempt to respond to the 
photographed figure, an attempt to reconstruct the part it played, . . . , and to realize, even if fieetingly a space 
of political relations between those who are governed, a space in which the demand not to be ruled in this 
way becomes the basis for every civil negotiation" (Azoulay, 2008, 16). 
This chapter thus raises two questions. First, what does it mean to be present in a 
pohtical community? I shall argue that to be present in a community is to be exposed, to 
others, to their addresses, to their presence that recognizes ours. Second, what are we 
exposed to when we are in front of those present but not recognized in our community? In my 
reading we are exposed to the law and its demand as the 'ought.' Lyotard gives it several 
names: the body characterized as the exposure to the law that demands a response; the mute 
Thing that "reveals its deafness, its silence, in demanding that you show it" (Lyotard, 1999, 
30), the IIy a that calls us to lend it words. In all cases our speech, or language in general, 
hints at an enigma on the threshold of presence which makes a demand on us to be 
recognized and represented. The demand of the Thing is none other than the obligation the 
differend places on us; that 'we' ought to make sense of a senseless figure that comes before 
the law through justice that goes beyond the law. 
Here my framing of the unsayable departs towards justice, to what comes before our 
law as the material embodiment of a silent call. In the first section 1 will give an account of 
Lyotard's understanding of having a presence in a community as exposure in spatio-
temporality, i.e., within sensibility. The following section reformulates justice as testimony to 
the sensible force of law, as an exposure to the illocutionary force of the address that forms 
the matter of the community: who will be heard as if their call is the law, and who will be 
seen as one of us. Thus, 1 will argue that one's material presence testifies to the effects of the 
law that sets up the terms of sensibility; i.e., visibility and audibility. The formation of 
sensibility coincides with the constitution of a community of sense where our responsiveness 
is restricted to others that make sense to us, justifying their meaningfiil address by the norms 
of the present; those the law represents as having a sensible presence in the 'we.' And this is 
the 'we' that testifies to and justifies the law that constitute them, by their presence and 
agreement. 
However, the closed circuit of sensibility can be broken by an ethico-poetical 
attentiveness to the insensible at the heart of the sensible. In the third section 1 shall argue that 
the law that subjectifies one is meaningless, but materially sensible; its effects can be sensed 
in the traces it leaves on one's body asked to respond to the address, and more importantly, 
the body, as the material conditions oiaffectability, is that passively comes before the 
law that does not necessarily have a discursive meaning, but can affect it. The bodily 
sensation of being exposed testifies to the effectiveness of the address, the meaningless 
illocutionary force that brings about the action passively performed by the body that follows 
the address if it is heard as an obligation to do so. Therefore our affectability by and 
submissiveness (i.e., passive responsiveness) to others not under the protection of the 
recognition by the law, and the rights-obligations system that aims to make sure one is heard, 
is constitutive of ethical responsibility in a community of sense.'^' 
The effect of the act of speech is subjectification by its f o r c e . T h e passivity of the 
act of turning towards the law also applies to sensibility—one hears the call passively. One 
may wish or pretend that one didn't hear it but nevertheless one can have no mastery over 
what one hears or sees. Being exposed to the presence, troubled survival and suffering of 
others, too, is something one can have no control over as the sovereign. Once exposed, what 
can be seen is seen. When we are exposed to the plight of others who make a demand on us, 
it also constitutes us as their addressee regardless of what we wish. Responding to them is 
constitutive of the community of sense in ethical terms while ignoring them unbinds the 
social bond. 
One of the implications of a community is relationality, the social bond between those who are related to 
each other by the system of rights and duties. Those in a community are bond by demands and obligations 
placed on their addressees who are in turn passively affected by them when they take up responsibility 
Responding to their demands is a part and parcel of responsibility. Therefore who we are responsible to 
determines the extent of our community. 
In the Althusserian scene of interpellation, when one is hailed by authority and becomes a subject one's 
body turns around passively to the addresser in the anticipation of a promise or a threat; the authority can always 
have recourse to bodily sanctions, hurt, incarcerate, punish and kill. 
What Lyotard calls "passibility" is irreducible to totally passive, heteronomous 
submission to the insensible, but also an active endeavour of doing justice to that which 
comes before us in its secret, meaningless, undecidable character; by seeking words in its 
silence, finding meaning in its invisibility that would indicate a presence to come—in other 
words a poetic activity that engages with the undecidable since one can never make sure 
one's response is just or responsible (Ibid., 27). As it is an attempt to hear through silence or 
see through a frame put in place by the law that makes us what 'we' are, its mystery may not 
be solved until a new community of sense comes. And as I argued in the last chapter the call 
of obligation ought to be heard as a disarming, dis-identifying address that through its 
disorienting force throws the undecidable matter back into our face: Who ought we to be? 
The question central to the political is thus futural. And in question is the future of the 
community that at the present suffers unjust limits to it. In this chapter I will re-formulate 
these limits as constrains placed on the public, on the sensibility that conditions the audibility 
of troubling demands and the visibility of the aporoi that come before 'us.' 
4.1. Response to the Insensible Before Us: Ethics 
In this section 1 will illustrate how Lyotard explores this before as the (un)representable 
presence of the body before it was exposed to the prescription of the norm: 
...To be aesthetically is to be ... exposed in the space-time, and in the 
space-time of something that affects before all concepts and even 
representations. This before, obviously, we do not know...like birth 
and infancy, there before we are. The there at stake is the body. 
(Lyotard, 1991, 241: my translation) 
This before, analogous to the differend to which no presence can testify to, comes before the 
norm. It is an exposure', of the body alien to the address of the law that will have subjectified 
it in an anticipation of having an effect on it. The body in Lyotard is a particular phrasal 
object within which the alienness of the before resides (Lyotard, 1999, 29). The remnant 
comes before being addressed as an autonomous subject, but every address "presupposes in 
the addressee a passibility, a patheia, an ability to be affected, a metamorphic ability" 
(Lyotard, 1988, 21). It is through this passive ability that one is affected by an address, and 
receives it as exposure to others one feels one ought to respond to. 
Lyotard's neology is another attempt to register the force of the address that makes 
use of receptivity to the locutionary force of the speech-act that forms one as one of 'us'; the 
receptivity to 'the must/the ought' here is reconfigured as the affectability of what will have 
become the embodied addressee that will achieve language, identity, a place in the 
community by receiving the norm. Yet subjectification or emergence of an addressee takes 
place as an emergency in which the latter (for whom the address does not make sense) can 
nevertheless sense its effects. Anthropologically, because of its lack of preparation, the infant 
obeys enigmatic commands without understanding, silently, relying on an uncommunicable 
sensibility. And "affectability is a condition of non-intentional, heteronomous and more or 
less vulnerable openness to the surrounding world. Affectability implies vulnerability 
because the body may be overwhelmed by what affects it" (Vasterling, 2003, 214). The 
addresses of the law in general need affectability in order to be enacted as norms. 
4.1.1. Response to the Undecidable: Responsibility for the Past 
Here 1 will turn to Levinas in order to flilly explain the subjectifying force of exposure to 
what there is. For Levinas "[t]he there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is 'being in 
general' (1947, 48) which is not an object, subject, or predicate but an almost nothingness 
that nevertheless is in its undecidability. The 'there' of the "there is' discloses existence 
unencumbered with engagement with daily things, objects and existents of ontology.'" The 
'there' is exposure to being as such that whatever is finds itself affected with it and needs to 
respond (Ibid., 63); the act of response turns the exposure and the sensibility of the exposed 
into an event that the body is (Ibid.). In ethical terms the event of being is staged through the 
It affects the same way as the sublime object of imagination that resists representation into an object in 
Kant 's Critique of Judgment. 
encounter between the self and other: the self is exposed to the excessive being of the other 
that affects it and demands a response which would be basis of the self s responsibility.'^"* 
A response is thus given to the situation the self senses itself to be within. And it is 
given to the before of that which it is exposed to; the subject of sensibility thus finds itself 
outside itself, within the spatio-temporality that affect and rules its sensations or in the 
difference of other that demands a response in language. The respond to the call of the other 
at the meeting confers responsibility to the self that manifests the radical passivity to 
affection; it interpellates the subject and one is subjectified before one responds (Levinas, 
1979, 66; 183; 1991, 142). The affect is communicated since the address has an excessive 
force. It is both threatening and promising as the debate between Habermas and Mead 
illustrated; it can have an overwhelming impact on bodily sensibility—it can punish, hurt, 
incarcerate or kill, or give recognition, a socio-political presence and a place in a shared life 
through the force of law. Being before the law or others fi-om whom we receive the law is 
thus excessive.'^' Being before both subjectifies and displaces the subject, putting it besides 
itself through awe, apprehension and anxiety over what it is before. 
The elusive before places an emphasis on having already been able to be addressed in 
either case, and not on being the addresser of the law; the addressability of the addressee as a 
subject always already achieved by this primary exposure (the body) affirms the futurity 
inherent in the address that demands a response. And the ethical necessity to respond to a 
" " The relation between the self and other that interrupts it through affectability is mediated through language 
that reveals the se l f s dependence on and affectability by other (Levinas, 1993, 39). However in the exposure of 
the self to other, as "a dialogue that causes one to 'enter into dialogue'" (Levinas, 1993, 16), the illocutionary 
force stems from the affection that the speech brings into existence by revealing the passivity. That radical 
dependency on the other that "leads man to the heart of his being -which is not entirely his" {Ibid., 20) precedes 
the dialogue and subjectifies the parties to it: subjectivity is subjection and answerability to the force of other 
that displaces the self which has always already occurred. 
For Santner when the encounter that overwhelms makes a demand on us, "a trauma is generated by a too 
much of address, by an excess immanent to an address that resists metabolization, that is symbolically 
indiges t ib le '" (2001, 32). If the excessiveness of the address, he elaborates, "persists beyond what can be 
translated into a demand for work, a task to be discharged, something we can do (or, for that matter, refuse to 
do, feel guilty for not doing, and so on)," (Ibid-) the addressee's vulnerability to and fhjstration over the 
enigmatic remainder of the address work against their sovereignty it may even purport to install; as in the 
primary address of the law that subjectifies an autonomous individual through threats to the bodily integrity. 
present/presence that, although other and enigmatic, is able to affect a response from us as if 
it was a part of the self that, through the control over the body, affects itself This should not 
be conceived as a mystic ability, but as persuasion through affecting. While Habermas 
presumed an active moral capacity for mutual understanding between the self and the 
generalized other that follow the same rules of meaning, Lyotard suggests that we have a 
passive ethical capacity for affectability by others even when all that can be sensed is 
absence of meaning. While the voice of the law in Habermas" philosophy says 'Thou must 
give me a valid response' in order to be fully responsible, the cryptic addressor in Lyotard's 
says 'Thou ought to hear me,' but one can never be fully responsible for one's response to the 
meaningless; one is instead responsive to what comes before and responsible to what will 
come next as the futurity of the address implies. Here the act of speech does not ask one to 
reiterate its present happiness conditions, or the law of the past that makes one autonomous, 
but it seeks a new norm in the present perfect future sense of what demands a response 
without decidable meaning, grammar or informative content; "You hear the voice without 
hearing it, you do not understand it, it does not say anything articulate" (Lyotard, 1999, 26) 
but 'you ought to listen, and find words in my silence.' Here one wishes that it will have 
already made sense if one responds to it. The futurity lies in the enigmatic order of 
temporality outside itself, in the time out of joint. 
Having been bom into a political community with norms already in force, given an 
identity, or confronting the present always already organized by the grammar of our mother 
language imply that the present comes too late, its presence only representable through the 
authority of the before, as a reiteration of the lawful, or the forceful homogenization of the 
homogenous as Derrida puts it.'^" The primary operation of the law, according to Derrida, is 
" . . . the monolmgualism of the other would be that sovereignty, that law originating from elsewhere 
certainly, but also pnmanly the very language of the Law... The monolingualism imposed by the other 
operates by relying upon that foundation, here, through a sovereignty whose essence is always colonial 
assimilation of others into the sovereign people, acts of speech into the past structures of 
signification, and difference into homogeneity. The law achieves the reduction of these into 
calculable, repetitive structures of the tradition through hegemony, i.e. an unjustifiable force 
of the past that re-asserts itself in the language of the law(ful). The rule-governed structures 
of the past have always already been forced on the incalculable and the unforeseen of the 
future, by relying on the imagined foundation that is the before; the imagined past where 
people have been constituted as the sovereign people, the initial encounter with the 
significant others, the first contact between the self and the conditions of sensibility that has 
always already been shaped through signification and communication of the rule. More 
importantly, the sovereign signification of the rule overwrites any concerns of difference, 
creativity, change, transformation and novelty, in a mechanical repetition of the language of 
the law(flil). 
In Lyotard's reading of Kafka's Penal Colony, the phrases to be inscribed on the body 
of the guilty were fed to the machine of the law before: 'The machine runs blindly" Lyotard 
explains, "... because it can only read the prescriptions inscribed in the language of the 
former" law (Lyotard, 1991, 240; translation mine). Our responses achieve meaning as long 
as they sustain the originary faith in a self-evident presence that comes before language, just 
as a self-authorized 'we' of the constitution already ensured the legitimacy of our norms. This 
presence, however, does not justify the grammar that conceals its silence, or the norms of the 
'we' that do no not authorize the phrasing of the differend. Our presence is rather sustained 
by our responsiveness to others that have already sensed, confirmed, recognized and 
represented us as their addressee since our constitution. 
which tends, repressively, to reduce language to the One, that is, to the hegemony of the homogenous.. ." 
(Derrida, 1996b, 39-40). 
4.1.2. Response to the Undecidable: Responsibility for the Future 
Responsiveness is not contingent on the addressee's ability to recognize others as lawful 
addressers, or as authorities that demand and deserve a valid response. The undecidable 
character of the authority here is reformulated, though in its sensible mode, where the 
illocutionary force of its meaningless address is sensed (in bodily terms) even when it is not 
at present recognized in a valid representation. And our sense of emergency takes a hold on 
us because it gives rise to an ethical demand for us to respond to the insensible sensibly. Yet 
a responsible response to the (un)representability of what emerges and comes before the law, 
takes doing justice to its undecidable character. In this section 1 shall argue that when the law 
is wrong a just response to others who exceed our sphere of belonging is irresponsibility. 
When we turn down the call of the law, however, we take responsibility for a fijture 
community, expanded and unified by our response to others. 
In political terms, we rely on the same passibility as a wish-to-hear in our exposure to 
those not recognized by norms as one of us. For example, when an Israeli soldier hears an 
outcry in Arabic, the demand does not have a meaning that can obligate her/him, but it makes 
sense to those who refuse to serve to the Israeli law whom we may name refuseniks. They do 
not wish to take part in a crime, they say, committed by the law from the Israeli before that 
threw them into a shared life established on the conditions of a silenced, invisible part of the 
'we.' In a letter signed by the commandos of the Israeli Army in December, 2003, the 
refuseniks said; "We shall no longer corrupt our moral character.. .no longer deny our 
responsibility as soldiers of the Israeli DEFENSE force." '" Here responsibility is taken in 
relation with the concept of'ethical character'"'^ and the characterization of soldiers 
responsible for constitution and maintenance of a community that undecidably includes those 
Htttp://www.seruv.org.il/English/news_item.asp?msgid=85. 
In Habermas' terms a 'character' impedes universalization and unity with the people Here however the 
ethical character of refusemks expands the ethical community and enables identification with the Palestinians 
who are not seen to be a part of the Israeli community. 
they fight: in defending 'the community,' these soldiers of ethical character re-articulate and 
defend the aporoi as one of them, a part of the 'we' inherited from before. Their 
(ir)responsible response to the situation and demand was overthrowing their responsibility as 
the soldiers of the Israeli law of the past they were not responsible for, finding their fiiture 
norm in a call with undecidable character they respond to. 
More importantly, they face their addresser just like they did the addresser from 'the 
before' again wrapped in the undecidability of a figure that can be the law-giver that would 
give the gift of a just life, or the enemy that would hurt and kill them: they re-iterate the 
forming conditions of the community and arrive at a different definition that refuses 
hegemony or forceful assimilation. They also re-interpret the law of the community, the 
conditions of its sensibility and sense. 'The Arab' thus arrives into the visibility field as a 
silent voice that may affect; and as a vulnerable body that can kill or offer a responsible 
life— an unrecognizable presence that may go beyond or reify the representation of the Arab 
as the enemy by the law. One of the refiiseniks, Noam Gur emphasizes that the people of 
Israel "don't really know what's going on in [the West Bank and Gaza Strip]. The only way 
they will see Palestinians for the first time will be once they will be soldiers."'" And seeing 
the invisible, being witness to its silence dis-identifies some of them with the present 'we' of 
Israel whose ethos, i.e., moral character, seeks to re-assert itself through ethics of 
responsibility that demands a just response to what comes before it in the figure of the 
unrecognized Arabs. 
Therefore the community of sense is tasked with justice in the sense of bearing a 
sensible testimony to the insensible presence of those among us. It ought to call into question 
the before when only some were constituted as present among us, and represented as rightfiil 
addressers we must respond to. The community of sense is activated by a wish to re-enact 
Htttp://www.electroicintifada.net/content/I-cant-take-part-these-crimes-israeli-refijsenik:-interviewed/11057 
this before to see them, receive and respond to their meaningless call as the law that may 
make a new "we.' Making use of the same passive responsiveness to the law from the before 
that constituted the present 'we' as a representation both vulnerable and threatening, 
analogous to the body in its exposedness, this community is overwhelmed by the ethical 
demand to make sense of the insensible embodied by the unrecognized visibility of the 
enemy that will have become the law-giver if they do. I argue that this was and still is the 
ethico-political moment in the constitution of community where responsibility is predicated 
on a risky response. 
The task of justice is not so much a passive testimony to the present we are exposed 
to, or the silent presence of the unrepresentable ones, as an active engagement with the future 
constitution of the 'we': it takes under its register the undecidability of the figure of authority 
that cannot be seen, and undecidability of the call that cannot be heard at the present, but does 
so only to re-present it in the light of new words, new laws, new identities and a new shared 
life peopled with a new 'we.' It is a creative engagement, a poetic action that seeks words in 
the silence and figures of authority in the invisible. The next section will attempt to formulate 
justice as testimony to the "before" that one is asked to respond to. The sections following it 
will then relate an ethics of response to a poetics of irresponsibility and indifference to the 
demand of the law. 
4.2. Justice to the before: Testimony 
Here I am still pursuing the exact definition of'11 y a' in Lyotard. I shall examine the 
enigmatic address of the law and responsibility of being witness to its force. 1 will argue that 
the disorienting effects of being before the law are traceable to the bodily signs that bear 
testimony to the undecidable before. This may be illustrated by the following example. One 
of the last Nazi war criminals that live today, John Demjanjuk, was tried and sentenced to 
five years on May 12, 2011, for being instrumental to the death of 20, 680 Jews at the 
concentration camp named Sobibor. But with the sudden death of the last witness, no 
evidence of any crime he was alleged to have committed had been presented to the German 
court by the prosecution, except for an SS identity card, the authenticity of which was later 
questioned by an FBI report. The exact nature of his crime was not quite spelled out by the 
argument of the prosecution that led to the verdict, either, and the final judgment was rather 
grounded in "his presence at Sobibor [which] is enough to charge him with being an 
accessory to murder."''*" The u«or//!oc/ox justification of the verdict"" was matched by an 
equally cryptic statement made by a Holocaust survivor fi"om Sobibor, Jules Schelvis, who 
said "[j]ustice must be done and be seen to be done, the sentence is almost irrelevant," {Ibid.) 
as the trial opened. 
The "almost irrelevance" of the sentence seems to belie the fact that the unique 
meaning of the crime, as well as responsibility, remains to be revealed by the last sentence in 
our stories. Contra Levi who believed that "the Nazi concentration camp still remains an 
unicum [unique mystery], both in its extent and its quality," (1986. 21) we are quick to get 
exasperated by mystery stories that keep us waiting at the doors of courts of justice. Perhaps 
not too many people would mind the technical questions regarding the justification of the 
almost meaningless sentence, or the questionable application of the law that, in its 
inventiveness, becomes more and more inexplicable with reference to the procedures of the 
past it itself established. The question of whether Demjanjuk was really responsible aside, 
since no one almost seems interested in an "almost irrelevant" question, what matters most to 
the juridical pathos of our age was not the haphazardness of procedural justice, but his 
involvement in a crime, sensu slricto, we know nothing about, evidenced by his hapless 
""'http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/john-demjanjuk-guilty-nazi-war-crimes 
"" It was a first in the legal history of Germany, not so unlike an act of speech that (un)makes the norm. 
presence in what Levi describes as a site of mystery. I argue that one can understand the 
presence before the law better through an investigation of bodily traces. 
The sentence given by the court, according to Schelvis who had made his statement 
before the court convened, would have had almost no bearing to justice had it not been "seen 
to be done." The word 'just' originally meant 'juste,'' viz., "righteous before God" in Latin, 
and through secularization came to signify a person "rightful before judge and witnesses." 
Just as Demjanjuk's past presence at Sobibor legitimized the judgment that he is guilty before 
the enigmatic law, Schelvis and other survivors were present at the court to bear witness to 
the fact that the judgment was just. Ironically Demjanjuk allegedly acted as "accessory," his 
body a petty object of the law that supplements the judgment that appeared in the garment of 
the just. His bodily presence at Sobibor was also the instrument of another law tried and 
judged, a darker sort that took hold of an entire continent: his body bore testimony to a 
"madness which is shared by all of those Germans who form part of the Third Reich, in effect 
the whole German nation" (Kelly, 2005, 80). 
4.2.1. Testimony to the Enigmatic Force of the Law: Exposure 
My interest in Demjanjuk's case is to illustrate subjectification as a material process. The 
operations of the law are traceable to its sensible effects that witness its force. The force used 
on the body has an undecidable character. The address subjectifies the body as somebody, its 
force leaving on it individualizing marks. Demjanjuk" case thus demonstrates how the law 
constitutes the subject. The operations of the law identify and subjectify the addressee as a 
lawful citizen, a criminal, or as an undecidable figure that becomes criminal by following the 
law. Critical to my argument is the multiplicity and temporality to the law; there are many 
instances of the law and numerous demands on us, various norms we are exposed to and 
many traces on us that testify, mostly in contradictory terms, to these encounters and 
struggles of power. The Nazi law, too, had a force which turned against itself and against the 
people who justified its being in force; the people it turned against all bore the marks of an 
encounter with a law 'undesirable' to the S.S.. The force of the Gestapo was the force of law 
but it was nevertheless a force that banalized and concealed irrationality, criminalized 
lawfulness, and as Arendt's term of'banality of evil' implied, popularized violence and 
injustice. The Nazi law enforced invisibility on these traces and the subjects that carried 
them.'"*^ As opposed to the concealed-ness of the wrong, 1 argue, justice is unconcealment, 
the visibility of the effects of the law in public, on our bodies, and right before us.'"*' 
Demjanjuk's case also seems to impose on us a few disconcerting questions; 
regarding the aporetic character of the law as crime and responsibility that at times should 
give way to irresponsibility, the role of witness in legal procedure as bodily presence, and the 
demand for justice to which judgment has almost no relevance. The law seems unconcerned 
with ascertaining and re-presenting the facts that would legitimize the judgment on the 
represented; although we all agree on Demjanjuk's guilt and responsibility, we have little 
insight as to what comprises the nature of his crime, or how his bodily existence at Sobibor 
can settle it as an indubitable fact. The unprecedented recourse to his guard duty at the camp, 
as if the responsibility given by the Nazi law that once addressed him contaminated his body 
irrevocably so that it still shows the unmistakable signs of a savage Nazi, was not justified by 
prior court decisions that would have considered the evidence merely circumstantial. If the 
law is fickle and innovative in legitimization of its judgment, one can hardly anticipate the 
Arendt 's conviction that Nazism was a crime committed under the permission of the law rests on the fact that 
the Nazis were "very busy destroying the evidence of their crimes during the last months of the war" (1964, 
276). That the law diligently sought to cover its visible effects, for me too, makes clear that there was a wrong 
committed by it, established by the pile of dead bodies. 
"" The individuals such as Eichmann, on the other hand, were complicit in the crime of the law they were 
subjected to when they acted lawfully but I argue that the guilt nevertheless lies with the law they had no legal 
options to respond with a 'No. ' The aporia of the law is such that we wish that Eichmann had always already 
violated the law and the aporia of justice is such that we wish there had already been no wrongs and no deaths 
of thousands (by the prescription of the law) that no judgment on Eichmann could bring back. That is why 
Schelvis rightly thinks judgment is almost irrelevant when it cannot take back the horrible past. 
sentence, unable to act on an expectation of what the law demands; it may for instance 
demand something ungrammatical and queer regarding the past, that one should not have 
exposed his body to the wrong kind of law, responding to the call of a murderous authority, 
having a presence in the wrong 'we ' at the wrong time. 
The point is the multiplicity and temporality to the law; what was permissible and 
demanded by the law in the past and in Nazi Germany is punishable by the law at the present. 
When the law is wrong and there is no higher authority to turn to, one needs to decide on the 
undecidable—break the law which is wrong and be punished as breaking the law is always 
wrong, or follow the law and do wrong. The decision as Demjanjuk's case illustrates, 
however, transgresses and digresses in time; he was tried by the present law (of others) for 
possibly following the past law (of the Nazi Germany's self)."*" 
On the other hand, the instability and inscrutability of the law opens onto the 
contestability of the legitimization of the judgment at stake, which finds its expression in a 
symbolic remnant Demjanjuk still bears on his visible figure, implicating him in an unknown 
crime. The disputable double ethical entailment in "He was there; therefore he must have 
been involved: therefore he is guilty" only implies that he was present there, most likely 
witnessing atrocities, if not committing them. The accusation takes a different course now, 
directed at the only thing proved, that is, his cruel testimony to a terrible event, which should 
be settled as a fact via his bodily identity in a continuum. In a former trial held in Israel, the 
experts on evidence examination represented all the bodily evidences.''*' Following several 
" " On the level of the positive law, the multiplicity of the norms can be observed in the conflicts between the 
constitution, criminal law, civil law, the counterpart.s of those in other states, international law, and the U.N. 
regulations. Since any of these is subject to amendment or annulment, the law is fickle and usually does not 
apply in retrospective. Demjanjuk 's case, however, is an exception in that the possible past obedience to the law 
in a country is tned by the present law in another country, with an exceptional procedure that cannot be justified 
by similar cases. 
Experts who studied the photograph on the SS card pointed out the matching skull formation broad 
zygomatic arches, protrusion of the subject 's left ear etc. that indicate a very real possibility that the Nazi face 
court sessions,'''^ the experts came to the conclusion that all the bodily marks testify to the 
fact that this is the body of the man who at least was there, at least testifying to the deaths of 
thousands. 
Yet his identification only revealed that he still is who he was without actually 
making too clear who he was. For all we know, the case is undecidable; he satisfies the 
necessary condition of being a Nazi (he was present before the Nazi law), though not the 
sufficient one: he may or may not be the Ivan the Terrible they are after. "It is clear that 
Demnanjuk was one of Trawniki 's roving Ivan the Terribles," concludes Nickell (2005, 50), 
though we have no idea which one. But as he (his body) shows no signs of contrition, by the 
implacable logic of presence, if "he is innocent of killing Jews at one camp [that is] because 
he was killing Jews at another" (Ibid ). Once again, we do not really seek truth, or who he 
was, or what he is guilty of, or not even a proper sentence to give him, but justice—a justice 
without stable norms of legitimacy, truth, identity or judgment. 
It seems fair to assert that contemporary justice cannot be phrased in the language of 
norms, truth, and judgment. In her commentary on the first war crime prosecutions in 
Australia, especially the Polyukhovich trial, Ranki protests that "[cjourts are not concerned 
with getting fact [and] the law simply does not seek the truth" (1997, 35). In reducing an 
event where the law was an accomplice to ordinary crime under the jurisdiction of the law, 
she complains, the Australian legal system in fact writes "a narrative of Holocaust history 
according to the requirements of what the law can handle" (Ibid., 36). By her account, the 
story-telling abilities of the lawyers, or the illocutionary force of their speech, marked the 
moment decisive to the verdict in the Polyukhovich trial, which absolved him of all charges. 
on the picture may be his (Nickell, 2005, 40-45). A scar on his back was mentioned, and some eye witnesses 
were summoned to identify him after seventy years, all of whom confirmed without hesitation that it was him. 
They were devoted to the debates on the authenticity of the signature on the card, whether it signifies, 
verifies or belies Demjanjuk ' s identity. 
in stark contrast to the Demjanjuk case, due to the lack of substantial evidence: "This aspect, 
the haphazard quahty of the law, that the potential outcome of the case depends on the skill of 
the lawyer, on presentation and quick-wittedness, is (still) a perplexity,... [and] shows the 
inability of the law to deal with these non-ordinary crimes" {Ibid., 24). The speech-act of the 
law feels random because similar cases are not presented within a similar procedure or 
concluded with a similar judgment; judgment can be swayed by rhetorics, uncanny 
persuasion, effective presentation, presence of witty witnesses and representation. If 
judgment is contingent in cases where the law is complicit, the only alternative is not to 
prosecute, she reasons. As Garland argued, perhaps we cannot make "people guilty of crimes 
that at the time they did not know were crimes" (quoted in Devan, 1994, 77). To conclude, 
the address of the law is enigmatic and when the law is wrong, it subjectifies one as a lawfiil 
criminal or an outlaw victim. The Nazi law created a surplus subjectification embodied by 
'the jews' as well as Nazis: they were (outside) the law they were exposed to, bearing 
testimony to its enigmatic force. 
4.2.2. Testimony to the Before: Bodily Traces 
In this section I try to give an account of the before as an encounter with multiple laws that 
left their marks on the body. I will investigate how different identities were constructed and 
caused a problem for the totalized sensibility of the Nazi presentist law. The holocaust 
victims were all identified and excluded from the society because they were guilty in the eyes 
of the Nazi. The gist of the matter is not that murder was never de-criminalized by the Nazi 
law, but revolves around a more interesting claim made by Ravi, that "Jews were deemed 
outside of law by Nazi doctrine and legislation" (Ravi, 1977, 28), and thus there was no 
responsibility.'''' There was no responsibility since 'the jews,' being outside the law like the 
That is, their status was the same as the sovereign: Schmitt says the sovereign is (outside) the law The 
paradoxical status o f ' t h e jews ' maizes them the excluded norm of community. They signified both the criminal 
wretches and the pnncipled constitution of the Nazi community. They were outside the law because they can be 
sovereign, were paradoxically not recognized as the sovereign addressers of the law those 
present in Nazi Germany were to respond to. Outsiders to the law and the community, their 
wish-to-say was not heard, their suffering not seen, and their plight insensible. And they were 
not to be responded since they were guilty from the before. 
Before what? In a sense 'the jews' of Lyotard paid for having been touched a 'first' 
time before the Nazi law; they had already been addressed before, by the Jewish Law, gypsy 
nomos, a lawless desire that constituted them as the remnant of the Nazi law,'"^ and a bodily 
crisis''" that expelled them from the community. Just like Demjanjuk, they were guilty of 
having their bodies exposed to another force of law before that subjectified them, being its 
witnesses and bearing stars that marked them. "This guilt is ontological in a manner of 
speaking; it is constitutive, such that the law always comes in second in order to sanction and 
erase this fault" (Lyotard, 1999, 39). And the violence exerted by the Nazi Law aimed to take 
back the traces of the before, 'the jews' were similar to a block of marble, nicked, pitched, 
and knocked off for the construction of an impossible statue. They became worn-out, mute 
objects of the law whose bodies testify to the effects of having been addressed before: The 
Jews, the gay, the sick and frail and the gypsy of Nazi Germany were identified by bodily 
traces, bloodline, circumcision, rectal cuts etc. (See Landau, 2006, 311; Margalit, 2002, 111; 
Gellately & Stoltzfiis, 2001, 213; and Gellately, 2001, 115). The Communists were identified 
by their desire, which is always a bodily force. In the Nazi taxonomy of the body, as the 
figures and cuts on bodies of "the jews" proliferated, so did the forces of law that compete 
over the passive body submitted to the address of multiple laws that carve their effects on it. 
Far from being exceptions that provide an escape from the uninterruptable address of the law, 
killed but on the other hand they expressed the rule that negatively identified the Nazi German: not one of ' the 
jews. ' 
"" The gay desired other men whereas the Communists desired the end of the Nazi law and society. In all cases 
their desire was seen as the mark that excluded them from the wider society, and given that desire is a bodily 
force, they were treated as a sickness spreading the heart of healthy Arian society. 
" " Of desire, sickness, and frailness. Their skulls were measured, their blood taken and analysed, the reasons of 
their sickness discussed, ' the j ews ' were diagnosed with being different where difference was a matter of life. 
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'the jews' and the bodily remnants attested to a war amongst several forces operative on 
them, hke phrases crossed over and written over by a thought in its urgency to pass the final 
verdict on the undecidable. 
This before does not only refer to a subjectification that went awry from the 
perspective of the present norms of the main-stream society; it also chimes with what 
Habermas calls 'character," which in Chapter 2 I interpreted as an indelible mark 
subjectifying a private other that hinders internalization of the voice of the generalized other 
and unification with the 'we.' In the second chapter 1 explored how in Habermas' thought the 
address of the law subjectifies with a mark that forms the lawless character. The marks 'the 
jews' bore on them were sensible effects of their encounters with others in the past that made 
them what they were. In the "before' they were addressed by, say, their gypsy mothers, caring 
rabbis, gay partners, sick strangers, Marxist popular leaders and these addresses had left a 
trace on them that subjectified them in an agonistic relation to the main-stream norms of their 
present; they had always already been gypsy, Jew, Communist, gay, sick, and old before they 
aroused the anxiety of the Nazi authorities who sensed a threat in their excessive presence in 
the community characterized by the forced hetero-Aryan-liberal-male-young-normativity. 
They were the aporoi representing the inassimable difference, living where they could (not) 
belong and did (not) survive. Being the inassimable remnant to the Nazi law, they were 
displaced. 
Nazi law aimed for an identity-free political world, like a terrible parody of the Ideal 
Speech Situation, where everybody will be perfectly alike, agreeable and not exposed to 
otherness that testifies to the possibility of being otherwise than was decided by the present 
law. Thus 'the jews' were confined outside the public, into concentration camps, as if their 
bodies were infected with the traces from 'the before" and seeing them, talking to them. 
sharing a life with them, in sum being exposed to them would have spread the infection."" 
Cast outside the Nazi conditions of sensibility, it was this embodiment of the insensible 
'before' that the Nazi law refused to recognize, see or hear. 
Therefore the Nazi law attempted to remove them from the sensible because their 
sensible presence testified to its precariousness; in addressing themselves to the 'we, ' their 
character made a call, without the mediation of speech and through the visibility of traces, 
that there are alternatives to 'the we' jealously guarded by the present law that recognizes 
only what it constitutes. 'The before' could have happened otherwise. We could have been 
subjectified otherwise than the Aryan constitution of the people as white, Anglo-Saxon, 
Christian, preferably male, young, and straight. Underneath the shaky hold of the law that 
constituted us by sheer luck as some body lies the undecidability of who we really are if we 
can differ from ourselves. They testified to an otherwise before and exemplified another way 
of being present in the society. They were subjectified as a wrong. They embodied another 
kind of law, other norms, other desires and world views. That is why they were sentenced to 
invisibility, inaudibility, and insensibility in the society. And if we can respond to their 
insensible presence among us, and assume responsibility for being what 'we' are, the 
question will be: Who ought we to be? 
Justice is responsibility for our constitution, this undecidability that makes us all alike 
even when obscured by precarious, contingent identities from the before we embody, but also 
responsiveness to the pile of dead bodies, outside the visibility field of the 'we,' silently 
voicing a lost chance to be otherwise; I have argued that the effects of the law are sensible, 
bodily marks and justice is equated with bearing witness to the force of the law in bodily 
terms. For Butler the body is a "signifying practice within a cultural field" that enables 
embodiment, or subversion, of an identity (1990, 139) and it is "itself shaped by political 
Cf. Butler's Excitable Speech, 1997, 110, where she critiques what is meant when the unsayability of 
homosexuality in military "as a contagious substance, a dangerous fluid" is said to " 'communicate' along the 
lines of a disease." 
forces with strategic interests in i<eeping tiiat body bounded and constituted by the marlcers" 
of norms (Ibid., 129). I argued in this section that normative operations embedded in 
practices of power exercised on the body are muhiple and leave sensible traces that testify to 
them; these operations can be seen to subjectify a body as somebody that signifies a way of 
being amongst the "we' in its difference and otherness. However, when the body is seen as a 
threat by its excessiveness, contagiousness, kept 'bounded," piled, concealed behind the wails 
of concentration camps, made invisible, and the signifying practice - the body's and bodily 
traces' exposure to the public- is foreclosed, it constitutes a wrong; difference, otherness and 
a way of living otherwise are foreclosed through the normative limitations to the sensibility. I 
argued that justice demands unconcealment and response: engagement with these limitations, 
making visible what has been concealed by the normative operations and responding to what 
is set outside these limitations. For Butler too justice refers to "ethical relations that make us 
ethically responsive to those who exceed our immediate sphere of belonging to whom we 
nevertheless belong, regardless of any choice or contract" (2012, 23). Yet if they exceed our 
sphere of belonging, they are foreclosed through the normative limitations to our sensibility. 
How could we respond to it if we cannot see, hear and make sense of an insensible presence 
among us? Responding to them means taking responsibility for a past that constituted them as 
the foreclosed others. How can this before be re-enacted as the future of the people? The next 
section aims to answer that question. I will argue that the right response to their senseless 
presence among us is to ignore the present limits to sensibility and that expanding our sphere 
of belonging implies irresponsibility towards the law that establishes these limits. 
4.3. Response and Responsibility: Poetics of Carelessness 
In the Introduction to this chapter I mentioned a 'common with no cares' and interpreted it 
along the lines of those uncared for, unrecognized and insensible. I suggested that the 
Palestinians under the Israeli jurisdiction as well as 'the jews,' could be a paradigm of the 
insensible trouble at the heart of the community of sense whose law does not assume 
responsibility to them. Moreover tiie trouble 'spreads' to the Israeli citizens who are exposed, 
addressed and affected by them and disavow their responsibility ascribed by the Israeli law. 
Yet it is no wonder that the ethics of response that traces responsibility back to a risky 
response to the insensible difference of the authority to the impostor leads to the realization 
that one's responsibility before the law too may turn out to be a precarious sham. When it is 
the law that is responsible for the wrong, the responsible response could be a sensible 
irresponsibility. If response and responsibility are entailed in subjectification, irresponsibility 
implies dis-identification, being and acting otherwise than what the law of sensibility decrees. 
In other words, when we act irresponsibly with regard to the law that makes us what we are, 
we change. 
4 . 3 . 1 . (Ir)responsibility and Sovereignty: Poetics and Obligation 
Arendt says of Eichmann that he acted terribly responsibly'" but Eichmann's legal 
responsibility was wrong and constitutive of an ethical wrong. He considered himself merely 
a subject to the law on which the sovereignty of the people rested, and not a sovereign subject 
being (outside) the law."^ He ought to have suspended sovereignty to vindicate sovereignty, 
being an irresponsible subject before the law that he is (outside of) in order to feel obliged by 
and respond to 'the jews ' as if they were the sovereign. He ought to have chosen the 
unchoosable to respond to his situation ethically, not legally. His responsibility before the law 
and irresponsibility before 'the jews, ' however, unfolded into the future responsibility for 
deaths of thousands. He was guilty from the before and he remained guilty in the future. 
I shall argue that irresponsibility extends to what comes before the law in its 
undecidable, insensible character to be constituted as a subject. The sovereign is (excluded 
That is, she seems to find him responsible for his acts: "Eichmann acted fully within the framework of the 
kind of judgment required of him: he acted in accordance with the rule, examined the order issued to him for its 
'manifest ' legality, namely regularity; he did not have to fall back upon his 'conscience '" (1964, 255). 
Being before the law he could have been careless: He could have chosen not to respond to the demand of the 
law, or remained indifferent and decided on an exception to the law, suspended its application, dis-identify with 
the Nazi 'we ' and risked legal punishment. 
from) the law, (ir)responsive to its demands when it is wrong and excludes and silences 
others. One is rather responsible to the wronged in its silent presence that acts like the 
sovereign. The excluded, 1 argued, occupy the same position in the 'we ' as the sovereign: 
they are (outside) the norm and address us in their silent, aporetic presence, demanding a 
response. The passivity oithe thing is thus a possibility condition of our response that reveals 
the thing's indifference to the phrasing (Lyotard, 1998, 20-30), its carelessness, its 
irresponsibility since it is both silenced and voiced by its consti tution. '" 1 argue that 
responsibility consists of irresponsibility before the law—an imaginative response to the 
figure that constitutes them as the sovereign. Our poetic response would constitute them as 
the subjects of the political, constituting a figure we represent in our discourse, poetically 
seeking words in its silence. This figure, in its undecidable character, is openness to address 
and its being before language silently, signifies, i.e. alludes to a demand that one ought to 
make sense of it through signification, like the silent call of "the jews. ' 
Before the law that addresses it, however the figure is just The Thing that Lyotard 
says ignores us in its meaningless sense; in other words, it is irresponsive, but it is open to 
and demands a response. It is there, and its being-there demands a representation that would 
make it visible, in a figure materialized in speech. As I argued in the last chapter phrases can 
form a universe if they are responded to as if they are obligations (Lyotard, 1998, 7; 40). And 
the silent call of the Thing is an obligating address that we ought to find a meaning in its 
being-there: being before it, one has a responsibility to answer and constitute them as the 
sovereign with a poetic response. This inauguration of an imaginary dialogue with the 
insensible thing is reminiscent of what Habermas implies by 'swapping the positions with a 
generalized other' in an ideal space of address free of identities since the constraints oithe 
before are suspended in each case: there is nothing identifiable present at the present and 
Likewise, a cognitive phrase aims to justify itself through reference to an object, but a concept displaces and 
replaces the presence of the object it represents, instead referring to the rules of language. 
"what is the difference between this thing and the Law," (Lyotard, 1999, 26) if an incorporeal 
voice says you ought to be just in your response"! Thus the Thing is meaningless unless its 
call is responded to, but has a sense that would be both revealed and concealed in a figure our 
discourse constitutes. 
Lyotard argues that the material figure is outside language, but language takes it as a 
norm because its being-there precedes and enables language. Language is possible because 
the extra-linguistic is addressable by language and it embodies possibilities of citation. The 
figure occupies an aporetic position in the discourse through this simultaneous exclusion and 
inclusion just like the sovereign. A phrase thus writes off the unconditioned signifiability of 
the "before" by subjecting it to a condition (the rule of the phrasing), realizing a possibility of 
citation, which both reveals and conceals the passive receptivity that enables it. In a sense, 
the Thing is always already in a phrasal universe it necessarily inhabits thanks to the passivity 
that, by its very exclusion, structures it in normative terms."' ' In other words, any figure 
constituted is already before the law with the foreclosed remnant of the "before."" ' Every act 
of constitution excludes by inclusion: this is the constitution of sovereignty. Just as the socio-
political norm is justified by an unrepresentable before (constitution, social contract etc.) that 
forms the community, language owes its representative operations to what comes before 
language, i.e., passive receptivity to the law/meaning. The remainder, the Thing that allows 
the making sense of the insensible and produces the force of law (Ibid.) is crossed over in the 
threshold from the almost nothingness to a life regulated by the forces of law; that is, it has 
always already constituted us as the addressee of responsibility for a past that is present 
before 'us. ' 
"" IIy a as the extra-discursive can only be made sense by discourse. Cf. Davidson, Donald, "On the Very Idea 
of a Conceptual Scheme," in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 47, 
(1973- 1974), 5-20. 
By extension, "[t]he body comes immediately under the force of the law—from the child's birth. Just as 
immediately, however, one knows that the child can never fully obey, that there will always be a remainder" 
(Lyotard, 1994, 117). 
"[T]he thing is 'present' but, like the voice of Yahweh, it says to listen; it endeavors 
to signal the affect [affection] of an absent 'presence'" (Lyotard, 1999, 24), taking shape and 
a form in front of our eyes if one listens and responds to the responsibility. At the moment 
when we sense its call and are addressed by this troubling ghostly figure that seeks its just 
representation, our response seeks a meaning in its being-there, envisions the silent address 
as if it is said by what is invisible but will have been sensibly present if its representation is 
identified and coupled with words: our response thus becomes irresponsible to the constraints 
of the present, shatters sensible limits in an attempt to the see the possible future through 
the opaque screen of the 'before.' 
4.3.2. Response and Receptivity: Voice and Silence 
In this section I shall again seek to explain the questions of subjectification but through 
poetics. How does constitution of identity operate in discourses? "Sense is present as absence 
of signification..." (Lyotard, quoted in Bennington, 1998, 63) and the naked sense of the thing 
can thus be defined as its passive exposure to an infinite labour of interpretation over what it 
ought to be. This interpretative work is, Lyotard elaborates, radical poetics, the world-
disclosing function of language: a speech-act of imagination that oscillates between the 
discursive (i.e., rule-governed speech) and the figural (i.e., a representation that has yet to be 
present) that always co-exist (Lyotard, 2011; 61; 65-66; 70; 347; 383-384).'" In other words, 
being before 'the jews' is also being responsive to the imagined discourse of this figure one is 
responsible to. Poetics can envision and materialize a phantasmagorical figure on the 
threshold of presence when it is presently not visible, and speech here owes its meaning to 
We disavow the presently sensible that conceals its sense, and the former identities that screen out its 
visibility, dislocating ourselves from the present, and take a leap of faith toward what is to come This "is poetic 
fiction, and occur[s] in a "vacant space' from which the constraints of sensibility in the Kantian sense and those 
of the language of interlocution are eliminated. Speech already carries out this exclusion of the obiect (and 
subject)" (Lyotard, 2011, 62). ' 
Constimtive speech-acts rely on the interdependence and mobility of the material and the ideal matter and 
speech, the addressor and the addressee, not on a referential relation to the presence- "If the artwork seems to 
'oscillate,' this is because there is in itself a to and fro between what is realistic and what is imaginary or to be 
more precise, between what is 'discourse' . . . and what is figure" (Lyotard, 2011, 383). ' 
the s i lent p a s s i v i t y o f the thing it a d d r e s s e s and cons t i tu t e s b y t h e e x c l u s i o n o f its 
m e a n i n g l e s s s ense . L a n g u a g e is m e a n i n g f u l , Lyo ta rd con t inues , o n l y b e c a u s e w h a t c o m e s 
b e f o r e l a n g u a g e is s i g n i f i a b l e b y l a n g u a g e and the material figure c i ted and cons t i t u t ed b y 
n a m i n g m u s t b e p a s s i v e l y r e s p o n s i v e , b e c i t ab le b y l a n g u a g e that f o r c e s it to en te r in to a 
phrasa l u n i v e r s e in w h i c h i ts m e r e s e n s e is c ea se l e s s ly d i sp l aced and rep laced . ' '® It is a 
r e spons ib i l i t y tha t f a l l s u p o n a n y o n e e x p o s e d to the f igure , and re spons ib i l i t y cons i s t s o f a 
r e s p o n s e — b y a t t r i bu t i ng a m e a n i n g , a speech , a d e m a n d to it. 
S i n c e t h e before is n e i t h e r lawfi i l , n o r l awless , bu t pa s s ive ly r e c e p t i v e to the l aw , 
mutadis mutandis, the thing is m u t e bu t no t to ta l ly insens ib le s i nce its s i l ence s t ruc tu res 
speech ( and n e w r e s p o n s e s to th i s respons ib i l i ty ) . S ince " ' l a n g u a g e ' h a s n o e x t e r i o r , " 
(Lyota rd , 1984a , 17) t h e unsayab i l i t y at s t ake m u s t b e c o n c e i v e d as an in ternal d i s tu rbance , a 
m e a n i n g l e s s n e s s e n d e m i c to the m e a n i n g f u l w h i c h neve r the l e s s " c a n say that [ the ex t ra -
l inguis t ic , such as ] the "body ' s a y s s o m e t h i n g , that s i l ence s p e a k s " (Ibid.). T h u s Lyo ta rd 
sugges t s that the so-called insensible, mute figure (say. of 'the jews') has an enigmatic 
address of its own, a meaningless sense, and a silent voice, o r a m o d e in w h i c h it s i len t ly 
tes t i f ies to a p r e s e n c e a l w a y s a l r eady r e s id ing wi th in l anguage , d e m a n d i n g r e s p o n s e , and 
I am gratefiil to William McClure for a discussion on the mode of receptivity called upon before the silent 
addressor. In Differend, Lyotard says Cezanne's is a painting that calls into question its very own nature and 
"obligates the addressee to ask about what it consists in" (Lyotard, 1988, 139). In other words, one may also 
conceptualize the mode of receptivity in terms of a wish-to-see. I however emphasize the obligation to hear the 
timbre, tone and voice of the painting as if it addresses you about itself, its possibilities of phrasing. And hence 
the wish-to-hear that calls upon the addressee even before it has a wish-to-see. We can liken the emergent 
addressor to a Cezanne painting that forcefully invites one to conduct a poetic investigation into its namre. That 
is what I call 'recognition,' which is closer to apprehension plus the creative work that follows it. The differend 
does not only arouse the feeling of sublime but also makes one feel an urgency: the visible needs to be phrased 
anew, again, in a similar voice to its tone that one is obligated to hear. And as a pagus, the next phrase to come 
that would address it would be the result of a work, conflict and trade, i.e. of a violent force of phrasing that 
cancels out other phrases and causes a silence to ensue. One experiences the differend here, but through its felt 
affects (a cut on the body, a threat, a promise, fear and trembling etc.). Exposed to the visible that demands an 
answer, one suspends the linkage between phrases and feels at home in silence. But this home is an uncanny 
home, cut off from the phrases and closed to what is to come. Here the emergent is concealed, the visible is 
silenced, and the Volk, Lyotard says, is attached to the archive of narratives. In order to re-awaken the feeling of 
sublime, war is necessary. I conceive the war as the constant struggle between narratives, phrases and links to 
keep up "the stakes." Again an analogy is useful here: war is between the forces of the law that keep addressing 
our body, making conflicting demands, and turning one into a work of art; i.e., a Jew addressed by German 
forces of law, forces of community, forces of others. The constellation of forces makes us what we are (not): 
every time we are addressed, we have the chance to be otherwise. 
placing a responsibility on u s . ' " That mute figure subjectified testifies to the cryptic 
character of language always in debt to the silent receptivity of what it addresses. Thus it also 
demands a poetic speech-act. It is our responsibility to perform an act of speech that would 
identify, subjectify and recognize them. And our responsibility is to respond with poetic 
creativity to sense the meaning in their senseless, unrecognizable presence and traces of the 
unsayable in the already-heard: "The phantasy (the figure-image in this instance) is a ghost, a 
lost soul that discourse is called upon to redeem, because it is a meaning that is waiting to be 
signified, and that presents itself as a representation because it cannot find expression in 
words" (Lyotard, 2011, 347). 
To be just in our response is our responsibility, but this responsibility can be 
performed by the irresponsibility to the present. We are thus exposed to the thing in its 
undecidable character that, without a recognizable identity, without speech, and without a 
norm of recognition, addresses its insensible visibility to us in a silent voice. ""The voice 
speaks to you only in the sense that it addresses itself to you, but its language is unknown to 
you" (Lyotard. 1999, 26) if one does not have an ethical sense and imagination.'^' The voice 
is insensible as its address does not make sense by the rules of our phrases, by the present 
norms, or by its presence, and although it is a 'real' other we face, like a Palestinian in Israel, 
what we hear is not their speech: we do not identify it with what/who occasions it but 
imagine it and re-present what is present before us. We do not care about the informative 
content of their speech, whether they actually speak or not, or whether one can hear, make 
sense and understand their call: we respond to them carelessly but ethically, being the ones 
responsible for the situation and responsible to other people. This address does not aim to re-
In other words, 'the jews ' voiced a demand that, if Eichmann had acted as if they did and responded to their 
silence, would have re-constituted the community in Nazi Germany. 
J® "the jews" make a demand on Eichmann and hold him responsible for not responding to their silent presence. 
Arendt relates it to the ability to hear the voice of the conscience: "a ' feeling of lawfulness that lies deep 
within every human conscience, also of those who are not conversant with books of law provided the eve is 
not blind and the heart is not stony and corrupt '" (1964, 255). 
instate the present norms of sensibility, i.e., validity and justification through the meaningfiil 
and the present, but a break with them, and although the address and our response mirror each 
other, that is because at this moment "signification is presented visually as meaning, and 
meaning is presented intelligibly as signification" (Lyotard, 2011, 70). In other words we 
respond by an act, say, in the Israeli Refuseniks' example, of putting down our guns, which 
says more than words can. Our act signifies, becomes signification, and a silent response to a 
silent demand. At this moment we are disoriented, lost between the material and the ideal, 
and our speech seeks its norms in the visible as if it speaks. 
It does not. It does not respond as it is irresponsible, careless, and indifferent: "the 
voice indebts you, the thing ignores you" (Lyotard, 1999, 29). It is just there: the Palestinians 
are, just are, in Israel. It is rather us that speak as / / this figure would, finding words it would 
say in an imaginative act of identification: we would differ from ourselves, identify ourselves 
with the stranger, and since it is indifferent to identities, our poetic speech-act is not 
necessarily an unjust response as long as it testifies Xo 11 y a and seeks a new norm in its 
silence. At that moment the "before' gives way to the future. We thus respond to its call 
toward the future, as if it is a new law that will have constituted a new 'we, ' disavowing the 
presently sensible, lifting the constraints of the community of sense, and as we grope for 
words in the silent call of others, we become otherwise. We become strangers to ourselves 
that we imagined would have been present if we responded to the silent call of the stranger. 
We also move from the present toward fiiture. Radical poetics is thus ftitural and predicates 
In Otherwise Than Being. Levinas notes that "[t]his breakup of identity, this changing of being into 
signification, that is, into substitution, is the subject's subjectivity, its susceptibility, its vulnerability, that is, its 
sensibility" ( Translating Levinas' terminology of "the said" and "the saying" into the vocabulary of the present 
context, the pragmatic relation with the being as an object of knowledge converges to the said, and relating to it 
as an indeterminate object of aesthetics to the saying (Ibid., pp. 30-36). If the meaning is not knowledge, the 
dialogue between two "P's in Levinas becomes an intimate community meeting where we experience our 
essential passivity and mutual dependency as opposed to the anonymous I-That dialogue of the public sphere 
that any remnant of personality must be left outside before entering: The parties to the meeting reveal and get in 
touch with their unique particularity beyond the pragmatic determination, a sort of being-there pa;Aos 
(singularity in the space-time) that transcends the brutal anxiety of being-thrown as they face the face of 
otherness, which turns out to be their own. 
responsibility on a mobility of identities, mobility of temporalities, and mobility of elements 
of representation—the visible and the audible. 
Conclusion: Ethico-Poetics of the Sensible 
Demjanjuk died while his appeal was pending, before this chapter was finished with a final 
sentence, before a final sentence was given to him. In his last announcement, he "maintained 
that he was a victim of the Nazis himself Whatever really happened to him before 
remains undecided, but his son, Demjanjuk Jr. says he "fell asleep...as a victim and survivor 
of Soviet and German brutality since childhood" (Ibid.), invoking a past no one can bear 
witness to. Nazi or victim, his testimony to the before and his presence before the law 
symbolized a past our justice system and understanding of responsibility have not found 
closure with.'''' His attorney, McGinnes also suggests that those charged at war trials "were 
nobodies—if in fact they were even there": what have been judged indeed were the traces of 
the before, remnants of the Nazi law embodied by the war criminals, and as U.S. Attorney 
Steven Dettelbach maintains, "there is no judicial or natural outcome that can erase the acts 
of Nazi persecution" (Ibid.). 
The silent remnants however cannot present a foundation on which the substance of 
law can be circumscribed from outside by the logic of exceptionality: they only embody the 
(un)representability of what comes before the law. As Lyotard argues, the addresses of the 
law subjectify an unrecognizable otherness that resists sovereignty. An ethical encounter with 
the unrecognizable 'there-is' transcends authority and dis-identifies its addressee. The silent 
presence of insensible lives makes a demand to be seen as the unrecognizable remnant of a 
material history of the political community that wrongs them. The exclusive past can be re-
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/03/17/obit-john-demjanjuk.html. 
Yet the language used in responses implies that his presence or responsibility was not the real is.sue- there are 
indications other charges may be made after his death that would find him responsible since justice a response 
and responsibility can well take place in one 's (or others') absence. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.eom/2012/03/20/john-demjanjuk-dead-accused-nazi-guard-dies-9l n 1365742.html 
read to uncover the contingency of norms that constitute and authorize the 'we, ' i.e., archive 
of the people and form the receptibility conditions of speech-acts that constitute a body as 
somebody. Thus a wish-to-hear requires semantic fiiturity in re-interpreting the norms of the 
past that constituted the silent presence that nevertheless speaks by being-there. 
In a community of sense one can and ought to respond to the silent bodies of 
Mussellmanner, the (in)sensible absence of those one is affectively attached to, the alien 
language of the unseen Arab as if they are right before our eyes, as if they materialize into a 
figure that speaks the words of the law. Therefore justice, as Lyotard frames it, is 
responsibility to what comes before the law with its undecidable character, and 
responsiveness to an insensible trace with regard to the (past and future) constitution of the 
matter of the lawful. It is a poetic response to the question of what "we' ought to be. Aiming 
to reform, and re-form the matter of the society in a sensibility enriched with the vision of the 
insensible remnant, justice brings ethics that go beyond the law and poetics that go beyond 
the present in a response to each and every invisible, silent figure in a community of sense. 
Azoulay defines the task of justice as "to direct one's look at what is revealed by each and 
every one, and to assume responsibility for how what is visible is articulated into discourse" 
(2008, 192). Similarly, I interpret it as expanding the legal frame that recognizes a body as 
somebody in order to realize that the silent stranger has always been (among) us. 
This chapter thus re-orients the study of the unsayable in the direction of a conceptual 
slide between the visible and the audible that seems promising for those who only have their 
silent visibility to offer in order to say something unheard by the law of our constitution. 
Radical poetics, Lyotard reminded us, can seek and find meaning in the visible that affects us 
by our speech's indebtedness to it, so that it can be articulated into speech that indicates a 
presence to come. Through poetic responses that rely on its silent addresser's indifference to 
identities,''^ one can have a response to a body as if it is the law of somebody that one 
identified with and felt indebted to. On the other hand, if justice is to be understood as 
responsiveness to all others who address us, we are also perforce responsive to the 'we, ' 
when it is its law that gave us a shared life in the before. Most Israeli refiiseniks in fact face 
condemnation, marginalization, legal action, stigma for being traitors who, choosing enemy 
over brother, failed to repay the debt. Although justice at times demands disagreement with 
the sovereign, if it is the 'we' that demands a response, are we supposed to agree with the 
sovereign, as Habermas suggested? The next chapters will address the inherent tensions in the 
response to the address, where for Ranciere too the silent visibility is indifferent to identities, 
and needs a poetic response that will articulate it, but it does not have an ethos, or a moral 
character: it is inherently non-ethical and in disagreement with the law. 
Chapter 5. The Visible and the Audible: Mobility of the People 
For my generation politics in France relied 
on an impossible identification-an 
identification with the bodies of the 
Algerians beaten to death and thrown into 
the Seine by the French police, in the name 
of the French people, in October 1961. We 
could not identify with those Algerians, but 
we could question our identification with 
the "French people" in whose name they 
had been murdered. That is to say, we could 
act as political subjects in the interval or the 
gap between two identities, neither of 
which we could assume. That process of 
subjectivization ... found its name ... in 
. . .a 'wrong identification, an identification 
in terms of the denial of an absolutely 
essential wrong. (Ranciere, 1994, 61) 
In this chapter, with the aim of exploring the constitution of and limits to what can be seen 
and heard socio-politically, I shall turn to Ranciere. He too subscribes to an agonistic 
understanding of the political and conceives of politics distinguished from the political as 
organization and management of the sensible. Unlike Lyotard, however, he rejects ethics.'^^ I 
will try to explore his ideas of subjectification as dis-identification and his notion of the 
political: 
The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in what 
is common to the community based on what they do and on the time 
and space in which this activity is performed... it defines what is 
visible or not in a common space...etc. There is thus an 'aesthetics' at 
the core of politics... It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the 
visible and the invisible, of speech and noise... Politics revolves 
around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the 
ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces 
and the possibilities of time. (Ranciere, 2004a, 12-13) 
Thus, for Ranciere, visibility and audibility are normative constraints on the shared sensibility 
of the community as the etymology of portage du sensible implies. In French, ''portage'" 
means both "division, distribution" and "shared, common." In other words, distinctions, 
separations, and demarcations both separate and connect us in a particular configuration of 
the sensible parts that should make the present whole. The sensible refers to both what can be 
sensed (as in a sensation) by the body, and what makes sense (as in the proper and the 
^ As next chapter elaborates, he frames ethics as an enslavement to the Other in its alterity. 
rational) by the present norms of the society. Therefore sensibility for Ranciere marks a 
normative mode of being there and together in a society regulated by divisions and 
differences. These sensible divisions and differences are managed by what he calls the police-. 
The police, to begin with, is defined as an organizational system of 
coordinates that establishes a distribution of the sensible or a law that 
divides the community into groups, social positions, and functions. 
This law implicitly separates those who take part from those who are 
excluded, and it therefore presupposes a prior aesthetic division 
between the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, 
the sayable and the unsayable opposed to politics. The essence of 
politics consists in interrupting the distribution of the sensible by 
supplementing it with those who have no part in the perceptual 
coordinates of the community, thereby modifying the very aesthetico-
political field of possibility. (Rockhill, in Ranciere, 2004a, xiii). 
In this chapter 1 shall argue that the police keeps the coordinates of the sensibility fixed, and 
peopled with sensible, recognizable citizens that agree with the law, and see, hear, say and 
do the sensible thing that agrees with their different identities. As opposed to the mob where 
the line between speech and noise, one's body and somebody else's, the proper action and 
the improper action is blurred, in the policed polis of sense everyone must have the symbolic 
coordinates distributed to them that define their body as somebody with a class, gender, race, 
age, fianction, and thus an identity. The police puts tags and roadblocks: it marks what 
bodies are to be seen as somebodies, what spaces are public, private or off-limits, what 
demands are sensible or preposterous, what responses do or fail to make sense. The mob, on 
the other hand, is characterized by mobility amongst identities, times, spaces and the 
elements of the sensibility: its visibility is usually a silent threat that disagrees with the 
present law and its promising noise may materialize into the people of the future if heard and 
responded to. The police is thus the law of our sensible constitution as somebody in the 
community of sense organized as co-present, synchronized bodies identified with their 
representations. 
In the first section I shall suggest ihaipartage du sensible bring the people together 
as different but cotemporaneous, co-present intensities of the sensible in the community of 
sense united by the norms of the present. Yet their dual character as the community and the 
people indicates the inherent tension that leads to a wrong, and disagreement: the people 
become a community of different identities recognized by the normative force of the police 
that is both the condition of and a limit to the sensibility. In identifying with the symbolic 
positions distributed to them and agreeing with the law, they also must dis-identify with 
other people addressed differently. 
This simultaneous identification and dis-identification in my account both wrongs 
the people in the name of the community, and brings to the fore the same tension between 
the self and the character in Habermas' understanding of subjectification, "[b]ut the political 
wrong associated with the double embodiment of the people is not a wrong like any other" 
(Ranciere, 1999, 97), because the gist of the issue is not about others excluded from the 
community of sense. It is rather about the police, or the authoritative limitation to the 
sensible that, through forming an archive of identities and stabilizing hierarchies amongst 
the elements of sensibility, reduces their unrecognized visibility amongst us to invisibility, 
their speech to noise, and their presence to that of dead bodies . ' ' ' Under the policed 
conditions of the community, the limit to the sensible is the limit to the symbolic positions in 
the archive one can identify with: namely, just One. The singularity of the individual is an 
effect of operations of power that individualize and subjectify. One is conceived in liberal 
politics as an atom, a sovereign individual that we all supposedly become when addressed 
by the law, although its symbolic position is a discursive place-holder that anybody can 
occupy as if we are one and the same. The aporetic formulation of identification assumes 
that this -One' is a symbolic unity in opposition to but constitutive of the 'we ' and the 
In the last chapter, I explained how the Nazi reduced the presence of ' the jews ' to invisibility, silence and 
absence but I suggested that even the dead bodies address us silently, demanding justice. Subjectification as the 
constitutive outside to the norm of the society nevertheless makes a negative norm. For Ranciere too 
subjectification as an outsider is an inside operation of the law. 
unexplored gap between identity and identification both precludes and enables identification 
with others similar to but different from 'us.''^* 
And one cannot see, hear, or respond to others because One is not allowed to identify 
with them by the power structure of the situation that silences the 'as- if constitutive of our 
identities: because the police's "identification of politics with the self of a community" 
(Ranciere, 1992, 61) seeks to ground authority in sovereignty, in the law of the self distinct 
from the other. However, I shall argue that identification is an effect of being before the law 
that others are and its modality is the same as the law: as if In liberal thought, we all think, 
sense, act and speak as if we all are atomic individuals distinct and independent from others, 
but the aggregation of atomic, sovereign individuals cannot account for the secret of the 
social bond; that is, our imaginary relation to an imaginary "we" that, by definition of 
democratic theory, places our, individual sovereignty in the hands of others who are the 
possibility condition of our act and speech in politics. In sum, the individual sovereignty is 
predicated on the collective sovereignty, one's identity on a constitutive relation to others 
that forms us in aesthetico-political terms. 
If politics is seen as one's relation to oneself as other, then what possibilities in the 
aesthetic-political field, new subjects and people can be revealed? And how exactly could 
re-formulating identification as dis-identification with one's self re-constitute the material 
conditions of the sensible in such a way that disagreeing others can be seen and heard? I 
shall draw on Ranciere's understanding of ' l i terarity' as authorless speech,'^' an address 
without an authoritative addressor, to argue that it will be through a poetic speech-act 
irresponsive to the police and irresponsible by the present norm, an imaginary identification 
In the Nazi Germany example from the last chapter, the problematization of the sovereign individual (i e 
Eichmann) explored why One may not hear others (i.e., "the jews") as if they are one of us and their demand is 
articulated by our voice. 
AUhough authorless speech for Plato (which is who Ranciere is reading) is writing, I challenge the 
distinction between speech and writing. I do not collapse literarity imo the terms of speech act theory but draw 
on Ranciere's notion to develop a theory. 
with an image that seeks its authority beyond the present.'™ It moves through times and 
spaces, identities, and limits in the sensible because it is characterized by mob-ility. 
5.1. The Sensible 'We ': The Moh-ility of the Political Body 
Ranciere approaches the political community through the organization of bodies as 
somebodies with identities, functions, appropriate manners of speaking and acting. This is a 
constitution of society through the allocation of times, spaces, visibilities, appropriate modes 
of speaking and acting to a socio-political role, i.e., a body socio-politically recognized as 
somebody: "There is the mode of being-together that puts bodies in their place and their role 
according to their 'properties,' according to their name or their lack of a name, the 'logical' 
or 'phonic' nature of the sounds that come out of their mouths. The principle of this kind of 
being-together is simple; it gives to each the part that is his due according to the evidence of 
what he is" (Ranciere, 1999, 27). In other words, the normative organization of a shared life 
makes us what we are, circumscribing what we can sense and act on in a vast network of 
sensibilities, granting our bodies a visible representation and our speech audibility before the 
representative institutions. Each body thus identified, recognized and placed in the world has 
modes of seeing and saying proper to it, and taken together, they are to form a whole, 
normative account of the material of the "we': sensory undertakings of the society, the 
constitutive forms of its matter, identities, as well as its space and time. We are supposed to 
sense the world through the filters of those modes, or partitions which constitute one as a 
possible subject of politics, acting in accordance with the socio-politically prevalent 
distribution of the sensible. 
5.1.1. Constitution of the 'We': Identification 
The spatio-temporal divisions do not only normatively structure a socio-political division, 
Ranciere elaborates. The distribution of sensibility articulates not just the subjects of politics 
that can be sensed but even the forms through which those subjects may appear in both public 
° The 'present ' is to be understood both as a temporality and as what is present before the law. 
and private, including their many subspheres: It "is not so much the 'disciplining' of bodies 
as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of occupations and the properties of the 
space where these occupations are distributed" (Ranciere, 1999, 29.: emphasis original). They 
thus lay out the line dividing the public and the private. They also aim to regulate one's 
relation to one's body and mind, a subject's sensuous, passionate or intellectual life, the 
possibilities of action and speech; they subjectify a body as somebody recognized among the 
'we' imagined to be a body political with parts. Therefore the norm of a partage du sensible 
circumscribes what is the proper thing for a body as somebody to think, feel, say and do at a 
time in a place allocated to him/her within the 'we'. The normative distribution of the 
sensible thus makes possible a subject-position in the socio-political whole and separates it 
from other positions through a division of times and places. Partage du sensible is irreducible 
into the Habermasian framework of norms because it is the very arrangement, patterning and 
portioning of the visible and the sayable, and hence of the normative itself The normative 
division is just one distribution of the sensible among others. The police likewise constitutes 
a distribution, not the distribution. As I do not mean to collapse the police into Habermas' 
version of the normative framework, it should be conceived as distinct from norms in the 
Habermasian sense. Identification and subjectification thus proceed on the basis of 
sensibilities, the spatio-temporal positions, visibilities and audibilities in the symbolic space 
of action occupied by political bodies. Ranciere's account of sensibility as a subjectifying 
constraint, however, implies that the sharing out of spaces and times also limits what can be 
seen and heard by the body through functionalist norms that form an archive of identities. 
Therefore, although each subject lives their lives in unique configuration of times and 
spaces, Ranciere argues that those configurations are subordinated to "forms of domination 
... operative within the very tissue of ordinary sensory experience" (Ranciere, 2009b, 31). 
Although our lives are distributed and separated into distinct times and spaces, we are 
nevertheless situated in the controversial spatio-temporality of a political culture that brings 
us together by the force of the law that constitutes us as identifiable parts in the whole. The 
spatio-temporality of a political culture for Ranciere is defined by the normative principles of 
co-presence and contemporaneity that unites diverse positions and temporalities of the people 
in the archive. They belong to the present, the space-time of our lives, sensing, speaking, 
acting and being simultaneously, though differently within the confined place of society. 
Therefore the norms of sensibility are the modes in which political co-presence is 
transformed into symbolic spaces and times of coordinated sensibility, speech and action. The 
principle of organization of the sensible thus serves as the law of our constitution in the sense 
that synchronization of this presence follows certain rules everyone is asked to agree on. 
Prevalent norms orchestrate the partition of sensibility and form the unifying values around 
which our lives should perforce revolve, in agreement with our functions, identities, and 
accorded sensibilities. Given that those norms are put in place and enforced by a political 
force, by a "system of distribution and legitimization," Ranciere thematizes and politicizes 
the normative distribution and management of the sensible via his distinction between politics 
and police: 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization 
of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of 
distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the 
police. (1999, 28) 
Conventional politics, in the sense Ranciere uses the term, is the founding and legitimizing 
act of speech whereby times and places are distributed to respective subject-positions that 
should make sense of the socio-political life through those partitions. It is again a ground zero 
subjectifying speech-act, Ranciere says, since the whole society is organized around an 
archive of identities, functions and respective sensibilities that bring together the precarious 
representation of our present united by a single force of law that constitutes and divides us as 
atomic individuals. However, the act of speech is subject to repetition and self-difference; it 
tends to change the meaning of its term and the identity of its subjects every time it is re-
iterated. And the police is the force that aims to foreclose self-difference, change, and a mob-
ility among spaces, times, and identities. 
5 . 1 . 2 . Anonymous Re-Constitution of the 'We': Dis-identification 
Since it has been embedded in the rules of the proper, a regime of sensibility can reproduce 
itself normatively, that is, justifying the distribution by the efficient harmony it establishes 
amongst the parts of the whole subjectified to agree with the system. As the system secures 
its prevalence the identities thus constituted become sensible, i.e., recognized by the law, 
whereas the manner of speech appropriate to them makes sense and can be responded to. 
Although a ftinctionalist representation of social subjects can never exhaust the modes in 
which they experience the possibilities of the present sensibility, there is "normally" a 
dominant distribution that posits a 'harmonious' relationship between the fact of being in a 
specific time and place, practicing particular occupations there, and being equipped with the 
capacities for feeling, saying and doing appropriate to those activities. Therefore police (i.e., 
control, management and sensible reproduction of the society) as domination (that is, 
hegemony of, by and over the archive) controls, legitimizes, and re-establishes the 
harmonious sharing of times and spaces by framing what ought to be sensed, said, heard, and 
seen by the body at the present. But for Ranciere, politics (as opposed to the police) as 
disruption of the distribution of the sensible brings into visibility new identities, subjects, 
manners of speaking and acting: 
Man is a political animal because he is a literary animal who lets 
himself be diverted from his 'natural ' purpose by the power of words. 
This literarity is at once the condition and the effect of the circulation 
o f ' a c t u a l ' literary locutions. However, these locutions take hold of 
bodies and divert them from their end or purpose insofar as they are 
not bodies in the sense of organisms, but quasi-bodies, blocks of 
speech circulating without a legitimate father to accompany them 
toward their authorized addressee. Therefore, they do not produce 
collective bodies. Instead, they introduce lines of fracture and 
disincorporation into imaginary collective bodies. (1999, 39) 
Here Ranciere takes subjectification and recognition as a matter of address, not of natural 
function, essence, or identity. Although the 'we' is constituted by the distribution of 
sensibilities, functions, identities, and a symbolic place to bodies in the political space-time, it 
owes its political existence to literary constitution of bodies by the illocutionary force of 
speech as somebody. Addressing a body as somebody constitutes and recognizes its identity, 
and places it in the shared sensibility of the society as they are diverted from their senseless 
presence of the before by "political statements and literary locutions" {Ibid.). Yet those 
constitutive addresses, as argued in the last chapters, rely on the mobilizing force of speech, 
its insensible persuasive power to move an other's submissive body as if it is one's own when 
responded to like addresses of authority. Therefore our identities, socio-political functions, 
and sensibilities are not inherent, 'natural,' properties that normatively structures what is a 
proper thing for a body to feel, say, or do. Rather, they are discursive place-holders: 
identifying representations of anonymity constituted by the illocutionary force of the 
authoritative address that make sense of and affect our presence as sensible difference in a 
whole which is both fractured and brought together by partage du sensible (Ibid.). 
Thus subjectification is "the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation of a 
self to an other" (Ranciere, 1992, 59) whom one will relate, respond and differ to in the 
sensible context of a whole; one of the major differences between Lyotard's account of 
subjectification and that of Ranciere's is that identification is simultaneously dis-
identification for the latter. And when Ranciere attributes to the subject the status of an 
"outsider or, more, an in-between...a heteronomy" (Ibid., 61), he emphasizes this is an 
anonymous difference in position (i.e., an aporia) constituted and policed by the authority of 
the norm that distributes the sensible: not a natural given, but a diversion from one's nature, a 
process whereby the self becomes otherwise when it assumes the position of the addressee 
that responds to the call. "In this way, a process of subjectivization is a process of dis-
identification" (Ibid.) with those who are not addressed in the same way. But being a self 
different to others also implies being an other to oneself in identification since it is a 
diversion from and to the path of sovereignty by others. In other words, "politics," Ranciere 
explains, "..is the politics of the self as an other, or, in Greek terms, a heteron" (Ibid.). When 
one responds to the constitutive address that would place one's body as somebody amongst 
us, one gains an identity one does not choose or give consent to, and as discussed in previous 
chapters, submits one's self to the law of others one is asked to (dis-)identify with. Therefore 
identification of one's body as somebody among us brings together both anonymity and 
heterony, being a nameless other to oneself that dis-identifies with others. It is thus that the 
'we ' is constituted from One. 
Yet the mobilizing force of speech that subjectifies and forms the primary social bond 
of the society on difference and (dis)identification is both predicated on and troubled by the 
exposure of a body to somebody else who addresses it. The positions of the addressor and the 
addressee can always be subverted by speech, since anyone can adopt anonymous positions. 
Since sensible identities are basically positions in the constitutive address that make sense in 
relation to each other, 'blocks of speech,' and not naturally inherited places in the sensible 
fabric of the society, authority enables another mobility; that of identities amongst bodies that 
can always be diverted from them by "the equality of any speaking being with any other 
speaking being" (Ibid.) that foils the monopolizing claims to constitutive authority. 
The community of sense is constituted around sensible differences. But differential 
positions in relation make sense by the norms of the present, when "the cutting up of the 
perceptual world that anticipates, through its sensible evidence, the distribution of shares and 
social parties" (Ranciere, 2004, 225) sets the sensible political world of differences. The 'we' 
also appears as "the place for a polemical construction" (Ranciere, 1992, 61) since the 'we' is 
constituted as the embodiment of a wrong: "The gap between the people as community and 
the people as division is the site of a fundamental grievance" (Ranciere, 2004, 61) since it is 
both a life-giving condition of and a self-justifying limit to our sensibility, sovereignty, and 
self-identity. In the next section 1 examine how Ranciere exposes the secret of democracy 
that keeps demos away from cracy, the self of the people from the rule of their constitution, 
paradoxically by self-justification. 
5.2. The Archive of the Sensible: Justification of the "We ' 
The aporia of the law is such that when it constitutes the people as the ' w e ' " ' it is not 
justifiable by the self-rule or the rule of the law in the senses Habermas uses these terms; the 
Constitution makes people (who have yet to become 'the people') otherwise in the temporal 
movement of self-constitution without justification—the people are not the ground but the 
force of the law. The force that constitutes them is thus unjustified power that the law will 
have had recourse to in order to justify itself The aporetic and futural movement, however, is 
by definition open-ended and when halted by the force of the law that now (at the present) is 
seated in the archive, democracy becomes the hegemonic rule of representations over the 
people, that is, the 'we' constitutive of a community of sense. 
5.2.1. The People are (not) the 'WeArche and Archive 
Ranciere therefore grounds the community of sense in the groundlessness of authority: "there 
can be no arche corresponding to the demos as subject, no way of ruling according to some 
inaugurating principle; there is only -cracy- a manner of prevailing..." that keeps demos 
submissive and responsive to the mythical law of its constitution (1995, 94). In Disagreement 
he illustrates, through his critical engagement with founding thinkers like Plato and Aristotle 
how 'policing' theory constitutes society as a distribution of proper identities, functions, 
powers and institutions according to principles, and from that point of reference proceeds to 
Demos is the situation where the people are aporetically set In contrast to the •we'; the aporetic line of 
differentiation and identification between the two is an ongoing theme in my thesis. I argue drawing on Ranciere 
that cracy, on the other hand, is the situation where the law takes part in unjustified power, and vice versa. 
justify it through authority granted by the constituted to the law. Yet this too is legitimization 
by the presently sensible: sensible citizens agree to the law that constitute them as sensible 
identities recognized, protected, and responded to in our community at the present. The 
people, however, had no say over their constitution, or the rule that made them what 'we' are. 
At the mythical origin of the society, they were the future addressee of the law that will have 
constituted them, moving through space, time and between identities and not simply present 
to give consent to the rule. It was and still is a poetic self-creation of the people as others by 
others through the mobility between the self and the other that makes us uncertain who 'we' 
are that makes the law. 
Disregarding this mobility constitutive of the social bond keeps the people from 
making the law that will have made them what they are: others to themselves. Ranciere thus 
exposes the scandal of democracy that kept demos away from cracy in the contingent 
constitution of the community of sense by the assumed authority of self-justification. Liberal 
politics is at an impasse, he argues, due to "the identification of politics with the self of a 
community" (Ranciere, 1992, 61) that seeks to ground authority in the sensibly present, in the 
sovereignty of what is present before the law, in its agreement it is constituted to give to the 
law. Its self-justification immobilizes them in the present, in its present identification with the 
'we' that, by the unperceivable line between the sensible, agreeable self, and the insensible, 
silent other, stops the time of the people, and limits its space. Yet this faint and precarious 
line also gives rise to challenges from in-between the present, and the absent, the present and 
the future: "[a] partage du sensible is thus the vulnerable dividing line that creates the 
perceptual conditions for a political community and its dissensus," (Panagia, 2010, 96) its 
own threat to and promise of re-constitution. 
Here 1 will expand on Ranciere's understanding of the law to re-formulate the rule of 
our constitution: 1 argue that the law is the intelligible, the present norms of rationality; 
making sense by rule-following. And the rule makes sense of the sensible through 
identification and recognition as a happiness condition of the speech act. Ranciere points out 
that portage du sensible materializes images of the people that we must identify with if we 
want to have a sensible presence in the shared life. It matches bodies with proper manners of 
acting, speaking, sensing, forming archetypical sensibilities. It thus dovetails visibilities with 
sayabilities, forming identities according to a rule of constitution. And it authorizes only the 
archive of sensibilities it constitutes to have a sensible presence in public where it is justified. 
Yet the police also demands that the people must not rule over the rule of their constitution. 
They must follow the rule that makes sense of the sensible, not move from the position of the 
addressee to that of the addresser, from one identity to another. 
His critique of the founding thinkers of the political casts into sharp relief that our 
sensible self that justifies the rule is constituted by others, i.e. by an address where the 
addressee and the addressor are not equal. In Plato's Republic, for instance demos is divided 
and represented as a set of social classes that, as narrated in the myth of the metals, are 
distinguished in their "natural' tendencies, capacities, and functions. While the people is 
expected to mind the private businesses that befit their class (crafting, selling, going to war 
etc.), they should leave political decisions to the sovereign philosopher. Similarly, in 
Aristotle's thought, the aporoi (in the Greek polis' context, the barbarian, the slave, the poor 
and the women) are not allowed into the public sphere to have a presence in the polis. 
Ranciere thus attaches a troubling element of inequality and insensibility into this sensible 
account of democracy, where the aporetic images of demos can only (dis)appear within the 
limitations on the political space imposed by figures that are supposed to represent and 
instantiate their presence. Political discourse demonstrates the animation of visible figures 
that can and must people the polis but they undecidably become presently absent, and present 
in their absence. Within the Platonic organization of bodies as a community, the farmer, as a 
political figure, can only come into view against the familiar background of farms, 
paradoxically losing its political visibility because farmers take no part in politics and have 
no business in the agora where they should have no presence. In Aristotle's thought, while 
the slaves are properly assigned to the work site and kept out of sight, the women must stay 
within the confines of the utterly 'apolitical,' i.e. the private. And the sight of the barbarian, 
normally blocked out by the high walls of the polis, only heralds the end of discursive 
politics, and the beginning of war and catastrophe. 
As identities gain visibility through the functionalist frames of gender, race, class, and 
nationality, they form an archive of political subjectivities that mark the invisible line that 
separates the visible and the invisible in a community of sense. They, those bodily parts of 
the socio-political body who have no parts, although constitutive of the political society, take 
no part in politics. Indeed those images of the people kept outside the public sphere of 
speech, deliberation, and politics are paradoxically construed as incapable of being the 
addresser of the law, since they cannot participate in intelligible discourse. The most salient 
example, that of "the barbarian' in Ancient Greek as someone you cannot reason with, is 
derived from PapPapo0cbvoc; (barbarophonos), 'of incomprehensible speech.' Their 
barbarity lies not in the fact that they are mute beasts, but that even when they speak, they do 
not make sense to the citizens of the Greek polis through speech that should only voice "the 
sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a household and a state" (Aristotle, 
Politics /, 1253a 9-17, 60; emphasis added). In other words, they do not agree, do not share 
the Greek nomas as they do not sense, say, or act as Greeks do. They do not share the Greek 
archive of the public meaning that matches the visible (bodily images) with the sayable 
(speech as discourse). There is no room in the agora for their senseless presence that disrupts 
the link between the visible and the sayable. Similarly for Aristotle "[s]ilence is a woman's 
glory" (Rhetoric, 1260b 28-30) as the women embody the passive, irrational, inert, bodily 
element "more false of speech" (History of Animals, Book IX, Part I). They become 
deceptive in so far as what they say does not correspond to what can be seen. And some 
should be slaves by nature if they "are as different [from other men] as the soul from the body 
or man from beast," (Aristotle, Politics, 1254b 16-21), that is, if they cannot reason, speak, 
make sense and make law. In other words, anyone deemed a visible figure without an 
intelligible meaning, a body without a soul, unable to order the sensible by the intelligible, 
should not speak or act politically and have a public presence. 
5.2.2. The 'We' and Silent Others among Us: Constitution of the Community 
In the last section I dwelled on the distinction between the demos and the archive of 
identities; the subjectification of the people into classes in time brings about archived 
identities one needs to identify with. In this section I will explain the subjectification of the 
aporoi through hierarchy. In Ranciere's thought, "a law of communal existence which was 
also a law of hierarchical subordination" (Ranciere, 1995, 69) brings together the two 
constituents of the community of sense: first the sensible (the visible and the sayable) and, 
second, the intelligible (the rule of combining them together, the law) in a hierarchical 
fashion. The operations between the sensible and the intelligible that it is always subjected 
and subordinated to'^^ and that orders it in meaningful sentences or images, constitute a 
community of political subjects reflected by a community of signs as "characters that make 
up a world for us" (Ranciere, 2007a, 35). The cutting u p ' " of the visible (the body, the 
matter, the naked presence) by the sayable (discourse) into figures runs parallel to the 
construction of the socio-political world that materializes the taxonomy of the rule. It is the 
"[A] combination of elements in accordance with general rules and a community between the intelligence 
that produces the combinations and sensibilities called upon to experience the pleasure of them ... involved a 
relation of subordination between a ruling ftinction ... and an image-forming function in its service" (Ranciere, 
2007a, 39). 
"1 understand by this phrase the cutting u[decoupage] of the perceptual world that anticipates, through its 
sensible evidence, the distribution of shares and social parties... And this redistribution itself presupposes a 
cutting up of what is visible and what is not, of what can be heard and what cannot, of what is noise and what is 
speech" (Ranciere, 2004, 12-3). 
"narrative of the division of labour in the social body: the fable of the belly and the limbs ... 
[where] the plebeians were the belly, the vegetative part of the city, powerless without the 
protection of the patricians" embrace" (Ibid.). The sensible component of democracies (the 
ruled, the people) is paradoxically characterized as senseless presence, noise without 
meaning, a body without invisibility, viz., with a lack of common sense and sensibility, 
passive, feminine, unable to respond to intelligible speech with speech, powerless and silent 
like a body in vegetative state. However, the inequality at stake does not so much stem from 
functional inferiority (the body is very usefiil, and so is a slave) as difference in 
representation: "One enters the community of equals not by being useful to them but only by 
being like them. There is no way being counted one of them without reflecting their own 
image: an equal is someone whose image is that of an equal" (Ibid., 70; emphases added). 
Ranciere thus situates political hierarchy in the sensible imagery, as an archive that 
splits the sensible only to privilege the (un)sayable equated with the rule as opposed to the 
(in)visible as the meaningless; the history of relations of inequality that sedimented into "the 
set of discourses that would deduce the forms of identity and alterity" (Ranciere, 2007a, 18) 
converge with the socio-political process of recognition that cloth the visible in an identity. 
Our senseless, naked presence is recognized as addressed and seen through the inventory of 
public images that unfold the meaning of the visible on the basis of sentences that organize 
semblance and resemblance, difference and similarity, the self and the other. And although 
the people are expected to take on and continually perform sensible (i.e. proper) 
representations that, by the logic of the private, privilege or subordinate them, the 
subjectivities they find themselves thrown in are not their property in their control. The 
archive of all the bodies (the artisan, the soldier, the slave, the women, the barbarian etc.) 
correlated with the social meanings they are to perform has always already been compiled by 
partage du sensible that anticipates and regulates what it means to have a sensible presence in 
the political world in advance. 
This self-reproducing spatio-temporalization is normative to the extent that it creates 
ontic criteria of membership to a community. When the people are addressed by the law, they 
are asked to identify with and incarnate one of those images available in the archive so they 
can come into the sight of the law as recognizable subjects. Ranciere names the archive of 
material modes of political existence ' types' : "Types are the formative principles of a new 
communal life, where the material forms of existence are informed by a shared spiritual 
principle" (Ranciere, 2007a, 95). The time of the political community, its present norms of 
spacing and visibility, its nomas of sensibility "wants the form of the object [of law] to 
correspond to its body and to the fijnction it is to perform. It wants a society's forms of 
existence to convey the internal principle that makes it exist" (Ibid.). Therefore through a 
series of metonymic operations, the body of the community becomes the signifier of the body 
politics where each singular body materializes a type in its fiinctional image. 
Ranciere thus approaches norms of visibility through the problematic history of types 
(not quite stereotypes, but arche-types, a principled way of having a material presence, acting 
and saying) that constitute and regulate the imaginary community of the sensible. The history 
he excavates encompasses a variety of the ways of seeing others' image as parts of the same 
public imaginarium, (i.e. different regimes of the sensible that flesh out images in the 
representative regime), however, the established practices of revealing the meaning of the 
visible with the sayable matches the political figures with the archetypes of the community. It 
was the expectation on the part of the people that a figure would appear, speak and act in an 
imaginable manner, Ranciere adds, that grounds the sense (rationality, conceivability, 
credibility etc.) of the image in a norm that materializes the anticipation. 
Therefore there is an imaginary history of the law that constitutes a community of 
sense -imaginary as it forms an archive of images, material representations-, sedimentations 
of which raise a social space (of meaning) out of time: "'the way in which, by drawing lines, 
arranging words or distributing surfaces, one also designs divisions of communal space" 
(Ranciere, 2007a, 91) constantly constitute and re-configure the material world in which the 
meaning of actions are predetermined by the available forms of inhabiting it. The matter of 
the law is the body of the people that the law cuts into manageable figures of the visible and 
the sayable, acting predictably. But behind the ordered appearance of the political that 
restricts the visible lies the plenitude and fecundity of unrecognized life forms that still seek 
their images by speech-acts of imagination. 
According to the thrust of Ranciere's argument, because a portage du sensible (when 
it polices'^'' and aims to regulate what is always multiplying, mobile and equal), limits our 
imagination, it restricts what bodies can sense, say, do and be to the sensible. It puts a 
normative restriction on differences that make sense, can be sensed and responded to by (dis-
)identifications. The rich cannot hear the poor, the men cannot identify with women and the 
gay, the stranger cannot be the citizen, and the people, paradoxically, cannot be the addresser 
of the law that would re-constitute the community of sense. In reducing the possibilities of 
having a presence in the society to the present archive of identities it authorizes, distribution 
of the sensible thus also starts a conflict and disagreement over who can be seen, heard, and 
responded to. "It is a conflict over what is meant by "to speak' and over the very distribution 
of the sensible that delimits the horizons of the sayable and determines the relationship 
between seeing, hearing, doing, making, and thinking" (Ranciere, 1999, 4). 
In the next section I will introduce Ranciere's accoum of elemem of insensibility in 
the rule-governed sensible world of the 'we' . This is a not a situation of the addressee and the 
'Apanage du sensible is not the same as the police. The pohce is a particular type oipartage 
addresser seeking agreement on the rule that makes us what 'we ' are. but disagreement where 
the parties do not reside within the same arrangement of the sayable and the visible to co-
author a performance orchestrated by the law since the addressee/addressor does not qualify 
(i) either as a sensible (rational, rule-following) subject that can response to the address 
sensibly or (ii) as a subject of the discourse that can be sensed as addressing us at the present 
{Ibid., xii). 
5.3. The Insensible: Injustice, Wrong, Disagreement 
Politics, as Ranciere conceives it, is both a condition of and a limit to our sensibility: 
partitioning the matter and time of a shared life in this way also distributes the sensible into 
subjects of politics which the people must identify with in order to have a sensory presence. 
They gain visibility and audibility if they perform the archive of identities while the system 
of representation gains ad hoc validity if they function, see, talk and act as prescribed by the 
law. The representation of the people presumably coincides with their constituted presence. 
The political on the other hand is disruption of politics by identifying with those who do not 
have a sensible presence amongst us to reveal their images. This is an imaginary 
subjectification: an impossible identification within the present aesthetic-political field of 
possibility because first, it identifies one with that dis-identification with which makes us 
what we are, and secondly, it dis-identifies one with oneself, one's law. and one's position 
within the 'we ' . 
Ranciere here gives the example of the Arabs killed in the name of the French law 
that his generation identifies with. This an identification that goes all wrong from the view 
point of present law of sensibility, finding its norm in a wrong done by the law. He interprets 
this identification as a process of equality that brings into the community's sensibility field its 
parts that have no part in the sensibility; like the unrecognizable dead bodies of those who 
were not recognized to have a sensible presence in the shared life of the French people . ' " 
Theirs is an identification which does not make sense, but which reveals the distribution of 
the sensible by occupying the border line between the sensible and the insensible. It reveals 
the community of sense as constituted by a wrong: "It is a function of the fact that a wrong 
exists, an injustice that needs to be addressed" (Ranciere. 1999, 97) that we sense the limits to 
our community. The wrong is the limit to the community of sense, and its sensibility which, 
paradoxically, we owe our sensible presence to. Wrong is thus another word for identification 
with the insensible at the present and addressing the wrong requires responsibility to identify 
with the wrong responsibility does to the insensible. 
5.3.1. The Insensible: Demand for Justice 
Ranciere places a stark contrast between justification and justice at the heart of his political 
theory: justification is by the presently sensible, whereas justice directs our eyes and ears to 
the insensible, the silent dead bodies that called Ranciere's generation to action. Whereas 
Habermasian agreement brings the sensible under the domination of the presently sensible, 
i.e., the law, in Ranciere's account of the political, the law does not give the unrecognized a 
space, time, visibility and audibility in the sensible since it delimits what can be sensed by 
what makes sense at the present. An insensible demand out of place and untimely, at odds 
with the normative distribution of the sense however, is usually reduced to nonsense since the 
object of the demand may not be a subject-position recognized and available at the time, just 
like a poet proletarian unimaginable in 1880s, or a lesbian mother unthinkable in 1950s, or an 
Arab French in the 1960s. Although there were no times and spaces allocated to the actions 
of those untimely subjects, they all became visible ahead of the political times and spaces in 
which they emerged, disturbing the spatio-temporal order of the present and the future. 
But the Arabs are not "victimized" by Ranciere wlio argues against Lyotard 's notion of the differend- they 
were not silenced because they l<ept problematizing a wrong even in their silence. Ranciere 's focus is rather on 
others who can speak for the Algerians murdered by the police. 
In other words, they had no share of our present times and spaces, their presence 
disagreeing with the distribution of the sensible. Yet they also embodied the dividing line 
between the sensible and the insensible, between a wrong and justice because it was wrong to 
be deprived of a shared life. They demanded justice, coming before us, trom beyond the 
before that constituted us. Ranciere thus posits justice as disagreement'^'' with the law of 
sensibility that can only recognize what it constitutes by the distribution of visibilities and 
audibilities to the present identities that make up the 'we. ' Chambers registers the 
untimeliness of justice perfectly when he notes down that "the appearance of a political 
subject is always untimely in the sense that the political subject is only intelligible as such 
after the moment of politics" (Chambers, 2012, 9). In other words, those emergent subjects 
disagreed with the distribution of the sensible of their times, acting out of turn, and speaking 
out of place, demanding justice: "[p]olitics occurs when those who 'have no' time take the 
time necessary to front up as inhabitants of a common space" (Ranciere, 2009b, 24). Judging 
from the perspective of justice, Ranciere asserts that the police wrongs them denying them a 
nameable identity and recognition: "outcast is the name of those who are denied an identity in 
a given order of policy" (1992, 61). While a conflict amongst the members can be resolved 
by justifications by the present norms of the community, a contestation by the aporoi over 
visibility, and audibility, i.e., criteria of membership in a community of sense initiates a 
debate on the founding norms of the 'we ' . The latter challenges the dominant principles of 
justification in the name of justice, risking the illegitimacy of a subjective-position that 
displaces itself from the community. 
Disagreement is not the same as the dijferend where silence prevails between the incommensurable 
discourses. In Lyotard's understanding, a different! occurs when two discourses cannot be bridged, whereas in 
Ranciere's account, disagreement questions the discourse of the powerful. 
5.3.2. The Insensible: Logic of Equality 
Ranciere casts this emergence of untimely and out-of-piace demands as a new logic of 
equality derived from aesthetical field that needs verification by a presence to come: 
"[c]ontrasting with the representative scene of the visibility of speech is an equality of the 
visible that invades discourse and paralyses action... It does not make visible; it imposes 
presence" (2007, 121) from within. However, Ranciere's politics of equality is not 
undertaken by the excluded subject in society that becomes aware of itself as the dominated, 
and creates a space for dissent by a demand that they be given what is their due, evidenced by 
what they are: on the contrary, it is the act of dissent that transforms the identities given in 
nature, the 'we,' and creates political subjects hitherto invisible/inaudible within the divided 
political space (Bingham, 2010, 25-49; cf Ranciere, 1992, 62-64). As a political act of 
dissensus that "operates upon the identities allotted by a dominant culture, locating within 
them opportunities for the demonstration of new capacities," (Tanke, 2011, 49) such modes 
of aesthetical subjectifications reliant on contestation reconfigure the division of the political 
whole, the sensible constitution of the society and the nature of politically recognized 
subjects: "It is introduction of politics, the system of forms of subjectifications through which 
any order of distribution of bodies into corresponding functions corresponding to their 
'nature' and places corresponding to their functions is undermined" (Ranciere, 1992, 29). 
Ranciere's account of disagreement thus relies on the visibility of those who have no 
space or time as subjects of speech in the present community of sense. "[l]t is through the 
existence of this part of those who have no part... that the community exists as a political 
community—that is, as divided by a fundamental dispute" (Ranciere, 1999, 97) on who 'we' 
ought to be . ' " A disagreement takes as its object the principle whereby the sensible parts that 
make up the community of sense are distributed to the available subject-positions. When a 
Although in Ranciere's account, the question is what the we can be, as opposed to the ethics-oriented 
question of Lyotard. 
new subject, insensible within the distribution, such as a lesbian mother, emerges, it initially 
has no position within the socio-political constitution of the society since its image does not 
make sense by the norms of sensibility of the present that couldn't foresee it before and 
cannot see it now. Consequently, the distribution of the sensible wrongs the subject-position 
at stake, makes it invisible and silences its speech; it becomes insensible. The emergent 
subject-position thus has to problematize the norms in "a conflict between a given 
distribution of the sensible and what remains outside it" (Ibid., 4). 
Disagreement happens on the borderline between politics (rule-governed management 
and control of the society) and the political (a disruptive contestation): between a political 
present represented as a limiting past, and its future that cannot be exhausted by the present. 
And it moves, around an image that oscillates between the presently insensible, i.e., 
imaginary, and thus possibly very rational, possibly very material if it can reform the matter 
of the community: if it can materialize the political space where its silent call is responded to 
as if it is the new law of our constitution. The question of disagreement is thus not if our 
demands are justifiable, but if they are heard and responded to as demands. And what is at 
stake is not politics per se, but what will have been constitution of the political, a polity, a 
community of sense where the response to the question of who we would see, hear, respond 
to and share a life with as equals before a law to come would re-form the material conditions 
of that life. And finally, calling into question and contesting the conditions of sensibility that 
enables and limits the presence of 'we, ' (which undecidably differs from the 'we, the 
people') the disagreement at stake is the re-enactment of the before', a re-count and a re-
constitution of the people by the mob-ility between times and spaces. The world-disclosing 
ftinction of speech is thus the irresponsible march of a mob towards what is off-limits. 
Again the question for Ranciere is not so mucli as "What ought the we be?" but "What can the we be?". He 
emphasizes creativity and aesthetics over ethics. 
The speech-act is thus imaginative, responding to an imaginary image by 
irresponsible imagination that throws off the normative hold of the present and the sensible 
on our senses. Seeking its norm beyond the presently sensible, it discloses a possible world to 
come by mysterious poesis that both points to and creates a shared world that moves beyond 
the present: "The machine of mystery is a machine for making something common, not to 
contrast worlds, but to present, in the most unexpected ways, a co-belonging" (Ranciere, 
2007a, 58). Ranciere argues that if the community is nothing but its own fi-agile expectation, 
then it is (re-)created by poetic speech-acts that possibly vindicate the community of equals 
through the mobility of the people between the present and the fiature, the sensible and the 
insensible, the visible and the sayable, the matter and the ideal of the community. 
Conclusion: Literarity of Mob-ility 
In this chapter 1 have argued that Ranciere frames the constitution of the society through 
distribution of the sensible that recognizes a body as somebody through literarity: the address 
of the law is both an enabling condition and a self-justifying limit. It enables our sensible 
presence so we can be seen, heard and responded to by others, but it justifies its authority by 
limiting the 'we' to an archive of identities recognized and policed by the present norms. This 
is achieved by our double constitution as a unified community of the police (a self) and 
divided, anonymous people of the political (character), simultaneous identification and dis-
identification that gives rise to a hierarchy that authorizes and wrongs at the same time. It 
authorizes the self of the community we identify with, but characterizes some parts of it as 
mute bodies that can only be the addressee of the law: insensible others we cannot see, hear, 
or respond to as if they are our equals before the law we can identify with. 
The insensible are the aporoi, parts of the community who cannot take part in the 
sensible life we share; those untimely, out-of-place bodies that seek their recognized images 
presently not included in the policed archive of representations. They are wronged by the 
present norms of making sense, Ranciere elaborated: a) because they are not part of the 
community's policed self that is assumed to justify its norms by itself, b) those norms 
immobilize the present self, ignoring its constitution as an anonymous other to itself by 
literarity, not justified authority c) and finally, those policing norms of making sense, as I 
shall investigate fiilly in the next chapter, arrest the insensible motion between the elements 
of the sensible, stopping us imagining that the bodily image can say something in its silence, 
point out a wrong about ourselves and show the limit to our sensibility. 
To the immobilizing force of the police, Ranciere opposed the free motion of a people 
seduced by its literarity. Throughout the history of the "autonomy of verbal arts" (2007, 39), 
Ranciere tracks down "the ability of a sensory community to grasp anyone and anything in 
poetic wandering, by going back over the route of the inaugural walk" (Ranciere, 2004b, 20). 
The walk where the mob returns to the moment of its constitution, faces itself as others 
wronged by itself, ready to be otherwise. The moment of disagreement for people, Ranciere 
argued, could be a moment of self-creation as others, where they recognize the wrong of the 
law of our constitution that misrecognizes the "we' as the sovereign. The people demand, not 
justification, but justice on this walk and since justice for Ranciere is fundamentally 
distributive in a non-liberal sense of the term, the excluded or subordinated groups who have 
no say over the distribution of the parts reveal the groundlessness of authority, "the absence 
of arkhe, the sheer contingency of any social order" (Ranciere, 1999, 14) that can be undone 
by authorless authorship of an address that can be taken up by the people insensible at the 
present. The visibility of the new subject-positions requires not dutiful application of the 
norms that rendered them invisible in the first place, but radical modifications in the 
normative order that would disrupt and expand the field of visibility. In other words, a 
disavowal of one 's place and dis-identification with one's subjectivity, only makes sense as a 
disagreement over the very distribution of the presently sensible. The disagreement does not 
take place outside the space-time of our lives, but on its borderlines, its controversial horizon, 
its fu ture ." ' And more importantly, a disagreement confronts the intelligible, that is, modes 
of rationality that control its delimitation. 
Ranciere's disagreement therefore attests to a normative crisis of making sense in the 
community of sense uncertain of itself at the present. It poses the question of who can be 
sensed to take part in politics of the sensible that makes sense of the people. Untimely 
perturbations in partage du sensible are thus challenges to move on from the present and 
invent a new socio-political space and time to make the invisible visible, and say the 
unsayable. The dissensus problematizes how justice can be done by what seems to be 
injustice from the viewpoint of the present. Therefore, injustice is done in temporal terms, to 
the present norms, by an untimely subject, for a democracy to come, and in the name of 
justice for the future. Disagreement as a speech-act should disrupt the linear flow of time, 
revealing the co-existence of the past, present and the future in the times of our lives. Events 
happen because there is futurity, the future in the present laden with the past, because there 
are different temporalities within the "same' time. 
If, as Ranciere puts it, "[p]olitics revolves around what is seen and what can be said 
about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of 
spaces and the possibilities of time" (2004a, 12-13), then some acts of speech create new 
spaces, new subjects of speech, new possibilities of time and new politics. In fact, politics is 
possible, he elaborates, since "Ihere is speech in excess" of the presently sensible: this would 
be "a 'politics' of art which consists in suspending the normal coordinates of sensory 
experience" (Ranciere, 2009b, 25). Those speech-acts in excess of the present do more than 
temporalize the matter and materialize a space: they say the unsayable, transforming 
nonsense into the meaningful to do justice to our lives. Ranciere claims that this would be, as 
Again in contrast with Lyotard's notion of the differend, disagreement is an inner struggle of creativity The 
-differend" assumes that mcommensurable discourses are external to each other whereas in disagreement, the 
discourse of the powerful is put into question. 
I will argue in the next chapter, not an ethics of response, but a justice without ethics—a 
poesis of mobility, moving beyond the line of the insensible to seek speech in silent things, 
creating matter by the force of words, and ushering the future that can(not) be sensed from 
behind the bars of the policed present. 
Chapter 6. The Ethical and the Poetic: To Recosnize a Wish-To-Say 
The last chapter aimed to show that for Ranciere even dead bodies can start a disagreement 
over the contestable line between the sensible 'we ' and the insensible others among us. As 
their senseless presence is neither excluded, nor included into the public sphere of visibility 
and audibility, but marks the limit to our sensibility, their aporetic image may say something 
about our constitution as a self-ruling community. The present norms fall short of giving their 
image a place in the communal space because they are characterized as this space's 
borderline, and their speech does not have the authority of those equal before the law because 
it is the law of our constitution that does not authorize their not being equal to their archived 
identities. 1 shall illustrate these points in this chapter by reflecting on the speech of 
Percennius the slave in Ancient Rome. He helped the organization of a slave rebellion and his 
address is indicative of the situation of the people where they appear out of place, speaking 
out of turn signifying a wrong, injustice, and demanding a just response in the form of 
recognition. They are already recognized, and misrecognized as the weaker, the mute, 
powerless mob that cannot take part in politics. And they demand recognition of a past 
misrecognition. 
In this chapter I will also further address the issue of recognition and argue that 
recognition is an act of speech that acknowledges and poetically investigates the silent figure 
that comes before the law, seeking words in this exposure to what is to come as a part of the 
'we. ' In other words it is not simply registration of emergent identities, as given by present 
norms of sensibility or as a part of the archive; the act of speech at stake also relies on 
substitution for and suspension of the norms of sensibility under which it makes sense. It 
reveals the misrecognition of the people as the sovereign 'we. ' As such, it requires new 
norms and forms of thinking, acting, speaking, making sense and living that mob-ility of the 
people makes possible. The silent demand also displaces the archive of identities, indicates 
aporias and reveals that the 'we ' is a fiction only stabiHzed and immobihzed by power. If we 
are rather characterized by mob-ility between identities, times and spaces, the act of speech of 
recognition aims to make room for others unrecognizable at the present and a new society to 
come. This chapter aims to argue that recognition in this sense takes on a futural character. It 
constitutes a movement toward the silent addressee unfettered by concerns of the present 
(truth, stable identity and judgment), and a movement toward the future. 
In the encounter with the silent other that constitutes and displaces our self-
understanding, the self is asked to recognize the situation; first, that it is the self that commits 
the wrong done to other and silences difference and otherness embodied by this silent figure; 
secondly, that this encounter is an assertion of equality between the undecidable figure that 
demands recognition and of its addressee; thirdly, that successful recognition would 
culminate in the acknowledgment of undecidability (of norms and identities) and a movement 
toward the re-constitution of society toward greater equality. In other words silent others call 
from the borderline between the present community of sense and a future society that will 
have been constituted by a gesture of the past re-iterated: once the act of speech is successful, 
the community of sense will have been re-constituted in such a way that not only others 
outside the community will have citizenship and constitutional rights, but also the oppressed 
others within the society will be in a lived situation of greater equality with the archived 
identities. To engage on a deeper level with recognition is to take it as an act of speech that is 
irresponsive to the present norms of interpretation, of acting and speaking; an act of speech, 1 
will argue, that is performed in the name of a justice that goes beyond the normative 
understanding of recognition. 
Wrong, injustice, response, and justice are all ethical terms, but although 1 take 
Ranciere's thematization of equality as a part of his more ambitious project of problematizing 
justice, his is not an ethics of response to the Other. One of his keen readers, Deranty, 
assumes that the defining gesture that sets Ranciere's thinking apart is the rejection of 
alterity: "Ranciere's 'heteronomic' logic of politics is not premised, as these latter accounts 
[that of Levinas and his followers] are, on an ethics of alterity, itself underpinned by a radical 
critique of Western Metaphysics" (Deranty, 2010, 10). In fact Ranciere charges his mentor, 
Lyotard, with passive servitude to the unrepresentable, mute, victimized other before the life-
giving Big Other, criticising "the way in which Lyotard [among others] ontologises 
otherness," (Dronsfield, 2008, 2), and refusing "to reduce le compte des incomptes to the 
marginalized or excluded" (Chambers, 2009, 1) that shocks the limited community of sense. 
Deranty draws the inference that Ranciere's is a politics of recognition where the universal 
subject demands recognition (2003, 136). 
If Ranciere indeed "opens a path toward a progressive post-identity politics" (May, 
2009, 3) does he aim to do so by releasing us from "the inescapable enslavement to the 
Other" (Ranciere, 2004, 15) in the scene of recognition that 'shocks' us? One can suggest that 
the main theme that chimes through Ranciere's understanding of ontology finds its 
articulation in "each party's difference from i tself (Ranciere, 1998, 18) that structures 
political community of sense as one in which recognition and identity seem like a matter of 
mere normative force of policing by portage du sensible. Yet, otherness could also be 
understood as one's difference from oneself one should recognize, a notion which Ranciere 
subscribed to in framing democracy as a relation to oneself as other. That implies either that 
Ranciere's framework does not provide an alternative to the other-oriented ethico-politics of 
response and recognition or that the pull between his ontology and politics leaves a remnant 
that has a fair resemblance to otherness. Panagia tends toward this interpretation: "It is this 
unrepresentable, sublime element that is, for Ranciere, the sine qua non of democracy. 
Politics, then, is distinguishable from the police by a constitutive unrepresentability that 
interrupts the order of mimesis" (Panagia, 2006, 93). This occurs when one ceases to 
recognize oneself in an identity from the archive. 
I shall argue, in this chapter, that, although both Panagia's and Deranty's accounts 
have some diagnostic value, they both miss the point of controversial anonymity of a self 
relating to and recognizing itself as an other in the suspension created by the address; 'the 
self and ' the other' are not fixed positions in an address but anonymous place-holders in the 
historical situation. Recognition is oriented towards the whole situation where the self is also 
to recognize its dependency on the other. In a situation of violence, systematic inequality, and 
domination that otherizes the weaker, the stronger also need to realize that, in seeking 
superiority, they force themselves to live in the face of a constant threat, possible 
repercussion of violence, fear and unfreedom. The situation of hegemony is one that 
subjectifies both parties as others.'®® 
The recognition of the being-other of the self through hegemony is a necessity that the 
situation demands. Moreover, unless an act of speech re-constitutes the situation into one of 
equality, the self remains in its parochial understanding that it is an isolated, self-sufficient, 
sovereign individual independent from the other that, Ranciere argues, constitutes it. It 
remains a stranger to itself, opaque in its self-understanding, limited, partial and closed to 
otherness. The denial of otherness which translates into the denial of the self, its innermost 
constitution and possibility, subjectifies it as an other. The self, when withholding 
recognition, turns into an other that cannot learn, share, understand or hear others, 
impoverished, and weak in its recognition of itself And when it grants recognition it has 
always already acknowledged its being an other to itself that others reveal to it in this 
encounter. 1 argue that recognition always entails recognition of the self as an other through 
reflection, reflexive critique, and acknowledgment of a constitutive contradiction at the heart 
" " As Hegel puts it in his famous account of the master-slave dialectic which is the scene of recognition, "each 
does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the 
same" (1977, 112). 
of one's self-identity that underlies the suspension of identification in the situation of 
address.'" 
What should be recognized, I will argue by drawing on Ranciere, is a wish-to-say; as 
an act of speech, a wish-to-say is the act of being present before others to demand equality. It 
disregards limitations of the present, and enacts a scene of recognition of the situation.'®^ I 
shall first discuss the tenability of positioning Ranciere as a theorist of recognition of 
identities, and offer an exposition whereby the speech-act of 'a radical other,' the address of 
Percennius the slave, indeed dis-identifies everyone addressed by his imagination that 
suspends the relations between meaning and truth. Ranciere re-narrates the story of the 
people's movement to arrive at his notion of citizenship "in terms of the staging of a 
dissensus in which those who are deemed to lack speech make themselves heard as political 
animals" (Schaap, 2011,23). 
Percennius was one of the slaves who engaged in rebellion when the Roman emperor 
died. They withdrew to the Aventine Hill and negotiated with the councils. In Ranciere's 
account they thus earn the recognition as rational members of society who can be reasoned 
with. In my account, Percennius the slave delivers a speech that goes unheard and performs 
an act of speech that speaks in silence. In truth the slaves were the mute, unrecognized 
addressee of the law that constituted them, not as parts of demos authorized to rule, but as 
insensible bodies ordered to labour, fight and die outside the community. Yet Percennius 
ignores that, envisioning another distribution of the sensible where they would be sovereign. 
Looking at the mob, the worn-out bodies of their fellow slaves, he saw what could not be 
seen at his present: the people that would make the law of the future. His speech-act was a 
wish-to-say that mobilizes the undecidability of the sensible that moves between the matter 
Although it is hard to argue Ranciere makes use of the Hegelian analysis, his examples suggest Hegelian 
undertones and themes regarding equality between the recognizing parties. 
The situation consists of the "there-is' as argued in Chapter 3. //>. a is the situation of address where the 
unrecognizable demand interpretation, an identity, and recognition. 
and the ideal, the malleability of what is given and the plasticity of the body that can be 
identified as anybody. The next section will break down the elements of his poesis: a making 
by words. Percennius first unmakes his (collective) identity of a slave incapable of political 
speech and action, and makes a novel identity of one commanding language and people. He 
indeed assumed an identity from the archive, the most troubling one for democracy: that of 
the sovereign. The act of speech Percennius performed is possible as the silent visibility, 
Ranciere will point out, is indifferent to identities.'®' Every poetic speech-act that wishes-to-
say its silent history dis-identifies it in order to re-identify it as recognition, 1 shall argue, is 
both acknowledgment of a silent body that wishes-to-say, and an investigation into its 
identity. What it wishes to reveal is the Active constitution of the 'we ' that silences the people 
by a wrong of sovereignty that equates them with the self-ruling 'we. ' Addressing the wrong, 
however, is not the same as recognizing the seen in its/their truth and cataloguing its/their 
identity in the archive. Being an anonymous body exposed to the meaningless forces of life, 
Ranciere argues, it just needs a poetic re-interpretation that makes its meaning 'literal' to 
perform its undecidable character that moves between identities, sovereignty and submission, 
the sensible and the insensible. 
Percennius ignores the address of the present law of the sensible, becomes 
irresponsive to and irresponsible in the eye of the 'we, ' but whether that characterizes him as 
an excluded subject will be a question 1 shall raise in the next section. Percennius is not an 
excluded Other, Ranciere assumes, but when the Other speaks, it dis-identifies with the 
representations in the archive, becomes unrecognizable by the law of the present, and 
foregoes the right to a shared life of the present in the name of a re-constituted community to 
come. It reveals the subject as an anonymous stranger in the community. 
The visible in Ranciere 's theory is dependent on the sayable that identifies and interprets it. A mute body can 
be anybody socio-politically, depending on the recognition granted. 
6.1. Recognizing the People 
One can interpret Ranciere's aesthetico-political philosophy as a subtle post-Althusserian 
theory of tension between domination and liberation that take place within the contested 
space of equal recognition. Yet this interpretation would risk placing him in identity politics, 
ha l fway between Habermas as a theorist of solidaristic emancipation (2002b, 161-162) and 
Lyotard as a theorist of irresolvable conflict and agonistic politics. I for one, read him as a 
thinker of agonistic politics, aesthetics of displacement, and fi-ee literarity. Deranty, reading 
Ranciere as a "thinker of recognition who rejects the notion of understanding," suggests that 
"Ranciere's fundamental political concern is the denial of recognition experienced by the 
dominated" (Deranty, 2003, 137). Newman subscribes to this account: "For Ranciere, politics 
emerges when an excluded subjectivity -that part which remains uncounted, excluded from 
political life (the poor, the demos) -claims for itself the universality of a whole community" 
(Newman, 2007, 12). In this reading, the hegemonic political forces, legitimized by 
consensus, function like the canonical representations of society that only make certain social 
phenomenon recognisable, i.e., visible within the confines of the canvas and/or audible within 
the range of hearing. Here I shall critique Deranty's view that the ever-widening horizon of 
democratization grants recognition to the subjectivities that emerge in the public sphere. 
6.1.1. Recognition: The Subject as the Stranger 
In his interpretation of Ranciere, Deranty highlights the way Ranciere supports his theory of 
domination with an account of equality demanded by the dominated subjects that, in dissent, 
make their ways into the political picture through authorization of new sensibilities that 
disrupt the prevailing representations and precipitate their recognition. According to Deranty, 
the second ambition informing Ranciere's project is to hear the unheard voice of the 
dominated to disagree with the hegemony that had denied them recognition as equal subjects 
endowed with reason. Deranty adds, Ranciere's thoughts on democracy rises above "a theory 
of representation" (2003, 139) in its two senses, viz., representation of the extra-conceptual 
(the matter, the given, the sensible) by the conceptual (the ideal, linguistic, the discursive), 
and representation of the masses by their political proxies. By contrast, Ranciere may be seen 
as deepening the dilemmas of state-centred politics "unable to represent the interests of those 
who are denied social and political recognition" (Ibid.), as well as taking on board a radical 
methodological materialism that reveals the sedimented labour of language having a material 
nature and effect. 
Accordingly, Ranciere's aesthetico-political theory from Deranty's pen starts to sound 
like a revolutionary politics of equality. Transformed from "a political imperative into a 
methodological rule, that is, the rule that all individuals have the equal ability to express and 
defend their own rights," {Ibid., 140) the axiom of equality presumes that the dominated 
subjects can nevertheless represent themselves and express their desire for recognition. The 
dominated groups demand, and fight for recognition, maintains Deranty, within the 
parameters of the logic of the wrong, "the dialectical articulation of universality and 
particularity within the polis" (Ibid.). The universal subject position ("the subject of speech"), 
equally available to others of the society, i.e., any singular wronged party to articulate their 
particular demand of justice, becomes ground zero for the contestation of hierarchies 
engendered by "socioeconomic" differences. The gist of Deranty's reading portrays Ranciere 
as a thinker "who puts the notion of the subject at the centre of his political thought" (Ibid., 
136), attributing to him "a strong rejection of the death of the subject" (Ibid., 141). In other 
words Deranty brings home by his reading of Ranciere a disputable message that, after the 
demise of Marxist sociology and the revolutionary proletarian class, the subject of speech far 
from being deconstructed and dethroned, re-emerges universalized and embraced by all 
dominated identities unequivocally. According to Deranty, the vocation of the political 
theorist is thus to help them "pull down the barriers that exclude their speech from the 
authorized forms of speech" (Ibid.) in order to include the perspective of the unrecognized 
subject. 
However, these barriers are paradoxically those of the sensibility that constitute the 
subject of speech. Deranty argues that the term •aporoi" denotes a collective subject, or a 
social group unrecognized as an actor by the socio-political order, but against him I argue 
here that it defers to the topology of a conflict that takes place on the borderline of a 
community of sense; the aporoi are the limit to the community. Accordingly, in my reading 
Aristotle misrepresents an outright political aporia regarding the conflict over the polis as an 
internal division within one policed mechanism that denies them recognition as equals, 
citizenship and sovereignty. While a conflict amongst the members can be resolved by 
justifications by the present norms of the community, a contestation over the criteria of 
membership initiates a debate on the founding norms of a political community of sense. The 
latter challenges the dominant principles of justification by the present norms of recognition, 
which coincide with the present principles of partage du sensible. Those who demand justice 
risk the illegitimacy of a subjective-position that displaces itself from the community of 
sense, being insensible and unrecognizable by the present norms. They are not heard as if 
they make sense when they challenge the norms of making sense. In other words the political 
conflict that the aporoi epitomized calls into question, paradoxically, the very standpoint from 
which it is represented—the limit to authority and identity of what is sensed and recognized 
to be the subject of speech. In contrast to Deranty's account, the subject of speech is 
deconstructed by literarity, not simply universalized. 
I need to emphasize that this challenge is not done from outside the community, but 
from the border, by muted parts included as those who have no part and wish-to-say the 
unsayable: that the people is a fiction. Thus it is a challenge to the archive of subjects, the self 
of the community, and the norms of recognizability: its own deconstruction. It thus reveals 
the subject as a gioundless fiction in the making, not identifiable with those present. The 
poetics of justice over immobilizing normativity in this respect does not presume a given 
identity to be recognized, but calls into question "being together to the extent that we are in 
between—between names, identities, cultures, and so on" (Ranciere, 1999, 63). It both 
exposes and affects our mob-ility from one identity to another. It dissolves the subject in an 
unrecognizable force of speech, emptying the identity recognized as the addressor, the law-
giver, the people that misrecognize itself as the sovereign subject. In fact authority is 
suspended in this address, but this suspension, Ranciere argues, is not the subject's 
intervention into the norms of recognition, i.e., those of sensibility, but its dissolution in the 
symbolic gap of literarity: between the body and speech, the visible and the audible, the 
matter and the ideal, and the self and the other of the community of sense. This vertiginous 
effect of literarity is created by the mobility amongst the elements of the sensible, and the gap 
can be filled by any identity. Its principle is analogous to the formula: a body who is nobody 
can be recognized by anybody as anybody. Since any identity is a fiction, poetical work of 
recognition, the gap between meaning and truth about the addressee within the similar 
polemical, controversial configurations of political agency that resides within "the gap that 
separates subject and predicate" (Ibid., 113) shapes the critical contours of what Ranciere 
calls "literarity." Its universality is characterized by contestation and its undecidable 
character ignores limitations, exclusions, and hierarchies that identify and recognize others 
through distribution of the sensible. 
What follows from this presupposition is the attempt to "evacuate the foundation upon 
which every deconstructive... ethics is built: the (ethical) category of alterity" (Badiou, 2002, 
xxxv), not to resurrect the subject in universal disguise or dismiss ethos as the self. The 
aporoi, Ranciere's other, is thus an anonymous third party, i.e., a stranger materialized by the 
distribution of the sensible, by the fictive constitution of the people: it appears as an empty 
signifier that, being indifferent to identities, "iiaunts the dialogue [between the self and other], 
[as] the confrontation with the Unknown..." (Ranciere, 2009a, 39). That confrontation, I shall 
argue, is configured as mutual exposure between the body that has a meaningless sense and 
literarity that makes sense of it by poetic imagination that ignores the sensible.'^" Therefore 
the debate about otherness comes down to the confusion about the self reduced to the subject 
and reduction of the sensible to fixed identities otherized by the police, not a sublimity that 
forever eludes recognition, or the subject-oriented framework. 
6.1.2. Recognition: The Self as the Other 
On the account I am developing here, the other is a Active subject-position in the address, an 
imaginary subject never present with its image, a remnant of the constitutive recognition of 
the people exposed to themselves as different. It also justifies only ad hoc reference to it as a 
subject of speech since it embodies but a "quarrel over the issue of speech" (Ranciere, 1999, 
23) that threatens its own sovereignty over the words, putting its authority at risk, and giving 
itself over to words that seek their addressee. Its image becomes unstably mobile in-between 
identities, communities and sensibilities. The speech of the addressor overthrows its image, 
its representation that cannot do it justice, and the constraints of the sensible. It recognizes its 
own body as somebody else, and the self as other. It thus dis-identifies and recognizes a body 
to the extent that recognition is a poetic investigation thatfuturally acknowledges 
(recognoscere in old Latin) a presence to come. Its speech also becomes available for re-
appropriation by others, fatherless, anonymous, and hybrid. Defying the spatial distribution 
of the sensible that matches visibilities and sayable words in identities, it challenges the 
bodily arrangement of the sensible, and hence its own identity: "It is the age of hazardous 
subjectification, engendered by the pure opening of the unlimited, constituted from places of 
speech that are not designatable places but rather singular articulations between the order of 
The visible always needs interpretation, Ranciere argues. And the body is encountered as the visible that is 
subject to interpretation. 
speech a n d tha t o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s " ( R a n c i e r e , 1994, xv i i i -x ix ) . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e so -ca l l ed 
un ive r sa l i ty r e v e a l e d b y d i s a g r e e m e n t is a singular a r t i cu la t ion o f t h e v i s ib l e that 
(d i s ) iden t i f i e s t h e addres so r . '® ' It r evea l s i t se l f as an o the r to i t s e l f In th i s s e n s e it d e p l o y s the 
" the p o w e r to pu t in to c i r cu l a t i on m o r e w o r d s , ' u s e l e s s ' and u n n e c e s s a r y w o r d s , w o r d s that 
e x c e e d t h e f u n c t i o n o f r ig id d e s i g n a t i o n " (Ranc i e r e , 2 0 0 0 , 115). U n s t a b l e as it m a y , h o w e v e r , 
it p e r f o r m s an act , an act o f s p e e c h that l i t igates , r e p r e s e n t s w r o n g , and d e m a n d s j u s t i c e 
aga ins t d o m i n a t i o n ( w h i c h is a l w a y s re la ted to an un ju s t r ep re sen t a t i on ) as R a n c i e r e te l l s u s 
in h i s a c c o u n t of aporoi: ' T h e o r d e r that s t ructures . . . d o m i n a t i o n r e c o g n i z e s n o logos c a p a b l e 
o f b e i n g a r t i cu l a t ed b y b e i n g s d e p r i v e d o f logos , n o speech c a p a b l e o f b e i n g p r o f f e r e d b y 
n a m e l e s s b e i n g s , b e i n g s o f n o ac/counr ( R a n c i e r e , 1999, 24 : e m p h a s e s or ig ina l ) . 
T h e cons t i t u t i on o f t h e c o m m u n i t y ' ^ ' i l lus t ra tes that D e r a n t y w a s r ight to po in t ou t 
the ma te r i a l e f f e c t o f a f i c t ion , f o r t h e speech -ac t o f d i s a g r e e m e n t a i m s to m a t e r i a l i z e a n e w 
c o m m u n i t y o f s e n s e w h e r e au tho r i t y is u n d e c i d a b l y bo th t aken a w a y fi^om and r e - inves t ed 
into the p e o p l e u n r e c o g n i z a b l e to t h e m s e l v e s , n e v e r p re sen t wi th the i r r ep re sen t a t i on , b o t h 
fragile and equa l s u b j e c t s o f speech , and sub jec t s to the speech o f o the r s that w i sh to revea l 
their s u b j e c t i v i t y as g r o u n d l e s s d o m i n a t i o n . T h e p e o p l e is t hus split from wi th in , a l w a y s o n 
Singularity belongs to the visible articulated by the sayable; it is an effect of the act. Cf Butler's Giving an 
Account of Oneself, 2001a, 25, where she notes that "singularity has no defining content other than the 
irreducibility of exposure, of being this body exposed to a publicity that is variably and alternately intimate and 
anonymous." 
Acts of disagreement for Habermas, for instance, are to be overcome. Similarly, say, the Palestinians in Israel 
do not count as political subjects of the state. And in Nazi Germany "the jews," although citizens, were not 
equal to others before the law. In many countries, the demands of the LBGTQA are not heard as rational and 
justified claims to the future law as if they do not count as a part of the greater society. May makes the same 
point when he notes that "[t]he refusal to allow gays and lesbians to marry is presented as grounded in a natural 
fact: that marriage is between a man and a woman. This supposed natural fact generates the inequality of two 
sets of people before the law. If, by contrast, we suppose the equality of homosexuals and heterosexuals as 
speaking beings, this directly challenges their unequal treatment before the law" (2009, 6). 
Here a discussion of aggregative models of democracy may be relevant; in the Introduction I demonstrated 
that in Rousseau's theory a general will is formed by the sum of private wills. Likewise Habermas argued that 
every opinion and argument should count toward the formation of public opinion that is translated into a policy 
and the law. The shift from interests of individuals to their singular opinions is achieved through speech where 
rationality and persuasiveness of an argument, according to Habermas, should prevail over the numerary 
advantage (of a majority forming an interest group). When the "best" argument wins, it forms the general will 
and sways the majority vote of the society. Yet if some of us do not count as members of the society, or are not 
recognized as rational subjects equal to the majority, or their forms of expressions are not seen as speech, 
rational argument and persuasion, the aggregation turns into a wrong that points to a situation of unjustified 
power; i.e., hegemony of the 'we' over the people. 
the move, tiptoeing the aporetic hne that separates the sayable from a wish-to-say that will 
have formed a new 'we,' if heard and responded to. I shall argue in the next section that the 
aporia of the people constitutes them as mute sovereigns that undermine sovereignty by 
speech; they are mute (souffle in French) as their speech is stolen. They do not speak, but 
reiterate the words of the sovereign that silences them, and doing so attaches the image of the 
sovereign to their body, leading to their identification and recognition as the sovereign. This 
Active identification exposes the position of sovereignty in the address as an empty place, 
indifferent to identities. 
6.2. Recognizing the Sovereign: Mute Poet of the People 
Against Deranty's thesis that reduces demand for recognition to a claim of the subject 
defending its interests, I am arguing that recognition is a poetic investigation that reveals the 
self s misrecognition of itself as the sovereign subject that sets the norms of recognition, the 
law that distributes the sensible into recognizable identities from the archive. These norms are 
constantly challenged by subjectless speech that destabilizes identities: literarity thus does not 
authorize anyone as the sovereign subject in the constitutive address that recognizes the 
addressee. Ranciere in fact suggests that literarity voices the silent parts that have no part in 
the community of sense, but this is not the voice of a stable identity coming before the law to 
demand recognition: it is a "mute" speech in a sense that I explain below. 
6.2.1. Recognition as Misrecognition: Sovereignty 
The aporoi are constituted by the address of the law as the mute addressee, passive bodies 
that mark the line between the sensible and the insensible: they are presently identified as 
lacking intelligence to make sense of and articulate the sensible into an order. Being outsiders 
to the law inside the community of sense, they were already recognized and misrecognized as 
the silent, insensible, subordinate: as the slave, the enemy, the women, the gay, the stranger. 
the refugee, 'the jews,' as an anonymous other among us who do not share or have the 
sovereignty}^^ 
For Ranciere speaking had been wrongly considered to be the act of the sovereign 
subject, an orator, a master of rhetoric addressing the assembly, and the act follows it thanks 
to the social force of the speech, the authority of the speaker, instead of its illocutionary 
force. "The power of making art with words was linked to the power of a hierarchy of speech, 
of a relationship of address regulated between speech acts and defined audiences on whom 
these speech acts were supposed to produce the effects of mobilizing thoughts, emotions and 
energies" (Ranciere, 2004a, 14). He does not hold the principle of policed sensibility that 
"kings had to act and speak as kings do, and common people as common people do" 
(Ranciere, 2004a, 13); if the normative link between audibility and the archive of identities 
recognized and authorized is severed off, he reasons, the aporoi, the subject-positions that are 
seen as the mute nameless mob whose speech is "by definition without depth" (Ranciere, 
1994, 25) can be understood as having an authority to stage their own aporia. 
They were assumed to be mute as their dissent was not authorized; not because they 
were unrecognized but because they were recognized not to be political subjects of speech 
that can distinguish between the just and the unjust: "For instance, Aristotle says, the slaves 
have the aisthesis of language (the passive capacity of understanding words), but they don't 
have the hexis of language (the active power of stating and discussing what is just or unjust). 
More generally, it is always debatable whether a sequence of sounds produced by a mouth is 
articulated speech or the animalistic expression of pleasure or pain" (Ranciere, 2009c, 4). 
Given that they are recognized as brutes lacking intelligence, their speech is silenced by the 
authority of the norms that demarcate the sensible, identify them as the slave and dismiss 
them as not making sense. Yet if the wrong done to them cannot be addressed by the present 
This is our double, aporetic embodiment discussed in the last chapter that hierarchically structures the 
community that the 'we ' cannot quite identify with as the people and gives rise to disagreement that questions 
the limits to the community of sense. 
law that distributes the sensible and they are rendered mute, how can they speak and 
challenge the community of sense that identifies and recognizes them as mute outcasts within 
us? 
The aporoi act like the sovereign in dissent. Ranciere gives Percennius' address as an 
example of successful poetic speech acts that dis-identifies him with a dominated subject-
position that lacks recognition as an equal among us. Their subordination is not predicated 
on exclusion from the system of sensibilities that denies them any recognition, and their 
coming into the sensible actually makes poetic use of the system that recognizes them as the 
insensible part of the community. Ranciere explicitly refutes two premises of this gloomy 
vision of the vicious circle of exclusion, radical otherness and unrecognizability. In 
Ranciere's rendering of the problem, the issue of recognition is centred on the community's 
self-recognition as a stable system of identities that make sense by the present norms of 
sensibility. These norms constitute and police who has access to authority to address the 
community, what addresses make sense and who can say what. Both constituting and 
authorizing the self of the community of sense, they form the sensibility conditions of an 
aporetic sovereignty. 
The point here is that the aporoi were and still are the limit to sovereignty, the 
borderline between what makes sense and nonsense, the line between politics of policed 
recognition and the aporetic political of the insensible. That is why the forms of speaking 
related to "the deceitful event of excessive speaking" (Ranciere, 1994, 23) of Percennius in 
Tacitus' Annals that lead to the legionaries' revolution take place on the borderline of the 
sensible. They happen outside the public sphere, out of place and out of turn, but nevertheless 
inside the community of sense, during "an interval for the expression of grief or joy" (Tacitus, 
L Workmg class youth are excluded from the University because they are unaware of the true reasons for 
wh,ch they are excluded ( L . . HerUiers).2. The.r ignorance of the true reasons for which they are excluded is a 
structural effect produced by the very existence of the system that excludes them" (Ranciere in Ross 1991 61) 
in Hort, 1882, 212) because the sovereign (their emperor) died. Percennius aims to talk like a 
sovereign who calls into question who can be the sovereign. 
Parker renames the speech acts Ranciere takes as exemplifications of disagreement: 
"For Ranciere, then Tacitus records in his discourse a speech event impossible to imagine 
phenomenally as a historical utterance" (Parker, 2009, 253). These speech events form 
subject positions impossible for those who utter them to embody, but those bodies who 
"suffered enough...worn out with infirmities ...[and] covered with wounds" (Tacitus, in Hort, 
1882, 212) cannot contain themselves, cannot contain the insensible demand for justice that 
breaks out. Their acts were not sensible as they were merely slaves, and their speech did not 
make sense because they were acting out of their character recognized as the slaves. 
That is why 1 believe those acts of speech are not impossible (Parker, 2009, 253), but 
poetic, i.e. their felicity conditions do not refer to an authority, conventional norms of 
iteration, or the mere presence or absence of the unrecognized groups. What makes them 
possible is not so much the voice of Percennius that nevertheless, hopelessly speaks (because 
their revolution failed), as what the representative, Tacitus the historian does with his voice: 
"Percennius had no place to speak. Nevertheless, Tacitus makes him speak" (Ranciere, 1994, 
24). Percennius acts and speaks as if he was the law-giver that Tacitus subjectifies; in 
Tacitus' representation, Percennius the subaltern gains the problematic identity of the 
sovereign subject whose demand still reverberates as a claim to the fijture law. It is the effect 
of literarity that disrupts the identities of the sovereign and the subaltern. 
In my discussion of Spivak's Can the Subaltern Speak? in the Prelude, 1 noted her 
conception of re-iteration in the double senses of representation (as signification and as 
speaking for) in the liminal zone between speech and silence, through the opening of the 
"" "By remonstrances or by sword, we may now obtain relief" (Tacitus, in Hort, 1882, 212: emphasis added) 
cries Percennius whose body had too much of injustice, excitation and fervour, "let everyone receive the arrears 
that may be due to him," referring to an anonymous soldier. 
context to further re-interpretations.'" Tacitus' voice supplements, substitutes for and brings 
into visibility Percennius' silent presence in re-iteration of his speech in a context open to 
further signification. This operation that doubles voices is of the same order of historiology in 
the sense that the historian can find a point of entry to the secret history of the oppressed 
through it. Spivak defines the task as thematization of silences that nevertheless speak and I 
argue that this is exactly what Tacitus does with Percennius' silent address that mimics 
legislation. 
The notion of law, especially colonial law, figures in Subaltern Studies more often 
than not as a discursive site of subjectification."^ And Percennius the subaltern is subjectified 
as the voice of the law by Tacitus: when the historian's operation of substitution negates his 
singular identity, he is elevated to the status of the Generalized Other in the Habermasian 
sense. He makes a demand; he threatens and promises; and he sets down a norm beyond the 
norm, as the sovereign subject being (outside) the law. He and Tacitus will be the co-author 
of the act of speech and thus co-authorities in the sense in which Agamben uses the term. 
Percennius' act of speech is resumed by Tacitus as an authority that intervenes to make his 
address heard in the legal, rational discourse of sovereignty. 
6.3. Recognition as a Poetic Act of Speech 
The subaltern therefore do not speak their own language, but borrow the language of 
authority that condemns them, pervert it through the indirect and impersonal use (anonymous 
'they," instead of 'you,' or 'we), and let the speech act speak itself outside the confines of 
I ' ' Derrida conceives representation as an act of substitution: "Representation regularly supplements presence. 
But this operation of supplementation ... is not exhibited as a break in presence, but rather as a reparation and a 
contmuous, homogenous modification of presence in representation" (1982 313) 
Hardiman, David, 1985, 165-
228, in Subaltern Studies IV and Baxi, Upendra, 1992, 245-264, in in Subaltern Studies VII 
In the sphere of private law, auctoritas is the property of the auctor, that is, the person .t,,' iuris (the 
( r i T i T " T r r ' • •• : " " ' ^o cannot independently 
bnng a valid act mto being. Thus, ih. aucorttas of the tutor makes valid the act of the one who lacks this 
capacity, and the auctoritas of the father "authorizes" (2005, 76). 
truth, identity and recognition by the mastery of Tacitus that lends rhetorical force to the 
arguments of Percennius: 
"The indirect style, in practice disjoining meaning truth and 
meaning, in effect cancels the opposition between legitimate and 
illegitimate speakers. The latter are just as much validated as 
suspected. The homogeneity of the narrative discourse thereby 
constituted comes to contradict the heterogeneity of the subjects it 
represents, the unequal quality of the speakers to guarantee, by 
their status, the reference of their speech. Although [the aporoi] 
may well be the radical other, the one excluded from legitimate 
speech, his discourse is included, in a specific suspension of the 
relations between meaning and truth." (Ranciere, 1994, 23: 
emphasis added) 
How can we understand the "specific suspension of the relations between meaning and truth" 
as a state of exception where discursive norms are interrupted? In this context, what the 
aporoi achieve by paradoxical use of language is to bring down the distinctions of identity 
and norms of recognition that do not do justice to them in their image, and rules of language 
that stabilize reference to the sensible. The second step is to identify themselves as the owner 
of the voice of the authorities (Tacitus here), and imitate a citizen that has a right to speak and 
dissent exploiting the crisis of sovereignty that does the job of recognition: "If we ever mean 
to redress our grievances," as Percennius emphasizes, "what time so fit as the present, when 
the new emperor is not yet settled on the throne?" (Tacitus, in Hort, 1882, 212). In doing so, 
they claim sovereignty over words to paradoxically suspend mastery over language, point out 
what is common to them and the authorities as anonymous parts unrecognizable fi-om 
another, and offer the speech act that reveals the linguistic abyss of identity. With the 
identities and distinctions blurred and destabilized through the anonymity of the subject of 
speech in interregnum (—Who sits on the throne? No one), indignation at political injustice 
(having no part in what they are a part of; inclusion into the society but exclusion from 
sovereignty, domination, and dismissal) is represented through the injustice of being 
recognized as mute brutes different to rational citizens that make sense in their speech. 
Percennius' act of speech suspends both discourse and sovereignty in a "state of exception" 
paradoxically in order to re-instate them."" 
Thus the subaltern expose themselves to the addressee as unrecognizable others to 
themselves, being (in)different to the identity that silenced them through an earlier 
recognition; they also move from their position in the insensible by dis-identification that also 
re-identifies them poetically. The identity of the addressor thus shifts in time and space, over 
to other bodies three times: in the speech of the aporoi unheard by its audience that would 
legitimize and authorize their act, through its representation by the historian that situates the 
subject of speech legitimately within its rights to speak against itself for the purposes of 
justice, and in the account of Ranciere who speaks for them. Their voices overlap, making it 
impossible to identify and recognize who it is that speaks and addresses us. This is a poetic 
act of sovereignty that still seeks its addressor as well addressee, wishing-to-say something 
about our present democracies and politics of recognition that ignore the mob-ility of 
identities and the mobilizing force of an address. 
In other words, Percennius' act of speech is made discursive by Tacitus' non-
discursive signification that poetically suspends the relations between truth and meaning in 
the ensuing paradoxes of futurity. Percennius speaks like the sovereign subject to address his 
situation that has already deprived him of sovereignty. If he is the sovereign his claim is not 
justified and if he is not the sovereign his claim is unjustifiable. And on the discursive level, 
his speech refers to nothing present: he is in truth not the Emperor who can address others in 
the terms he does. In truth his address is unheard, but paradoxically, in Tacitus' re-iteration 
we still hear it. His speech does not make sense to others at his present, and he was to invent 
the conditions under which it would have; if his act was successful (i.e., if his uprising 
"The structural analogy between language and law is illuminating here. Just as linguistic element subsists in 
tangue without any real denotation, which they acquire only in actual discourse, so in the state of exception the 
norm is m force without any reference to reality. But just as concrete linguistic activity becomes intelligible 
precisely through the presupposition of something like a language, so is the norm able to refer to the normal 
situation through the suspension of its application in the state of exception" (Agamben 2005 36) 
succeeded) he would already have been the emperor who had intervened in order to speak for 
other slaves and authorize rebellion. In other words, in the act he identified himself with his 
future self that he would have been had his act of speech been successful. He therefore 
differed from himself in the act and placed his identification within a gap between truth and 
meaning, between slavery and sovereignty, and between his past and future. The act of 
suspension here is a futural interruption of the (temporal, discursive, representative) order. 
This speech act is poetic since it is about poesis, making an imaginary image through 
speech, an anonymous identity that seeks its conditions of materiality: it envisions a body that 
wishes-to-say, that could be anybody, that is always on the threshold of being otherwise if 
heard. What is of utmost importance here is not to recognize the addressor truth fully, but to 
invent conditions of meaning under which it can be heard as an address of the anonymous 
sovereign that questions sovereignty in his/her silence. And Percennius' address was silent: 
he does not speak but re-iterates the address of the sovereign he never was. Percennius' 
actual speech was not documented, and it is safe to assume, went unheard of. He is just 
envisioned to embody a silence filled by others" words: the dead emperor's, Tacitus', and 
Ranciere's. He was a mute poet of the people. And "to restate Percennius' reasons is by no 
means to repeat them," (Ranciere, 1994, 26) Ranciere emphasizes, since no one can possibly 
know them, or voice them faithfully. Tacitus' representation does not document but invents 
those reasons in a manner analogous to "Principle of Actuality" in Parole Muette (Ranciere, 
1998, 21). Here Tacitus himself narrates a story free of concerns with truth and knowledge, 
creating the identity of a subordinated legionnaire, the allegedly unheard speech made by 
such a personage through speech acts (Ranciere, 1994, 26). As a poetic subjectivity designed 
to the necessities of the speech situation, Percennius (as Tacitus), represents him briefly and 
paradoxically embodies the anonymous subject-position that wishes to say the unsayable: 
that we, the insensible, are a part of the senseless 'we' that cannot recognize itself The 
demand for recognition thus questions the legitimacy of the criteria of being a recognized 
subject of speech. Therefore, with the singularity of Percennius elevated to the collective 
status of class (a classless class, i.e., the subaltern), one finds the mobile, poetic element of 
speech in the anonymity of a newly designated subject-position of speech that can be taken 
up by countless subjects in the same situation as Percennius. Bereft of singularity, it is 
represented to be universal, i.e. unrecognizable in any identity or subjectivity. 
The second discursive function that the representative achieves in his history is the 
universalisation of a conflictual position from which one can challenge a portage du sensible 
that silences one regardless of one's identity. Even though one cannot articulate an injustice 
done to one by a law of the sensibility that silences one, Ranciere implies,yM5rice gets done 
through a series of (dis-)identifications that interpret and vocalize the silence of an 
anonymous body amongst us. Even some of the identifications do injustice to the silent body 
that was Percennius, others gain the authority to point out his silent presence, speak for him 
in this way, and recognize the wrong that constitutes the community of sense. In lending 
words to transform his wish-to-say into a meaningful address, the 'we" can address the 
injustice through being otherwise. It can thus materialize a new community of sense where 
his silence makes sense. It can envision a new ethos, a new shared life where norms of 
recognition can constitute anyone, and by extension, no one. as the sovereign. It can even 
form a sensible democracy where one moves beyond the present norms of sensibility. 
Ranciere thus formulates those speech acts that mimic and undermine discursive 
sovereignty only to make sense the "place [discourse] gives, through its own agency, to what 
it declares to have no place" {Ibid., 28). This is an act of justice that does not respond to the 
other that demands recognition in his/her singularity: although it mobilizes an anonymous 
body that appears before us, the "we' responds to its own wrong, its own constitutive address 
as the sovereign of the sensible that makes its dominated parts insensible. It is the community 
of sense that realizes it misrecognized itself through a miscount of the bodies, some of which 
have no ac/count. The silent other is indifferent to identities, or recognition; just an 
anonymous body that occasions this recognition through its wish-to-say, it marks the aporetic 
hne between the sensible and the insensible, between the meaningful and truth, between the 
present and a fijture community of sense. The democratic task is to find words in its silence, 
to make the body of the mute poet speak through poetry. 
6.3.1. Recognizing a Wish-To-Say 
For Ranciere the aporoi do not speak. They expose us to their silent wish-to-say something 
about us: that we misrecognized ourselves; that 'we" are and will always be other to 
ourselves. Their speech-act only offers a silent body to the literal movement between 
identities, between sovereignty and subordination, between silence and discourse. In other 
words, we are still at the constitutive moment of the 'we,' where subordination and 
sovereignty is tied together by the aporetic authority of the people that seek their 
representation. This is also a mute speech, stolen from others: Percennius steals it from the 
sovereign that mutes him; Tacitus from Percennius muted by him in speaking for him, and 
Ranciere from Tacitus, acknowledging his theft. For the intelligibility structuring speech as 
meaning cannot be grounded in the presence, or the present norms of sensibility: we can 
make sense of an anonymous other who lived millennia ago in a different part of the world 
because of literarity. The force of the address is the senseless historical movement of a people 
that pursue their own law and sensibility through which they will have recognized 
themselves, and their speech seeking its addressee, regardless of the identity of the body that 
will have uttered them. 
6.3.2. Recognition: Silent Image 
When words are appropriated by a different body that reiterates them, their meaning digresses 
and undoes the relation between the visible and the sayable: one becomes a body that 
speaks others" words, against one's identity. A performative contradiction thus comes down 
to wishing to speak the lawftil language in order to speak against (contra diction) the law that 
silences. The people act out of their character when they contradict the self of the community, 
embodying a different meaning in their image, and being unrecognizable from the 
perspective of the present norms of recognition. They thus forego the present conditions of 
shared sensibility, and their place in the present community of sense. Detached from the 
bodies that utter them and exposed to others constantly re-interpreting them, the stolen words 
of this wish lose and regain their material conditions of meaning that unmake and re-make 
(poema in Greek) the community of the sensible. Performative contradictions occasion 
democracy where the people contradict their identity, become unrecognizable from the law's 
point of view, acting out of character to forge a new character from the senseless. 
The poetics of recognition acknowledges a silent body we are exposed to and 
investigates into its silent meaning, identity, and situation. Democratic speech-acts prefigure 
the figure that would perform them, dis-identifying the subject of speech with the allocated 
image in the archive, and re-identifying them with the equalizing wish of democratic 
literarity. The plebs in Ranciere's story voice an untimely demand from outside the limits of 
intelligibility, addressed from a subject-position invisible at the present time. They become 
intelligible subjects after the political act that changed the sense of their speech; the act 
changes what it means to speak, to be seen and to be heard. It changes the distribution of the 
sensible in such a way that we acknowledge we are exposed to a silence we need to make 
sense of But before the success of their speech-acts, it was only a-wish-to-say that they were 
"By stealing away to wander aimlessly without knowing who to speak or who not to speak to [literarity] 
destroys every legitimate foundation for the circulation of words, for the relationship between the effects of 
language and the position of bodies in shared place" (Ranciere, 2004, 13). 
the equal parts of the community of sense, a silent body on the borderline of the sensible that 
seeks its meaning. 
The untimely and out-of-place emergence of a political figure that reconfigures 
political intelligibility thus also reverses the arrow of meaning, from the (un)intelligible 
toward the (in)sensible, towards the body that wishes to say something in its silence about our 
policed sensibility. An apolitical figure that changes the meaning of the political and derives 
its intelligibility from a law that differs from itself cannot be accounted for by the immediate 
presence mapped by transparent discursivity; it is "rather a body announcing another body 
that will complete it by making its truth corporeally present" (Ranciere, 2004, 107) through 
the mobility between words that act like material things and things that bespeak of words. To 
tell the story of a subject to come in this sense is to make the sensible conditions under which 
it can appear and speak, and to materialize a world where the wish to unmake and re-make 
the law is fiilfilled. 
This is done by recognizing a wish-to-say in the silent body of the aporoi, and 
recognizing the wrong in our constitution that silences it. Exposure to and reception by 
an/other body that speaks like somebody we recognize in a hierarchically regulated context of 
speech and action does not exhaust the primary sociability. The history of the law, similarly, 
does not simply consist of a single command, the eternal return of the same when time is 
stopped by the sovereign; there is also a spatial rupture, displacement of bodies, separation 
and reunion of the visible with the sayable, and incongruous montage of the parts of the 
society unanticipated by the law (Ranciere, 2007a, 6 0 ) t o imagine a new image of the 
body: somebody unrecognizable by the present norms of sensibility. 
"Between elements that are foreign to one another it [symbohc montage] works to estabUsh a familiarity, an 
occasional analogy, attesting to a more fundamental relationship of co/belonging, a shared world where 
heterogeneous elements are caught up in the same essential fabric, and are therefore always open to being 
assembled in accordance with the fraternity of a new metaphor." (Ranciere, 2007a, 57) 
An image is not pure visibility, but articulation of visibility, its poetic wordless re-
presentation that nevertheless speaks to us. "Essentially two things are meant by the order of 
representation. In the first place it is a certain order of relations between what can be said and 
what can be seen. The essence of speech in this order is to show" (Ranciere, 2009a, 17) what 
can be seen. Out of Ranciere's understanding of the image, I seek to give an account of 
recognition in terms of a wish-to-say. An image brings together speech and visibility without 
words. If "[t]he text's part in the representative schema was the conceptual linking of actions, 
while the image's was the supplement of presence that imparted flesh and substance to it," 
(Ranciere, 2007a, 46) the visible remains mute {souffle), and the sayable makes it talk and 
act, pointing out what can be seen. It investigates into the sense of the visible, which cannot 
be seen but imagined. Imagining, both limiting and revealing its aesthetic-political 
possibilities of the silent body tells us what it can do, say, feel etc. if recognized in other 
ways. 
The muteness of the visible also implies that speech is not inextricably attached (or 
proper) to it: by literarity, it can escape its present conditions of utterance and move in a 
passage toward other bodies, toward other distributions of the sensible that may subjectify the 
body otherwise. Derrida also warns us that the muteness of speech that makes the body talk 
becomes 'spirit-ed," that is, ghostly, animated, and spirited away, stolen (souffle), leaving a 
trace of the a d d r e s s e r . T h i s trace is left by the body's journey to Us future image that shows 
what it wishes-to-say. I mentioned that Ranciere tracks down "the ability of a sensory 
community to grasp anyone and anything in poetic wandering, by going back over the route 
of the inaugural walk" (Ranciere, 2004b, 20). The wandering of the letter, poesis that spins 
out of the control of the law experiments with the internal undecidability of the community's 
"Let us understand stolen by a possible commentator who would acknowledge speech in order to place it in 
an order, an order of essential truth or of real structure... all speech fallen from the body, offering itself to 
understandmg or reception, offenng itself as a spectacle, immediately becomes stolen speech Becomes a 
sigmfication which 1 do not possess because it is a signification. Theft is always the theft of speech or text of a 
trace" (Derrida, 1978, 175). 
ever-inaugural principles that can(not) be materialized by any image, for in Ranciere's 
favourite example, the plebs borrow the words of the patricians "by constituting themselves 
... as speaking beings sharing the same properties as those who deny them these" (1999, 24). 
The slaves with 'unintelligible speech," "execut[ing] a series of speech acts that mimic those 
o f (Ibid.) the law-makers, exercise popular sovereignty and speak against the current regime 
of sensibility that distributes subjectivities, matches certain discourses with certain images 
and constitutes the society on the basis of the sayable/visible. They foresee and initiate a 
change in the political rationality. "For politics, in the modem era, has come to dwell in the 
very place which was ... the non-signifying, the non-representative" (Ranciere, 2004, 13) and 
the transport at stake is the transfer of the words onto a different body, a metaphor that 
recognizes and changes the "immediate visibility of meaning in the sensory" {Ibid.). 
6.3.3. Recognition: Imag(in)ing 
Therefore, democracy, for Ranciere, is not the space of justified speech animated by public 
meaning and agreement, but "the regime in which the law is given by the wanderings of the 
orphaned letter, in which it occupies the place of living discourse, the place of the 
community's soul" (Ranciere, 2001, 95). The literarity of meaning, divorced from the 
presence it must refer to, is interpreted by Ranciere to pave way to the poetics "of a speech 
that speaks by itself, that is forgetful of its origin and heedless of its audience" (Ibid., 94). Its 
tacit "'self-referentiality' makes it available for anyone to use for his own goals" (Ibid.), 
disrupting the relation of authority set by the archive of identities and the public speech, "the 
way in which knowledge and discourse order visibility and establish authority" (Ibid.). "The 
democratic disease and literary performance have the same principle," Ranciere explains, 
"namely the life of the mute-loquacious letter, the democratic letter that upsets any ordered 
relation between the order of discourse and the order of social conditions" (Ranciere, 2011, 
106). As opposed to the literal framing of the people whose senseless presence overlaps with 
their sensible appearance, one may re-think the people along the line of literarity of the image 
that help their recognition through archived identities; the anonymous body as a poetic figure 
whose contours can only be sensed, recognized and made sense of through the figurative use 
of language that changes the meaning of what is seen and disrupts the archive of identities 
and meaning. 
For there is more to an image for Ranciere than a naked exposure to sight that speaks 
for itself clearly: image, Ranciere suggests, indeed consists of "primarily operations, relations 
between the sayable and the visible, ways of playing with the before and the after, cause and 
e f f ec f (2007, 6). The image is irreducible to the visibility of the body, or a passive material 
mode of being-there, an immediate presence that speaks for itself: "[t]he regime of visibility 
of the 'immediacies' of presence is still configured through the mediation of words" 
(Ranciere, 2007a, 79). If the image is not restricted to the domain of the visible, "there are 
images which consist wholly in words" {Ibid., 1) that reverse the causal order and 
temporality, visually recognize and represent what is not present or sensible. This brings us 
back to imaginative speech acts that recognize and identify a silent body. If words "by way of 
narration and description ... make something visible, yet not present, seen" {Ibid., 12) they 
also break with the task of representing reality faithfully in that they "deploy a visibility that 
can be blinding" {Ibid., 7), both resembling and dissembling, exposing and postponing the 
visible in the images they construct. 
Therefore formation of an image frees the visible from the ultimate domination of 
speech in revealing its muteness in interpretation and malleability in formation (Ranciere, 
Words (re)arrange the visible in meaningful tropes" (Raneiere, 2007a, 7). The figurative use of language 
displays how the meanings of words differ from themselves, and cease to coincide with their referents or the 
concepts they express. Tropes are meaningful backfires of semantic operations, "no longer an illustration of 
though . nor the original mode of language and thought" (Ranciere, 2011, 152), but "a rearrangement of its 
elements (Ibid.) that, through the constructions of words and images, rearranges the sensible. 
2006, 2).''^'' It is revealed without an identity to be recognized, without a unique character to 
be acicnowledged, without its given singularity (Ranciere, 2009, 25) by standing indifferent 
to all addresses that recognize and misrecognize it in the images constructed. The free play 
between the nameless, shapeless matter and the identities bestowed upon it by the distribution 
of the sensible, thus places equality of all addresses operative on the silent body: "What the 
'free appearance" of the Greek statue manifests is the essential characteristics of divinity, its 
'idleness' or 'indifferency'" (Ibid., 27). Yet she is not passive, wishing-to-say something 
about our gaze that makes her speak: that recognition is possible because any body is 
somebody else when addressed by a different gaze and each gaze equally constructs what it 
wishes to recognize in it. Seemingly, what Ranciere wants to release politics from is the orbit 
oi inequality, passivity and singularity that structures speech and action as response to the 
Other that captures us in its singularity, like a de-politicised, sublime work of art that is the 
Policed 'we,' or the ever-shifting mob that is the people. To conclude, any 
normative/regulative approaches to the image that comes before us, and before the law risks 
i/e-politicization of what is peculiarly political. 
Conclusion: Recognition as a Poetic Investigation 
1 argued that Ranciere's framework of recognition is not to be conceived, like Deranty does, 
simply as a claim of the subject to individual liberties, rights and state protection. Although 
Deranty rightly approaches the issue via the oppressed subjects voicing a demand that at 
present goes unheard, 1 suggested that his interpretation of Ranciere risks situating him as a 
theorist of identity politics. In my reading, Ranciere's account of recognition conceives 
dissent as a silent act of speech that suspends (disrupts) norms of discourse, displaces its 
Ranciere emphasizes that the unrepresentability of brute aherity (of matter in this case) does not follow from 
the lack of a concept for what lies outside socio-linguistic institutes. It only sheds light to the excess of being 
that can make itself sensible in myriad ways, through many aesthetical strategies, within a constellation of 
socio-politically valid forms. It does not hint to the vulgar position that the real will always elude capture, or that 
due to the metaphysical nature of language, representation of alterity is bound with reproduction of the 
sameness. On the contrary, things materialize in and through representations, taking up on a discursive 
dimension. In a sense, Ranciere merely reformulates the old Kantian maxim that the existent only appears under 
limitations, though the restraints are subject to under-determination since they are put in place by the aesthetical 
(dis-)harmony of representation. 
subject and places it in others' discourse (Percennius is subjectified in Tacitus' discourse), 
demands acknowledgment of a wrong (i.e., misrecognition of the silent addressor), and 
makes both the addressee and the addressor otherwise. In other words, recognition is an act of 
speech that poetically investigates the situation and re-constitutes what is present in it 
discursively and by suspension of discourse. 
Percennius' address disrupts relations of truth, identity, and meaning: the conditions 
under which the subaltern's assertion, identification and signification make sense refer not to 
what is present, or to the present, but to a possible future. Percennius' address is exemplary of 
the aporoi's: those who are neither absent nor present in our community of sense stage 
disagreement, first and foremost, to make their socio-political presence sensed and 
recognized. Percermius' situation illustrates the aporias of the political; the sovereign people 
cannot take parts in the constitution of the political situation and need recognition of their 
situation where they cannot exercise their sovereignty. Percennius' speech rather addresses us 
to his silent image substituted for, and supplemented by others' speech that subjectify, 
identify and recognize him; the others of the community too, when they do not have the 
power to make their demands heard, offer their silence to the people who may substitute their 
self for them in an act of identification, speaking for them, subjectifying and recognizing 
them. 
More importantly, recognition is an act of speech that reveals the self as an other to 
itself; Percennius' singularity is both exposed and displaced by the literarity of his address 
that, through others' re-iteration, universalizes his subjectivity as an anonymous, silent 
presence. His address occasions the recognition of himself as One in a master-slave dialectic: 
it mainly signifies his self as a subjugated other who paradoxically refers to his possible 
ftiture self as the sovereign. Tacitus, in narrating, re-iterating and appropriating Percennius' 
situation to address a wrong suffered by the slaves, recognizes and substitutes his own 
subjectivity, words and speech for the silent image and unheard address of Percennius. 
Tacitus poetically invents an other who is substituted for his self in the act of re-presentation. 
In a metonymic move, his historical representation of Percennius undecidably becomes his 
own representation; Tacitus' makes Percennius speak, lending him his own subjectivity, 
words, and acts. He identifies with him, and recognizes himself in him—in an other 
substituted for his self. 
Yet the series of identification, recognition and acknowledgments are, for Ranciere, 
merely political. Ranciere aims to dissociate politics from ethics, and recognition fi^om the 
relentless "imperative dictated by the sudden encounter with the Other" (Ranciere, 2009, 87) 
in his/her/its singularity, passivity, and (un)recognizability. Whether it is the unrepresentable 
Other of ethics of response. The State, The Police, The Father or passivity before the law, for 
Ranciere, "the imperative" to respond to the stronger implies inequality between the 
addressee recognized in its singularity and the addressor that sets the norms of 
recognizability. Singularity too poses a difficulty for language (which necessarily operates in 
universal terms) and the law (which is impersonal and systematic in its treatment of those 
who come before it). Ranciere emphasizes (with Lyotard) the necessity of disagreement 
and invention of a new norm/language game in order to recognize the subordinated others, 
but singularity for him is a discursive effect of literary identifications and not a substance 
subjects of discourse always already have. Singularity is only possible on the basis of 
creativity, of inventing a novel (i.e. singular) act of speech that stages dissent. 
To summarize, Ranciere implies that the Police justifies its norms with the present 
distribution of the senses in agreement with our singular identity captured and recognized, 
assigning a function, proper way of acting, speaking, sensing and being in a shared life to us 
™ If it is the singularity of the addressee that should be addressed, Lyotard implied (Lyotard, 1988, 13), one 
needs to invent a new norm ethically and new phrases to respond to the situation. Habermas, on the other hand, 
as discussed in the first chapter, seems to privilege the "following the rule" as the only acceptable response of 
the addressee whose singularity should be a "private" matter (Habermas, 1987, 16). 
(Ranciere, 2004a, 12-13). Since identity, any identity, is constituted by an address that seeks 
its addressee, singularity too is a poetic effect of the address that identifies and recognizes the 
anonymous body by suspending the relation between our presence and its meaning. The body 
is again an exposure to the address that recognizes us as others to ourselves, but speech here 
points to its anonymity. And recognition does not only identify, but investigates possibilities 
of identification always mired in material conditions of misidentification and dis-
identification where the distribution of sensible both limits and reveals what is it that we see. 
Poetics, here, bring together incongruous elements of the sensible together in an image, in 
hitherto unimagined ways to investigate and find words in its silence. Singularity is thus not 
that of the body, but of the poetic speech-act that seeks and envisions a new way of being 
under the shared conditions of sensibility deformed and reformed by it. 
As 1 stressed above, the aporoi do not appear out of turn and place only to have their 
singular image recognized and recorded in the archive (which would be an applaudable 
achievement in and of itself), but also to mark the limit to our present, hierarchically-
structured sensibility that cannot make sense of their silent presence among us as a sign of us 
being others to ourselves, not absolute sovereigns that control the itinerary of the address that 
make us what 'we' are.^"' This is a movement of the people poetically addressed to 
themselves as unrecognizable others to themselves and it is the policing force of the norms of 
recognizability that keep them in their places, in the hierarchical past of the archive. 
Their mobility is the literarity of subjectless speech that dis-identifies in identifying its 
addressee, but unlike Habermas' ideal speech, it moves people from the position of a lawful 
selfhood to anonymous otherness constitutive of the self; from a policed sensibility to an 
imagined ethos and a new shared life. Although it is not ethical, it paradoxically aims to 
This IS the primary sociability, understood as the senseless forces of a shared life that circulate without a final 
address or addressee. Its material effect is not predictable, or controllable by the present norms of recognition. 
Our present sensibility is characterized not by sovereignty over these forces, but by mobility between the 
sovereign addressor and the submissive addressee, identification and dis-identification, the insensible and the 
meaningful, the matter and the imaginary, the body and speech, the present and the future. 
constitute an ethical community of sense where speech reveals we are strangers to our self. 
Recognition is the act of speech that exposes us to others constitutive of us and to ourselves 
as others. It involves a demand for the acknowledgment of the situation of address (as 
structured by violence, unjustified power, and inequalities), self-recognition (recognition of 
the self as an other and others as constitutive of the self), inventing new norms, acts, speeches 
and a future of greater equality. What comes before 'us, ' before the law and before others is 
an anonymous body that still seeks its possibility conditions, on the aporetic line between 
what is present and what is to come. I have argued that it demands a poetic re-interpretation 
that articulates its 'literal' meaning to perform the aporia that brings together sense and 
(in)sensibility. It embodies a wish-to-say that can be materialized if heard and responded to 
with an act that re-constitutes the community of sense. It is futural in the sense that once we 
respond to it, it will have already been one of us in an "otherwise" society. 
Chapter 7. The Ethical and the Poetic: Wish-to-Live 
The last chapter aimed to show recognition is an act of speech that reveals 'we ' are others to 
ourselves. For Butler, too, the other appears as a concealed difference of the self one forced 
to disown its debt to the other by the constitutive address of subjectification so it can be the 
sovereign. The problematic constitution of the self distinct from the other, however, also 
offers a promise of a shared life as somebody identified in the archive of bodies and a threat 
of death in life as a nobody. We respond and attach to the addressor as we have a wish-to-live 
in a shared life even when we are constituted as the foreclosed other, but this attachment is 
always troubled by what is included as the excluded. Butler thus aims to offer a solution to 
the aporia of recognition when she frames identification also as dis-identification. Here the 
self both disavows the other as 'Not-I,' and preserves it as a foreclosed norm that continues to 
define one's identity silently, in unacknowledged negative terms. This norm is unspeakable if 
the fantasy of the self-sufficient, secure and independent self, i.e., of sovereignty, is to be 
efficient and have material effects. However, I shall argue that 'the sovereign,' for Butler, is 
an empty signifier that can be 'filled up' by anybody; it does not refer to any identity, but 
defers us back to the contingent authority of strangers in the past that established a speech-
act's success conditions to constitute, identify, and recognize a body as somebody in the 
archive of the 'we. ' And since the foreclosed other is not simply excluded from the 
community but included in it as the inner limit to the norms of recognizability, it can appear 
among us as a troubling stranger, a queer body insensible at the present that talks and acts 
like a sovereign member of the society because the sovereign is a stranger. 
In what follows I shall develop the argument that the queerness of our constitution 
both forecloses and authorizes the scene of recognition where the sovereign self and the 
foreclosed other meet time and again to address and recognize each other as strangers in a 
shared life through words borrowed from unidentifiable strangers with obscure origin. The 
constitution of us all as strangers is not ontological, but historical: we are troubled by a past 
that sets limits whilst constituting us, our socio-political world, and possibilities of response 
without asking for our consent, agreement or response. It conditions us in both senses: the 
law is the possibility condition for us to act, speak, live and share a life with others, but it also 
limits our responsibility and possibilities of response. I denote the necessity to adjudicate 
those conditions with the term 'wish-to-live.' The subject of the wish-to-live is not the 
sovereign self which is conditioned on a refusal of acknowledgement and sociability to the 
foreclosed other. The recognition of strange otherness within us, acknowledgement of our 
constitutive debt undermines our sovereignty, and that is why their emergence troubles us, 
and causes an emergency we do not wish to respond to at the present. 
In the first chapter 1 traced in Habermas' theory how speech is in excess of its 
ftinction of conveying information and sets up the scene of recognition.^"^ The strangeness of 
the 'me ' that addresses itself as a stranger, or the abstraction of the 'we ' into an unidentifiable 
Generalizable Other signifies more than anonymity. It also expresses an enigmatic excess of 
being (outside) the norm—incongruity, performative contradiction, a split within the 
individual self that becomes a stranger to itself, and within the collective self of the 
community (the 'we ' ) that also appears as 'they.' It creates an incongruous excess of obscure 
origin that I refer to by the queemess of our constitution. The gap between the people and the 
Generalized Other, between "me" and "my character" creates a tension of recognition, a form 
of semantic stress and political struggle, and an inner contradiction that binds sovereignty and 
otherness together. Both the Generalized Other and the character exceed the subjects they 
refer to, with an enigmatic identity that exceeds reference, representation, discourse, 
regulations, limitations, and the present. 
The transmission of norms is performed by significant others, who re-iterate the speech-acts of others from 
whom the 'we ' inherits the normative structures. In the situation of address that also subjectifies, speech is in 
excess of the present too. That is, the subject or significant others are not present (Habermas, 1987, 35); the 
subject learns to relate to itself as a third party, "me" as "him/her" that it will have been, in the address of the 
'we ' that identify with "them" that has appeared as the Generalized Other. 
Drawing on Lyotard, I also argued that the encounter with the excessive being of the 
law displaces the subject and places it outside itself as an excess constituted by stress, 
conflict, and contradiction.^"' Excessiveness on the individual level is inherited from the 
collective level.^"'' In other words, the subject is bom out of an unrepayable debt to the law, 
as embodiment of guilt because the excess - the sovereign, that is, the Generalized Other, as 
well as the character- is constitutive: the law, the possibility condition of a shared life, gives 
life to the legal subject "I" and the person of "me,' its duties and responsibilities as well as 
rights (Ibid.), placing it within the "we.' The unpayable debt, however, comes with the 
ontological guilt; the subject is guilty of having a character that displaces it from the 'we. ' 
The singular identity is the site of recurrent conflict with and violation of the norm of 
subjectification, but as I will argue, this fiature-oriented, lawfully lawless, innovative excess 
of sovereignty is also the possibility condition of change. 
In this chapter I shall argue that the aporia of recognition has less to do with mutual 
recognition of persons, subjects, and identities that encounter and address each other in their 
(un-)recognizable presence than the mutual address of two temporalities, two bodies of the 
people that share a life. I shall first formulate recognition as a struggle between two strangers, 
i.e. the sovereign "we" and its foreclosed others. 1 will illustrate our queemess and 
sovereignty in Butler's hauntology where the bodiless addresses from the past constitute and 
recognize a body as somebody among us in differential ontologies. In recognition, speech re-
iterates the contingent authority of strangers underlying the success conditions of speech-acts 
See Chapter 2, the section titled DijferendiHy a or 'Wstawac'\. 
™ Santner calls subjectification by the excessive being of the voice of the law "ex-citation" (2001, 31) of the 
subject; the subject is "charged"—with excessive energies, as well as with a symbolic crime. The representative 
crime for Habermas consists of having an excess that hinders unification with the 'we, ' a strange and private 
constituent of identity that is (outside) the norm of the subject. In having a singular character the subject 
contradicts itself, becomes otherwise, i.e., a stranger to itself, and constitutes itself in contradiction to the law; 
i.e., the subject embodies a performative contradiction that strangely places it outside its community. But as this 
is also the gesture that has already constituted the law and the society, the subject paradoxically identifies with 
what it dis-identifies with. In my re-construction of Santner's argument, the 'me ' becomes the foci of a stress 
and excitation in the face of threats (of sanction) and promises (of recognition) that shore up the constitutive 
address. 
of constitution and forming a fragile, ambivalent social bond amongst the 'we' as the archive 
that forecloses some lives; The " 'we' is always and only a phantasmatic construction 
...which denies the internal complexity and indeterminacy of the term and constitutes itself 
only through the exclusion of some part of its constituency that it simultaneously seeks to 
represent" (Butler, 1990, 142). 
Butler's hauntology is pivotal to my thesis. If the 'we' as a representation is 
constructed by an act of speech that grounds its legitimacy, Butler's "task is to interrogate 
what the [ontological] move that establishes foundations authorizes, and what precisely it 
excludes or forecloses" (1995, 39). The social bond of recognition subject to re-iteration, 
Butler argues, is haunted by what it forecloses. Those who are denied the sovereignty of the 
'we' re-enact the moment of constitution in their dissent and demand recognition and 
inclusion as equals. The struggle treads the aporetic line between attachment and detachment, 
between death and life, between the queer and the sovereign, between the past and "a future 
[founded] through a break with that past" (Butler, 1995a, 159) re-iterated.^''^Her reading of 
Sophocles' Antigone compels the dualities above into a productive crisis where the sovereign 
and its other struggle over socio-political transformation and constitution of a future society. 
Antigone's act of speech not only reveals the contingency of the social bond that can always 
be subverted and re-articulated, but almost materializes "the aberrant temporality of the 
norm" (Butler, 2000, 29) that regulates and maintains it. 
Antigone, as Butler interprets her, demonstrates recognition as a struggle between the 
sovereign and the other bound by the social bond. Her address calls into question the 
sovereign's founding act and the norm of the society (i.e., kinship) through its performative, 
aporetic act of speech that reveals the unrecognizable excess: if the reification of certain 
socio-political practices as norms results in grids of intelligibility that define "the parameters 
Hence our constitution must "be lett permanently open, permanently contested, permanently contingent, in 
order not to foreclose in advance future claims for inclusion" (Butler, 1995a, 41). 
of what will and will not appear within the domain of the social" as the recognized (Butler, 
2004, 42), Antigone brings into sensibility the unrecognizable excess—the enemy, the 
familiar as the stranger, incest, treason, civil disobedience, and other practices the absence of 
which normatively constitutes in negative terms and sets the limits to the community of 
sense.^'"' Killed by his own brother and exposed as the defeated enemy by his uncle, 
Polyneices too lives the life of the familiar and dies the death of a stranger still related to the 
familiar by the force of the social bond.^"' He embodies the stranger that the brother is, and 
the strangeness of our constitution that denies social bond to the unrecognizable excess 
constitutive of the community.^®^ 
Antigone inherits the strangeness trom her brother, and from the constitution of her 
society. A fragile social bond links the body that Polyneices was to that of Antigone who 
demands recognition for her brother and for herself; he is my flesh and blood, she offers by 
way of explanation, as she takes the place of Polyneices in a social death that renders her an 
ambivalent link in a chain of representations. Her body becomes its metonymic proxy, the 
representation of the unrepresentable excess. She in Polyneices" place demands recognition 
as a citizen whose address must be heard as if voiced by the law-giver. Although she 
becomes a stranger to her family, her society and herself, she dies in defence of a friture 
community that includes what it forecloses. But she continues to address us. Seeking an 
answer why Antigone failed to tip-toe this line of survival, 1 will relate the social bond to the 
co-presence of a promise and a threat in a troubling address of the future foreclosed by a 
strange past. 
My interest here is how the famihar, the familial, and the lawful are revealed to be also the strange, the 
stranger, and the contestable. 
The social bond is the ethical necessity to relate to others as if they are constitutive of the self 
Polyneices (who led an army to his home city) is the blood and flesh Antigone's, who is "closer yet in blood' 
to Creon who, as the law-maker, decrees that his dead body remain exposed in the battlefield to mark the 
boundaries of the community of the living. Yet his body, far from representing an external threat to the 
community that must (re-)constitute itself in opposition to it, becomes entangled in an aporetic relation of 
(in)visibility to the bodies it comes to be detached from by the norm. 
In other words, the aporia of recognition is transfigured here from recognition of 
identities into the promise and threat of socio-political transformation as two temporalities of 
the pohtical meet at the present of a shared Hfe; the strangers from the past who have always 
already constituted us and the strangers from the future (the unrecognized at the present) who 
will have always already constituted us address us. They both have a wish-to-live; they 
promise a shared life. They both survive outside their time; their origin, though obscure, 
refers to a past that has (never) been or defers to a future that has yet to be. They share a life 
at our present, within our shared life.^"' The obscurity of our troubled times (the present as 
the site of the conflict and dialectic between the past and the future) can be the answer to the 
aporia of the people where the emergency of the emergent lives is traced back to the 
emergency of the contingent authority of the past that constituted the socio-political world by 
an excess. The present appears as the obscure time where the norm can be found already 
included in a past that foreclosed the future that would have troubled it but it has a wish-to-
live: The foreclosed survive, just like 'the Jews' and the situation of the present continues to 
make a demand on us. If the present is politically promising precisely because of the conflict 
between the past and the fiiture, 'we ' ought to address the present situation by recognizing its 
demand, and addressing the past to the future. 
1 A. Strange Lives: Queering the Sovereign 'We ' 
In this section 1 will argue that the 'we ' is constituted by the strangers from the past that 
recognize us. Recognition for Butler is performative - 'done' through the same impersonal 
norms that identify and subjectify us, though those norms are lived in a tension, thus 
negotiated, challenged, affirmed, or subverted through the life of the subject that come into 
life after its body is placed in a shared life as somebody. Subjectification takes place before 
the appearance of the subject, through naturalised discourses that anticipate its birth into a 
socio-political world always already organized by categories that, through unmentioned 
To wit, the people are also the 'we ' and the 'me ' is also 'my character' ' I ' embody at the present. 
prohibitions, confer on us an identity as a part of the 'we.' Ahhough it enables one to think, 
feel, talk, act, and live as a responsible subject we recognize and respond to accordingly, one 
becomes a socio-political agent through this subjection that one is not responsible for: 
"Subjection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a discourse we never 
choose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency" (Butler, 1997a, 2). This 
dependency, I shall argue, is both subjection to strangers, and subjectification of ourselves as 
sovereign strangers, caught between an obscure past of the people we did not choose, and a 
fragile future we cannot respond to alone. 
7.1.1. The Strange Constitution of the Sovereign ' We' 
On the collective level, "sovereign" refers to the legal subject and the subject of legislation 
with juridical power, i.e., the state as the collectivity of subjects. One becomes sovereign and 
a part of the legally-demarcated 'we' through the address of the law that subjectifies; one is 
included into the society as a subject - with rights, duties, and a recognized identity -who can 
speak and act politically, take part in legislation and other political processes. The power 
invested in one as a viable sovereign subject who has the permission and capacity of political 
action is acquired from the addressor's sovereignty: the archived 'we' as defined in the 
Constitution as a representation that is substituted for the people and forecloses the socio-
political presence of others, mainly the foreign subjects, refugees, and the aporoi as strangers 
in their home country. The people are not equal to the 'we'; the latter also has an undecidable 
excess—strangers in and outside the country. 
On the individual level, "sovereign" refers to the one who can decide, choose, act and 
speak on one's own. Yet the constitutive address of the sovereign subject defers to others' 
decision, choices, norms and discourse that enable, regulate and limit the subject's 
sovereignty. The subject, in order to be part of the sovereign collectivity, needs to have 
recourse to others' power, norms and discourse that neither originate in one's self nor can be 
located in one 's self-understanding. The subject 's power to act and speak is derivative of the 
power of the collectivity that subjectifies one. This address of strangers, therefore, displaces 
subject and places its possibility conditions of action, speech, and understanding outside it— 
into a subjectless discourse and universal representations that one cannot recognize one 's 
character in. Having been constituted by strangers from whom one derives one 's sovereignty, 
the subject recognizes itself as a stranger in them as it also has a singular identity in excess of 
these universal representations. Thus one is not equal to the subject; the latter also has an 
undecidable excess—a strange character in opposition to the universality of norms of 
recognizability. 
Butler casts this lived conflict of recognition between the sovereign 'we ' and 
foreclosed others as the primary scene of continual subjectification of a body as somebody 
performatively where recognition as an address needs to cite the shared norms of recognition 
that articulates what is seen into what can be said about it. Just like the distribution of the 
sensible, the norms of identification define "the very meaning of what counts as a valued and 
valuable body in the world" (Butler, 1993, 22): it is an address that makes sense of the body, 
but the initial address of performativity that identifies, subjectifies and recognizes a body as 
somebody among us precedes the addressee and is done by strangers we learn to live with: 
the 'we. ' The doctor that genders the newborn initiates a chain of signification that both 
constitutes what it means to be a bodily subject and recognizes bodies by those norms but 
through our lives we are addressed by everyone who articulates our body as somebody. As 
"there is no recourse to a body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural 
meanings" (Butler, 1990, 8), this is a silent placement of the body into a figure of speech 
materialized by constitutive speech-acts, an indeterminate figure of speech deployable in 
political discourse (Ibid., 90-93), a phantasm that is body (Butler, 1993, 66). Being s o m e W > ' 
displaces the subject, exposes it^'" to others' address, gives it a life outside itself, inside the 
normative grid of recognition that structures a shared life. It gives the name of a stranger one 
becomes when addressed by strangers we are born amongst. 
The speech that addresses the silent body of the baby is thus very strange and the 
strangeness at stake is inherent in the temporality of norms of recognizability that have 
already identified forms of life; 1 shall argue that although these speech-acts tend to foreclose 
and delimit possibilities of response, they are open-ended and subject to re-iteration where 
the subject may have an effect on these representations. Butler maintains that lives are only 
recognized and legitimized to the extent that they can be represented as autonomous subjects 
by a signification (from others) that has already had materializing effects on our lives before 
we are born', i.e., discourses and other socio-political practices that affect and mark a body as 
real, intelligible and significant to the community (Butler, 1993, 14), without asking for our 
opinion, consent, or response. The heteronomous constitution of autonomous subjects is 
signification done in the before, in silence, by strangers, in our absence to recognize a body 
as somebody that we will already have become once addressed.^" These speech-acts 
constrain lives performatively in the sense that they construct and enforce the matter of 
community; i.e., practices they describe as forming a life intelligible to even others we never 
meet living under the similar material norms of the society (Ibid., 32). Through these norms, 
a body is materialized and recognized as somebody whose life matters as long as it acts, talks, 
feels, and lives like the stranger it is named as. But the 'we' is strange since its birth, or since 
we learn to talk: 
[SJpeaking is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through 
and as oneself, the melancholic reiteration of a language that one 
never chose, that one does not find as an instrument to be used, but 
that one is, as it were, used by, expropriated in, as the unstable and 
continuing condition of the "one" and the "we," the ambivalent 
condition of the power that binds. (Butler, 1993, 242) 
The subject is both 'one' and ' i t ' because it is a person as well as a representation. 
Hence the baby does always have tag in pinks, or blues picked from the archive of colours so that even 
strangers on the street can tell its gender and address it as a g i r l ^oy when they see its body without even talking. 
In other words the norms of recognizability are speech-acts with success conditions 
estabhshed by strangers in the past that formed the archive of possible identities that make up 
the 'we,' and one is addressed from the before to re-iterate words of ghostly strangers when 
one speaks, acts like them, perform their lives through and as one's own life. Strangeness of 
speech dissolves the materiality of the body political into material conditions of constitutive 
speech-acts that identify bodies as somebodies in our society. But why does one need to live 
the life of a stranger and what is the power of the norms of recognition? For Butler, one is 
attached to one's name and the identification that comes along with it as it gives one a life as 
a recognized subject in a shared life: "the subject is the effect of power in recoil" (Butler, 
1997, 6) and this is the illocutionary force that expresses the basic sociability we are 
subjected to, the excessive power of the addressor, the socio-political power of the 'we,' the 
promise of life/threat of death. Although the authoritative address that names could be 
subordinating as in 'You, slave!', one is identified with it because it promises and threatens, 
just like the enigmatic voice of the law that promises a shared life of love, friendship, and 
recognition and threatens with exclusion, violence, and actual or social death in Habermas' 
theory. By the power of this address one becomes the name one addresses oneself with: 
norms are not internalized, but re-iterated by an 7' that will already have become itself when 
it addresses in heteronomous terms and recognizes itself as a stranger that has a wish-to-live. 
A wish-to-live is an act of speech that negotiates the lived conflict between the 
universality of norms and singularity of the subject of the act. The norms may be unjust, 
authoritarian, oppressive, violent in their misrecognition of one's character, but one 
nevertheless needs to rely on them in order to critique, subvert, and change them. That is 
because the possibility of life as a subject is predicated on recognition by them, even in 
subjugating terms, as a viable subject in society; a shared life offers resources for its critical 
transformation by subjects who partly place themselves within, taking up its norms, and 
performing even subordinating identities subversively: Butler's example of resignification is 
that of the gay willingly embracing the name 'Queer.' Here, the wish-to-live mobilizes "the 
possibility of a repetition which does not consolidate that dissociated unity, the subject, but 
which proliferates effects which undermine the force of normalization" (1993, 93). Reliance 
on unjust norms that constitute and misrecognize one also implies acting and speaking in 
accordance with them, which nevertheless has the potentiality of subverting and transcending 
them. 
7.1.2. Re-Constitution by Strangers: Performative Re-Iteration 
The constitution and misrecognition by the oppressive law also give one the power to be a 
part of the 'we': a slave's life is better than being in a prison, being no one, being Wstawac\, 
or being dead.^'^ But more importantly, one becomes a self in a relation to others one 
loves/hates, responds to, and (dis-)identifies with. They are strangers that one does not choose 
to live with, but are addressed by in terms one does not sovereignly dictate, having been 
thrown in a shared life ruled by norms that precedes one's body performatively constituted, 
identified, recognized and animated as somebody by them. Benhabib, however, is convinced 
that Butler's theory of performativity "still presupposes a remarkably deterministic view of 
individuation and socialization processes which falls short of the currently available social-
scientific reflections on the subject" (1995a, 110: emphasis added). The heteronomous 
formation of subjectivities for Benhabib rules out universal ideals of autonomy, choice, self-
reflection and self-determination which are necessary resources for the emancipated life of 
the subordinated/excluded groups unthinkable without them (Benhabib, 1995b, 21). 
Against Benhabib, 1 argue that performativity does not imply a life whose trajectory is 
predetermined by the past of the norms since, "in living my life as a recognizable being, 1 live 
a vector of temporalities, one of which has my death as its terminus, but another of which 
One may and at times ought to choose death over life, but subjectification, to repeat, precedes the subject. 
Even in order to subvert, or overthrow one's misrecognition as a possible subject requires performing it. 
consists in the social and historical temporality of the norms by which my recognizability is 
established and maintained" (Butler, 2005, 35). The double embodiment of the 'we ' as the 
strange people that wish to live and a sovereign community that decides what is life and who 
gets to live what life, enables narration of a life lived under the restraint of norms that have a 
life of their own. This in turn is how others make sense of and respond to our life. But the 
relation between the addressor and the addressee is always troubled by a promise and a threat 
of strangers as we will see in the next section because the strange power of speech can bind, 
unbind and re-bind us. One 's life is thus lived in the historical scheme of making sense 
provided by the past of the representative norms of recognizability, but recognition works 
because it is misrecognition of the addressee: it relies on a sWent fantasy of the self as other, 
the child's imaginative identification with a stranger from the past that others tell her/him 
that s/he is. This shows that initial recognition is a failure as an absolutely binding, 
determining power of the sovereign addressor that subordinates, because it is precariously 
dependent on the child's performance as a stranger to him/herself as well as performativity 
of speech. For recognition to work, it must fail: "[i]t would have to be a recognition that fails 
to capture the other" in an identity (Butler, 2010, 85) by the binding power because it also 
unbinds the addressee from others s/he dis-identifies with by the address. 
Performativity does not simply boil down to repetition of words borrowed from 
sovereign strangers we owe our agency to: neither is 'being constituted" the same as 'being 
determined' (Butler, 1990, 182; 1995b, 46). All categories of sovereignty, i.e., subjectivity, 
agency and being some^xjcfy are thus performatively constituted by the very expressions that 
are said to be its results but the subject is not constituted once and for all by signification that 
constitutes the possibilities of agency and marks a life as lived autonomously.^'^ That is 
"because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that 
213 The moment one breaks with the norm of autonomy, paradoxically, requires autonomy of a heteronomously 
constituted subject that submits oneself to the norm of others. The ' se l f of the 'self-rule' becomes an other to 
itself in change. 
both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of the 
substantializing effects" (Butler. 1993, 185; emphases added) that constitute and recognize a 
body as somebody.^'"' Because -'historicity of norms" underlies the performativity of the act 
(Butler, 1993, 140), unless the historical authority invested in the signification that serves as 
the universal norm is invoked in marking a body as somebody and giving an account of a life, 
it will be immaterial.^'' 
When the norms are unjust, they need to be taken by the subject jeopardizing its own 
being (or coherent identity), submitting itself to the norm one disrupts by what Butler names 
"the art of voluntary insubordination" (2001b, 12). Given that a life not recognized and 
situated within the greater context of a shared life would amount to a social death, the norms 
of the past foil the claims to autonomy in their universality that offers a choice between death 
and survival through an attachment to the normative domination, subordination, violence and 
inequality. In other words, living a life of one's own entails appropriating and practicing the 
historical authority of social norms one did not author: it is living the life of a stranger we 
cannot be responsible for, not of the sovereign subject that can control the response to the 
life-giving address. The agency turns out to be the power of past norms that one acts as the 
agent of And if this power subordinates, excludes, silences, effaces and reduces some-body 
to no-body, this power can be turned against itself by re-iteration because the sovereign 
addressor is a stranger that could be any-body: the sovereign, being (the excess outside) the 
norm, can (un)make the norm, just like the 'founding fathers' of our constitution. Civil 
disobedience in fact discloses how precariously the norm binds us. 
Butler, in this passage, in fact refers to and subverts exactly what Habermas registers by the performative 
attitude towards norms (Habermas, 1996, 488): agency as being somebody is the self-fUlfilling belief that the 
life provided by norms must be lived 'out of respect' for the law that rules a shared life as one 's own life lived 
by one's own norms. 
A life unrecognized by the norm will be insignificant, unintelligible, unmarked and not affected and 
responded to as a part of the shared life that has a recourse to its historical norms of intelligibility to recognize it 
as a life. 
For Butler, sovereignty limited to strange figures from the past needs rearticulation in 
socio-political material conditions of the 'we ' that historically change by "queer re-
signification of the symbolic to expand and alter the normativity of its terms" that makes 
visible our strangeness (Butler, 1993, 111).^'^ 'Queer ' is the name of some strange, enigmatic 
bodies that challenge the present norms of intelligibility from its limits that conceal its 
strangeness: a queer body is unperformable in a shared life at the present, because the norms 
of speech-acts that articulate bodies into somebodies operate on the exclusive base of 
heteronormativity. A body which is neither 'man ' nor 'woman' is excessive—it is nobody as 
it cannot be identified with anybody in the archive of the strangers from the past. The 
strangeness of our constitution by strangers in the past is thus again, Butler claims, both a 
condition of and limitation to our bodies being performed and recognized as somebody. Yet, 
although it gives us a life and recognition as a stranger, some strangers are excluded and 
recognized to be outside these limits of a shared life of responsiveness and affection as their 
bodies and ways of life contest the authority of norms that constitute those limits. The queer 
embody a foreclosure of the power of the socio-political that also materializes "a set of 
disavowed attachments or identifications that constitute a different domain of the 
'unperformable, '" (Ibid., 235), not unrecognizable, but unlivable. 
Our aporia is thus not about contestation of the subordinated/excluded groups to have 
their identity recognized autonomously, in terms they dictate, and place it in the archive of 
identities that make up the sovereign 'we. ' It is to disclose the strangeness, fragility and 
subvertibility of enigmatic terms of recognition to re-constitute a community that shares its 
life with anybody that could be both a silent stranger and sovereign. Therefore the 'queer ' 
does not only name a strange some body that defies hetero-normative articulation of bodies 
and demands recognition. As the next chapter elaborates, it is also an enigmatic mode of 
And it could be re-signified because 'sovereign' is an empty signifier of a stranger that can be filled by any 
body. 
living together promised through the exposure of our strangeness inherited from an obscure 
past, "hs meanings [also] include," Butler adds, "of obscure origin.. ." (Ibid., 176). The 
obscurity of this origin that we all share makes the 'we ' queer too as the enigmatic address 
that makes us what we are has an obscure origin: the addresser finds its expression in the 
undecidability between the sovereign and a stranger. This stranger opens up, Butler says, "a 
difficult fiiture terrain of community, one in which the hope of ever fully recognizing oneself 
in the terms by which one signifies is sure to be disappointed" (Ibid., 142) .Our queemess is 
revealed by the aporetic visibility of a hybrid body that cannot be made sense of at the 
present by our norms of recognizability as somebody: it has an obscure origin and future 
since it is constituted by strangers but not determined by the sovereign 'we ' . It is thus a threat 
to our present since its being nobody signifies the possible failure of the constitutive address 
that recognizes us only as somebody from the archive of identities with an obscure origin. But 
it also embodies a promise and a hint to 'the subordinated/excluded groups': that the power 
of the 'we' so precariously constituted to grant or refuse recognition depends on our 
performance as strangers to ourselves and performativity of identities. To put it another way, 
the power of the 'we" does not depend on sovereignly dictating the terms of our recognition 
as somebody with an identity, it depends on revealing how strangely and precariously 
constituted we all are. 
To summarize, the aporia of recognition is irreducible to identity politics of radical 
difference and stable identities offering their visibility to the classifying, and recognizing 
gaze of strangers irom the past. The queer body addresses us in enigmatic terms, not to its 
identity, but to the failure of their address as sovereign speech: norms of recognition that fails 
to bind and conceal our strangeness. This is a loss of the identity of the sovereign as the queer 
body of the people still seeks its meaning, identity, and representation through speech beyond 
the past, beyond our control, and beyond the recognized forms of shared life. Yet this loss is 
paradoxically the condition of our sovereignty as the people where anybody could 
appropriate the language of law and address us. Speech, constitutive address, speech-act of 
recognition are all re-iterative, Butler emphasizes, because speech is basically melancholic. 
The next section brings together melancholic identifications which poses against the strangers 
from the past that survives, the lost other that survives death in life. 
7.2. Strange Surx'ivals, Strange Ghosts, Strange Words: Hauntology 
1 argued that, for Butler, the norms of our lives have a past we have never lived but are asked 
to live as and through our own pasts. More strangely, we are addressed by ghosts from the 
past, in the sense that successful conditions of speech-acts that constitute, identity and 
recognize our bodies as somebodies whose lives matter in a shared life at present, are 
established in a bygone life, by dead strangers with obscure origins. Our presence and present 
are thus "already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds [one's] own capacities for 
narration" (Butler, 2005, 8).One cannot be quite rationally responsible for one's life, but one 
may nevertheless respond to it critically. As these norms constitute society as an archive of 
identities that form the 'we" peopled with ghosts, Butler's approach is not an ontology, but 
hauntology: our lives are addressed, constituted and recognized by an undead representation 
of the 'we' that we perform and become when we respond to the enigmatic address of ghosts 
who have a wish-to-live beyond their time. ^'^Their speech survives the past, transformed into 
the ways of speaking, acting, living and being that form the material conditions of a shared 
life limited by a social temporality that does not start or end with our lives. 
7.2.1. Survival of the Stranger within and among Us 
The past of the people survives through performance of strangers whose lives we are asked to 
repeat, identifying with them, silently responding to their enigmatic call which we do not 
They have a wish-to-live because they form the conditions under which we still, at present, live. They 
survive the past and become our present. 
even hear, and re-iterating their words when we speak. Their address is silent, but formative, 
performative and hmiting. Formation is limitation, appearing within a field normatively 
restrained, as Ranciere and Butler argued. And the field of representation is an already 
circumscribed context of discourse that delimits the sensible from insensible; the formative 
power of their speech also serves as a prohibition, a foreclosing injunction, a bar that renders 
some words unspeakable, some bodies unrecognizable nobodies, some subject-positions 
unacceptable, and some lives unlivable. 
Whether foreclosure is tantamount to exclusion, however, is a question that needs to 
be foregrounded against the survival of what is excluded fi-om /foreclosed in a shared life. 
Butler insists that just like the ghosts of the sovereign 'we ' that still trouble our present, their 
excluded presence haunts the people because it is included into discourse as its 
unacknowledged norm that circumscribes the domain of the sayable, recognizable, and 
livable from within. Thus in Butler's account of the unspeakable, the subject of speech enters 
into the normativity of language through a strange prohibition (Butler, 1997, 114-121) that 
both enables and limits life by an unacknowledged debt, melancholic attachment, and 
response to the other that nevertheless survives in a shared life it is excluded from. And the 
unsayable debt enables the insidious constitution of the sovereign, i.e., self-sufficient, 
autonomous 'we' that survives by concealing its unacknowledged response to a ghostly 
stranger. 
Thus the unsayable is the "apprehension"^'^ of the un-present other within us which 
the present 'we ' owe our life to. These are both the ghosts fi-om the past, and ghosts from the 
future that live unlivable lives outside the public, in the darkness of the private. Butler 
believes that the line that separates the "I" from a "not-l," the self from its foreclosed other. 
"Apprehension" is a form of recognition laden with the awareness of a threat/promise Butler elaborates on it 
as "marking, registering, acknowledging without full cognition" and "[i]f it is a form of knowing it is bound up 
with sensing and perceiving, but in ways that are not always ^ r not yet— conceptual forms of knowledge" 
(2009b, 5). Apprehension entails sensing and acknowledging what is unrecognizable by the norms and 
acknowledging the presence of those rendered absent by the norms of recognizability (Ibid) 
the presence from absence and the production of a hfe that survives the formative prohibition, 
is the limit concept of the social the queer embody. In her rendering, the prohibitive bar takes 
on the character of a productive constrain on the discourse that forms the subject as a 
coherent, stable, identifiable body viable in a shared life. In Excitable Speech she turns her 
critical gaze to censorship as an attempt to constitute the public domain of the sayable and 
consummate the possibilities of signifying the body. "[U]nspeakability as the condition of 
subject formation" (1997, 135) sets the background against which hegemonic representations 
structure the intelligibility of the body as a viable identity.^'^ 
What is investigated in Butler's corpus is thus the address and apprehension of this 
enigmatic remnant which survives as a ghostly presence that can only be represented in its 
absence. And of particular concern to her, in this account, is how our presence acquires a 
socio-political representation within a normative matrix of discourses that produces zones of 
unrepresentability, unrecognizability, unliveability, and ungrievability. The enigmatic excess, 
for Butler, is predicated on a loss in the past, in the before, that still holds a grip on the 
present, a prohibition of the law that, for its own survival, needs to maintain the insensibility 
of the always-already-excluded from the shared life. In her rendering of the unrepresentable 
excess, Butler tracks down an almost illegible trace of an 'ungrievable loss' during the 
address identifying the subject in relation to an unacknowledged otherness produced by the 
law. The alterity at stake both gravitates toward and finds its language in the distance to a loss 
the subject cannot own up to and hence mourn. Although the subject becomes intelligible and 
viable through what it dis-identifies with, it nevertheless understands itself as the negation of 
the prohibited identity: "a radical refijsal to identify with a given position suggests that on 
some level an identification has already taken place, an identification that is made and 
And it also produces what Lyotard called a 'waste product' of unrepresentability (Lyotard, 1990a, 85-93) 
that serves as the exclusive norm from within the representable. 
disavowed, a disavowed identification whose symptomatic appearance is the insistence on, 
the overdetermination of, the identification by which gay and lesbian subjects come to signify 
in pubhc discourse" (Butler, 1993, 113). The unrepresentable signifying 'not-me' thus 
survives and provides the foil against which the subject can represent itself negatively, along 
the visible/sayable limits of normalisation structured by the prohibition. It is the lack of those 
whose presence must remain, by the norm, unacknowledged in the background of the 
conditions under which the subject appears and lives. As a loss the subject cannot admit 
having suffered, the unrepresentable is disinvested of a recognizable presence in what makes 
the subject what it is, but the covering up of a troubling trace paradoxically leads to a 
melancholic investment in and an attachment to the loss that secures its identity. 
The differential norms of having a socio-political presence, i.e., identifications, are 
transferred to the emergent subject by significant others who already embody them, and who, 
in nurturing, enabling, making demands, and providing enigmatic figures of desire one can 
nevertheless identify with, deploy affective channels, mobilizing the child's both bodily and 
affective dependence on them, through which an attachment introduces him/her into a 
collective life."" That "no subject emerges without a passionate attachment to those on whom 
he or she is fundamentally dependent" (1999, 7) suggests that the vulnerable subject-to-be in 
fact of^en sur-vives in its denial of the groundless prohibition that places it in an inhabitable 
zone of the socio-political.^^' 
The unrepresentable operates within normativity "as an indispensable interior exclusion - a n outside which is 
inside mteriority making the articulation of the latter possible, a transgression of the border which is necessary 
to constitute the border as such" (Fuss, 1991, 3). 
That is because the trajectory of its socio-political life is dependent upon the precarious life of a normative 
discourse expected to go beyond (sur-) it, in its mythical past and uncertain future. "The act [of subjectificatlon] 
'works ' in part because of the citational dimension of the speech-act, the historicity of convention that exceeds 
and enables the moment of its enunciation" (Butler, 1997b, 33) 
7.3. Survival as a Poetic Struggle over Life: Performative Re-Iteration 
The historical endurance of the normalized subjects is also coextensive with the opening up 
of uninhabitable zones of life where others are rendered nameless and ftitureless. Our survival 
may depend on being named, but the marking of a body either as 'boy' or as 'girl' denies a 
name to those who are neither. The primary desire to survive in a shared life is negotiated by 
the queer within the space allowed by the binary and exclusive imperative that "enables 
certain sexed identifications and forecloses and/or disavows other identifications. This 
exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production 
of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet 'subjects,' but who form the constitutive 
outside to the domain of the subject" (Butler, 1993, 3). "This raises the question of how it is 
that [a norm] secures the conditions of intelligibility by which life becomes livable, by which 
life also becomes condemned and foreclosed" (Butler, 2000, 23). She suggests that the norm 
secures the survival of the foreclosed excess through melancholic attachment to and 
identification with its loss. 
In the last section 1 discussed the intelligibility of lives in their material, bodily aspect 
in social relations.^^^ Indeed one only becomes an autonomous subject by re-enacting and 
"re-experiencing ... a set of meanings already socially established" (Butler, 1990, 140). 
Performativity here is defined as "a stylized repetition of acts" that (de)stabilizes the semantic 
relation between the body and its socio-political reception, its action and others' response to 
it by the temporal grammar and vocabulary of subjectivity established in the past. When this 
semantic relation between what is seen and what is said/done is broken, we do not make 
sense. In other words, a performative contradiction occurs between the visible and the 
"[I]f certain constructions appear constitutive," Butler underscores, "bodies only appear, only endure, only 
live within the productive constraints of certain ... regulatory schemas" that represent us as a part of the lived 
relations (Butler, 1993, xi) 
sayable that undoes the subjects of speech. Butler's earlier works^^' suggest this momentary 
gap between the two as a possibility to address the melancholic loss and re-signify a queer 
body as somebody we can respond to as if one of us in a shared life: since 'the sovereign' is 
an empty signifier of a stranger, she assumes, one needs a disruption in the signification 
practices to fill it with another body?^" The demand is performed as a struggle over life, its 
liveability and performative re-articulation of the norms that regulate it. For Butler, "the 'we' 
does not, and cannot, recognize itself, that it is riven from the start, interrupted by alterity ... 
and the obligations 'we' have are precisely those that disrupt any established notion of the 
'we'" (2009, 14). The aporoi thus lay a claim on the 'we' as its equal members who can 
(un)make the law. They re-signify themselves as a part of the society, equal to others. The 
subversive re-iterations of the set of meanings disrupts the lived relations of the 'we' that, 
through fantasies of absolute sovereignty, refuses to seek the norm in the presence and 
demand of subordinated and misrecognized others. The disruption that "queers" the subjects 
could be performed in sensible or discursive terms, as a disagreement, or the visual shock of a 
queer body. 
An interruption in the re-iteration of lives indeed exposes the strangeness and 
precariousness of our constitution, but can it expose it as a loss? Can the addressed respond to 
nonsense as if it is the law that will have formed a new community once responded? "What 
are the conditions under which we find that we are responsive to other human beings," Butler 
asks, "[bjecoming responsive— seeing or sensing suffering, responding to it?" (2003b, 103). 
During a performative contradiction one's body dis-identifies with someone from the 'we' 
that one is and loses its viability as some-body among us; it becomes queer. Ranciere's 
framework assumes that at the moment of dis-identification one excludes oneselfftom the 
Cf. her Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity, 1990, 57-60; Bodies That Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of Sex,' \993, 65, 232-2i5 • Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection 1999 93 132-
142. . . . 
" " The sovereign is one, being (outside) the law, (un)makes the law and if domination of the 'we ' is the lived 
norm of the society, the aporoi make a claim to the sovereignty that disrupts and aims to unmake it. 
present community of the sensible and becomes a silent presence offering itself to our poetic 
gaze. Earlier Butler casts this moment as a poetic struggle over life', an address of a life lost to 
a shared life that foreclosed its being lived wants to re-articulate what it means to live 
together in inclusive, equal terms. At this critical moment of loss, the wish-to-live of the 
sovereign strangers from the past and the wish-to-live of the ghostly stranger battle and 
everything hangs by the illocutionary forces of two addresses, one fi-om the past and one from 
the future. 
Butler's Antigone in fact aims to bring home how the foreclosed other can lose the 
battle of life she has never lived to begin with, but still haunts our life and demands a 
response. Antigone enacts the undecidability between the stranger and the sovereign, 
appropriates the language of law, does everything in her power to re-articulate her body as a 
patriarch, demands another community where enemies are recognized as citizens that deserve 
burial, but she failsP^ She mistakenly takes her addressee Creon, whereas the stranger from 
the past that constituted her responseless is Oedipus/Polyneices, the ones she was 
passionately attached to and kept her from having a life of her own. Yet I argue Antigone 
dies as she does not take into account the temporality of recognition, and although she died, 
we, just like Butler and countless others before her, respond to her here so she survives as an 
addressor. 
13.1. A Stranger Who Does (not) Survive: Antigone Antagonizing the People 
So far 1 have argued that the other in Butler's theory is a foreclosed and troubling remnant of 
the constitutive address, internalized into the self in recoil as a disavowed absence; an 
unmoumable loss. In Butler's parable of gender melancholy, what she terms 'foreclosure' 
operates, first, via the ambivalent signification of a demand of love by the same-sexed parent 
She fails because, Ranciere would argue, her response to her dead brother is ethical and she was enslaved to 
the Other, Polyneices who silently calls her. 
whose body as a signifier the child is expected to lose as an object of desire but retain as a 
figure of identification paradoxically considering that desire functions as a force offdis-
)identification. Butler transposes as a gender-formation process Freud's arguments in 
"Melancholia and Mourning" where he suggests that "in the experience of losing another 
human being whom one has loved ... the ego is said to incorporate that other into the very 
structure of the ego, taking on attributes of the other, and 'sustaining' the other through 
magical acts of imitation" (Butler. 1990, 57). In Freud's account of the primary scene of 
gendering where the child repudiates the desirous attachment to the same-sex parent s/he then 
again needs to mimic and represent in action, bodily demeanour, and gender orientation, the 
loss of desire as the force of identification is at once experienced, overcome and re-
established as the child submits his/her disavowed desire to the heteronormative gesture that 
doubles and covers over the amorous presence of the denied identity in the representative 
point of reference for his/her future. The child becomes a gendered subject insofar as s/he 
desires the negation of his/her desire for the same-sex parent as a loss that lingers in its 
unrepresentability. 
Yet the primary prohibition against same-sexuality also eroticizes what is denied in 
the sense that the child is consigned to the desire of being the same sex of the parent s/he can 
never love, or admit to loving passionately. As "gender identification is a kind of melancholia 
in which the sex of the prohibited object is internalized as a prohibition" (Ibid., 63), the desire 
at stake should not only be prohibited, but also unspeakable for the efficacy of the prohibition 
that represents the self in mimetic relation to other: "Mimesis within melancholia performs 
this activity as the incorporation of the other 'into the ego.' This is an effort to preserve the 
other and at the same time to dissimulate aggression toward the other" (Butler, 1997, 189-
90), a strange, aporetic constitution by identification which is also a dis-identification. This is 
the same relation to the other understood as the ambivalent bond of re-iteration between the 
queer one and the 'we'; the foreclosed others and the self of the people. 
7.3.2. Antigone's Present 
Living in the "unstable and continuing condition of the 'one' and the 'we'," Butler argued, 
the people inhabit an uncertain space-time of those speech-acts blurring the demarcations 
between those bound by the power of the social bond; they do not take place in the isolated 
moment and context of their first utterance by the 'one' but are always re-interpreted via a 
chain of reiterations of an anonymous, controversial 'we' troubled with the foreclosed other 
that in its hostility and solidarity, its past and future take up, reform and deform all the past, 
present and unforeseen fiiture meanings of the shared words. Yet our debt to strangers 
remains unsayable for the fantasy of sovereignty in speech to be efficient. The 'excitability' 
of speech, the address given under the stressful bond of the people, or "the condensation of 
iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions" (Butler, 1997, 14) however stretches over 
"the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects . . . [and] begins a theory of 
linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relentless search for legal remedy" (Ibid., 
41). In analysing the speech-act performed by Antigone, Butler notes "how her language, 
paradoxically, most closely approximates Creon's, the language of sovereign authority and 
action" (2000, 6). Antigone, at her present not a citizen with a right to speak but a 
subordinated subject, an insider to the community but outsider to the politics of the public 
sphere, nevertheless speaks, and in speaking the language of law "her speech exceeds the law 
that governs acceptable speech" (Butler, 2000, 9). Antigone disrupts the normative 
distribution of the sayable of the present. She enacts her identity as the (un)representable 
'one' that forms the limit to archived identities. She invokes the words of the 'we' 
(mis)appropriated by virtue of re-iteration that places discourse outside any identity's control. 
The undecidability of the future effects of speech, uttered by emergent subjects 
unanticipated by the archive, in communities always uncertain of its boundaries, at once both 
exposes and disrupts the representative limits that coincide with the normative restrictions on 
pohtical presence that stabilize the community through security by the norms of the archive 
of the sovereign. We feel secure knowing who is seen as one of us, who we are, who we are 
to respond to (and in what way), and where the boundaries of the self end and otherness 
begins. Antigone's (un)representability operates within this normative scheme as the 
foreclosed other that troubles us from the border, making us insecure at our place as the 
sovereign. Assuming the voice of the 'we, ' and citing the conventions that give words a 
normative power to constitute the addressor as well as the addressee as parts of a community, 
Antigone as a part of the aporoi does more than call into question the exclusion that 
characterizes "the sphere of laws and norms that govern the accession to speech and 
speakability" (Butler, 2000, 2). Speaking out of place and turn, neither outside nor inside the 
community, she shatters the space-time of the ethico-political, making visible an emergent 
presence that is at the present unrecognized by the norms of the past. She asserts the outside 
whence she speaks as a risky opening to others whose presence does not count as real inside a 
contentious community, "a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is 
perpetually in the process of being overcome" (Butler, 1993, 53). 
Antigone's performance indeed relies on the formative power of speech to re-form 
what was already 'typified' and put to its place in the archive in Ranciere's terms. But it also 
makes clear the people need "[t] he ability to narrate ourselves not from the first person 
alone, but from, say, the position of the third, or to receive an account delivered in the 
second" (Butler, 2002, 60); Antigone struggles with the ontological story of the ethico-
political life told by ' them': the strangers from the past ruling over her present. The 
unspeakability of her desire for her brother, the queemess of her status, her extra-legal 
character makes her present unlivable within the existing material conditions of the 'we.' The 
norm, Butler implies, "might be understood as a certain kind of tomb that does not precisely 
extinguish that which nevertheless remains living and trapped within its terms, a site where 
Antigone, already half-dead within the intelligible, is bound not to survive" (2000, 44). 
7.3.3. Antigone's Future 
Antigone's feet slipped over the aporetic line of survival, but why? Could it be that her 
attachment to a ghost drove her response into silence before the living, another subordination, 
and death? Was she dis-identifying with a patriarch who was not her father only to identify 
with the sovereign other that rules her heart, body, desire and life? Berlant, for instance, reads 
passionate attachments in reverse, as an impulse to repeat the very forms of life of significant 
others with insignificant lives we emotionally identify with, adopt an aspirational normalcy 
as we need love, solidarity, a feeling of belonging to, and a fantasy of intimacy we demand 
from others (2007, 277-78): the subordinated/excluded "do this in gestures that try to force a 
sense of obligation in someone, which will just have to stand in as the achievement of their 
desire for acknowledgment and a way of life" (Ibid., 288). For Berlant, the fantasy of 
passionate attachment actually imprisons the attached into the past of normativity that 
encroaches on the present, because the address of the attached is to curry recognition from 
those present in a shared life constituted by the past, to feel normal, desired, loved, and 
accepted by the sovereign strangers who made the 'we' what it is. Stuck in 'the time of 
survival,' the child has no future, or life of her/his own, and hence cannot survive if s/he 
cannot disavow passionate attachments that work by "the transmission of fantasy as an 
inheritance of an impossible life" (Ibid., 299) their parents lived. S/he, the child of an abject 
family, was always already lost if s/he was subjectified through an attachment and loving 
response to an already lost life unrecognized as a 'bad' life. The child is thus enslaved to a 
stranger whose life s/he lives in his/her attachment. 
Jenkins, however, argues that an attachment to the foreclosed other cannot be reduced 
to an emotional response that re-affirms the present norms in simple mimicry, and reproduces 
the same material conditions of unliveable, ungrievable lives inside a shared life. What 
counts as a livable life 'retains integrity on existing terms only by foreclosing the response' 
that would disintegrate the self of the community that refuses to see unliveable lives as lives 
to begin with (2009, 69) and reveal this unrecognized loss as integral to its constitution that 
recognizes certain lives one ought to attach to. Our ability to have emotions at the sight of a 
loss is in fact constructed by the norms of recognition that re-articulate and recognize what is 
seen', they tell us what is to be seen as a loss, and what is a waste product. The foreclosed 
other is foreclosed exactly because it is not seen as a lost life by "conservative investments in 
a certain narrative of its meaning" {Ibid. 72). Again, a life is not lost if it is not the life of a 
body recognized and responded to as somebody among us subject to the same norms of 
meaning. 
It is Antigone's insensible attachment Xo insidious invisibility, hideous unlovability, 
wretched unliveability and queerness that troubled her community's norms of recognition 
that structured its narrative as a way of life lived by the identities in the archive. Polyneices 
was a waste product of war in this story necessary for the security of community, an abject 
body of an enemy left for clarion birds, worse than nobody as a traitor who disavowed his 
attachment to the family (Creon was his uncle), and his loyalty to the city. Calling others to 
see this waste as a loss by antagonism is not the emotional call of solidarity from the meek 
that seek recognition, love, visibility, and audibility from those present in the community, but 
a promising threat of the queer to their constitutive story that others respond to with fear, 
anxiety, and apprehension (Ibid., 71). It is an insensible call oi transformation by the 
unrecognizable loss that suddenly appear as a loss of their sovereignty to recognize only 
certain bodies as somebodies whose lives matter to the community. Those dead in a shared 
life, and queer attachments thus can always trouble us, because they disclose how fragile the 
meaning of our lives is. 
Antigone died because she did not make sense in this historical story; it was 
impossible for anybody in her present community to emotionally identify with her. Her 
strange emotions for the enemy brother, Butler notes (2000, 23), were exactly the 
unrecognizable limit to the passionate attachments and mimicry of life that sustained the 
Greek community constituted by foreclosure of incest, disloyalty and treason: Butler notes 
her symbolic position was "the social deformation of both idealized kinship [as the 
foundation of Greek society] and political sovereignty [as the foundation of Greek 
politics]..." (Ibid., 6). Antigone embodies the excess over the recognizable by the norms of 
her society. She brings this limit of unrecognizability into the public field of visibility by an 
ambivalent bond of antagonism and solidarity toward others who were 
enemy/lover/brother/sovereign, all estranged but already brought together in a shared life 
where lines amongst identities were disturbed (Ibid., 11). Berlant, in mistaking Antigone's 
address as a call for and expression of emotional identification with the subordinated other, 
overlooks the melancholies involved in this identification as "an effort to preserve the other 
and at the same time to dissimulate aggression toward the other" (Butler, 1997, 189-90). This 
is a strange identification that also dis-identifies. Rather than re-producing the community of 
the self, it undoes the relation between the self and others, threatening the set of identities 
materialized in their distinction to form a 'we. ' In my reading, Antigone's mimetic 
identification with Creon the sovereign only wished to undermine sovereignty. She called for 
solidarity with the fallen, disavowing the solidarity of her present that cannot see the enemy 
as one of them (Butler, 2000, 37). She loved her brother queerly enough to trouble her 
community, but also wanted to bury him to find closure with a foreclosed love in a symbolic 
act of aggression and dis-identification. She wanted to preserve the fantasy of unfilled. 
unarticulated, unrecognized, unconditional love while at the same time bury it in the tomb of 
the past that foreclosed her future life. She wanted to move on, stop grieving the ungrievable 
in a community of troubled conservatism and peaceful aggression toward the other we share 
a life with. 
What Butler suggests is not the ethics of sympathy that a nice story invokes in us. It is 
rather a response of the self to the other unrecognizable by norms that constitute the self 
Characterization of the foreclosed other and the estranged self as 'nice' is a category mistake. 
Both of them are promising and threatening in the scene of recognition. What Antigone did 
was enact the undecidability of love as a norm of identification and recognition that can 
always represent and conceal an aggression, exclusion, and violence toward others we attach 
to and recognize as one of us; this exclusion enables both identification and dis-identification 
with the other through a risky, precarious, ambivalent bond. To see her mourning simply as 
an depoliticized act of compassion toward the loss internalized into the self through 
emotional mimicry, parodies the necessary political labour of antagonism to expose and 
recognize it as a loss that cannot be owned up to by the self in recoil at the present (Butler, 
1990, 63); /br as soon as Antigone owned up to it she wished to disown it. Hers was a risky 
fight she could not win against others as well as against herself until those norms of 
lovability, identifiability and recognizability that constitute the self of the community (as well 
as herself), were changed by the political shock of what is revealed as unlovable, 
unrecognizable and ungrievable within us (Butler, 1999, 121; 2000, 79-80; 2004b, 31; 2009, 
4). 
As Jenkins suggests, "the ungrievable life is to be located within a question of social 
transformation that criticises a certain refusal of sociality" (2009, 75), a sociality that both 
conditions and limits our lives with a loss. Antigone lost (her brother/lover/sovereign/her life 
that she never had) but so did Creon, and his community; they lost the promise that cannot be 
separated from the threat Antigone embodied towards sovereignty. The promise is to be 
untroubled in a shared life, peace with the other that has been troubhng us in its antagonism. 
So did Antigone survive? No, but that does not mean she lost the fight and her address was 
lost forever. Speaking for her turns out to be predicated on the socio-political conditions of 
being able to be heard; a political act that can be successful if the speech that performs it 
does not ring hollow to others in a shared life built thereby. And recognition fiinctions 
likewise with regard to the norms of recognizability; one is recognized if one is constituted to 
be recognizable by the norms of the community of sense. Antigone thus had to invoke the 
ethico-political forces that first constituted the conditions of sensibility in a shared, political 
life that disavows and reduces certain lives to silence but only to threaten the present 
community and promises a future society that has a wish-to-hear. 
Thus, contra Ranciere, Butler argues for the inherent ethical paradox of a speech-act 
that nevertheless adopts the norms it shows to be contingent. The contingent ground of 
authority to constitute the people, for Butler, is a wish to be heard in a shared life by what 
will have been constituted as the subject of the political. Yet she takes into consideration the 
wish-to-live in a shared world which the controversial norms still have a hold on. A shared 
life of the people, for Antigone, is not "simply a situation she is in but a set of practices that 
she also performs, relations that are reinstituted in time precisely through the practice of their 
repetition" (Butler, 2000, 58). Since the founding act of these relations must be continuously 
cited even to debate them, Antigone had to situate itself in the present. However, in repeating 
the constitutive speech-act, she lays a claim to the authority to refer to an ethico-political 
world yet to exist, & future shared life entombed within the present she has to live within. 
Antigone seems to have failed. She was not heard because her becoming politically 
sensible, i.e. visible, audible and recognizable, was belated. It was motivated by and against 
the present speech of Creon, not by the prophecy of the authority figure in the more distant 
past where her father, Oedipus, had already wished that she had not been bom (anti-gone as 
in anti-descent), would not give birth to children {anti-gone as in anti-womb) and finally 
generate no future (anti-gone as in anti-generation) at all. Although in Butler's reading 
Oedipus is indiscernible from Polyneices whom I argue that she {dis-)identifies with, she 
does not disavow the birth name given by him. In sum, Antigone did not have a past or a 
future from the start, was not socio-politically alive, living a shared life, but led a life made 
unliveable by a self-ftilfilling prophecy. Within the political world set up by the founding 
speech-act of the fathers, she finds herself implicated in prophetic words she has but already 
taken up, acted on and realized in action, living an unlivable life (Butler, 2000, 22-25). 
Between the 'has-been' and 'will-have-been' lies her (un)representable present she 
regrettably attempts to unearth. But she does not consider her life's normative constitution in 
the past from which she should seek the norms of the fiiture community. 
Conclusion: Wish-to-Live Peacefiilly 
Butler's understanding of subjectification conceptualizes recognition as a silent semantic 
event that, preceding the birth of singular subjects, always already confer on them a political 
identity available in the archive of the 'we'. The law, for Butler, thus addresses the people in 
terms they cannot choose, creates hierarchies amongst the identities, subordinating some to 
others and in the most extreme cases forecloses some from taking a part in the constitution of 
the community. "Here a silence is walled up in the founding structure of the founding act," 
again (Derrida, 1992, 11) since the silence is about a prohibition, pro/i;6ere, "habit of the 
'before,'" an ungrounded norm of the past that authorizes and constitutes by foreclosing 
certain presences from a shared life of the recognizable. 
Although no one can evade the founding call that names, genders, identifies and 
renders recognizable as everyone needs to enact an identity in order to be politically present 
as one of us (i.e., have recognition, protection, rights and a meaningful place in the political), 
Butler argues this speech-act is the site of an ongoing debate. Its semantic character with 
open-ended future, and its contingent authority provides an opportunity for the un-
/misrecognized, or a threat for the re-constitution of the people in democratic terms. 
"Interpellation," Butler elaborates, "is an address that regularly misses its mark, it requires 
the recognition of an authority at the same time that it confers identity through [presumably] 
successfully compelling that recognition" (Butler, 1997, 33). Paradoxically the very authority 
that grants recognition first needs to be recognized as the credibility of a precarious 
prophecy that fulfilled itself with the promises of a shared life', the felicity of an act of speech 
is precarious, and not a given of the norms it is subjected to. It is similar to a self-fiilfilled 
prophecy regarding the future that comes true once 'we ' act as (/it refers to and obligates, 
subjectifies us. 
If the subject of politics comes into presence through speech-action that oscillates 
between the past that has (never) been and a risky future that might (never) be, the present is 
always laden with a "paradox of referentiality: namely, that we must refer to what does not 
yet exis t" (Butler, 1997, 4). And, as I argued, the limits to the present coincide with inter-
subjective norms of semantic operations that articulate what is seen into what is said about it. 
In order to understand the ethics of sayability and hearability, Butler proposes that the 
ontology should be replaced with hauntology, listening and responding to ghosts from two 
times of the people within the present. Antigone failed as the temporality peculiar to her 
wish-to-say ("will have been") made her an untimely political subject, unintelligible and 
unrecognizable to the address of the law that only understands the language of the 'has-been.' 
It constituted her identity as a silent part of those relations that govern the access to audibility 
as well as public speech and speakability. Just like Ranciere suggests, she silently 
appropriated the words that circulate without authorizing, but ended up agreeing with the 
authority of the norms of the past, instead of taking them up and acting on their 
undecidability. And, although she wished to say, her speech, dead and meaningless at her 
present, was not met with a wish-to-hear. She sadly did not take into account of the aporia of 
recognition as a conflict between the two temporalities. She could not negotiate the conflict 
within a present laden with the past towards a dis-foreclosed future. She did not choose, as 
Ranciere impHes, soHdarity over antagonism, the past over the future, the law of the 
community over the law of the people. She chose another dead stranger from her past -
Polyneices whom she had a passionate attachment to - over the future people she could have 
shared a life with; she was responding to a ghost's call of justice. But she too was a ghost in 
life. She never lived to start with, but even if she died her promising/troubling speech 
survived through millennia: Antigone died, just like the sovereign strangers fi-om the past 
who constituted our community with foreclosure, but their fight still haunts us. If the other is 
a foreclosed part of the self, it can only be killed by the suicide of the community that wants 
to secure itself against its troubling call, as in the examples I have taken in this thesis fi^om 
Nazi Germany. A community that does not have a wish-to-hear is not dead, but neither is it 
quite alive; it is seemingly untouchable like a sovereign ghost, but incapable of change, 
response, and a future life. 
So in asking "Will>'ou hear my story?," Antigone demands an ethical wish-to-hear 
the unsayable, i.e. what could not make sense by the political rationality of her time that 
condemns her to death in life and still haunts our present in its wish-to-live. 1 have argued 
that it will be heard when conservative narratives and norms of meaning that secure our 
sovereignty submit to demand for socio-political transformation to enable peace with the 
troubling/promising other in its insensibility. The next chapter asks how one can make peace 
with an other both threatening and promising and without doing violence to one's self or the 
other. 
Chapter 8. Conclusion: Wish-to-Hear 
The last chapter foregrounded that norms that recognize a life as a part of the shared life of 
responsiveness, visibility and audibility operate in tandem with a silent and silencing 
prohibition, an effaced and effacing foreclosure that recognizes some bodies only as no-
bodies. Through the grids of these norms we can only recognize familiar faces from our 
shared past; but when we meet a threatening stranger whose image is not constituted and 
marked as familiar, those norms are bound to fail. Butler argues that this is not an ontological 
limit that forever separates the self from the sublime other that cannot speak, or enslaves it to 
the sovereign other one can never respond to but with a yes; it is rather a semantic/ontic 
operation performed through norms and critiqued by a hauntology that investigates how 
ontologies are historically narrated, embodied, and lived at a cost. Hauntology aims to bring 
into visibility the ambivalent signature of anonymous others that, in marking our lives 
livable, respondable, visible and audible for others, both promises us lives we never live and 
threatens us with deaths we never die. Hauntology is thus not an ontology but a critical 
investigation of the differential ontologies historically operative in the present that mark and 
humanize some faces as familiar, recognizable, respondable 'archive' of subjects, and others 
as less, or not recognizable at all, misrecognizing, wronging, insulting, subordinating, 
effacing or killing them. 
If there is a possibility of deriving an ethics from hauntology, Butler suggests (2000, 
9), it can only be a historically contingent one derived from the conflictual situation of 
address that enables the appropriation of norms, not a morality with stable norms.^^"^ In this 
conclusion, I hope to consider Butler's critique of violence as the founding moments of law 
Disclosing and responding to less human faces does not promise the good life of a morality. Hauntology 
critiques norms that constitute lives without subscribing to a universal morality of stable rules that immobilize 
the people in a way of life. It is not either theology where the asymmetry between an unrepresentable God and 
human present before Him ontologically wrongs the latter and subjects it to an alienating law and the inequality 
of being the addressee that cannot disagree, though hauntology does provide reasons why others ontologized as 
such is seen to be deprived of a response when wronged by the law, and relies on a pre-ontological priority of 
being addressed by others that conditions the response. 
itself that limits life into unlivable lives. If the norm cannot be appropriated in a living way, a 
shared life loses its potential for socio-political transformation and openness to what is to 
come. Life is suffered as death in its repetitive compulsion where the present of the people is 
enforced to live a dead past. In eariier chapters I criticised Habermas for not giving enough 
theoretical space for potentiality for socio-political transformation. In Lyotard, 1 found the 
resource for political change in what comes before the law, a suffering other that addresses 
and obligates us. In Ranciere's thought, the people are defined by mob-ility, change, and 
movement. Here I will conclude my pursuit by turning to Butler who argues that re-iterating 
law through non-violent violence has a potential to bring about a democracy to come. 
Mine will also be an attempt to complement poetics with an ethics of power where the 
ethical force is flitural. 1 will bring the investigation into the temporality of politics to a 
conclusion, arguing that fiaturity and what is to come characterizes the basic temporal mode 
of socio-political life. A shared life is shaped by the force of obligating addresses that move 
us toward what is to come. Butler indeed aims to reveal the power inherent to the silent call 
of others exposed to the violence of a constitutive address that through differential ontologies 
condemns them to unlivable lives and undiable deaths. But she says this power should be 
seen as a power in recoil, a power that de-ontologizes the archive; it is; as a power turned 
against itself, a non-violent violence directed against the silent violence in the past, not the 
present lives of a people, or future lives of those not unrecognized. I will argue that the 
address is silent, imaginary, imaginative, and imaging. And if the ongoing violence is 
inherited historically, from a past re-lived as the present, the demand for a non-violent 
violence, Butler argues, is futural in its power, both re-iterating norms of the past against 
themselves, and forcing us to constitute a new community of a livable shared life. 
Ranciere's Althusserian framing of the recognizing address is between the identifying 
Police^^^ that ontologize and regulate lives and the anonymous wronged who live on the 
move, whereas in hauntology we are both the police and the wronged in our self-difference 
and wish-to-live within the regulated walls of the polis'. we are complicit in the violence 
norms exercise over the wronged through performativity of our selves, confirmative re-
iteration of and conformist attachment to a life structured and limited by those norms, unless 
we disavow a secure but impoverished life?^^ We respond to foreclosed others because they 
too can appropriate power of words that animate/kill, because the lives we never live and 
deaths we never die are at stake, because we may be violently affected by others we are 
exposed to, just like we may affect them with violence, because we are in trouble due to the 
ambivalent social bond of promise/threat, but, more importantly, because we have no other 
sustainable choice in a life shared by others. In the first section 1 shall follow Butler's reading 
of legal violence in order to suggest that normative violence is performed in temporal terms, 
through indifference to a particular situation of address and attempts of re-appropriating the 
norms in a living way. The past of the law is thus continually re-asserted as the present. In the 
second section 1 shall formulate what can be seen as the right response to the legal violence; 
here justice will be understood as a response to the co-temporaneity and co-presence of the 
particulars within the universal fi-ame, our dispersion in and outside it. Making visible the 
presence of the foreclosed others within the 'we,' responding to their suffering under the 
norms, and revealing their survival constitutes what Butler means by justice as a relation to 
others with whom we co-habit the world. In the third section I shall investigate the possibility 
conditions of responding to the obligating address of the suffering others within the same 
frame as the sovereign 'we.' I argue that, having a plurality and being a stranger to ourselves. 
When capitalized, the poHce refers to the general system that manages the sensible. 
^^ ^ We do not respond to the foreclosed other because we are good, nice, conscientious people with a bad 
conscience; or because we feel sorry about the 'mute,' dehumanized others the Police's norms wrong; or 
because we feel poetic before the silent other indifferent to our response. 
we are always on the threshold of being otherwise. The future of democracies thus relies on a 
wish-to-hear others as if their address comes from within us, within the plurality that 
constitutes "me" as a part of unidentifiable 'we.' 
8.1. Difference, Indifference, Violence: Of the Law 
Ranciere conceived a wrong to be irresponsiveness to the other as our equal; ontologically the 
Other is just a historically assumed position in the address that constitute the coordinates of 
sensibility, indifferent to the ontologizing forces. Although Butler agrees that the Other is 
historically produced by a regime of articulation, for her indifference belong to the wrong 
norms that constitute a shared life where certain lives are made unlivable by the violence of 
the differential and differentiating address: 
These norms are, as it were, indifferent to me, to my life and my 
death. Because norms emerge, transform, and persist according to a 
temporahty that is not the same as the temporahty of my Hfe, and 
because they also in some ways sustain my life in its intelligibility, the 
temporality of norms interrupts the time of my living. Paradoxically, it 
is this interruption, this disorientation of the perspective of my life, 
this instance of an indifference in sociality, that nevertheless sustains 
my living." (Butler, 2005, 35) 
These norms, 1 wgueA, force us to live a life that is not our own, or a life that in its obscure 
temporality is not a part of the present where it is considered to have no material force, no 
materialized effect, no visibility, no audibility. Indifference is not of the other's being, as 
Ranciere argued, but indeed of the speech-act: it is the wrong done by the semantic norm 
(rules of sensibility and making sense) to ourselves as well as others. The norm's "violence 
consists in part in its indifference to the social conditions under which a living appropriation 
[of the law] might become possible. If no living appropriation is possible, then it would seem 
to follow that the precept can be undergone only as a deathly thing, a suffering imposed from 
an indifferent outside at the expense of freedom and particularity" (Butler, 2005, 7). 
Indifference is the violent response of a ghostly sovereign that refuses to hear, see, and 
respond to the violence inherent to its foreclosing norm "that refuses to become past, and 
violence is the way in which it imposes itself upon the present" (Butler, Ibid.): the norm. 
when it cannot be appropriated to address the present situation by an act of speech, forecloses 
socio-political transformation with a violence that conceals the limits to our sensibility, i.e., 
the conditions under which the sovereign 'we' can be responsive to the suffering it causes. 
8.1.1.0/7 Violence: Temporality of Politics 
Reading Benjamin's critique of violence. On Violence, Butler furthers his "critique of legal 
violence, the kind of violence that the state wields through instating and maintaining the 
binding status that law exercises on its subjects" (2007, 205). The law first needs to be 
asserted, but as I argued drawing on Lyotard and contra Habermas, its justifying ground is 
what will already have been constituted by it if it is taken for and responded to as an address 
of authority. The constitution of a community of sense is contingent, i.e., the constitutive 
moment of the law's authority is not justified, and involves violence. In the third chapter I 
suggested that, as no authority was justified in and of itself, the address is felt as a violent 
force of speech threatening the sovereignty of those present before an undecidable figure of a 
stranger who can be a law-giver or a threatening enemy. In the last chapter 1 described how 
Butler suggested the violence of the law lies in its strange spatio-temporality of a mythical 
past where we were always already addressed, constituted, identified, and recognized by 
strangers as somebody within the archive. This corresponds to Benjamin's understanding of 
'law-instating' violence as the address of the law is constitutive of the 'we,' the rules of 
sensibility, and a community of sense, and it silently coerces us to be the 'we' as all lives are 
dependent on shared, material conditions of living-together. Yet in her exposition of re-
iteration, Butler also implied the law must be continuously re-stated, re-confirmed, re-
embodied and re-performed. The law's binding and coercive authority is thus maintained and 
perpetuated by the norms of speech-acts that make a universal claim to regulate what counts 
as a good performance of life, and in Ranciere's terms, what makes sense, what is a 
I identify violence with the unjustifiable, not simply with asymmetrical power, or domination which is 
historically embedded and has its conditions of emergence. 
responsible thing to feel, say, do and be, and what is sensible: and that is parallel to what 
Benjamin terms as 'law-preserving' violence as it is the constant policing by norms of 
sensibility that regulate identities making up the subjects of the law. 
The second distinction in Benjamin's text is between the mythical violence 
underlying the justification of the law and "a 'divine violence,' one that takes aim at the very 
framework that establishes legal accountability" (Ibid, 203). The law is presumably justified 
and sustained by the fantasy of sovereignty of the 'we,' in Habermas' jargon, an imaginary 
relation of unbridled freedom (i.e., sovereignty) through which the subjects of the law are 
asked to relate to its rule as a part of the community, but the violence consists of the 
clandestine gesture that aims to erase the trace of founding strangers whose lives we are to 
live as if we respond to the law we made in solitude. Although the law is founded without 
justification, it thus marks what is unjustifiable, violent, and illegal as opposed to what is 
sensible, responsible, and legal by recourse to myths (mainly, of sovereignty). But to enforce 
the line between them, its coercive authority is preserved by the police, army, armed forces; 
these turn a contingent foundation of the society by an act of speech into an incontestable 
authority with the factual power to sanctify, incarcerate, hurt and kill by its law-preserving 
force. 
However, the Police is not a force external to the people, which is a point underplayed 
by Ranciere.^'" The law of sensibility is enforceable whereas the address of the silenced 
others is not. It is because the illocutionary force of the ethical address is not shored up by the 
police that people need to negotiate their wish-to-live with a wish-to-say the unsayable in the 
present company of others who do not wish to hear. The silent beauty of a statue or the 
pathetic sight of the Miissellmanner is no threatening force to the people who 'have no time' 
" " As we have seen in Arendt 's notion of banality of evil, most of tlie time people police themselves even when 
the law is in the wrong and could be overthrown by an opposing force. The majority of the population under 
Nazi Germany chose suffering a deathly force and surviving in perilous times over responding to the silent call 
of the wronged because to be indifferent was the most sensible (rational) thing for most of them to do. 
or reason to decipher its meaning in a life of a liberal indifference that aims to perpetuate the 
silence of the past. The illocutionary power needed to mobilize the people enslaved to their 
'selves' cannot be only promising: it should also be violent, not the serene call of a petrified 
people ontologized as loci of indifference and equality, but a divine violence that, Butler 
quotes from Benjamin, releases what is sacred in all lives {Ibid., 212) from the mythical 
violent past in a discursive war. And the soul of the people is time, its openness to change and 
transformation. 
In other words, an act of speech both reveals the contingent foundations of the present 
and through its subversive re-iteration, subjects it to change. The temporality of the political 
act is such that it is future-oriented but takes its norm from the past which it frees from the 
unjustifiable limits, violent myths and policing regulations. The past is disclosed as it is; as a 
constitution contingently performed, with an opening to future re-interpretations. The past of 
the people offer its own possibility of change, socio-political transformation and a repetition 
that breaks with it.^^' Both Benjamin and Butler take the popular strike (Ibid., 203) as an act 
of civil disobedience that vindicates the Constitution when it is threatened by the lived 
situation. It aporetically halts the temporality of the people when a shared life is suspended in 
the name of a life to come structured by the constitutional principles; the time of the people 
ceases to be the present, and returns to a time (hypothetical and similar to the state of nature 
in social contract theories) where the people, a shared life and norms had yet to exist. It re-
enacts the past constitutive moment by an unjustified act in order to arrive at a fiiture when 
the past violence ceases to be present in the situation. 
This should not be taken as a call to arms, or as an urge to civil war to say the 
unsayable, but as an acknowledgment of the situation of address where there is violence in 
If the Constitution is the soul of the legal structure, say, the civil disobedience of a citizen equal before the 
law but treated differentially by the lived norm eschews the norm in order to re-install it if the act is 
constitutional; as an act of speech it is aporetic, being (outside) the norm. It refers to the past (making of the 
Constitution) which defers to the future (interpretation and acting on the Constitutional principle). 
the present address, because there was violence in our past which we are responding to. 
Butler makes clear that the release which divine violence brings about "is at once an 
expiation of guilt and an opposition to coercive violence" {Ibid., 203). This is the guilt that 
we are asked to own for an archival violence that precedes the law, the 'we,' and an unpaid 
debt for its shared life, because the law is an address that comes before the community, 
retrospectively constituting what it recognizes and enforces itself by violence that petrifies 
the people in a lifeless representation of the "we,' or an unlivable life of the unrecognized and 
the misrecognized amidst the 'we.' The law thus frames the people's soul by the state's 
monopoly on violence, might of militarism, and force of the police; it limits and forces us to 
share the guilt for the wrong in/of our constitution done to those constituted as different to the 
identities in the archive. The unjustified act of speech that discloses the unrecognized 
aporoi's presence would be an instance of what Benjamin calls "divine violence" that undoes 
the mythical violence (Benjamin, 1999, 294-297).^'^ Niobe for Benjamin signifies the people 
who come before the law "both as an eternal bearer of guilt, and as a boundary stone between 
men and gods" (Ibid., 295). Butler's reading of Benjamin's account emphasizes how, as "a 
mortal ...more fecund and greater than Leto, the goddess of fertility," Niobe's life exceeds 
the limiting frame, being more godly than gods. In other words, there is more to the people 
than the 'we' and its normatively framed representation; we are also guilty of having a 
character that exceeds the frame. The accusative speech-act here "works performatively to 
mark and transform Niobe, establishing her as the guilty subject, who takes on the form of 
petrified rock. Law thus petrifies the subject, arresting life in the moment of guilt" (Butler, 
2007, 208). As a suffering statue her body attests to the force of the law-preserving violence 
In Benjamin's account of the myth of Niobe, "[m]ythical violence in its archetypal form is a mere 
manifestation of the gods" (Ibid., 294). In tempting the wrath of a superior power, she discloses the always-
already established situation that consists of asymmetry of power. In the myth Niobe boast her fertility that gave 
her more children that the goddess of fertility. Having heard the challenge of Niobe who tempts fate, Leto sets 
Apollo and Artemis after Niobe, and they kill all of her children in revenge and turn her into a weeping rock. 
that condemns her to death in Hfe where she is asked to pay for an infinite wrong and debt. 
She continues to cry even in her rock state but nobody responds to her. 
8.1.2. The Frame and the Image: The Queer Acts of Speech 
In the sixth chapter I noted how Ranciere conceives the metaphor that 'the people' is as a 
statue subject to equal forces; he interprets the present situation to be a situation of equal 
power where the weaker, the aporoi, and the oppressed vindicate equality of all. However, 
Butler implies that to see the statue as a statue is already an achievement in our present 
sensibility violently policed and limited by the past frames of a shared life that ontologized 
the visible into lives we recognize; first the present policing frames on the sensibility that 
conceal the violent gesture of hiding what is suffering in plain sight must be disclosed, 
contested, expanded, modified, subverted and disavowed by power?^^ In Butler's 
understanding of'precariousness,' the limited ontologies dehumanize what they foreclose 
(e.g. Niobe), denying it a response that familiar faces with familiar lives in a shared life 
deserve. They also desensitize everyone's gaze, attempt to conceal, justify or re-articulate 
violence done to lives that are not considered to be human lives. Similarly I argued in the 
third chapter that for Lyotard too the remnant of the law is a dehumanized waste (' Wstawac') 
excluded from the shared sensibility of the 'we' threatened by the ontological difference of 
'the jews.' 
Therefore our sensibilities are both constituted and limited by the Police that 
immobilizes us, like Niobe, with its limiting frames; naturalized unarticulated norms that tell 
us it is not quite violent to insult, hurt, or kill the enemy if the 'we' says so.^'" The logic of the 
Besides one cannot possibly wrong or exercise violence on a dead statue in one's address. The ontologies of 
the past, however, are violent in their wrong, not only because they are unjustified, hierarchical/exclusive, 
dominating and vengeful in producing life contingent on what it forecloses; they also, making a claim to the 
universal conditions of sensibility and rationality, aim \o foreclose the rational force of a grieving cry, 
dissenting address, and a silent call and dismiss it as nonsense, or 'bad poetry' that should have no place in a 
rational shared life. 
" " Within the violent situation, for a policed sensibility it is kind o/O.K. to respond to the queer boy at our high 
school with a sneer especially when our peers do so. It is a bit acceptable not to recognize the Palestinians as 
police maintains that it would be somewhat sensible to resort to violent self-preservation 
when a stranger seen through these frames has a past that threatens our sovereignty, 
masculinity, superiority of our gender, race, nation, class, family, and the 'we. ' Butler seems 
to suggest that the war is between two pasts that frame our present and Hmit us to a sensibihty 
of our present selves conceived as the absolute sovereign, or the victimized other. And those 
constituted as the aporetic limit, in their silent address aim to awaken the law of our 
sovereign selves to the precariousness of life hurt, wronged, effaced, silenced and foreclosed 
by its violence. As we are asked to admit the wrong in/of our constitution, and this is an 
address between ghosts that already share a life, this is also the situation of address between 
the sayable as reproducing the material conditions of dead lives long gone at the present, and 
the unsayable foreclosed until these conditions are re-formed, an immaterial body that speaks 
through its silence. This is not about speech per se, but a struggle over the power of speech-
acts that frame, form and limit a life under the conditions of a shared life through differential, 
hierarchical and foreclosing addresses, articulating whose bodies we are (not) to see, hear, 
and respond to as if they are one of us in an estranged society troubled by what it refuses to 
see, hear, and talk to. ' T h e 'frames' that work to differentiate the lives we can apprehend 
from those we cannot (or that produce lives across a continuum of life) not only organize 
visual experience but also generate specific ontologies of the subject" (2009, 3). To conclude, 
the subject at stake is the 'we ' of a shared life estranged with the people. 
I have argued that the queer bodies are not only poetic images, but also violent wish 
images shocking to a life in recoil, a people in denial withdrawn to the frame, here, the 
' frame' is that which, in Derrida's terms, both demarcates the outer boundaries of a 
equal to the Israeli citizens when they did everything in their power to hurt Jewish people; just like it made 
sense for the Palestinians to resort to violence when uninvited strangers stole their land, subordinated them, sent 
them to exile in their homeland, killed them with a justification by a law that did not exist as a sovereign power 
a hundred years back in those lands. 
community and opens it to its outside.^" To place an image within a frame is done by the 
frame itself that as the limit also disrupts the inner organization of the image."^ In the lived 
situation of the present societies, the limit case is the queer; their visibility forms the 
boundary of the community of sense, disrupts violently its normatively limited order, and 
says something about a shared life that gives no room to them. To expose one's queer 
presence to others is an act of speech: it manifests the constitution of the society that refiases 
to acknowledge the presence of the queer. It, being (outside) the norm, shocks the order of 
the heteronormative, the rule-following bodies, the sensibility of those who find the queer 
repulsive. 
In the queers' act of speech, the visible limited by a normative ontology seek words 
that will both overcome and transfigure its muteness by an "ontological guilt' in the sense 
Lyotard uses the term (Lyotard, 1999, 39): the body at stake was addressed differently in the 
past, marked as different to or enemy of the sovereign 'we, ' and in some cases as the limit to 
the sensibility that frames a body as somebody among the 'we" that survives (by) the violent 
fantasies of sovereignty preserved by our attachments. Queer bodies are rendered (in)visible 
at the present, being (outside) the norm of representation: it is the operation of the lived norm 
that conceals them, not so unlike the (im)perfect crime of Nazism that wished to destroy the 
sensible proofs of the genocide in denial of the crime (Lyotard, 1990a, 25). Yet the frame 
both reveals the image and itself; the queers' act of speech both exposes the 'we ' to their 
bodies which are (outside) the norm and the self-image of the 'we ' that denies the guilt. 
This is a guilt the queer are asked to feel as the shame that interrupts their lives, 
confines them to a survival in the dark solitude away from the insulting gaze of others. But 
this is also a guilt shared by the 'we' when they are on the brink of taking responsibility for 
It, from within the image, "opens every system to its outside and divides the unity of the line [trait] which 
purports to mark its edges" (Derrida, 1987, 7). 
' T h a t which it puts in place-the instances of the frame, the title, the signature, the legend, etc.-does not stop 
disturbing the internal order of discourse on painting, its works, its commerce, its evaluations, its surplus-values, 
its speculation, its law, and its hierarchies" (Derrida, 1987, 9). 
the wrong in their shared life, betraying the law that constituted them as the sovereign within 
our community of sense where to be on the side of the 'we ' that gave a life to us is to be on 
the safe side; and where not responding to threatening strangers is the sensible condition of 
inhabiting a shared life that repeats itself In as much as the queer is the limit and the frame 
of a community of sense, the community frames it as its limit that conditions its 
unconditionally shared life. In Habermas' theory "access to [the public sphere] is guaranteed 
to all citizens" (1974. 49) by the law, but the lived norm does not welcome the queer into the 
sphere of all; the public is open to anyone on condition that one is not queer. For Derrida, the 
conflict between the unconditionality and the condition forms an aporia of sensibility.^'^ If 
the queer has a disturbing 'character,' that is also because the 'we ' characterizes them as the 
conditioning limit. If the 'we ' apprehends the simple presence of somebody as disturbing and 
threatening, it is also the fault and guilt of the 'we ' not to identify with him/her as one of us, 
being attached to the policed sensibilities of the present. 
Ranciere conceives the 'we ' that responds to the queer visibility as "active 
participants in a collective performance instead of passive viewers" (2007b, When 
we are exposed to an image, we all are charged, with creative energies and with being 
complicit in the constitution of the image of the queer as disturbing, "by looking at and 
listening to the world around [us], by figuring out what [we have] seen or heard, by repeating 
what [we have] learned . . . " (Ibid., 275). "The spectator is active" in making sense of "the 
distribution of the visible [which is] itself part of the configuration of domination and 
subjection" (Ibid., 211). Thus "looking is also an action that confirms or modifies that 
distribution and that 'interpreting' the world is already a means of transforming it" (Ibid.). In 
He notes that "[b]etween the outside and the inside, between the external and the internal edge-line, the 
framer and the framed, the figure and the ground, form and content, signifier and signified, and so on for any 
two-faced opposition...[t]he trait thus divides in this place where it takes place" (Derrida, 1987, 12 
If one can talk about a "spectacle" of the community where certain visibilities such as the queer are exposed, 
speeches and acts performed, then in the lived situation all is "surrounded by performance, dragged into the 
circle of action, which gives them back their collective energy" (Ranciere, 2007b, 274). 
other words, the act of apprehension also takes part in the constitution of what the onlooker 
apprehends as a promise/threat. 
I argue that the act of looking at the image also frames it within the configuration of 
domination and subjection. It becomes more than an exchange between the master and the 
slave in the scene of sovereignty where they both seek, violently, to impose their norm on 
each other. It subjectifies and identifies the other as the enemy who embodies a 
threat/promise that breaks with what one identifies with—as an exception to one's norm that 
makes one what one is, i.e., the sovereign. Here the analogy between the sovereign and the 
queer is useful. The attachment to the norm of recognizability makes it impossible to identify 
what appears as the unrecognizable at the present: we come before it, and from it, we receive 
the new norm. In other words, a democracy to come needs to take its ftjture norm from the 
unrecognizable. "The 'unrecognizable' is the beginning of ethics, of the Law," Derrida says 
(2009, 108), because the sovereign comes before the law and comes before 'us' as the 
unrecognizable. 
The images of the unrecognizable on the border of the sensible at the present betray 
the law of the sayable that deprives them of a liveable life amongst others and asks them to 
betray the norms making stories of some lives unsayable. They are acts of speech to the 
extent that they wish to break out of their fi-ame, bring with them consummation of 
sovereignty, invulnerability of a life insulated ft^om trouble that dwells within and thus leaves 
traces (hard) to ignore in the shared space-time of a people still limited by fantasies of its own 
sovereignty. They wish to be heard, seen, and talked to as equals in a shared life to come. The 
time of the sovereign has passed but it has a wish-to-live: it lingers. And the task of the 
present to build a democracy to come, I argue, is to seek conditions of mutual hearing and 
making peace between a sovereign ghost from the past and an unspeakable ghost from the 
The sovereign is (outside) the norm as an exception because at the moment of legislation s/he makes the 
norm independently from all norms. 
future not considered as living at the present. Those conditions framing and constitutive of an 
ethos can be cstabHshed not without violence, but with a non-violent violence that will put 
some ghosts to their graves and give life to others, bringing them out their graves in life. The 
'we, ' when articulated by an act of speech as an unidentifiable people within a democracy to 
come, will find closure with its loss, grieve the ungrievable and disclose the foreclosed 
otherness it was estranged from if they have a wish-to-hear. 
Butler characterizes the interruption of non-violent violence as "a certain crucial 
breakage [that] can take place between the violence by which we are formed and the violence 
by which we conduct ourselves once formed" (Butler, 2007, 180) Non-violent violence is 
directed against the violence of the past that forms us so we can dis-identify with the given 
subject position in a shared life. Re-reading the history out of an image of the past in order to 
arrive at the material conditions and the history of rules of speech-acts that violently framed it 
as a life, as somebody, as one of us necessarily refers back to violence of the founding 
moment of the society that renders some bodies as not one of us, formerly left out of the 
frame, or effaced, or misrecognized in the image. This would be a violent, unjustified act of 
speech to apprehend the unrecognizable, not because it would eschew all those norms of 
identification, recognition, and responsibility but it would appropriate, subvert, and re-
interpret them in a living way to respond to the trouble of unlivable lives in a shared life at 
the present. 
This ethical wish-to-hear, Butler suggests, could best be understood as an inner 
struggle with one's own sensibility to apprehend a life as life, and a risky opening to "the 
rhythm of transience" (Ibid., 216). Sensitivity to life should not be simplified as respect for 
the living in their precariousness, or mere life in its finitude; if it is undertaken by a poetic 
gaze that seeks to see the silent image fi-amed by the past and recover its history, the 
motivation is not only to enrich life by breaking apart the frame and hear a wish-to-live in the 
silence of unlivable lives, but also violently re-orient this gaze on "another perspective on 
time" (Ibid., 218) of the people that in their rhythm always already change in their elusive 
representations; the act of speech is performed mainly in temporal terms. The ethos of non-
violent violence releases from the force of a violent past that repeats itself thus "opens onto a 
sense of time that refuses teleological structure and prediction" (Ibid.) and brings us closer to 
a democracy to come. 
Therefore the figure of the stranger (i.e., the queer) in the image is produced by a 
frame from the past that violently limits, constitutes, and (de)subjectifies, but the frame 
interrupts and is subject to an interruption in its spatio-temporality. The frame captures an 
image of the people which can be traced back to its mythical constitution in the past, or 
followed up to its undecidable ftjture if it is violently broken apart by an act of speech that 
points out the ghostly trace of others in it. The non-violent violence of an act of speech, I 
argue, is thus futural. It brings into the visibility of the present the past that frames it and a 
fiiture shared life in a democracy to come unfettered by violence, hegemony and injustice. 
The next section aims to formulate justice as this movement of unconcealment. 
8.2. Justice to the Silent Ghost 
The last chapter aimed to cast into relief the dispersion of the present lives back into a strange 
past of the 'we" that has (never) been. And in the last section, 1 showed how Butler argues 
that the heteronomous constitution of our sovereign presence by a strange past defers our self, 
the possibility conditions of life into the precarious universality of norms violently 
established in an undecidable past. Those conditions that frame a shared life coincide with the 
contingent conditions of a life that is, despite the law's claims to universality, beset by 
violence, inequality, injustice, subjugation, exclusion, and a primary foreclosure that sustain 
the fantasy of sovereignty and belie their universality. The historical fact of always already 
sharing a world with strangers who are not within our community, not our equal, 
unrecognized, unprotected within the citizenship-rights-duties framework, troubling the 
universality of the law bears witness to the fragility of the present that can only recur by a 
violence of the Police that maintain the unacknowledged differential status between the 'we' 
and the people.^'"' As "we have to understand that what is 'universal' is constantly being 
made, it is constantly being articulated and re-articulated" (Butler, 2003, 120) the task of the 
present is to open by power to negotiation and re-appropriate in a living way the norms and 
conditions under which we are responsive to others in a world separated by matrices of power 
for a democracy to come. 
8.2.1. In and Outside the Temporality of Politics: Dispersion as Condition of Justice 
This would be an occasion to re-consider justice in a sensible world our self is disseminated 
over/into, where our lives are inextricably bound up with others' lives, where the so-called 
universality of norms of responsiveness wrongs them, and our sovereignty may be the very 
reason why both we and others live unlivable lives, lives that are not our own, but framed or 
troubled by trace of surviving others that can be both promising and threatening, as well as 
the lives that have been already lived, lost, unlived and unliveable: 
The "frames" ... also generate specific ontologies of the subject. 
Subjects are constituted through norms which, in their reiteration, 
produce and shift the terms through which subjects are recognized. 
.. .Normative schemes are interrupted by one another, they emerge and 
fade depending on broader operations of power, and very often come 
up against spectral versions of what it is they claim to know: thus, 
there are "subjects" who are not quite recognizable as subjects, and 
there are "lives" that are not quite —or, indeed, are never-recognized 
as lives. (Butler, 2009, 3) 
If this is the frame of the violently foreclosing ontologies, it is also the normative frame of 
what can be seen as rightftilly belonging within the frame, what is witnessed, recognized and 
can be responded to within the frame. And a life is actually lived both inside and outside the 
frame, dispersed into a wider setting, space and temporality. 1 argue that this is the situation 
of the people, sometimes acting as the 'we' and sometimes exceeding their normative 
representation. Butler sets out in a new direction in Parting Ways, asserting that "dispersion 
That is the same gesture as, in Lyotard's terms, to "bear witness to the differend" (Lyotard, 1988, xlii) 
elaborated on in the second chapter. 
is a condition of possibility for thinking justice" (2012, 5). Dispersion over/into a world we 
share with otherness is to be understood as multiple traces in what makes possible our 
presence and the presence of what is not quite present in our fi-ame, unacknowledged, unseen, 
unheard and un-responded to. The non-violent violence of the gesture that indicates their 
ghostly trace that constitutes our self, discloses their unseen image within the frame of our 
lives, articulate their bodies as somebodies we can hear, and challenge the frame in which 
"the only lives that could be construed as living were living in a certain way, conforming to a 
set of norms" (Butler, 2003, 115) is justice in the sense of hearing the inaudible voice and 
bearing witness to what is suffering the violence of the Police. 
Likewise, 1 argue for the conception of justice developed in the fourth chapter on 
Lyotard's understanding of it as an obligation to respond to the constitutive "before" 
critically and bear witness to what comes before us as the unrecognizable by present 
n o r m s . I f this can be construed as a wish-to-hear the voice of threatening strangers 
suffering our violence and living unliveable lives, the violence consists of limiting what we 
can hear to justification, confirmation and maintenance of the 'we ' s sovereignty. The 
justification for our violence follows the lines of self-defence that nullifies the persuasive 
power of any other account that challenges the hegemonic structure of the sayable: the 
stranger at stake has always already imperilled our power, life, or way of life and gets what is 
his/her due. The traditional justice of an-eye-for-an-eye, as in the case of American 'war 
against terror' following 9/11, Butler writes, brings together the image of the victim with the 
sovereign people rightfully responding to a loss with justified violence. Thus "a frame for 
understanding violence emerges in tandem with the [past] experience, and that the frame 
works both to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds of historical inquiries, and to 
function as a moral justification for retaliation" (Butler, 2002, 58). 
™ Lyotard "promises a justice without law [and] a politics without normative principles" (Dunn, 1993, 194), 
where without a program (Lyotard, 1988, 181), one can only bear witness to the present, present suffering, 
present wrongs, and the silent presence of those who demand justice. 
The frame "decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be 
taken as explanation or as exoneration, whether we can hear the difference, and abide by it" 
{Ibid.)}^^ In a similar way the power operative in constituting a domain of the unsayable also 
decides what we can see on the media and what these images of war say. Butler investigates 
the insensible forms an otherwise power takes through its embodied, lived effects on the 
public as "[vjiolence against those who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of 
suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark" (Ibid., 36)?"' The image 
that troubles and marks lives lost, wounded and wronged is thus marked as unmarkable. The 
point is not to condone violence, but to disclose how the framing of what can be seen and 
heard (Butler, 2004, xx) aims to silence the message these images convey silently: about lives 
lost and not mourned, our own violence disguised as justified self-preservation, and suffering 
of others we assume we have nothing in common. 
The relation between the sayable and the visible within the self-justificatory 
normative fi-ame of a vengeful politics is in fact manifold. Butler brings into our view not 
only the frames that both show and limit, disclose as much as they conceal, replace and 
displace, and efface while giving a face to the other (Ibid., 36). She also indicates an ethical 
resource to bear witness to the survival and return of what is foreclosed from the fi-ame to 
make a demand on us. With this aim Butler invokes the ethical and political implications of a 
just relation to alterity we always already share a life with that interrupts the way norms 
interrupt our lives. As a paradoxical power, a force in recoil, the power underlying ethical 
Disagreement with this narrative framework that makes sense to those among us hurt, mjured and mourning, 
in order to give a broader account that involves a narrative of the past conditions before 9/11 that may have laid 
the setting for the present, (or for our own violence at the present), is equivalent to nonsense, treason, moral 
equivocation, or unsightly at its best. 
The politics of revenge commanding that the war must go on, circumscribes what can be sensed in a 
regulated public where only the pictures of liberated Afghani girls throwing off their burkas, bin Laden's evil 
face, victorious American soldiers hugging Iraqi children circulated freely (Butler, 2004, 141-143). The images 
of coffins covered with the American flag (Butler, 2009, 65), mutilated bodies of civilians in villages barraged 
by U.S. army, wounded, hungry, bewildered children covered in blood, or tortured war prisoners detained 
against the Geneva conventions in Guantanamo, however, were either strictly censored, waived away as 
inevitable collateral damage, or dismissed as a treason-like project by excuseniks that undermines American 
sovereignty in hard times. 
relations expand, break apart and lift up the frame that limits our lives by the life-giving force 
of differential ontologies that violently constitute the 'we ' as an unchosen archive. It dis-
identifies us with an unchosen identity.^"" 1 argue that although this constitutive address 
defines the parameters of a responsiveness that is crucial to a shared life, it does so by 
limiting our responsiveness to those who witness and internalize its force, and enact an 
identity of the recognizable in the archive. Butler notes that "[s]ubjects are constituted 
through norms which, in their reiteration, produce and shift the terms through which subjects 
are recognized" (2009, 3). The grids of recognition, however, also foreclose certain identities 
that do not conform to our norms (Butler, 2003a, 110; 115). The conditions under which "we 
find that we are responsive to other human beings," (Butler, 2003b, 103) coincide with the 
conditions of apprehension and lonely responsibility where we grant or withhold recognition. 
The aporia of recognition is such that if one is addressed differently, by a different law, or by 
the self-same law but in subjugating, excluding, foreclosing terms, one becomes a stranger, in 
or outside our community as not-one-of-us we respond or recognize, in a differential, power-
based and probably agonistic relation to the sovereign self of the people. 
Here I aim to trace the paradoxical temporality of the political. Being present in a 
community of sense is predicated on conditions of responsiveness preceding the present, 
traceable to a strange past of the law that violently constituted, on differential basis, who we 
are to respond to as a part of the people that make the law. And being addressed is the 
precondition of a response (Butler, 2012, 173), an opening to those who come before us and 
to what is to come in the ftjture. The unrecognizable others demand a response even if they, 
although within the community of the people, are not present in our community of sense. 
The relations an ethics of responsiveness discloses are not chosen either because the relation to alterity 
constitutive of our selves and responsibility precedes the ontologies of the archive that justify our responses. But 
whereas the ethical force reveals and testifies to the 'not-me' as a stranger integral to making sense o f ' m e , ' the 
power of the policing past marks 'me ' as a negation of 'not-me, ' to capture me as a fixed identity in the archive 
of the 'we ' in opposition to ' them, ' a petrified figure of speech embodied as a national, racial, gendered, classed, 
aged identity among us we respond to as one of us. 
addressing us from an impossible future where they will be heard and responded to as the 
law-giver. Their unacknowledged presence points to a possible fliture unfettered by the past, 
and to a democracy to come where they will be recognized and included under new norms of 
recognizability. When we realize that the life of the people who seek their norms is scattered 
among temporalities that make a claim on the present, spaces neither inside nor outside the 
living area of the society, and unliveable lives of strangers with undecidable identities that 
make up the people, this comes as an acknowledgment that "sovereignty itself will be 
dispersed" (Ibid, 6) in the aporia of the people. In fact the sovereign address always comes 
from a place/time outside of the present, outside the present self, from a past that survives 
toward an (im)possible future. We are addressed by a wandering people, a ghostly sovereign 
treading along and beyond the spatio-temporal horizon that no image, no figure of speech can 
do justice to unless it too is caught within the gesture of self-differentiation. 
If the people is split within, internally divided by the force of a violent constitution 
that interrupts our lives, this does not only herald dissemination of sovereignty over an 
undecidable spectrum of times/places/identities, and across socio-political worlds. It also 
indicates justice as another kind of sociability that interrupts our community of sense secured 
by socio-political relations allowed for by the archive.^"' If an address survives the unliveable 
life inherited from the past that has a grip on the present, the future life of the law and the 
people chasing after it must also be sought in and excavated from it and brought to bear on 
the present in a new light (Butler, 2012, 8). For Butler "only by "ceding ground' does an 
ethical resource from the past come to thrive elsewhere and anew" [Ibid) where this ethical 
resource expels our selves from the frame that fetters our receptivity to demands from 
elsewhere we do not necessarily have a sense of belonging to but nevertheless perforce 
belong. This resource for justice that brings us together on an unchosen ground is our 
An "interruption" is the interval between two ruptures (i.e., unexpected constitution), two emergences (of tlie 
people and the aporoi), and two emergencies (of justification and justice). 
constitution by strangers as strangers to ourselves that always already dis-identify with their 
selves. The ethical relation of justice does not capture the people in a frozen image within a 
fixed fi-ame, but leaves open the question of who might embody this strange figure of 
address. To conclude, to accompany a people through an aporia of suffering and hope, 
wandering across geographies and histories in pursuit of their own representation, counter-
acts the violence of the Police that guards the borders of nation-states, limits to identities, and 
spatio-temporal frames of a shared life in order to stabilize, immobilize the people forced to 
re-enact a past unceasingly. 
8.2.2. Justice to the Particular: Universalism and Temporality 
Butler finds the neutralizing power that meets the power of the past in an address of what 
survives a shared life it was foreclosed from. I argued throughout my thesis that there is a 
creative tension between the 'me' and the Generalized Other in Habermas' terms. As the 
tension is of the ambiguous force between the T' ('character') and the 'we,' the present task 
of justice, she argues, is "to reconcile the particular with the universal" (Ibid., 42) that 
expulses it from a shared life it conditions. The task is to reveal historical conditions of the 
foreclosed other's survival under which the law can be re-iterated and subjected to deviations 
and unexpected sequences by this ghostly other demanding inclusion and recognition. "This 
universalism, this justice, "moves into history'," writes Butler, "which suggests that it 
originates in a non-historical relation, synchronic, and somehow passes over into the 
historical or diachronic" (Ibid., 43); to conclude, it breaks with the present distribution of 
identities, and present sensible conditions of the 'we' under the sovereignty of the violent 
past, ruptures the recurring time to disclose the present as a time of the people out of its 
joints, them as anyone, here as anywhere, and now as any time. 
If "we have a sense of one force entering a certain established horizon," (Ibid., 103) if 
there is a historicity to the norms that constitute the image of the 'we' by a violent address, 
there is also a cohabitation of times at the present. When the petrifying force of the past is 
contested by re-iterating and turning it against itself, "a struggle for the past which is the only 
way to transform the present" (Ibid., 113) reveals a concealed and congealed 
contemporaneity structuring the present immobilized by a force. The force of non-violent 
violence reveals and releases it. "Its effect is to interrupt, reorient, or pull the break on the 
politics of this time" (Ibid, 106) and can only do justice to a people suffering unliveable lives 
if it succeeds in contesting the eternity of unjust norms inherited from a past, and representing 
them as a new ethical resource from which an otherwise, non-normative norm of sociability 
can be derived for a democracy to come. The history of the oppression, marginalization, 
exclusion, foreclosure, and other kinds of violence done in the name of the law thus shows 
the universal has been conditioned; and that the lack of unconditionality is what one responds 
to in a lived relation to the material conditions of a shared life. If a dual gesture is to be 
imagined, it needs to return the law to its imaginary past that threatens, and promise a future 
life derived from it. 
If the universal can be shown to be empty, i.e., as I argued in my thesis, its addressor 
a stranger, and its address without any justifiable or informative content, it can be re-iterated 
by foreclosed strangers, against the violence it exercises, in the name of those lives rendered 
unliveable under its present rule. In a sense we always already respond to the dark history of 
the law that constitutes us as witnesses to its force: as Habermas argued, we identify with its 
life-giving power to be a part of the 'we, ' or as Lyotard argued, we survive in a shared life 
centred on the foreclosure of our presence. Here speech as re-iteration of sovereign strangers 
who silence us takes on a (non-)historical importance. Although Lyotard warned us that the 
address that comes from the borders of the sensible is more a silent conveying of power than 
informative speech or demand for justification, speech, as in Ranciere's understanding, can 
also be employed to indicate and re-articulate what survives on the threshold of a shared life. 
unrecognized as our equal, unprotected, and un-responded to. If anyone can be its addressor, 
pointing out its unacknowledged presence, insensible under a forced distribution of the 
sensible, one can do so by moving in the direction of an imaginary, impossible relation, an 
imaginary imaging, deporting the self towards an anonymous figure of speech that can be 
embodied by anyone, and departing for a time outside the history of sensibility. 
In other words, when one wishes-to-hear the silent voice of the suffering, oppressed 
others one acts as if one was the sovereign, being (outside) the law. One can imaginatively 
embody the figure of the sovereign as (an exception to) the norm it (un)makes. An act of 
speech in this context would aporetically (dis)regard the law it invents. In Habermas' theory, 
an act of civil disobedience is lawfully lawless as long as it is constitutional and aims to bring 
a change in the law through non-violent violence (1985, 135). Ranciere holds these acts of 
dissent to be a re-enactment of the constitution of community in the regulated distribution of 
the sensible; when one performs a dissenting act of speech one "set[s] up a community by the 
fact of placing in common a wrong that is no more than this confrontation" (1999, 27) 
between the norm and what is supposedly outside it; i.e., the sovereign. This discursive 
operation for Butler takes the form of a lived relation to the image of an alterity "expelled 
from its frame, and this is the disorienting trajectory of moves both ethical and 
counterhegemonic" (2012, 22). Bearing witness to this image as demanding a response 
vindicates the radical equality of a stranger that survives the foreclosure from sensibility, 
foregrounding impossible "ethical relations that makes us ethically responsive to those who 
exceed our immediate sphere of belonging and to whom we nevertheless belong, regardless 
of any choice or contract" {Ibid, 23) that may be the ground of any sociability. The image of a 
stranger living an unliveable life is what demands a re-articulation as one of us, subject to the 
same ethical law, worthy of being addressed as a part of the 'we ' even when it is our enemy. 
The stranger can also arrive at our borders and frame of our lives in the form of a silent body 
articulating our wrong. And we are authorized by the present law to turn back, ignore, hurt, 
even kill him/her because s/he is not somebody in our community of sense, not one of us 
whom we are ethically obligated to respond to by the universality of the categorical 
imperative. If we cannot bring us to respond to a stranger, s/he is most likely an enemy, or a 
stranger "we' wronged. 
In fact, we refuse to respond to this image because it is not somebody we sense we are 
responsible to, and our responsiveness hits its limit at the sight of this stranger because taking 
responsibility for its suffering would undermine our sovereignty. Reading Levinas, Butler 
concludes that "[wje do not take responsibility for the Other's suffering only when it is clear 
that we have caused that suffering" (Ibid., 43). In the context of the Israeli-Palestine conflict 
where each side caused the other's suffering to some extent, the universalizability of an 
ethical principle that contests and challenges the universality of the present ethical principle 
can be invoked by any body that embodies any identity suffering under the lived conflict that 
forecloses responsiveness.^'*' 
In other words, an ethical response to the wronged would imply taking responsibility 
for the wrong; and responsibility to other would subject us to the future law that we receive 
from him/her/it. It would submit us to them, and submission and heteronomy would 
destabilize our sovereignty and autonomy. In a democracy all ought to take part in the 
(un)making of the law; the sovereign is an anonymous figure. Even the foreigners, refugees, 
the aporoi, and the queer can make a demand on us as one of the sovereign people when they 
suffer. The universalizability of the wrong is matched by the anonymity of the sovereign. 
And not to hear others as if they are one of us is not only wrong; it also implies violence in 
the sense of the inability to re-appropriate the law, incapability of learning from our past 
It is not due to some forgivable naivety on my part that I conceive unliveable the hves of Israehs who have 
the upper hand in a struggle characterized by an asymmetry of power. A life within the policed borders, under 
the imminent threat and what Benhabib terms "paranoia" (2013, 158) is not unlike the unliveable life lived by 
Antigone in a tomb with normatively regulated walls. 
mistakes, and incapacity to change through a risky response. To conclude, a shared life is 
defined by risk, learning, growth, richness of understanding, responsiveness to the situation 
by change and transformation. That which does not change cannot live either. 
Benhabib worries that the ethics of responsiveness Butler outlines remains "without 
normativity" (Ibid., 151), in an ambiguous relation to universal principles, norms and laws, 
and risks condoning violence exerted by Hamas and Hezbollah. I have been attempting to 
respond to this line of reasoning with a thinking of the aporia of norms. In Butler's thought, 
just because present norms are wrong, wronging, violent, limiting, foreclosing and pre-
emptive of responsiveness, it does not mean, I argue, that we cannot derive a non-normative 
norm operative in her thinking. Such a norm might be the necessity to respond to the 
emergency of justification understood as a "formalizable set of rules" that frame our lives by 
violence. Similarly Lyotard too argues that we need to respond to differends with lateral 
thinking, the innovation of a new norm and the future principles of a shared life. Justice, 
however, requires doing injustice to the norms that wrong, returning to the moment of law-
instating violence to un-instate law-preserving violence. At this moment we find the law 
undoing its own very formality, and if a violence is involved in this process, it consists of 
power in recoil. To conclude, the paradoxical moment of addressing the law that has always 
already addressed us is the attitude of "as-if," which is also a Kantian move in his Critique of 
Judgment. 
The symbolic operation of universalization for Kant is a rule-following that cannot be 
grounded in content, or the rules followed (Critique of Judgment, 1996, 59, 196); it, too, is an 
Judgment as subsumption of singular individuals under a rule (Critique of Pure Reason', 2003, A 132, B 171, 
177), Kant argues, is universalization and unification but it brings about a projected unity (Ibid., A 647-B 675, 
535); it is a regulative ideal that cannot be justified by the character of the judged, but acting on it as i/it can 
realizes the ideal. We act as i/there is a unity, i.e., a ground of the law; and we act as if it is justified. In the case 
of the aesthetical judgment which is "a special faculty forjudging of things according to a rule, but not 
according to concepts," (Critique of Practical Reason, 1993, VIII, 31), judgment cannot even be defined by the 
concept under which the judged is imaginatively brought together; it remains a procedure of as-if where we act 
as if the concept is definable. 
acting as if judgment is (im)possible. The judgment of the subHme proves even (im)possible 
as it is unhmited, and eludes norms, or concepts it is subjected to. All is a Formless infinity, 
the determination of which the understanding is incapable of via the qualitative limitations 
(Ibid., 25-26, p86-96), but can nevertheless judge. In all cases judgment is a violation of 
the unity preordained by the law of understanding cooperating with the imagination (1996, 
27, 97), and it is violence par excellence, because it cannot be grounded or justified; it is 
purposively purposeless so that the subject of the law can be free. 
In other words, law-making is subject to no laws but its own; the procedure of the as-
if In its violent and imaginary character, however, it orients us: it is lawlessly lawful and 
futural; it guides us toward action, change and transformation of what is present before us. To 
make the world, one needs to judge the world into what it is, and judge oneself into what one 
ought to become in this world. Judgment is creation of the future self and the future world as 
they ought to be. 'Therefore the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own 
destination..." (Ibid., 27, 96). If the procedure of universalization and law-making in 
Kant's thought is lawfiilly lawless, groundless in grounding the law without a guiding 
concept or norm, it nevertheless addresses us to a future of greater justice. We respond to the 
other like, as Lyotard suggests, we are before the Sublime; wronged by a norm of presumed 
universality as if other is anonymous and hence generalizable without an identifying concept, 
but nevertheless responding to the very singularity of historical conditions that situated it as if 
s/he is a non-generalizable other within our sensible world. I argue that we are neither outside 
nor inside the normative domain, but on its temporal borders that disorient our rules. 
According to the distinctions established in the First Critique (2003, A 141-B 180; 183), in the reHective 
judgment the conceptual process is missing and it is similar to the schema of a category only in that it "is a 
transcendental product of imagination, a product which concerns the determination of inner sense in general 
according to conditions of its form (time), in respect of all representations... in conformity with the unity of 
apperception" (2003, A 142-B 181, 183). 
The subject uses judgment to violate laws one makes, i.e. as the Sublime, for its Freedom (Ibid., 29, p i 10-
111). Although it is unity, the whole, the law, that has priority over the individuals, and the parts (Ibid., 77, 
256), as to the whole and the law, the subject needs to act as i / i s it is purposive to the whole, in my reading of 
Kant, for law is "as-ifa law," because it is aporetic. 
8.3. Face, Life, and Death 
1 argued in the last section that the non-historical moment of the 'as-if is inserted into a gap 
forcefully opened up in the people's time, when enforceability of the law is neutralized by its 
own power in recoil, returned to its mythical past imagined to be otherwise, re-iterated in 
order to dis-identify with the 'we' and derive an other-oriented resource for our ethos. This 
futural force imagines and re-presents our strange present as the recurring past history of 
oppression, foreclosure, suffering and violence, and the image of the people within the same 
frame as their other, the wronged, unrecognized, suffering and unliving. Co-habitation as 
Butler expands upon it, is the force of a shared life forever divided and brought together by 
the image of the self coextensive as the other, the inside as the outside, and the past as the 
future. As I argued is the case for Lyotard, there is no exit option within the ethical (no life, 
no death outside the domain of the law), and Butler takes this force, although not coercive, to 
be the power of the socio-political life one is "without power to turn away from" (Ibid., 55). 
The moment we are addressed by wronged others who "offer a kind of injunction that is 
irreducible to coercive law," (Ibid., 73) we take a risk; we may respond to the address of the 
antagonized as if\\ has the force of the 'must,' our law in Lyotard's terms, though, as I 
argued drawing on Lyotard's reading of Levinas, it says nothing that can obligate us. Or we 
may risk turning away, or killing it, but killing others is not the same as killing otherness 
constitutive of our selves continuing to address us. In fact as Nazi Germany illustrated, it is 
tantamount to the suicidal movement of a shared life. 
8.3.1. The Saying of the Face 
What we face in the face of the Other, and what we rely on in trying to turn away from it, 
Butler says, is "a power that is not properly our own," (Ibid., 55), but a force of relations 
scattered over a shared life we cannot choose not to share it with others. As the force of an 
ambiguous social bond between the 'we' and 'them,' between '1' and 'other,' and between 'I ' 
and the 'we' cohabiting our present and our presence, it survives the death of others we owe 
our identity, life, past and future to. As I have been arguing, our selves can only make sense 
in the lived relation to foreclosed others, a strange relation of a double negation of strangers 
that expresses me as not not-me, and placing not-me at the heart of me. Although it is an 
imaginary (dis-)identification that feeds the fantasies of sovereignty by unacknowledged 
violence of primary exclusion and deathlike lives, the foreclosed other is always already 
included in a life we cannot unchoose, cohabiting in a self we could not choose, in a world 
we ought to/must share with it in relations that are not our design. As long as we live and re-
live our past as our petrified present that placed the insensible other as the condition of our 
sensibility, it will survive its imaginary death. 
Lyotard's account of the silent address o f ' t h e jews ' surviving death is parallel to 
Butler's interpretation of the suffering that can be expressed by a body silently. Just like he 
argues that different phrases of the situation of conflict from the same regimen can be linked 
or translated into each other (1988, xii), Butler thinks we can simply be addressed by 
somebody''s suffering, presence or absence when "we are addressed by others in ways that we 
cannot avert or avoid" (Butler, 2004b, 130). The address is constitutive and disruptive of 
sovereignty for both thinkers^'" and Butler suggests it forms authority and interrupts one's 
authority as will (Ibid.). More importantly both Lyotard and Butler share a concern with the 
ethical moment in the agonistic political. 
When it is argued that the Other can be and is killed all the time, Butler says, "this is 
another way of claiming that the political supplants the ethical" (2012, 55), as the 'must" 
usurps the power of the 'ought," and an anonymous addressee the place of the singular Other 
in the dyadic relation of the address. Yet Butler, turning to Levinas, reads him against himself 
and hopes to find how the ethical relations sun'ive within the domain of the political of 
Lyotard writes that "[t]he people is not the sovereign [but] the defender of the differend against the 
sovereign" (1988, 144) where others demand to be heard as the sovereign people. 
anonymity which threatens to taice over and dominate it. Re-iterating Levinas' interpretation 
of the commandment 'Thou shall not kill' Butler writes: 
...it is this commandment.. . that the face conveys, that this 
commandment compares the very meaning and 'saying' (/<? dire) of 
the face. When he refers to the 'face of the other ..., where the face is 
a voice, and where the voice does not emerge from the face, through 
the mouth, but is another name for the face... We are given this face as 
a voice and thus asked to allow this particular mixing of metaphors 
between what appears and what is heard (Ibid., 56). 
Therefore the face one faces is not only a face but also a voice that addresses us when the 
audible is dispersed over the visible. The face acts to the extent that it speaks, and it shows, 
discloses, makes visible to the extent that it acts; it is an act of speech that disorients the 
norms and normative distribution of the sensible as Ranciere argued. But it all happens on the 
borderline of speech and action: although what it says can be expressed in words, it does not 
necessarily say them. And although it has an effect on us as we sense that we are addressed as 
if someone forcefiilly grabbed our arm when we did not hear them calling out our name, the 
face remains still. Therefore there are distinct modes of address that can nevertheless be 
translated into each other, or re-phrased as Lyotard puts it. 
It must be stressed that the situation of this address was conceived by Levinas to be 
the war, that the addressor and the addressee are "aware of the vulnerability of that other, that 
the other's life is precarious, exposed, and subject to death; but one is also aware of one's 
own violence, one 's own capacity to cause the death of the other" (Ibid.). In other words, the 
inaudible voice of the stranger's face threatens us with death and promises a life peacefully 
shared with others, its force precisely coming from the same ethical resource as the ground 
zero speech-act of the political in Habermas' theory: the constitutive address of the law that 
establishes our self, community of sense and possibilities of action and speech as a society of 
strangers. The situation is both dyadic, between the self of the people and its others, but also 
plural, disseminated into many others that have and will have addressed us. The temporal gap 
between the two modes of address is closed by the law-preserving violence that re-stages the 
past of our constitution as the present that forecloses the fact that here and now we are asked 
silently by the foreclosed stranger to let him/her/it live amongst us, as one of us, our equal, an 
authority in the shared life of the people, who in their unidentifiability, remain strangers to 
themselves. 
Thus the image of the stranger (which is a catachresis also imaginable to be a 
suffering body, a cry, a historically constituted image and a commandment (Butler, 2004, 
77)) testifies to an unliveable life wronged by the violence of the strangers from the start, by 
the material conditions of a shared life that have always already defined it as the enemy. The 
image bears witness to the past which offered life or death by the authority of the strangers 
we have been exposed to, at the present when we are exposed to the stranger offering life or 
death by the same force. Just like the voice of the law its force has nothing to do with the 
informative content of speech, but it says in metonymic terms. The saying of the face consists 
of imagining what the image of the stranger bespeaks, finding it in our own embodied, lived 
and living past, but it nevertheless forces us not to be indifferent to its death it can never die 
as long as we live unliveable lives: it asks us to dis-identify with our selves. This is not only a 
moment of (dis-)identification, dissolution of fantasy/misrecognition but also a revelation: 
once we respond to the force of the stranger's address as / / i t is our law, the enforced 
conditions under which we, too, have been wronged, perforce living an unliveable life of war, 
hatred, disgust and guilt are revealed to us. We come to the realization that we have been 
fighting the war of strangers fi-om the past we were coerced to identify with in order to 
survive, seeing our own image in the face of other we share nothing but a life that is not our 
own. 
In Ranciere's terms, the functionalist distribution of the sensible underpins the 
differential allotment of identities to the subjects of a shared life by the address of the law 
(Ranciere, 2004a, 12-13).^" In the situation of domination, conflict, and subordination, the 
unchosen identity negates formal principle of equality in practice; the slaves, the plebeians, 
the subaltern are subjectified paradoxically as an excess, or waste, without political 
rationality, understanding, or articulateness, unequal to others (Ranciere, 1999, 23). When the 
dissent of the subordinated, such as the plebeian insurrection on Aventine Hill, disrupt the 
distribution of the sensible, however, it occasions a scene of revelation and recognition where 
the subordinated are disclosed as equal to the dominating subjectivities: "they [the slaves on 
Aventine Hill] establish another order, another partition of the perceptible, by constituting 
themselves ... as speaking beings sharing the same properties as those who deny them these" 
{Ibid., 24). The subjectivities are disclosed as strangers to their differential representations 
(as the inhuman slave, or as the superior patrician), and equal to the face present before them 
that disrupts the formalizations. The equalizing force of dissent also re-articulates the struggle 
as one between the hegemonic representations inherited from the past. But one can dis-
identify with these characterizations in an action with character (dissent) that re-constitutes 
the shared life in which one 's (or slaves') actions can have consequences for others 
(patricians). Although Ranciere does not reflect on the ethical ramifications of the situation, 
the act of recognition also reveals the constitutive status of others for the self defined by a 
precarious relation to it that can be altered by action. The obligation is not that of self-
recognition; it is rather the recognition of this constitutive relationality which places one 
outside oneself, as a stranger to oneself This is the reason why the slaves' newly-found voice 
was heard and responded to as if voiced rationally by a sovereign consul. To conclude, 
recognition is directed to the precarious relationality between the self and the other, not to 
identities. 
The subordinated addressed differentially perforce internalize their roles due to the dominating force of the 
Police that both subjectifies and control subjectifications that are equalized, i.e., in part universal, impersonal, 
and categorical; one becomes a subject through heteronomy (Ranciere, 1992, 59-61), i.e., submission to the 
overarching rationality of politics that, in the lived situation, already imposes on one a fiinction, a way of 
thinking, seeing, feeling, acting and speaking. 
8.3.2. Wish-to-hear: The Face as Our Own Voice 
Wishing to hear the voice of the face as our own voice, as Butler elaborates in discussing 
Arendt's final judgment on Eichmann, requires recognition of the singular self disseminated 
into the voices of strangers that we are (Ibid., 57). The decision to hang Eichmann situates 
sovereignty in the plurality of the Jerusalem judges, the victims of the genocide, those who 
care about victims, and Arendt herself who identifies with them all in her book on the trial 
without re-asserting her singular self; "her voice becomes entangled with theirs, nearly 
knotted up in that plurality" {Ibid., 164). The moment of judgment that requires a certain 
splitting of the self (Ibid., 154) is parallel to the constitutive moment of subjectification in 
Habermas' thought explored in the second chapter. The self is disrupted by the voices of the 
plural, split from within, dis-identifies with itself and identifies with the voice of the 
Generalized Other, i.e., the law: the T speaks as if it is (outside) the law. The voice of the 
sovereign people finds its universalized articulation in the plurality of people who address 
and make demands on Arendt. She is asked to make a legal judgment on Eichmann who 
wronged them. 
In identifying with this plurality and re-iterating their speech Arendt's voice 
articulates an image, that of the sovereign judge, but this articulation, "as a voicing that is 
attributed to the judges ... seems to mark a departure from her own voice" (Ibid., 164). 
Similar to Tacitus' voice entangled with Percennius' mute speech in Ranciere's theory, it is at 
the same time both her own voice, and the voice of thousands who suffered. She becomes the 
discursive site of an inner estrangement and oscillation of identity; it subjectifies an "I" as a 
representation that is both/neither Arendt and/nor the plurality. As "the voice of the judge 
repeats Arendt's own subjunctive ventriloquism," (Ibid., 165), her opinion becomes 
unrecognizable within the pluralisation and final universalization of voices. She becomes 
unrecognizably identical with the 'we,' or identically unrecognizable in the 'we,' a stranger 
to herself except for the strange effect of individuality that distances itself from them. She at 
times takes issue with their justification of the decision, norms it may be based on, subjecting 
the mob of voices to critique; that is the undecidable effect of the spUt within the 
representation of Arendt 's self which does not let one decide who is speaicing—Arendt, or the 
sovereign 'we ' ? 
"The unattributed 'we ' allows Arendt's own voice," Butler continues, "to cohabit 
with those of the Jerusalem judges in this voiced reconstruction of a decision" (Ibid., 166) 
and re-enactment of sovereignty. In my reading of the text, Arendt has a wish-to-hear the 
voices of the plurality as if it is her own voice; to conclude, the discursive articulation of an 
"I" couched within the "we" is, I argue, the epitomized form of subjectification and 
recognition where the singular self is disseminated over in the mob in the act of 
representation. Arendt becomes a stranger to herself in the process that forms her innermost 
self She thus hears the obligation others placed on her and judges quite un-sovereignly, 
deriving a novel norm from the scene of co-habitation of voices: no one ought to be able to 
choose with whom they share the world. We share an unchosen life with under the limited 
universality of the same force that gives rise to "concrete political norms and ethical 
prescriptions emerg[ing] from the unchosen character of these modes of cohabitation" (Ibid., 
151). The universality at stake seems to be 'weak, ' partial, contestable, lacking the preserving 
force of the law, metonymic, derived from a lived and representative tension between T and 
the plurality cohabiting within the life of the people's self, i.e., the 'we. ' 
Yet, although the tension is experienced as an inner struggle in solitude facing the 
stranger, it is not resolved by the sovereign self, calculating, choosing, deciding and 
successfully acting on its choice between response and irresponsiveness. The decisionist 
counter-argument relevant here suggested by Habermas was that the individual child 
develops a critical capacity to take responsibility for his/her action even when the universal 
norm regulating it is in the wrong, and choose the right thing to do by demanding justification 
for the demand. Yet if the demand the image conveys is, as it is, to disavow one's own self, 
sovereignty, individuahty, and choice always already decided for one in the past that 
preclude justification of the demand, the ethical resource for a risky response to a demand 
that says nothing that can justify or obligate cannot be the self preserved in the process. One 
may of course calculate the consequences of not responding, sensing the impending violence 
and fearing for his/her life when facing the threatening stranger but unless we wish the same 
for the enemy, the motivating force of this reasoning has a compromised, conditioned 
universality. 
And if we do wish that the enemy of our past lived and wish-to-hear the 
commandment of its face, we would have to undecide what has been decided for us, dis-
identify with our representation, the "we,' our community, particular law, and limited present, 
being estranged to the strangers from the past, by a stranger's strange address, taking the first 
step toward a fiiture community of strangers in a democracy to come. This would be a 
response that is sensed by the 'we' to be violent, making us unresponsive to the violent past, 
one 'which depend[s] on no external authority for its legitimation and [is] futural in its 
orientation" {Ibid., 153). When particularity is dissolved within an aporetic universality 
characterized both by antagonism and solidarity among strangers, the justification comes 
from a self revealed to be an image (i.e., a representation) cohabited by an unchosen plurality 
that keeps asking: Who am 1, and more importantly, who are we? Could this stranger be one 
of us? 
A wish-to-hear seeks the future principles of the 'we' in what is to come; in Derridean 
terms, a promise to relate to others' address justly in a community to come.^" The image of 
the other thus demands a response that dares wish and imagine a self that can hear the 
Derrida elaborates on this concept as a promise, "not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the 
democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the future, but a democracy that must have the 
structure of a promise-and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to come here and now" (1993 
19). 
foreclosed other. It asks the self to imagine how our strangeness can be a pre-ontological 
universal that defines an unlimiting and unlimited community of sense where neither 
disagreement with the present nor a hope for an otherwise future is foreclosed. Being a 
stranger to ourselves implies we have yet to invent our selves, representations, norms, and 
material conditions of a shared life; it means democracy has yet to come. The demand of self-
creation that debunks all ontologies of the past, Butler hopes, can find a resonance of the 
other's strangeness in our own strangeness, in a life brought together within the frame 
constituted by strangers in the past. If there can be a rupture in the time of the present people 
that live the violent past for ever, estranged to themselves by myths of sovereignty, the force 
motivating can only be found in the shared history of strangers who have yet to learn to live 
together in a democracy to come. 
When the image's frame is expanded, and historicized by this force to reveal the 
troubling strangeness sharing our lives, the image of the silenced other is revealed to be a 
temporally shifting position in the address embodied contingently, under the material 
conditions of a shared life that at times assigned 'the jews,' and at times 'the arabs" to that 
position. And when both the self and the other are disseminated over a spatio-temporal 
horizon of an unidentifiable 'we,' that is the people, one can always find a shared past, like 
the moment, Butler emphasizes drawing on Said, Jewishness was and still is constituted by 
the Arab: Moses, and the Palestinian. 
Conclusion: An Otherwise "We" 
1 have been following the question of what power the call of an unidentifiable stranger may 
have in its silent image if s/he/it does not have the authority to speak as one of us; one needs 
to represent him/her/it, speaking for a silent body. In my thesis 1 have argued, by drawing on 
Lyotard, Ranciere and Butler, that a future democracy can be principled by the obligating 
address of the silent others. And in order to bring about a democracy to come, it needs to 
have a force that disrupts, unmakes and re-makes. Butler answers that this is the same power 
as the constitutive power of the law that has no origin but the mythical past that articulated 
our bodies as somebodies in the archive of the 'we,' and foreclosed one as the stranger within 
us. But "[t]he one is articulated within the other and in this sense speak to, address one 
another, cannot be thought outside this mode of address," (Ibid., 215), Butler concludes, 
referring to the futural mode of address in which the image demands a response from us. The 
face of the other is a historically constructed image, and hence limited, and limiting our 
response to the 'we,' but the image demands a response that violently ceases to respond to the 
violent past that constituted the "we,' and an imaginative response to a possible future when 
we acknowledge the 'we's unchosen articulation within what it has been foreclosing from its 
community of sense. This is the situation of the image's silent address within an 'unwilled 
proximity, the modes of being bound together in antagonism and without contract" (Ibid., 
217) in the form of a speech-act that justifies our presence and the present. If it is the present 
norms of constitutive speech-acts that articulated our bodies as somebodies and formed a 
community of sense by the unacknowledged reference to what it has been foreclosing in the 
myths of justification and sovereignty, the norm that would guide our response to the image 
would necessarily be unjustified, violent, and coming from an otherwise place than our 
normatively-limited community that precludes communing with the stranger. 
Surprisingly this otherwise place is none other than our own past, our own self, our 
own community imagined and lived to be otherwise if we can struggle with the preserving 
violence of our identities, sensibilities, and limits to our community that preclude a wish-to-
hear. Therefore the demand the image makes on us is about imagining and embodying new 
forms of articulation without enforcing them, but the ambiguous force of the social bond 
survives in the claim for justice to the invisible, inaudible, and un-responsible that demands 
to be seen, heard and responded to as if they are one of us. In my thesis I investigated the 
possibility conditions of a justice beyond the law; Lyotard argues that it is a just response to 
differends. Ranciere formulated it as a re-distribution of the sensible. To conclude, justice 
implies giving a response to the unauthorized presence of the unrecognizable strangeness 
constitutive of us all without an accompanying ontology insidiously enforced by the Police; 
not only to the wronged Other that has no place in the archive, but the 'we ' that has an 
unfinished future obscured by its past constitution. In this sense, the silent presence of the 
unliving makes a demand on us to be seen as the unrecognizable remnant of a material 
history of the political community that has been foreclosing and wronging them. Yet the 
foreclosing past can be re-read to uncover the contingency of norms that constitute and 
authorize the archive of the people and form the receptibility conditions of speech-acts; 
contingency is related to possibility, emergency, exigency of a people that can always re-
constitute themselves, with reference to a past that has (never) happened and to a future that 
has (yet) to happen. Thus a wish-to-hear requires semantic futurity in re-interpreting the 
norms of the past that constituted the silent presence that nevertheless speaks by being always 
already there from the start, since the constitutive address of our own law. 
Just as Ranciere argued, "[vjisible forms yield a meaning to be construed or subtract 
it" (2007, 7) in order to arrive at the material presence and the history of rules of speech-acts 
that constituted it. Thus the image has a history, a frame that (un-)familiarizes, forms and 
gives familiar faces to some strangers, while effacing, deforming the image of others. 
Imaginative poetics that reiterates this history as a shared past of the strangers definitely helps 
expand the frame, yet the force of this gesture remains a power of the ethical as the domain of 
a shared life. As a violent force that aims to put an end to the past cycles of violence and 
revenge, the mode of the address finds a hope for a new ethos that can be politicized by the 
central figure of the aporoi that, although foreclosed, always already share the life of the self, 
the 'we, ' and the present. Functioning as a non-normative norm, it too resolves the aporias of 
the people by unjustified speech-acts irresponsive and irresponsible from the present's point 
of view, but it is also felt as the law of the 'here and now' rupturing the violent law of the 
past that dominates the present. In other words, the norm of the ethics of responsiveness is 
mainly futural, re-articulating past norms wrought by violence, inequality, exclusion, 
foreclosure, of deathlike lives as ethical resources for the future community of sense where 
we can sense and respond to an universal strangeness. 
Thus the image asks us to be both imaginative and ethical; "still within the language 
of bequest and imperative... [its] voice says, "Invent a hope for speech" (Ibid., 220), where 
speech is just a historical mode of address that through it unjustified, limited and limiting 
norms of making sense, preclude hearing and responding to otherness constituted in the past, 
by violence. As the demand the image makes on us is to locate the fijture in the past imagined 
to be otherwise, find hope in the hopeless, life in the unliving, the unsayable in the saying of 
the face, this is also a shared past of anyone where the other has always already addressed us 
by an act of speech, i.e., by its silently not-being there, suffering a lack of response to its 
insensible presence. And "there remains the question of what other time might yet be 
possible... [that can] open up a future beyond catastrophe" {Ibid., 221), a time besides the past 
that has always been the present. Another time enters the history of violence when our lives 
are interrupted by the unliving, our temporality disoriented by the silent address of the image. 
Thus the image is a recurring moment of the people in their unidentifiable identity 
taken hostage by their own law, unable to hear and move on for the fear of violence that may 
follow the violence of the past. If temporality is materialized by a mythical law, an address is 
embodied by the 'we,' and a communal space is created by walls of silence what is 
foreclosed from but always within the image speaks from a community that has yet to come, 
once heard and mobilized to form the material conditions of a shared life imagined othemise. 
The voice that is also a face, silenced and effaced, addresses 'an open-ended 'we ' and an 
utterance that extends through time" (Ibid., 222) of the unliveable shared life inherited from 
the past: whereas the 'must' refers to the law of the past, the 'ought' of the response refers to 
a future self, to a democracy to come. It asks us "to live outside the defining threat of death," 
{Ibid., 223), addressing us toward a future community of sense where it will finally be heard. 
Thus the wish-to-hear it is to wish for a shared life imagined to be otherwise. 
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